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## FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING

## EASTERN AFFAIRS.

PART XIV.

CLOSED  
UNTIL

1975

JANUARY TO JUNE 1924.

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# TABLE OF CONTENTS.

No. and Name.	Date.	SUBJECT.	Page.
Chapter I.—MOSUL.			
1 Mr. Henderson No. 547. Tel.	1923 Dec. 31	Turco-Irak frontier. Reports that Turks are in no hurry to begin discussions ...	1
2 Mr. Henderson No. 3. Tel.	1924 Jan. 4	Turco-Irak frontier. Yuseuf Kemal, in conversation, pretended to be ignorant of his Government's intention regarding place and date for negotiations ...	1
3 Mr. Henderson No. 590	1923 Dec. 30	Turco-Irak frontier. Reports that he has informed Adnan Bey that His Majesty's Government will be represented by Sir P. Cox at conversations. Yuseuf Kemal not to be Turkish delegate ...	1
4 Colonial Office	1924 Jan. 5	Assyrian refugees. Transmits copy of Bagdad despatch making proposals for disposal ...	2
5 Mr. Henderson No. 10. Tel.	" 10	Turco-Irak frontier. Reports interview with Adnan Bey, who thought negotiations could not begin until Treaty of Lusanne had been ratified ...	4
6 Mr. Henderson No. 11. Tel.	" 10	Turco-Irak frontier. Considers that Adnan Bey's view, that ratification of treaty by Great Britain must precede negotiations, is shared by Turkish Government ...	4
7 Colonial Office	" 24	Future of Assyria. Transmits copy of telegram to Bagdad regarding ...	4
14 Mr. Henderson No. 60	" 15	Flight of British aeroplanes over Turkish territory. Transmits copy of note to Adnan Bey refuting Turkish allegations ...	5
7a Mr. Henderson No. 43	" 21	Bombardment of Suleimanieh. Transmits copies of correspondence with Adnan Bey concerning ...	5
8 Mr. Henderson No. 71	" 23	Turco-Irak frontier. Reports interview with journalist and subsequent conversations with Adnan Bey regarding date on which negotiations may be deemed to have started ...	7
9 Mr. Henderson No. 75	" 23	Turco-Irak frontier. Refers to statement in "Waki" regarding date on which negotiations may be deemed to have started ...	8
10 Mr. Macdonald to Mr. Henderson No. 18. Tel.	" 26	Turco-Irak frontier. Informs that negotiations are considered as having started on 5th October, 1923 ...	9
11 Yuseuf Kemal Bey	" 26	Alleged infringements of <i>status quo</i> by Irak Government. Protests against ...	9
12 Mr. Henderson No. 82	" 27	Turco-Irak frontier. Expresses view that Turkish Government will dispute contention that negotiations started on 5th October, 1923 ...	10
13 Colonial Office	Feb. 13	Alleged infringements of <i>status quo</i> by Irak Government. Refutes allegations of Turkish representative in London ...	10
14 To Colonial Office	" 16	Turco-Irak frontier. Refers to No. 13. Asks Colonial Office views on personnel, &c., of British delegation to attend forthcoming conference ...	11

# TABLE OF CONTENTS.

iii

No. and Name.	Date.	SUBJECT.	Page.
15 Colonial Office	1924 Feb. 18	Turco-Irak frontier. Transmits copy of despatch from Bagdad urging attendance of representative of Irak Government at conference ...	12
16 To Yuseuf Kemal Bey	" 15	Alleged infringements of <i>status quo</i> by Irak Government. Refutes allegations and expresses view that best means of preventing incidents lies in early settlement of frontier question ...	13
17 Memorandum by Mr. Ridd	" 23	Turco-Irak frontier. Summarises reports on Turkish troop concentration ...	14
18 To Colonial Office	" 25	Turco-Irak frontier. Participation of Iraki representative at conference ...	15
19 To Mr. Lindsay No. 318	" 25	Turco-Irak frontier. Participation of Iraki representative at conference ...	15
20 Mr. Lindsay No. 32. Tel.	" 25	Turco-Irak frontier. Has informed Adnan Bey that His Majesty's Government are considering composition of British delegation ...	16
21 Mr. Lindsay No. 167	" 27	Turco-Irak frontier. Press references to negotiations. Calls attention to rumour that Turks contemplate acquisition of Mosul Vilayet by giving autonomy to Kurds and oil concessions to British ...	16a
22 Colonial Office	Mar. 4	Turco-Irak frontier. Summarises Turkish troop movements ...	16a
23 Mr. Lindsay No. 41. Tel.	" 3	Turco-Irak frontier. Has asked Adnan Bey if Turkish Government would object to participation of Iraki representative at conference ...	17
24 Colonial Office	" 8	Turco-Irak frontier. Turkish posts in French controlled territory. Suggests protest might be made to French Government ...	17
25 Colonial Office	" 10	Situation in Irak. Transmits correspondence with Bagdad concerning ...	19
26 Colonial Office	" 12	Anglo-Irak Treaty. Transmits telegram from Bagdad suggesting that Irak Government might be pressed to accept treaty before frontier negotiations start ...	19
27 Mr. Lindsay No. 52. Tel.	" 11	Turco-Irak frontier. Turkish Government object to participation of Iraki representative at conference ...	20
28 Memorandum by Mr. Osborne	" 13	Conversation with Shevki Pasha. (1) Visit to London of Turkish Military Air Mission; (2) Turco-Irak frontier negotiations; (3) oil concessions in Irak ...	20
29 Foreign Office to Colonial Office	" 14	Turco-Irak frontier. Refers to No. 24. Turkish posts on Syrian territory. Suggests French Government should merely be requested to make enquiries ...	20
30 Colonial Office	" 15	Anglo-Irak Treaty. Summarises correspondence with Bagdad regarding consideration of treaty by Irak Assembly ...	21
31 Foreign Office to Colonial Office	" 18	Turco-Irak frontier. Desirability of making clear to Turks that Irak Government are not fomenting agitation among Kurds on Turkish side of frontier ...	22
32 Foreign Office to Colonial Office	" 20	Anglo-Irak Treaty. Agrees to suggestions contained in No. 30. Instructions to Bagdad ...	23
33 Colonial Office Secret	" 21	Turco-Irak frontier. Transmits copy of Air Ministry's memorandum on strategic aspect of frontier ...	23
34 Colonial Office	" 24	Turco-Irak frontier. Proposes to instruct Bagdad not to hold manoeuvres near frontier ...	23



No. and Name.	Date.	SUBJECT.	Page.
35 Colonial Office	Mar. 23	Anglo-Irak Treaty. Transmits copy of telegram to Baghdad urging speedy acceptance of treaty by Irak Government	28
35a Yusuf Kemal Bey	Apr. 3	Representation of Mosul Vilayet in Irak Assembly. Protests against	29a
36 Mr. MacDonald to Mr. Phipps No. 1106	" 4	Turco-Irak frontier. Instructs Mr. Phipps to make representations regarding Turkish posts in Syrian territory	29
36a Mr. Lindsay No. 284	" 2	Alleged infringement of <i>status quo</i> by Irak Government. Transmits copies of correspondence with Adnan Bey, and suggests subject should be dropped	30a
37 Foreign Office to Air Ministry Secret	" 9	Turco-Irak frontier. Comments on Air Ministry memorandum on strategic aspects of frontier	30
38 War Office Secret	" 16	Turco-Irak frontier. General Staff's observations on strategic aspects of frontier	30
39 Mr. Lindsay No. 75. Tel.	" 17	Turco-Irak frontier. Turkish Government suggest negotiations should begin early in May	31
40 Mr. Hodgson No. 338	" 19	Future of Assyrians. Gives numbers of Assyrian refugees in Russia	32
41 Air Ministry	" 24	Turco-Irak frontier. Gives reasons for disagreeing with Foreign Office regarding strategic requirements of frontier	32
42 Mr. Lindsay No. 83. Tel.	"	Turco-Irak frontier. Composition of Turkish delegation at negotiations	33a
42a Mr. MacDonald to Yusuf Kemal Bey	Apr. 26	Representation of Mosul Vilayet in Irak Assembly. Cannot agree that <i>status quo</i> has been infringed	34a
43 Mr. Lindsay No. 87. Tel.	May 2	Turco-Irak frontier. Has received note from Turkish Government informing him of arrival of Turkish delegation and asking when Sir P. Cox will arrive	34
44 Lord Curzon No. 1005	" 2	Movement of Turkish troops through Syria. Transmits copies of correspondence with French Government regarding apparent disparity between French assurances to His Majesty's Government and French promise to allow Turks to transport war material over Syrian railways. French renew assurances	34
45 Mr. MacDonald to Mr. Lindsay No. 67. Tel.	" 7	Turco-Irak frontier. British delegation will arrive in Constantinople on 16th May	36
46 Mr. MacDonald to Sir P. Cox	" 8	Turco-Irak frontier. Gives instructions for line to be taken at Conference of Constantinople	36
47 Colonial Office	" 9	Future of Assyrians. Irak Government's scheme for settlement of Assyrians	37
48 Colonial Office	" 8	Situation in Irak. Transmits telegram from Baghdad giving account of disturbances at Kirkuk	38
49 Colonial Office	" 16	Turco-Irak frontier. Transmits report of proceedings of interdepartmental conference to consider strategical aspects of frontier	39
50 Mr. Lindsay No. 322	" 12	Turco-Irak frontier. Transmits copies of correspondence with Turkish Government regarding date on which negotiations are to begin and composition of British delegation	41

No. and Name.	Date.	SUBJECT.	Page.
51 Mr. Lindsay No. 99. Tel.	1924 May 20	Turco-Irak frontier. Transmits telegram from Sir P. Cox reporting proceedings of first meeting of conference held on 19th May	42
52 Mr. Lindsay No. 99. Tel.	" 22	Turco-Irak frontier. Transmits telegram from Sir P. Cox. Proceedings on 21st May. Fethi Bey's speech claiming whole Mosul Vilayet for Turkey	43
53 Mr. Lindsay No. 100. Tel.	" 23	Turco-Irak frontier. Transmits telegram from Sir P. Cox reporting conversation with Fethi Bey, pointing out danger of breakdown of negotiations	43
54 Mr. Lindsay No. 459	" 21	Turco-Irak frontier. Anticipates breakdown of negotiations and urges early ratification of Treaty of Lausanne by His Majesty's Government	44
55 Mr. Lindsay No. 101. Tel.	" 25	Turco-Irak frontier. Transmits telegram from Sir P. Cox. Turks refuse to regard British proposal for frontier as basis of negotiations and maintain claim to whole Mosul Vilayet. Negotiations at standstill	45
56 Mr. Lindsay No. 102. Tel.	" 26	Turco-Irak frontier. Transmits telegram from Sir P. Cox proposing to discuss with Turks terms of reference of question to League of Nations	45
57 Mr. Lindsay No. 104. Tel.	" 28	Turco-Irak frontier. Transmits telegram from Sir P. Cox calling attention to fact that article 8 (2) of Treaty of Lausanne does not stipulate that decision of League shall be binding on both parties	46
58 Colonial Office	" 29	Future of Assyrians. Transmits copies of correspondence with Baghdad giving detailed proposals for settlement of Assyrians accepted by Irak Assembly	46
59 Mr. Lindsay No. 103. Tel.	" 22	Turco-Irak frontier. Transmits telegram from Sir P. Cox regarding unsatisfactory of representatives of Turkish Petroleum Company visiting Constantinople at present time	48
60 Mr. Lindsay No. 106. Tel.	" 30	Arming of discharged Assyrian levies. Adnan Bey has protested against. Asks what reply should be sent	49
61 Mr. MacDonald to Mr. Lindsay No. 89. Tel.	" 31	Turco-Irak frontier. Telegram for Sir P. Cox. Turks to be informed that His Majesty's Government cannot accept Turkish claim to whole Mosul Vilayet as basis for negotiations. Instructs Sir P. Cox to discuss terms of reference of question to League	49
61a Turkish Chargé d'Affaires	June 3	Representation of Mosul Vilayet in Irak Assembly. Requests protest against attendance of Mosul Deputies in Irak Assembly, which Turkish Government regard as infringement of <i>status quo</i>	49a
62 Mr. MacDonald to Mr. Lindsay No. 82. Tel.	" 3	Turco-Irak frontier. Refers to No. 37. Points out that League's decision under article 8 (2) of Treaty of Lausanne would be binding on both parties without specific mention of fact in the article	50
63 Mr. Lindsay No. 108. Tel.	" 3	Turco-Irak frontier. Refers to No. 61. Sir P. Cox has addressed note on these lines to Turkish delegation, who have referred for instructions to Ankara	50
64 Mr. MacDonald to Mr. Lindsay No. 83. Tel.	" 4	Turco-Irak frontier. Transmits instructions for Sir P. Cox in event of breakdown of negotiations	50
65 Mr. Henderson No. 110. Tel.	" 6	Turco-Irak frontier. Transmits telegram from Sir P. Cox. Turkish delegation have no fresh proposal to put forward, and are unable to discuss terms of reference of question to League	51



No. and Name.	Date.	SUBJECT.	Page.
66 Mr. Henderson No. 111. Tel.	1924 June 6	Turco-Irak frontier. Transmits telegram from Sir P. Cox reporting final meeting of conference and signature of <i>protocoles</i> ... ..	61
67 Mr. Henderson No. 112. Tel.	" 9	Turco-Irak frontier. British delegation leave Constantinople on 9th June ... ..	62
68 Sir P. Cox ...	" 11	Turco-Irak frontier. Minutes of meetings of the conference at Constantinople ... ..	63
69 Mr. Henderson No. 475	" 11	Turco-Irak frontier. Describes general political setting in which question presents itself at Constantinople ...	72
70 Parliamentary Question	" 16	Turco-Irak frontier. Questions by Lieutenant-Commander Kenworthy and Viscount Curzon answered by the Prime Minister. Breakdown of conference and reference to League ... ..	75
71 Mr. MacDonald to Mr. Henderson No. 88. Tel.	" 17	Turco-Irak frontier. Failing agreement by 5th July, 1924, date on which nine months contemplated by article 3 of Treaty of Lausanne expire, His Majesty's Government will refer to the League. Turkish Government to be informed ... ..	75
71a Mr. Henderson No. 116. Tel.	" 18	Turco-Irak frontier. Transmits for approval text of proposed communication to Turkish Government ...	76a
72 Mr. MacDonald to Mr. Henderson No. 90. Tel.	" 21	Turco-Irak frontier. Refers to No. 71a. Approves proposed note with instructions to report attitude of Turks regarding date of expiry of nine months ...	76
72a Colonial Office ...	" 24	Turco-Irak frontier. Transmits telegram from Bagdad enquiring when frontier question will be considered by League ... ..	76a
73 Mr. Henderson No. 803	" 24	Turco-Irak frontier. Reports conversation with Adnan Bey concerning reference to League ... ..	76
74 Mr. MacDonald to Mr. Henderson No. 744	" 30	Turco-Irak frontier. Instructs as to line to be taken with Turks ... ..	77
74a Turkish Diplomatic Mission	" 30	Alleged flight of British aeroplane over Turkish territory. Protests against ... ..	77a

## Chapter II.—ARABIA.

75 Consul Bullard No. 100	1923 Dec. 18	Jeddah pilgrimage report. Transmits for 1923 ... ..	78
76 Consul Bullard No. 103	Dec. 31	Jeddah report. Transmits for period 30th November to 31st December, 1923 ... ..	96
77 Foreign Office to Consul Bullard No. 7	1924 Jan. 17	Unsatisfactory conditions in Hedjaz. Calls attention to, with special reference to the pilgrimage. Instructs to address protest to Hashimite Government ... ..	90
78 Mr. Clark Kerr No. 32. Secret	" 13	Sheikh Mohamed-el-Arabi. Reports interview with by Oriental secretary. Requests instructions regarding Arabian chiefs' request for British help against King Hussein and Sultan of Nejd ... ..	100
79 Mr. MacDonald to Lord Allenby No. 78. Secret	" 24	Sheikh Mohamed-el-Arabi. Informs that sheikh's expressions of friendly sentiments have been noted, but no British help can be promised him ... ..	102

No. and Name	Date.	SUBJECT.	Page.
80 Consul Bullard No. 2	1924 Jan. 8	Seizure by Hashimite Government of property of alleged Turkish nationals. Reports reasons for confiscation of Ahmed Fahur's property and requests further instructions ... ..	102
81 Foreign Office to Consul Bullard No. 22	Feb. 2	Seizure by Hashimite Government of property of alleged Turkish nationals. Instructs to make representations to King Hussein ... ..	102
82 Consul Bullard No. 9. Secret	Jan. 29	Jeddah report. Transmits for period 1st to 20th January ... ..	103
83 Foreign Office to Consul Bullard No. 32	Feb. 26	Slave traffic in Hedjaz. Instructs to protest to King Hussein against his continuance in ... ..	107
84 Colonial Office ...	" 28	Anglo-Hashimite Treaty. Unsatisfactory conduct of Dr. Naji. Suggests transfer of negotiations from London to Jeddah ... ..	107
85 Lord Crews ...	" 28	Slave traffic in the Hedjaz. Transmits copy of note to French Government suggesting French co-operation in measures to suppress ... ..	108
86 Mr. Lindsay ...	Mar. 1	Pilgrimage to Mecca. Transmits copy of notice published in Turkish press warning intending pilgrims not to go to Hedjaz ... ..	109
87 Colonial Office ...	" 8	Anglo-Hashimite Treaty. Considers that Mr. Bullard should continue negotiations at Jeddah rather than that His Majesty's Government should treat with Dr. Naji in London ... ..	109
88 Foreign Office to Colonial Office	" 17	Anglo-Hashimite Treaty. Considers it immaterial whether negotiations take place in London. Suggests Sir H. Samuel should discourage despatch of special Arab mission to London ... ..	109
89 Consul Bullard No. 19. Secret	Feb. 22	Jeddah report. Transmits for period 30th January to 29th February ... ..	110
90 Lord Allenby No. 213	Mar. 29	Proposed visit to Hussein of Ibrahim from Egypt. Transmits copy of a despatch to Allenby reporting interview with Sayyid Mahmud-el-Shereef ... ..	115
91 Consul Bullard No. 27	" 19	Slave traffic in Hedjaz. Reports recent correspondence with King Hussein concerning, and enquires whether protest should be against existence of slavery in Hedjaz or against importation of slaves ... ..	116
92 Consul Bullard No. 29. Secret	" 29	Jeddah report. Transmits for period 1st to 20th March ... ..	120
93 Consul Bullard No. 35	Apr. 10	King Hussein and the Caliphate. Reports King's actions on assumption of title of Caliph ... ..	124
94 Consul Bullard No. 43. Secret	" 30	Jeddah report. Transmits for period 20th March to 30th April ... ..	126
95 Consul Bullard No. 60	May 21	Slave traffic in Hedjaz. Reports that British Indians keep slaves. Making further enquiries ... ..	133
96 Mr. MacDonald to Lord Crews, No. 1909 Sir H. Graham No. 524 Mr. Seymour No. 283	June 11	Slave traffic in Hedjaz. Transmits copies of Nos. 82, 83, 99 and 97. French, Italian and Dutch Governments to be invited to co-operate with His Majesty's Government in measures to suppress ... ..	133



No. and Name.	Date.	SUBJECT.	Page.
97 Foreign Office to Consul Hullard No. 112	1924 June 11	Slave traffic in Hedjaz. Gives lines on which protest should be addressed to King Hussein. Informs that French, Italian and Dutch Governments have been invited to co-operate	134
98 Consul Hullard No. 58. Secret	May 29	Jeddah report. Transmits for period 1st to 24th May	135

## Chapter III.—PALESTINE.

98a Italian Ambassador to Mr. Oliphant	1924 Feb. 8	Mandate. Recapitulates observations of Italian Government on British memorandum of 25th October, 1923	140a
99 Colonial Office	" 12	Latin Patriarchate at Jerusalem. Transmits despatch from Jerusalem reporting disputes between Mgr. Barlassina, the Patriarch, and population of Bethlehem	140
100 Colonial Office	" 25	Situation in Transjordan. Transmits correspondence with Jerusalem regarding resumption of negotiations with Emir Abdullah after departure of King Hussein from Transjordan	142
101 Sir O. Russell No. 22	" 19	Vatican and Palestine. Reports activities of Vatican in regard to Palestine. Catholic pilgrimage to Holy Land, &c.	148
102 Sir O. Russell No. 30	Mar. 6	Liturgical honours to French representative in Palestine. Reports conversation with and transmits note addressed to Cardinal Gasparri regarding withdrawal of liturgical honours	149
103 Sir O. Russell No. 31	" 7	Vatican and Palestine. Reports conversation with Cardinal O'Connell on his return from pilgrimage to Holy Land, and transmits copy of Cardinal's declaration to press	150
104 Sir O. Russell No. 33	" 10	Vatican and Palestine. Reports further conversation with Cardinal O'Connell	151
105 Sir O. Russell No. 45	Apr. 3	Liturgical honours to French representative in Palestine. Cardinal Dubois is organising petition for continuance of, supported by French Ambassador to Vatican	152
106 Sir O. Russell No. 50	" 15	Liturgical honours for French representative in Palestine. Cardinal Gasparri states that honours will be discontinued. Forwards copy of French Ambassador's proposals for revised privileges to be accorded to French representative in Palestine	153
107 Sir O. Russell No. 52	" 18	Cardinal Giorgi's visit to Palestine. Will take place during May	155
108 Mr. Kellogg	" 16	American consular jurisdiction in Palestine. Calls attention to trial of United States citizen by Palestinian court. United States Government ready to negotiate convention to regulate position and recognise British mandate	154
109 Mr. Dormer No. 60	" 30	Cardinal Giorgi's visit to Palestine. Gives substance of conversation with Cardinal Giorgi concerning	154
110 Mr. Kellogg	" 30	American recognition of Palestine mandate. United States Government agrees that convention is desirable, and submit that convention should follow lines of Franco-American convention concerning Syrian mandate	155

No. and Name.	Date.	SUBJECT.	Page.
111 Mr. Dormer No. 64	1923 May 6	Celebration of King's Birthday in Jerusalem. Reports conversation with Cardinal Gasparri, who is anxious to avoid recurrence of unpleasant incidents similar to those which took place in 1922	157
112 Mr. Dormer No. 65	" 6	Cardinal Giorgi's visit to Palestine. Report discussions of in Italian press	157
113 Mr. MacDonald to Mr. Kellogg	" 12	American consular jurisdiction in Palestine. Refers to No. 108. American citizen has been released. Agrees as to desirability of early conclusion of convention	158
114 Mr. MacDonald to Sir O. Russell No. 5. Tel.	" 19	Liturgical honours for French representative in Palestine. His Majesty's Government cannot agree to French proposals for revised privileges in place of abolished liturgical honours	158
115 Sir O. Russell No. 73	" 27	Liturgical honours for French representative in Palestine. Has informed Cardinal Gasparri that His Majesty's Government cannot agree to French proposals	159
115a Colonial Office	June 5	Religious property of late Russian Government or Russian Palestine Company. Transmits draft Order in Council, for concurrence, respecting	160a
116 Sir O. Russell No. 90	" 30	Liturgical honours for French representative in Palestine. Vatican contemplate acquiescence in two of French proposals	160

## Chapter IV.—SYRIA.

117 Acting Consul Vaughan-Russell No. 132. Secret	1923 Dec. 5	Situation in Syria. Appointment of Kadur Bey as kaimakam in North-East Syria. General situation in Eastern Syria	171
118 Acting Consul Vaughan-Russell No. 136. Secret	" 12	Visit to Jerablus and Carchemish. Rebuilding of Jerablus bridge. Railway developments in Northern Syria	173
119 Acting Consul-General Secret No. 185. Secret	" 15	Situation in Syria. Franco-Turkish relations. Forthcoming elections in Syria. Observations on French administration	174
120 Acting Consul-General Smart No. 167	" 17	Situation in Syria. Deprecates interference or protest against French administration of North-East Syria referred to in No. 117	175
121 Acting Consul-General Smart No. 1. Tel.	1924 Jan. 9	Consular jurisdiction in Syria. Consular courts will not be abolished until 1st February, 1924	176
122 Foreign Office to Acting Consul Vaughan-Russell No. 5	" 11	Hashim Pasha. Instructions as to note to be addressed to French High Commissioner concerning	176
123 Foreign Office to Acting Consul Vaughan-Russell No. 5	" 11	Situation in Syria. Refers to No. 117. Developments in North-East Syria to be fully reported	176
124 Foreign Office to Acting Consul-General Smart No. 3. Tel.	" 12	Consular jurisdiction in Syria. Notice to be published in "London Gazette" providing for continuance of consular courts in Syria until 1st February	177



No. and Name.	Date.	SUBJECT.	Page.
125 Consul-General Satow No. 2. Tel.	1924 Jan. 26	Consular jurisdiction in Syria. French courts will only begin to function on 3rd March. New notice in "London Gazette" required ... ..	177
126 Foreign Office to Consul-General Satow No. 4. Tel.	" 28	Consular jurisdiction in Syria. Consular courts will be continued until 3rd March, and notice published in "London Gazette" ... ..	177
127 Acting Consul Vaughan-Russell No. 145	1923 Dec. 27	Situation in Syria. Attack elections. Future of Aleppo and Alexandretta ... ..	177
128 Acting Consul Vaughan-Russell No. 146. Secret	" 28	Situation in Syria. Elections in Sanjak of Alexandretta, and resulting situation ... ..	180
129 Acting Consul Vaughan-Russell No. 4	1924 Jan. 4	Baghdad railway. Jerusalem bridge. Work on line to Nablus ... ..	181
130 Acting Consul-General Smart No. 17	Feb. 2	Syrian customs tariff. Rates to be raised from 11 per cent. to 15 per cent. ... ..	182
131 Acting Consul-General Smart No. 18	Jan. 28	Baghdad railway. Transmits extract from M. Hekimian's report on conditions on railway ... ..	183
132 Colonial Office	Feb. 28	Hashim Pasha. Iraq Government do not wish Hashim Pasha and Anisah tribe to migrate into Iraq ... ..	184
133 Colonial Office	" 29	Syrian customs tariff. Transmits telegram from Baghdad regarding Syrian agitation against duties on goods entering Syria from Iraq. French attitude towards Sherifian Princes ... ..	184
134 Foreign Office to Acting Consul Vaughan-Russell No. 28	Mar. 4	Hashim Pasha. Transmits copy of No. 132. Hashim Pasha to be informed that Iraq Government cannot agree to migration of Anisah tribe, except with French concurrence ... ..	185
135 Acting Consul Vaughan-Russell No. 30. Secret	Feb. 17	Situation in Syria. Autonomy of Sanjak of Alexandretta may be due to possibility of its cession to Turkey under secret clause of Franklin-Bouillon Angora Agreement ... ..	185
136 Acting Consul Vaughan-Russell No. 33	" 19	Baghdad railway. Reports progress of work on in Syria ... ..	186
137 Consul Smart No. 55	Mar. 12	Syria-Iraq Customs Convention. Gives observations on advisability of concluding. French attitude towards Sherifian Princes ... ..	187
138 Consul Smart No. 56	" 13	Najd agency at Damascus. French relations with Transjordan and Najd. Desirability of Mr. Smart controlling protection of Najd interests in Damascus ... ..	188
139 Consul-General Satow No. 30. Very Conf.	" 12	Syria-Iraq Customs Convention. Gives observations on advisability of concluding. French attitude to Sherifian Princes ... ..	189
140 Consul Smart No. 58	Apr. 10	French and Transjordan. French attitude to King Hussein's visit to Amman. King Hussein's intrigues in Syria ... ..	190
141 Consul-General Satow No. 81	" 15	French courts in Lebanon. Transmits copy of decree concerning ... ..	191

No. and Name.	Date.	SUBJECT.	Page.
142 Consul Hough No. 73. Cypher	1924 Apr. 30	Situation in Syria. Syrian discontent at French administration. French attitude to Sherifian Princes ... ..	193
143 Consul Smart No. 95	June 16	Situation in Syria. Flight of Druze notables. Discontent at French administration of Jabal Druze ... ..	193

## Chapter V.—GENERAL.

144 Sir O. Russell No. 7	1924 Jan. 9	French privileges in ex-Ottoman countries. Reports conversation with Cardinal Gasparri concerning French pretensions to continuance of privileges ... ..	195
145 Foreign Office to Colonial Office	" 30	Spelling of Oriental names. "Mahomet," "Mahometan," "Moslem," "Islam," "Caliph," and "Caliphate" ... ..	195
146 Secretary-General League of Nations	June 3	Iraq mandate. Consideration of by Council of League ... ..	196
147 Consul London No. 23. Tel.	" 13	Iraq mandate. Lord Parmoor requests instructions when council consider draft instrument to replace mandate on 17th June ... ..	198
148 Foreign Office to Consul London No. 35. Tel.	" 15	Iraq mandate. Transmits instructions for Lord Parmoor ... ..	198
149 Colonial Office	" 14	Iraq mandate. Constituent Assembly at Baghdad have approved Anglo-Iraq Treaty. Submits draft statement to be made by Lord Parmoor to Council of League ... ..	199
150 Foreign Office to Colonial Office	" 16	Iraq mandate. Instructions to be sent to Sir H. Dobbs regarding ratification of Anglo-Iraq Treaty. Lord Parmoor will make statement to Council of League ... ..	202
151 Extract from Minutes of meeting of Council of League	" 17	Iraq mandate. Lord Parmoor's statement and suggestion that council should consider Anglo-Iraq Treaty at their next meeting ... ..	203



## SUBJECT INDEX.

[The figures denote the serial numbers of documents.]

- AIRPLANES, ALLEGED FLIGHT OF BRITISH OVER  
 TURKISH TERRITORY.—8, 74.  
 AIR MISSION, TURKISH, VISIT TO LONDON.—28.  
 AMERICAN CONSULAR JURISDICTION IN PALESTINE.  
 —108, 113.  
 AMERICAN RECOGNITION OF PALESTINE MANDATE.—  
 110.  
 ANGLO-HASHIMITE TREATY.—84, 87, 88.  
 ANGLO-IRAK TREATY.—25, 30, 32, 33, 146, 147,  
 148, 149, 150, 151.  
 ASSYRIAN REFUGEES, FUTURE OF.—4, 7, 40, 47,  
 58.  
 ASSYRIAN LEVIES, ARMS OF DISCHARGE.—60.  
 BAGDAD RAILWAY.—118, 120, 131, 139.  
 CALIPHATE, KING HUSSEIN AND.—53.  
 CALIPHATE.—118.  
 CONSULAR JURISDICTION IN SYRIA.—121, 124, 125,  
 126.  
 FRENCH PRIVILEGES IN EX-OTTOMAN COUNTRIES.—  
 102, 105, 106, 114, 115, 116, 141.  
 GEORGE, CARDINAL, VISIT OF TO PALESTINE.—107,  
 108, 112.  
 HASHEM PASHA AND ANIKAN TRIBE.—122, 132, 134.  
 HEDJAZ, SITUATION IN.—77.  
 HEDJAZ, TURKISH PROPERTY SEIZED IN.—81.  
 HUSSEIN, KING, AND CALIPHATE.—63.  
 HUSSEIN, KING, ATTITUDE OF FRENCH TOWARDS.—  
 138, 139, 140, 140.  
 IJERSE, PROPOSED VISIT TO HEDJAZ.—53.  
 IRAK MANDATE.—146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151.  
 IRAK, SITUATION IN.—25, 48.  
 JERUSALEM, SITUATION IN.—143.  
 JERUSALEM SITUATION REPORTS.—76, 82, 89, 92, 94,  
 98.  
 JERUSALEM READER.—118, 120.  
 KING'S BIRTHDAY, CELEBRATION OF IN JERUSALEM.  
 —111.  
 LATIN PATRIARCHATE AT JERUSALEM.—90.  
 LIBANON, FRENCH COURTS IN.—141.  
 LITURGICAL HONOURS TO FRENCH REPRESENTATIVE  
 IN PALESTINE.—102, 105, 106, 114, 115, 116.  
 MOHAMMED-EL-AHAB, SHEIKH.—78, 79.  
 MOSUL VILAYET, REPRESENTATION OF IN IRAK  
 ASSEMBLY.—532, 414, 614.  
 NEJD, REPRESENTATION OF AT DAMASCUS.—138.  
 OIL CONCERNINGS IN IRAK.—21, 28, 30.  
 ORIENTAL NAMES, SPELLING OF.—145.  
 PILGRIMAGE IN HEDJAZ.—75, 86.  
 SLAVE TRAFFIC IN HEDJAZ.—88, 89, 91, 96, 98, 97.  
 "STATUS QUO" IN IRAK, ALLIED INTERESTMENT  
 OF.—12, 14, 17, 35A.  
 SULAIMANIEH, BOMBARDMENT OF.—54.  
 SYRIA, SITUATION IN.—117, 119, 120, 123, 127,  
 128, 135, 142, 143.  
 SYRIA, MOVEMENT OF TURKISH TROOPS THROUGH.—  
 44.  
 SYRIAN CUSTOMS TARIFF.—130, 139, 137, 139.  
 SYRO-IRAK CUSTOMS CONVENTION.—137, 139.  
 TRANSJORDAN, SITUATION IN.—100.  
 TRANSJORDAN, KING HUSSEIN'S VISIT TO.—133,  
 139, 140, 140.  
 TURCO-IRAK FRONTIER.—1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 9, 10, 11, 12,  
 15, 16, 18, 18A, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 27,  
 28, 29, 31, 33, 34, 36, 37, 38, 39, 41, 42,  
 43, 45, 46, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56,  
 57, 59, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69,  
 70, 71, 71A, 72, 72A, 73, 74, 149, 150.  
 VATICAN AND PALESTINE.—101, 103, 104.

## CONFIDENTIAL

## Further Correspondence respecting Eastern Affairs.

## PART XIV.

## CHAPTER I.—MOSUL.

[E 7/7/65]

No. 1.

*Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received January 1, 1924.)*

(No. 547.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Constantinople, December 31, 1923.

YOUR telegram No. 351 of 27th December.

I informed Adnan accordingly on 29th December. He said he would notify Angora. Though he could give me no indication of views of his Government, impression he conveyed was that they were in no hurry to begin discussions.

Press, however, announces this morning that Yussuf Kemal Bey is leaving Angora to-morrow for Constantinople and London. Adnan informs me that though he has no official news report is probably correct and that once in Constantinople Yussuf Kemal will probably leave immediately for London.

[E 124/7/65]

No. 2.

*Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received January 4.)*

(No. 3.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Constantinople, January 4, 1924.

MY telegram No. 1 of 4th January.

Though communication which I had made to Adnan on 29th December must have reached Angora two days before his departure, Yussuf Kemal proposed to me to-day to be ignorant of views of his Government in regard to Turkish representative and locality for Mosul discussions. He urged, however, the advantages from Turkish point of view of Constantinople and said that there was no truth in press report that he had himself been instructed to conduct negotiations.

[E 173/7/65]

No. 3.

*Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received January 7, 1924.)*

(No. 800.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, December 30, 1923.

I HAVE the honour to acquaint your Lordship that I called on Dr. Adnan Bey yesterday in order to inform him, in accordance with the instructions in your Lordship's telegram No. 351, of Sir Percy Cox's appointment to represent His Majesty's Government in the verbal discussions respecting the frontier between Irak and Turkey, of His Majesty's Government's desire to begin these discussions as soon



as possible, and their preference for London as the site therefor. On Adnan Bey's observing that his Government had already expressed its preference for Constantinople, and that, therefore, an agreement would first have to be reached on this point, I added that His Majesty's Government, while always regarding London as the more convenient locality, were prepared to waive their objections to Constantinople in the event of the Turkish Government proving unable to modify its standpoint in this respect.

2. Adnan took note and said that he would at once inform Angora, but that he could give me no indication as to the views of his Government. On my remarking that the local press had mentioned Yussuf Kemal Bey's name as likely to be the Turkish negotiator, he stated very categorically that there was no truth in this report, as no decision had been come to on the subject; that he knew this for a fact, as Ismet Pasha's "chef de cabinet" was in Constantinople, and had told him so that very morning.

3. I asked Adnan, in this connection, when Yussuf Kemal was likely to leave for his post. Adnan said that he had asked Ismet Pasha for information on this point after my conversation with him, as reported in my telegram No. 538 of the 19th instant, and the latter had replied: "In a few days," an expression which, Adnan was careful to explain, was very vague and might mean several weeks. He then proceeded to estimate the period which had already elapsed since the Mosul negotiations were initiated. We agreed that it was nearly three months. His remarks in this connection were of interest as clearly indicating that the Turkish Government had no thought of contesting their commencement from the 5th October, the date of my first communication to him on the subject.

4. He added, however, somewhat pointedly, that, since six months remained to run there was no great urgency, and that the verbal negotiations might well wait for another couple of months before commencing. I contested this point of view very strenuously, chiefly in view of article 7 of the Evacuation Protocol and on the ground that outstanding questions, being always obstacles to the due resumption of normal relations, the sooner they were settled the better.

5. Adnan Bey professed to be in agreement personally with this view, but having regard to his previous observations and to the fact that he had seen Ismet Pasha's "chef de cabinet" earlier in the day, and had, as he said, discussed Mosul with him, I am inclined to fear that the Turks are indeed in no hurry to begin. Though Adnan did not revert to their previously expressed desire to await the ratification of the treaty by Great Britain—a theory which it would similarly have been easy, on the basis of article 7 of the Evacuation Protocol, emphatically to contest—it is highly probable that, under the, doubtless erroneous, impression that they will have an easier task with a Labour Government, the Turks see advantage for themselves in retarding rather than accelerating the commencement of discussions.

6. The Turkish Government will not find it easy, out of its available Nationalist elements, to select a representative of the calibre and status of Sir Percy Cox. Yussuf Kemal Bey would meet requirements in this sense, and for that reason it is still possible that Ismet Pasha's Cabinet will agree to London as the more convenient place for the discussions to take place.

I have, &c.  
NEVILLE HENDERSON.

[E 152/88/65]

No. 4.

Colonial Office to Foreign Office.—(Received January 7.)

Sir,

Downing Street, January 5, 1924.

I AM directed by the Duke of Devonshire to refer to the letter from this Department of the 24th December enclosing a copy of a secret despatch from the High Commissioner for Irak regarding the disposal of the Assyrian refugees, and to transmit to you herewith, to be laid before the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, a copy of a note on the subject prepared by the Special Service Officer, Bagdad.

2. Copies have also been sent to the Treasury, the War Office and the Air Ministry.

I am, &c.  
J. E. SHUCKBURGH.

Enclosure in No. 4.

*Note on Assyrian Refugees.*

RECENT enquiries go to show that influences are at work trying to exploit the somewhat natural discontent among the Assyrians. A fact of some gravity, as such might in time undermine the loyalty and efficiency of the levy units. It is, however, understood that no such effect has, as yet, been produced.

2. Quite recently Assyrian chiefs from the hill country arrived in Mosul, and the anxieties of the Mosul Vilayet as far as Shergat being handed back to the Turks, based on rumours both of town and district, were under discussion. This anxiety is reflected in high Assyrian quarters, where there is now a distinct feeling that they can no longer trust the British, and that the latter are quite capable of being willing to hand back the Assyrian country, if not the whole Mosul Vilayet, to the Turks, while continuing to deny any such intention.

3. The local position is, of course, aggravated by the Arab Assyrian feeling, which goes so far as to say that the Assyrians, assisted by the levies, are planning to seize the Mosul Vilayet for themselves.

4. There seems little doubt that both these rumours are the result, to some extent at least, of French propaganda, and that the Bolsheviks, ready as always to exploit any existing discontent, are also taking a hand.

It has been openly stated in a responsible Assyrian quarter that the French have strongly invited the nation, including the levies, to emigrate bag and baggage to their mandatory area. This would, of course, fit in with their scheme for an Assyro-Chaldean State, with which they are always playing, strongly supported by the Church.

The recent arrival of Captain Ducecq at Beirut, who was interested in this project, and in Agha Petros in Paris should not be forgotten. One or two small French indiscretions have also made it quite clear that the military value of the levies and the route to Mosul are of very live interest to them. Furthermore, reports from Mosul state that propaganda is at work among the Assyrians there, and the same is independently reported as regards the Assyrian camp at Bagdad. The inference behind being the same. (Further enquiries have been instituted in the latter connection.)

5. It is also known that the Persian consul in Mosul, who has held appointments in Bolshevik Russia, and who has a Russian wife, and is in correspondence with the Bolshevik Minister at Tehran, has been active in trying to induce Assyrians in Mosul to return to Urumia or to Russia, promising them assistance from the Bolshevik consulate at Kermanshah.

It has also been reported that Bolshevik agents are working among the Assyrians in Bagdad, though no details are at present available.

6. The cause and effects of this propaganda work and the relations between the Assyrians and the Irak Government require very carefully watching, and emphasis is laid on the necessity of taking a strong line as regards the retention in Irak of as much as possible of the Assyrian country. Once this question of the boundary is settled and they are reassured, it will be the time to determine a definite scheme in concert with the Irak Government for the continued conditions of service of the levies and the settling of the remainder of the nation; such a definite scheme would go far to dispel fears and counteract propaganda.

Granting of land to the remainder of the nation must, however, accompany any scheme for the levies, and it must not be forgotten that if we lose the hill country we shall lose some of the best military material. The loss of the military material of this nation to Irak would be irreplaceable, either in quality or, at any rate until conscription is introduced, in numbers.

Bagdad, December 12, 1923.

W. D., Colonel,  
Air Staff Intelligence.



[E 354/7/65]

No. 5.

*Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received January 11.)*

(No. 10.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Constantinople, January 10, 1924.

MY despatch No. 890 of 30th December.

Adnan informed me to-day that he had received reply from his Government maintaining preference for Constantinople as the place where Mosul negotiations should take place.

He said that Ismet Pasha's telegram did not refer to choice of Turkish representative nor to commencement of negotiations, but expressed the opinion as a personal view that ratification of treaty by Great Britain must be awaited. He added that delay in ratification by Powers was getting on Turkish nerves, and argued that until their apprehensions in this respect were allayed it was inexpedient to initiate Mosul discussions.

[E 355/7/65]

No. 6.

*Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received January 11.)*

(No. 11.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, January 10, 1924.

MY immediately preceding telegram.

Adnan's so-called personal view is undoubtedly that of Turkish Government.

[E 687/88/65]

No. 7.

*Secretary of State for the Colonies to the High Commissioner for Irak.—  
(Communicated to Foreign Office, January 21.)*

(No. 35.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Downing Street, January 19, 1924.

QUESTION of Assyrians.

1. I concur in suggestion that we should encourage remainder of Persian Assyrians to return to Persia. His Majesty's Minister at Tehran is being consulted by Foreign Office both as to suggested appointment of British vice-consul at Urumia and as to school difficulty mentioned in your despatch. On receipt of Minister's reply I will address further communication to you.

2. His Majesty's Government propose at forthcoming frontier negotiations to press in any case, as regards Assyrian area, for the "extreme limit" frontier proposed in your secret despatch of the 18th October. This is with a view to making provision for all Assyrian communities, with the exception of those referred to in 1 above, on lines recommended by you. It is recognised by His Majesty's Government that direct settlement with Turkish Government will almost certainly be prevented by this demand, and that reference to the League of Nations will consequently be required. Our case before the League would be greatly strengthened if it could be shown that sufficient territory would be available within proposed frontier for ultimate settlement of all Assyrians, including communities scattered outside Irak at present. His Majesty's Government would be glad to be informed for this purpose—

(a.) Approximate number of scattered Assyrians likely, if desired frontier is obtained, to return eventually to Irak.

(b.) Precise locality and total area of land in Irak available for their settlement, and whether this area is adequate in your opinion.

3. It would not be possible for any section of Assyrian community to be supplied with arms by His Majesty's Government. If settlements of Assyrians in Irak are to be armed, it must be done as part of its organised system of defence by Irak Government. In no circumstances can there be any question of Assyrians outside whatever frontier may be eventually decided being supplied with arms by either the Government of Irak or His Majesty's Government.

4. Would it not be possible to mitigate present unhealthiness of Dohuk area, in which it is proposed that Assyrians should be settled, by relatively inexpensive measures against malaria? Please ascertain to what extent Irak Government would be prepared to assist in such measures. As preliminary step I suggest that expert to examine local conditions and submit recommendations to Irak Government might be sent out from the School of Tropical Medicine in England. Such mission unlikely to cost more than 1,000L, which might be regarded as money well invested by Irak Government.

5. Irak Government should be pressed by you to agree in principle to settlement of Assyrians on lines indicated above under loose Irak control and to provision of enough land for accommodation, if and when they come, of further returning Assyrians. It should be represented to them—

(a.) That from diplomatic standpoint best and perhaps only prospect of securing strategically defensible and really satisfactory frontier for Irak is afforded by this.

(b.) That Irak would secure excellent military material for defence of northern frontier by settlement of Assyrians.

(c.) That there is risk, if the Assyrians are not satisfied with their treatment by Irak, of their being tempted to throw in their lot with the French or the Turks.

(d.) That we expect Irak Government on general grounds to give us assistance in doing what we can for a people to whom we are under obligations for services rendered during the war.

This refers to your secret despatch of the 13th December.

[E 840/7/65]

No. 7A.

*Mr. Henderson to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received January 28.)*

(No. 60.)

HIS Majesty's representative at Constantinople presents his compliments to His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of the communication which has been made to-day to Dr. Adnan Bey respecting the alleged violation of Turkish territory by British aeroplanes.

Constantinople, January 18, 1924.

Enclosure in No. 7A.

*Mr. Henderson to Adnan Bey.*

M. le Représentant,

Constantinople, le 18 janvier 1924.

PAR votre note en date du 24 décembre, votre Excellence a attiré mon attention sur certains renseignements reçus par le Ministère de l'Intérieur, selon lesquels quatre avions britanniques auraient survolé les villages de Mavan, Bask et Channan, en date du 5 décembre dernier.

2. Je n'ai pas manqué de m'en référer au principal Secrétaire d'Etat pour les Affaires étrangères ainsi qu'au Haut-Commissaire de Sa Majesté britannique à Bagdad à ce sujet. Sir Henry Dobbs m'assure que ces renseignements sont inexacts, vu qu'en date du 5 décembre aucun avion britannique ne se trouvait ni au nord de la ligne Mossoul-Arbel ni du côté de Rowanduz.

3. Par contre les autorités de l'Irak se voient obligées de leur côté de se plaindre des procédés d'Ismail Hakki Bey, Commandant turc à Nisibin. Ces autorités, en effet, sont entrées en possession de lettres adressées par ce commandant aux chefs de Sindjar où se trouvent les phrases suivantes :

"Le Gouvernement britannique nous a offert Mossoul et nous viendrons en peu de temps à Sindjar. Nous punirons tous ceux qui favorisent les Anglais. Le vilayet de Mossoul est le nôtre."



4. En priant votre Excellence de porter ce qui précède à la connaissance de son Excellence le Général Ismet Pacha, je suis chargé par mon Gouvernement de protester de la manière la plus formelle et la plus énergique contre toute continuation, dans le territoire de l'Irak, de procédés pareils, qui constituent, du reste, une violation évidente de l'esprit du l'article 3 du Traité de Lausanne, ainsi que de l'article 3 du protocole relatif à l'évacuation.

Veuillez agréer, &c.  
NEVILLE HENDERSON

JE 841 7 65

N. 76

Mr Henderson to Mr MacDonald. (Received January 28)

(No 61)

My Lord,

Constantinople, January 21, 1924

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 1193 of the 4th December, I have the honour to transmit herewith a copy of the note which I addressed to the delegation of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in reply to their protest against the bombardment of Souleimanieh by British aeroplanes.

Your note from Adnan Bey on this subject, a copy of which I have also received, and your Lordship will observe that the Turkish Government contended that the whole of the Mosul Vilayet is under the administration of the British and also that the status quo has not been maintained.

3. While the disclosure of the facts reported in Sir H. Isaksen's telegram to the Office, a copy of which was enclosed in your Lordship's despatch No. 3 of the 11th December, would no doubt make it more difficult for the Turks to maintain their contention that the status quo has not been maintained, I would therefore propose, subject to your Lordship's approval, to reply that nothing in the present communication from the Turkish Government causes His Majesty's Government to modify in any way the contentions put forward in my previous note.

I am, &c.  
NEVILLE HENDERSON

Enclosure 1 in No 76

Mr Henderson to Adnan Bey

Constantinople, le 20 décembre 1923

Je n'ai pas manqué de transmettre à mon Gouvernement la copie de la note que vous m'avez adressée le 18 août, par laquelle votre Excellence a bien voulu m'informer que le Gouvernement de la République turque envisageait de continuer l'occupation de Souleimanieh qui aurait eu lieu le 18 août, ainsi que l'envoi d'un détachement de Kerkouk à un certain Mohamed et non d'ailleurs de Souleimanieh, ce qui est contraire aux stipulations de l'article 3 du Traité de Lausanne.

Je suis chargé par le principal Secrétaire d'Etat pour les Affaires étrangères de porter à la connaissance de votre Excellence, en réponse, que, comme il a été clairement exposé à la délégation turque lors de la Conférence de Lausanne, le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté considère la totalité du vilayet de Mossoul comme étant en occupation effective et soumise à l'administration des autorités de l'Irak tant qu'une modeste opération de la frontière ne résulte pas des négociations qui furent engagées le 5 octobre.

3. Par conséquent, l'opération dont il est question ne constitue aucune violation du status quo, n'étant en effet qu'une simple mesure d'administration locale rendue nécessaire par suite d'une menace à la sécurité publique. En outre, cette opération ne fut aucunement dirigée contre des intérêts turcs.

4. Tout en vous priant de vouloir bien communiquer ce qui précède au Gouvernement de la République, je suis, &c.

NEVILLE HENDERSON

Enclosure 2 in No. 76

Adnan Bey to Mr Henderson

Excellence,

Constantinople, le 13 janvier 1924

JE n'avais pas manqué de transmettre à mon Gouvernement la teneur de la note responsive que votre Excellence a bien voulu m'adresser en date du 20 décembre dernier au sujet du bombardement de Souleimanieh.

En réponse, je suis chargé de porter à votre connaissance que le Ministère des Affaires étrangères de la République turque regrette de ne pouvoir partager l'avis émis au No. 3 de votre note. La thèse d'ailleurs, selon laquelle la totalité du vilayet de Mossoul se trouverait sous l'occupation effective britannique, a été de tout temps contestée, et il n'existe toujours aucun motif d'un reconnaître le bien-fondé, étant donné qu'elle n'est nullement conforme à la réalité des faits.

Mon Gouvernement s'en tient donc à l'alinéa 2 de l'article 3 du Traité de Lausanne stipulant que "les Gouvernements turc et britannique s'engagent à ce que, en attendant la décision à prendre au sujet de la frontière, il ne sera pris aucune mesure en contradiction avec ces stipulations, de même qu'avant l'article 7 du protocole relatif à l'évacuation des territoires turcs confirmant que le status quo ne devra pas être modifié sur cette contrée."

J'ai donc l'honneur d'informer votre Excellence que les protestations qui ont été formulées dans ma précédente communication restent entièrement inchangées.

Veuillez agréer, &c.  
ADNAN

JE 850/7/65

N. 8.

Mr Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (Received January 28)

(No 61)

My Lord,

Constantinople, January 23, 1924

THOUGH I make a point of never giving formal interviews to Turkish journalists, I was accosted a few days ago, on leaving Adnan Bey's office, by the correspondent of the "Watan" who put to me several direct questions on the subject of the Mosul question.

I answered him briefly that, inasmuch as out of the nine months of the Treaty of Lausanne three months had already elapsed since the negotiations had commenced with a note that I had addressed to the Turkish Government on the 5th October, His Majesty's Government were desirous of initiating the verbal discussions forthwith, but that the Turkish Government were showing an inclination to postpone these discussions until the treaty had actually come into force.

2. A somewhat confused version of this statement was published in the "Watan" the following day, and elicited a "rectification," which was alleged to come from a competent source at Ankara, to the effect that I was under a misapprehension, as the period for the discussion of the Mosul question would begin as from the ratification of the Treaty of Lausanne.

3. Adnan Bey, who called on me to-day, asked me whether I had noticed this "rectification." I said that I had, but that I did not understand it since there was no connection between the commencement of the period for the Mosul negotiations and the entry into force of the treaty. Adnan thereupon asserted that I had been mistaken in declaring that the negotiations had already commenced, since they could only be regarded as really starting from the initiation of the verbal discussions.

4. I at once repudiated this theory. Article 7 of the Evacuation Protocol stipulated that the negotiations respecting the frontier between Turkey and Iraq should commence as soon as the evacuation operations had terminated, and they had, in fact, so commenced with the note which I had addressed to him on the 5th October. That was the standpoint of His Majesty's Government, and one which I had consistently adopted in my notes and conversations with himself. I referred him more particularly to my second note of the 19th October, and to his conversation with me as reported in my despatch No. 840 of the 30th ultimo. He had expressly admitted this standpoint by his remarks to me on that occasion. His Government had implicitly no less



admitted it by its replies to my above-mentioned notes. It was now too late to attempt to go back on these admissions. It would, moreover, create a deplorable impression if it essayed to do so, since the Turkish Government was itself responsible for the delay in commencing the verbal discussions.

5. Adnan explained that when he spoke as he did to me on the 29th December he had himself been under the impression that this standpoint held the field. He was not certain now whether he had not been in error, as there was some doubt whether negotiations could be said to have commenced with a mere exchange of notes.

6. I denied that there was any possible doubt about it, and said that he would do well to clear up the point with his Government. In so doing I requested him to inform Ankara that I could not admit of any other interpretation than that of the negotiations having started from the 5th October last. If Ankara did not realise this, the sooner a false impression was corrected the better it would be.

7. Adnan Bey undertook to report to Ismet Pasha accordingly. His Majesty's Government are on strong ground in this matter, both on account of the long period during which the Turkish Government has made no attempt to controvert the categorical statements made in my note of the 19th October and of the Turkish obstructiveness to the commencement of the verbal discussions, as well as in view of His Majesty's Government's conciliatory attitude as regards the place where the discussions shall take place. In the event, therefore, of the Ankara Government expressing any opinion to the contrary, I propose, on the above-mentioned grounds, to put the matter altogether to consider it.

I have,  
NEVILLE HENDERSON

E 854/7 65

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. — (Received January 28)

No 75)

My Lord

SINCE drafting my despatch No. 71 of today's date, relative to the attitude of the British Government towards the Mosul question, I have been attracted to a telegram from the special correspondent of the "Wakt" newspaper in Ankara, dated the 25th January, which contains the following statement of that paper. The telegram runs as follows:

A personage belonging to our Government replied as follows to a question which I addressed to him regarding the Mosul question:

We cannot begin the discussions which will determine the fate of Mosul before the British Government have passed through their Parliament and ratified the treaty which they signed at Lausanne. We are at present considering the question in a suitable manner of the question of the Public Debt. We cannot for the moment lay down what will be decided upon.

I have also been in contact with the Under-Secretary of the Foreign Office. Tewfik Kamil Bey began by saying that erroneous information had got mixed up with what had been written in the press concerning the settlement of the Mosul question, and went on to say:

"There will be discussions between the British and Turkish Governments regarding the delimitation of the frontier between the two countries. The two parties do not reach an agreement within a period of nine months. The question will be referred for settlement to the Council of the League of Nations."

"Apart from this, moreover, according to article 1 (a misprint for 7) of the evacuation protocol, there is agreement between the two Governments at the point that the Mosul frontier discussions are to begin upon the conclusion of the evacuation of Constantinople. It must, however, be noted that this period of nine months runs not from the conclusion of the evacuation but from the date of the evacuation of Constantinople. The discussions have not yet begun, neither has this period begun. I particularly ask you to make this correction."

I have reproduced these statements literally as I attach particular importance to that attributed to Tewfik Kamil Bey. He will be remembered as secretary to the second Turkish delegation at Lausanne. He is not a prolix person nor is he a politician. His statement to the "Wakt" contains an unusually accurate and dispassionate statement of the legal position, and presents all the appearance of having been carefully prepared. It is not, however, the view of the Ankara Government, there has as yet been no commencement of the discussions regarding the frontier, and that the nine months' period has consequently not yet begun.

I have,  
NEVILLE HENDERSON

E 854/7/65]

No 10

Mr. MacDonald to Mr. Henderson (Constantinople)

(No 19)

(Telegraphic)

Foreign Office, January 30, 1924

YOUR despatch No 71 of 23rd January

I approve your proposal firmly to maintain our contention that negotiations commenced on 5th October

(E 1019/7, 65)

No 11

Yusuf Kemal Bey to Mr. MacDonald. — (Received February 1)

Mosul, 30 January 1924  
Le 30 janvier 1924

M. le Premier Ministre,

Je vous prie de vouloir bien faire connaître ci-dessous les actes accomplis dernièrement par les autorités anglaises à la limite des territoires occupés par les troupes turques et britanniques, actes dont quelques-uns sont contraires au dernier alinéa de l'article 3 du Traité de Lausanne, et dont les autres sont de nature à créer des incidents regrettables pouvant influencer défavorablement les relations turco-britanniques.

1. Quatre avions britanniques venant de la zone occupée actuellement par les troupes turques, ont survolé la zone d'occupation turque de Karakouk de Cheindman, dans la zone d'occupation turque.

2. Le Gouverneur d'Amadié est en train de faire réparer toutes les routes allant d'Amadié vers les territoires occupés par les troupes turques et d'excéder de nombreuses reconnaissances du haut des crêtes dominant la limite de la zone d'occupation turque.

3. Les Nestoriens, les Tayaris, et les Arméniens que les autorités britanniques entretiennent dans le vilayet de Mossoul et tout près des territoires occupés par les troupes turques sont, par suite des sentiments bien connus qui les animent à l'égard des musulmans et des Turcs, un danger pour les relations des deux pays; ces soldats lorsqu'ils sont licenciés viennent s'établir en grand nombre et en armes à la limite de la zone occupée par la Turquie et peuvent occasionner toutes sortes d'incidents.

4. Vers la fin de l'année écoulée, de nombreux Nestoriens nouvellement licenciés, mais qui ont gardé leurs armes, sont venus s'installer à Tchal et à ses environs, 900 autres, également armés, sont en train de se rendre à Harouni au sud de la rivière Hadji Bey (cane de Cheindman), et 200 Arméniens à Cheih Barzan; il est très probable que ces nouveaux-venus entreront en conflit avec la population musulmane des localités où ils se rendent. A la localité de Cheih Barzan eut lieu dernièrement un combat de quatre heures, dont le bruit a été entendu de la région placée sous l'occupation turque.

Avec mes remerciements anticipés pour tout ce que vous voudrez bien entreprendre en vue de mettre fin à cet état de choses, je vous prie, &c.

YOUSSEF KEMAL

[12045]



[E 1098/7/65]

Mr Henderson to Mr MacDonald.—(Received February 4.)

(No. 83.)

Sir,

Constantinople, January 1.

I HAD the honour, in my despatch No. 71 of the 23rd January, to report a note of the Turkish press having contested the view that these negotiations must be regarded as having been begun last October.

A few days later, in the course of a conversation by telephone on some other matter, Adnan Bey remarked that the views expressed in the Turkish press had been following day a telegram from the special correspondent of the "Waki" at Angora was in fact published in that newspaper to the following effect:

"The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Tewfik Kiamil Bey, making two points in his statement regarding Mosul said: Firstly, the article in article 7 of the Evacuation Protocol

of the treaty, but with the evacuation. The starting point from which the nine months' period runs is another question which I do not wish to enter into."

3. This declaration should be read in conjunction with the previous declaration by Tewfik Kiamil Bey reported in my despatch No. 75 of the 23rd instant. The latter was a carefully considered statement, nor is it modified by his second declaration except in so far as Tewfik Kiamil Bey, without admitting that he was actually wrong, withdraws his original categorical affirmation that the nine months' period had not yet begun. I gather from this that, though Tewfik Kiamil Bey's views have not been altered, the Turkish Government itself has altered its standpoint in regard to the expediency of protracting the period for the Mosul negotiations.

4. There is some reason to believe that this volte face on the part of the Turkish Government is not alien to the change of Government in England. I have already, in my despatch, summarised the views expressed in the Turkish press in regard to the advent to power of a Labour Government in England. The Turkish newspapers lay particular stress on the point that a solution favourable to Turkey of the Mosul question is more likely to be obtained from a Labour Government than from either a Conservative or a Liberal Government. The possibility of the present Government remaining but a little while in power, and the consequent uncertainty as to the future of the Government, support this view, and therefore, openly take the view that it is desirable to strike while the iron is hot, and to get the Mosul discussions over before a further change in Government, which might be to their disadvantage in this respect, occurs in England.

My conversation with Adnan Bey on the 23rd January left no doubt in my mind that the Turkish Government was preparing to dispute the thesis that the Mosul negotiations had begun with the note which I addressed to Adnan Bey on the 5th October. His subsequent telephone message would seem to indicate that his Government is inclined to share the view expressed in the Turkish press, and, on the ground that delay will not be to its advantage, may now be willing to expedite the initiation of discussions.

I have, &amp;

NEVILLE HENDERSON

[E 1454/7/65]

No. 12.

Colonial Office to Foreign Office.—(Received February 16.)

Sir,

Downing Street, February 16, 1924.

I AM directed by Mr Secretary Thomas to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 8th February, transmitting a copy of a note from the Turkish representative in London, drawing attention to certain alleged acts of the British authorities in the districts east and north of Mosul as being either contrary to article 3 of the Lausanne Treaty or of a nature likely to create undesirable incidents in the area in question, and,

in reply, to state, for the information of Mr Secretary MacDonald, that subject to the following observations, Mr Thomas concurs in the terms of the draft reply which it is proposed to address to Yussuf Kemal Bey, and of which a copy accompanied your letter.

The statement in paragraph 4 of the draft reply to the effect that none of the British mandate is engaged in maintaining Nestorian or Armenian, with the exception of those incorporated in the Irak levies, might appear somewhat inconsistent with the statement appearing later in the paragraph that the returning refugees at present constitute a considerable burden on the resources of Irak. Moreover, Mr Thomas is advised that the accuracy of the latter statement is open to doubt. I am therefore to suggest that the words "constituting a considerable burden on the resources of that country" should be omitted from the draft reply.

3. The final sentence in this paragraph also appears to Mr Thomas open to objection in that it might give the impression that His Majesty's Government desire to divert themselves of all responsibility in the matter of the welfare, both now and hereafter, of Assyrian refugees returning to their original homes in Turkish territory, and I am to suggest, for the consideration of Mr MacDonald, that this sentence also should be omitted.

I am, &amp;c.

J. E. SHUCKBURY

[E 1098/7/65]

No. 14.

Foreign Office to Colonial Office.

Sir,

Foreign Office, February 16, 1924.

WITH reference to Foreign Office letter of the 1st instant on the subject of the Mosul negotiations, I am directed by Mr Secretary Ramsey MacDonald to transmit to the information of the Secretary of State for the Colonies, a copy of a despatch of the 20th ultimo, received from the Acting British High Commissioner at Constantinople, from which it appears that the Turkish Government are now more inclined than before to initiate verbal discussions for the settlement of the frontier. From this despatch Mr Ramsey MacDonald no longer anticipates that the prior ratification of the Treaty of Lausanne in this country will necessarily be made *a sine qua non* by the Turkish Government, negotiations which, as Mr Secretary Thomas will be aware, are to take place in Constantinople.

The question, therefore, of the departure for Constantinople of His Majesty's representative to carry on the negotiations has become a matter for early consideration, but before a date can definitely be fixed, and a notification accordingly be made to the Turkish Government, it will be necessary to decide what personnel, with expert knowledge of the matters which will come under discussion, shall accompany Sir P. Cox.

3. From your letter of the 11th December last and previous correspondence, it is presumed that Mr. Thomas will desire Mr Jardine to proceed from Irak to join Sir P. Cox, who is from your letter of the 6th instant it may also be inferred that the Irak Government, notwithstanding the appointment of Sir P. Cox as His Majesty's representative, will wish to despatch a representative who may, in the first instance, take part in the negotiations in an unofficial capacity. Further, I am to enquire whether Mr. Thomas will also delegate a member of the Colonial Office to assist Sir P. Cox. It is assumed that Mr Jardine and any official delegated from the Colonial Office will be paid from Colonial Office funds, and the Irak representative by the Irak Government.

4. The question of clerical personnel and the method of dealing with work connected with cyphering of telegrams and of interpreting at the meetings will be considered in due course as soon as a reply is received to this communication, and need not, therefore, for the moment be further discussed.

5. As soon as a decision has been reached on this subject, the question of financial responsibility for the salaries, &c., of Sir P. Cox's staff and the details connected with the clerical staff will be taken up with the Treasury.

I am, &amp;c.

LANCLOT OLIPHANT.

[12045]



Colonial Office to Foreign Office.—(Received February 18.)

Sir,

Downing Street, February 18, 1924

I AM directed by Mr. Secretary Thomas to refer to the letter from this Department of the 6th February, transmitting, for the information of Mr. Secretary MacDonald, a copy of a telegram from the High Commissioner for Iraq regarding the question of the official representation of the Iraq Government at the Turco-Iraq frontier negotiations. From this it will be observed that, despite the appointment of Sir Percy Cox to represent His Majesty's Government in these negotiations, the Iraq Government are still desirous that the concurrence of the Turkish Government should be sought in the attendance at the discussions of an official Iraq representative.

Mr. Thomas is disposed to sympathise with the Iraq Government's desire, and, moreover, is impressed with the force of the argument which they have advanced in support of it. It is true that, in the event of the Turkish Government's refusal to admit an Iraq representative into the meetings of the Lausanne Conference, it does not necessarily follow that the Turkish Government would oppose official Iraq participation in the forthcoming frontier discussions, since the negotiations at Lausanne related to the conclusion of a multilateral treaty and to questions of the widest international concern, whereas the delimitation of the Mosul frontier is a question which directly concerns Turkey and Iraq alone. Moreover, when the Lausanne Conference was in progress the Turkish Government did not admit the separate existence of Iraq, which at that time theoretically was still a part of the Ottoman Empire, and thus the Turkish negotiation were not unnaturally averse from taking any steps which might have been interpreted as extending some measure of official recognition to the Iraq Government.

2. As, therefore, the action of the Turkish delegation at Lausanne is not necessarily indicative of the attitude which their Government would now adopt towards the question of Iraq participation, and as it is clearly reasonable that the Iraq Government should wish to take part in a discussion so closely affecting their own future, His Majesty's Government would, in Mr. Thomas's opinion, be justified in making representations to the Turkish Government in the sense desired. He trusts, therefore, that, in view of those considerations, and particularly in view of the unfortunate impression which the High Commissioner apprehends would be created in Iraq if His Majesty's Government were to persist in their refusal to communicate the Iraq Government's wishes to the Turkish Government, Mr. MacDonald will be moved to reconsider the decision of his predecessor in this matter, and will cause the Turkish Government to be approached accordingly.

4. It occurs to Mr. Thomas, although this is a matter which is somewhat beyond the competence of this Department, that the wishes of the Iraq Government would be amply met, and the effect of a possible refusal on the part of the Turkish Government would to some extent be mitigated if the representations on this subject to the Turkish Government were to take the form of a note merely enquiring whether the Turkish Government would be willing to admit an official Iraq representative to the frontier negotiations.

I am, &amp;c.

J. E. SHUCKBURN

High Commissioner Sir H. Dobbs to Mr. Thomas.

(Telegraphic.) P

February 4, 1924.

I HAVE communicated to Iraq Government decision not to approach the Turkish Government and have also intimated to them that selection of Cox as representative of the Majesty's Government would secure that their interests would be fully represented and that in all probability their advisory representative would obtain admission to the official representatives' deliberations. However, they have again requested that Turkey be approached officially. It is pointed out by them that the refusal by Turkey at Lausanne to admit their representative is no precedent, since that conference was of an international nature, whereas the Mosul boundary question is one by which Iraq and Turkey alone are directly affected. Their request is sympathised in by me. From the

Colonial Office to Foreign Office.—(Received February 18, 1924.)  
Sir, which was enclosed in your letter of the 10th February, it appears that His Majesty's Government are not prepared to accept any official representation by Iraq, but it is realised that choice of Constantinople as the venue would make Iraq's request for such representation more difficult to refuse. I do not know what are His Majesty's Government's objections, and no indication of their existence is given in either your telegram of the 20th September or in your letter of the 10th February. Undesirable impression that His Majesty's Government do not wish Iraq to be officially represented must inevitably arise from persistent refusal to approach Turkey. I can see no reason, as already stated, for fears of Foreign Office communicated in your telegram of the 4th December. I feel sure that the Government will be able to find a way out of the difficulty. I hope it will be possible for decision not to approach Turkey to be reconsidered. This refers to your telegram No. 7.

E 1454 7 65

Mr. MacDonald to Yusuf Kemal Bey.

Sir,

Foreign Office, February 19, 1924.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your note of the 30th ultimo, drawing attention to certain alleged acts of the British authorities in the districts north and east of Mosul as being either contrary to article 3 of the Treaty of Lausanne or of a nature likely to create regrettable incidents in the area in question.

2. The incident to which you refer in the paragraph numbered (1) of your note had already been reported to Mr. Henderson by Adnan Bey as having taken place in the district of Bagdad.

In enquires addressed to the British authorities at Bagdad, Mr. Henderson was able to inform Adnan Bey, in a note dated the 18th January, that no reconnaissance of British aircraft whatsoever had taken place on the 5th December either north of the Mosul-Artik line or yet in the direction of Rowanduz and that there was consequently no ground for the complaint of your Government.

The next paragraph of your note refers to the construction of roads in the area towards the country occupied by Turkish troops. While I have no detailed information of a nature to enable me either to confirm or to contest your statement, if roads are being constructed they must be designed to open up and pacify the districts and therefore the work cannot be interpreted as a hostile act directed against the neighbouring country. The effect must inevitably be to bring the area under British control being exercised over the inhabitants of the area.

I would, moreover, point out that, notwithstanding the construction of roads in any of the mountain areas in the neighbourhood of Mosul, almost unsurpassable obstacles presented by the high and inaccessible mountains of this region would effectively preclude any military operations against Turkey, even if it were the intention of His Majesty's Government, as seems to be implied in your note—a suggestion which I take this occasion most emphatically to repudiate.

3. The paragraph numbered (3) discusses the activities of the Nestorian and other Christians in the Mosul area with the implication that the British authorities in Iraq are engaged in trying to create disturbances on the Turkish side of the administrative border. I wish to state categorically that none of the authorities in the areas under British mandate are engaged in "maintaining" ("entretenir") Nestorians or Armenians except in so far as the incorporation of certain Assyro-Chaldeans in the local levies in Iraq can be interpreted as falling within this definition. The sentiments of this Christian community are, as you state, well known, but there can be no question of His Majesty's Government or of any of the British authorities in Iraq, either at the present time or in the future, inciting or arming any of these people against Turkey. The return to their homes in these districts of numbers of these refugees, now living in Iraq, is of course permitted by the local authorities and could, in any case, not be prevented.

4. In so far, however, as the presence of these Assyrians and other Christian communities in this area on the Turkish side of the border constitutes a menace to friendly relations between His Majesty's Government and the Turkish Government, I have the honour to suggest that the question might with advantage be considered at the forthcoming discussions on the subject of the frontiers of Iraq.



8. In conclusion I may point out that it was not the intention of His Majesty's Government to raise this question had the Turkish Government not been the first to do so. His Majesty's Government consider that the only way to avoid future incidents of this nature is to secure an early settlement of the Mosul question, on a basis which will do justice to the interests of the various racial elements concerned, and they are confident that with the display of goodwill on both sides a satisfactory solution is attainable.

J. RAMSAY MACDONALD

E 1676 929 65

## Memorandum by Mr. Smith

unruly is a normal measure, while recent information from Iraq goes to show that the

In conclusion, it may be said that, while we have no grounds at present for protesting to the Turkish Government against what we assume from our information may well be their intention, the danger of an aggressive policy and its effect on the Mosul negotiations must be clearly borne in mind, both because some information points to it being true and also because it would fit in so well with what we know has been the practice of the Turks in the past.

F R.

Foreign Office, February 21 1941

E 1522/7 '65 1

No 18

Foreign Office to Colonial Office

Foreign Office, February 26, 1924.

2 I am to transmit, for Mr. Secretary Thomas's information, copy of a despatch which has been addressed to Mr. Lindsay on the subject.\*

1 mm. &amp;c.

LANCELOT OLIPHANT



E 1522 7/65

Mr MacDonald to Mr. Lindsay (Constantinople)

Foreign Office, February 25, 1924

WITH reference to my despatch No. 200 of the 16th instant on the subject of the Mosul negotiations, you are probably aware that correspondence has been exchanged with the Colonial Office during the past three months on the question of the representation of Iraq at the forthcoming verbal discussions at Constantinople.

In view of the attitude assumed last year by the Turkish delegation at Lausanne, the Colonial Office were at first informed that it was not considered likely that the Turkish Government would accede to any request from His Majesty's Government to allow an Iraqi representative to participate officially but that it might be possible for an Iraqi to attend the discussions in an unofficial capacity in the first instance and eventually to take a more active part therein without the Turkish Government being formally approached on the subject.

3. His Majesty's High Commissioner in Bagdad is most insistent, however, both upon the undesirable effect which would be produced on local public opinion by a refusal on the part of His Majesty's Government to approach the Turkish Government, and upon the fact that such a request would have in disillusioning the Turco-Persian elements of the population of Iraq, more especially in the Mosul area.

4. While it was at first considered undesirable to court a rebuff from the Turkish Government, the situation is now understood from Mr Henderson's despatch No. 83 of the 29th ultimo, to have changed in a certain measure, and it is no longer clear that the Turkish authorities would prove intractable on this matter. I transmit, for your information, copy of a letter, with enclosure, from the Colonial Office, from the latter of which you will see that Sir H. Dobbs has suggested addressing an enquiry, rather than a definite request, to the Turkish Government on the subject.

I am, accordingly, informing him that I am authorising you to use your discretion in the matter. I shall be glad, therefore, if, should you see no objection, you will approach the Turkish Government in whatever manner best commends itself to you, and report by telegram, repeating your communication to His Majesty's High Commissioner at Bagdad.

I am, &c

J RAMSAY MACDONALD

E 1742 7 65

No. 2

Mr Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald — (Received February 26)

(No 32)

(Telegraphic)

Constantinople, February 25, 1924

YOUR despatch No. 200 of 15th February. I informed Adnan Bey to-day that His Majesty's Government were taking steps to approach the Turkish Government on the subject of the Mosul negotiations. Turkish Government had decided on their negotiators and what date they contemplated for beginning discussions. Adnan said that, so far as he knew nobody had yet been appointed, but that, as negotiations were to take place here, this did not much matter.

He had taken place, and no arguments in opposite sense would move him. He did, however, express the opinion that it would not be necessary to await actual exchange of ratifications. By this he may mean that, when House of Commons commits itself to ratification, Turkish Government will be prepared to meet British delegates.

I should be grateful if I could be informed when Parliament is likely to be able to take up treaty.

As to nine months period, Adnan said he thought Angora would have no objection to making it run from immediately after date of evacuation.

(E 1905 7, 65)

16A

No. 1

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald — (Received March 3.)

(No. 167)

Constantinople, February 27, 1924.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 32 of the 25th February, I have the honour to state that this morning's Turkish newspapers contain numerous references to the Mosul negotiations. These include a short article in the French "Tahsin" a copy of which I enclose, and an important interview with Dr. Adnan Bey in the "Ismail". The following is a literal translation of Adnan Bey's statement as reported:—

"As a matter of fact the statement that the Mosul question will be discussed in the immediate future is not absolutely correct. I can say definitely that this question is dependent on the ratification of the Lausanne Treaty. This statement which I have made to you is repeated constantly and on every occasion. It is hard to talk about the names of representatives and delegates for a matter, a rôle, the character of which is unknown. There is not one official or true word to be added to the expressions of opinion that his Excellency the Prime Minister (Ismet Pasha) will conduct the negotiations. This, however, might or might not be the case. Anyhow logically it cannot be so, because his Excellency is up to his ears in important business to such an extent that he could not undertake this."

Dr. Adnan Bey, who is spoken of as second delegate, As it happens, Riza Nour Bey really influenced the sound and well-informed views on the Mosul question. M. Nour Bey will take part in the negotiations, because of his position.

1. Statement of Tewfik Bey, the military expert, may be taken as pretty reliable. As I have stated above, there is nothing definite. The Under Secretary's room here, in which we have concluded treaties with other Powers, should be quite adequate for the discussion of the Mosul question."

2. Most of the other papers also canvas the probability of Riza Nour Bey being a member of the negotiations owing to Ismet Pasha not being available. Some say that M. Nour Bey will be a member of the Turkish delegation, but it is not seen by the above that Adnan does not think so. The appointment of Lieutenant Colonel Tewfik Bey is generally expected.

3. One paper, the "Waki," anticipates that the British ratification of the treaty will take place about the 15th March and that Sir Percy Cox and his staff will leave London for Constantinople immediately after. Another, the anti-British "Fikar," remarks that Sir Percy Cox has always identified himself with the Mosul must be retained by "the British."

4. I will not fail to report by telegraph should any official announcement be made regarding the composition of the Turkish delegation. The selection of Riza Nour Bey is not intrinsically improbable, although he has not always been on the best of terms with Ismet Pasha and was not included in the Pasha's Cabinet last October. He has for some time been in Constantinople on leave of absence from the Assembly.

5. I think it may be regarded as a foregone conclusion that Lieutenant Colonel Tewfik Bey will be a member of the delegation. It will be remembered that this officer was a member of the Turkish delegation at the Peace Conference, took a leading part in the ten discussions of the Mosul question, and appeared to enjoy in a high degree the confidence of Ismet Pasha.

(Confidential)

6. I learn from a very secret source that at the military conference at Smyrna Ismet Pasha outlined a plan for securing a considerable part, but not the whole, of the territory in dispute, by offering a large measure of apparent autonomy to the Kurds and by granting liberal oil concessions to the British. Protests against any alienation of the territory claimed by Turkey would then be stage-managed in the Assembly, but the matter is not yet decided. I do not attach undue credence to this report, but it is interesting.

I have, &c

R. G. LINDSAY

[12045]

c<sup>2</sup>



Enclosure in No. 21

Extract from the "Tanin" of February 27, 1924.

## LA QUESTION DE MOSOUL.

Il résulte des renseignements puisés à bonne source, qu'on inaugurera bientôt les négociations concernant la question de Mossoul. Le retard provient du fait que le Gouvernement turc n'a pas encore décidé de la composition de sa députation.

On sait que la Grande-Bretagne a nommé son délégué Sir Percy Cox, ancien Commissaire en Mésopotamie. Les conseillers britanniques ont été également nommés et ils se rendront en route vers le 10 ou le 12 du mois prochain. Le

Imet Pacha aurait dirigé lui-même les négociations au nom de la Turquie. Mais, étant donné que le conseil des commissaires compte déployer une plus grande activité dans le conduite des affaires du pays, après le grand discours-messager du Président de la République, au début de mars, on ne voit pas la possibilité pour Imet Pacha de s'occuper de la question, qui sera probablement chargée de mener les pourparlers.

Les conseillers turcs sont ceux mêmes qui ont été à Lausanne, le Colonel Toyfik et le conseiller agiste, Muter Hay. Les négociations auront lieu dans les locaux de l'Administration des Affaires étrangères, occupés actuellement par le Dr. A. ... Au cours de son entrevue avec Adnan Bey, Mr. L. ...

E 1971/7 65]

No. 22

Sir H. Dohls to Mr. Thomas.—(Received at Colonial Office, February 29. Communicated to Foreign Office, March 4.)

(Telegraphic.) P

Bagdad, February 29, 1924.

ON the 26th February it was reported from Mosul that posts had been established by Turkish garrison of Jezirah at Girikara, 37° 20' north, 42° 10' east, Damerkapu 36° 55' north 41° 50' east, and Dugura 37° 03' north, 41° 27' east. Correct names are Girigira, Damerkapu and Dugur and references are to Mammal 1:250,000, sheets 26

This report is confirmed by later information regarding last two places. All three are well south of road from Jezirah to Nisnin, and are therefore, according to Franco-Angora Agreement and Treaty of Lausanne, in French mandated territory. French Government should, I suggest, be urged to enter a protest immediately.

I presume that a protest from His Majesty's Government could be made, should you consider one also desirable, on the ground that this is a forward military movement likely to disturb Mosul and status quo. Please refer to report No. 15, 28th January to Foreign Office from Consul at Aleppo, which mentions move Turkish troops through Syrian territory on Bagdad Railway. This small move

Government's attention might be invited to correspondence ending with Lord Curzon's M. de Montille of the 25th November, 1921, enclosed in Colonial Office confidential despatch of the 1st December, 1921, and a definite

that, in the event of the Turks beginning to concentrate troops on the Bagdad Railway to allow further Turkish troops to pass over Bagdad Railway section between Mardin

This refers to my immediately preceding telegram

E 1978/7 65]

No. 23

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received March 4.)

(No. 41.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Constantinople, March 3, 1924.

YOL R despatch No. 216 of 28th February

I saw Adnan Bey to-day about Irak representation at Mosul negotiations, and left with him *ad-re-memoire* of my language to him to the effect that His Majesty's Government presumed that Turkish Government would not object to proposed association of an official Irak representative with Sir P. Cox in his delegation. I supported my arguments by pointing to reasonableness of His Majesty's Government's desire in view of vital interest of Irak in the question and to change of situation since Lausanne.

Adnan was unable to give any definite reply as to Turkish Government's view, but he clearly anticipated that it would be unfavourable. In arguing he based himself entirely on narrow ground that situation which prevailed at Lausanne continues, technically at any rate, until ratification is complete. He proposed enquire of Ankara at once and to let me know the result.

Repeated to Bagdad, No. 7.

E 2111 229 65]

No. 24

Colonial Office to Foreign Office.—(Received March 10.)

Colonial Office, March 3, 1924.

Sir,

I AM directed by Mr. Secretary Thomas to transmit to you, herewith, to be laid before Mr. Secretary Ramsay MacDonald, copies of three telegrams from the High Commissioner for Irak, regarding, as explained in the enclosed, the establishment of posts in French mandated territory in the neighbourhood of Girigira (Mammal sheet 1:250,000, 37° 10' N., 42° 10' E.)

2. Mr. Thomas does not consider that the establishment of these posts affords sufficient grounds for a protest to be addressed by His Majesty's Government to the Turkish Government under article 3 of the Treaty of Lausanne, but, in view of the fact that these posts are situated in territory under French mandate, he is disposed to think that there would be adequate justification for inviting the French Government to enter an emphatic protest against this armed penetration of Syrian territory.

3. Should Mr. MacDonald concur in this view, I am to suggest that, when making representations to the French Government, you will refer to the fact that the establishment of these posts took place between the French and the British in the neighbourhood of Girigira, in violation of the conclusion of the Franklin-Bouillon Agreement in 1921, and in particular to the following statement which appeared in M. de Montille's note of the 26th November, 1921:—

Sur ce point, le Gouvernement français tient à donner au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté l'assurance la plus formelle qu'en aucun cas il ne pourrait envisager l'hypothèse d'une facilité quelconque donnée par lui à des desseins hostiles dirigés contre le territoire de mandat britannique. Les liens étroits qui unissent la France britannique et l'idée que le Gouvernement français se propose de maintenir en tant que membre de la Société des Nations et Puissance mandataire, sont à faire écarter semblable préoccupation.

En cas de conflit armé, les lois de la neutralité feraient même au Gouvernement français l'obligation d'interdire aux transports l'usage de la navigation du territoire syrien, et la voie ferrée au delà de Chobanbeg, coupée du reste de la Turquie, perdrait toute valeur pratique.

The French Government might be reminded of this assurance and informed that His Majesty's Government are confident that they will implement it in the event of Turkish troop movements along the Syrian section of the Bagdad Railway of a nature to threaten Irak from the Turkish side of the frontier.

4. At the same time it would appear desirable to inform the French Government that, in the event of a concentration of Turkish regular or irregular forces on the Syrian

[12045]



side of the Irak frontier in such strength as to cause tribal unrest, His Majesty's Government would look to the French Government to take the necessary steps to eject them, and that, in the alternative, they might be compelled to ask the French Government to agree to military or air action being taken by British or Irak forces in Syrian territory with this object.

A copy of this letter has been sent to the Air Ministry

I am, &c

A. C. G. PARKINSON

Enclosure 1 in No. 24

High Commissioner for Irak to the Secretary of State for the Colonies

Bagdad, February 20, 1924  
It was reported from Mosul that posts had been established in the region of Jezirah at Garikara (37° 10' N., 42° 10' E.), Demirkapu (37° 50' E.) and Dageura (37° 03' N., 41° 27' E.). Correct names: Girigira, Damiyapu and Dogir, and references are to Maunsell 1/250,000, sheets 26, 31 and 27.

This report is confirmed by later information regarding last two places. All three are well south of road from Jeziret to Nisibin, and are, therefore, according to Franco-Anglo Agreement and Treaty of Lausanne, in French mandated territory. French Government should, I suggest, be urged to enter a protest immediately.

I presume that a protest could also be made by His Majesty's Government if considered desirable on the ground that this is a forward military movement likely to disturb Mosul and status quo. Please refer to Report No. 16 of the 20th January to the Office from Consul at Aleppo, which mentions movements of Turkish troops through Syrian territory on Bagdad Railway. This small move cannot in itself, I consider, form ground for protest. I suggest, however, that French Government's

correspondence ending with Lord ... 1921, enclosed ... and that they might be asked

in strength as to cause tribal unrest, French Government will refuse at our request to allow further Turkish troops to pass over the Bagdad Railway section between Mardin Ekbes and Choban Bey.

This refers to my immediately preceding telegram.

Enclosure 2 in No. 24

High Commissioner for Irak to the Secretary of State for the Colonies

Bagdad, March 4, 1924.  
(Telegraphic) P.  
FOLLOWING reports now received:—

Beyond a grain dump (unconfirmed), there is no post at Dogir. Cavalry regiment from several sources on several occasions of a post at Girigira; also posts at following places: Mijelan, 2 miles north-east of Girigira; Hanawiyah, south [? east] of Girigira; Mustafawiyah, about 15 miles from Jeziret on road to Nisibin is said to be

This is in continuation of my telegram of the 29th February

Enclosure 3 in No. 24

High Commissioner for Irak to the Secretary of State for the Colonies

Bagdad, March 6, 1924.  
(Telegraphic) P.  
MY telegram of the 6th March  
Suggestion has been made by Air headquarters that your attention should be called to allegation made throughout whole of recent series of French intelligence reports which have been communicated to them  
These allege that in order to bring pressure to bear on Irak during Mosul negotiations the Turks intend to concentrate in direction of Mosul frontier, to incite the tribes and to arrange for raids by irregular bands  
A plea by French that there is nothing to lead them to imagine that the significance of Turkish troop movements on French part of railway is unfriendly towards British cannot therefore be accepted, and tenour of French reports themselves would appear fully to justify a protest. This refers to my telegram of the 4th March.

[E 2192/7 65]

No. 25.

Papers communicated by Colonial Office.—(Received March 11)

Secretary of State for the Colonies to the High Commissioner for Irak

(No. 106)  
(Telegraphic) P.  
Downing Street, March 5, 1924  
REUTERS are publishing *déments* to-day. Since these and other rumours of the same sort will probably recur, conclusion of business, or at least acceptance of treaty, by Constituent Assembly before commencement of Mosul negotiations, appears to be a matter of urgency. How do matters now stand?

This refers to Constantinople telegram No. 42 of 4th March, reported to you as

High Commissioner for Irak to the Secretary of State for the Colonies

(No. 126)  
(Telegraphic) P.  
Bagdad, March 7, 1924  
PRESENT position is that except in Kirkuk, whence results are expected in a few days, elections are concluded. Provided I have authority to sign the agreements, with amendments submitted in telegrams of last few days, I hope that when Assembly meets on 20th March it will proceed immediately to consider these and the treaty. Impossible to predict how long discussions may last. Owing to telegraphic interruptions, Reuter's of 5th March and Constantinople telegram No. 8 not yet received. This refers to your telegram of 5th March, No. 106.

[E 2241 232 65]

No. 26.

High Commissioner for Irak to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—  
(Communicated to Foreign Office, March 12.)

(No. 129)  
(Telegraphic) P.  
Bagdad, March 11, 1924  
I WOULD propose to tell the Irak Government confidentially that His Majesty's Government now consider that, with regard to Mosul negotiations, their position vis-à-vis Turkey would be greatly strengthened if subsidiary agreements and treaty of alliance were accepted by Constituent Assembly before the negotiations begin, since such acceptance will demonstrate that Irak people, including the inhabitants of Mosul Vilayet, were united by a common purpose to achieve, with Great Britain's assistance, their independence.

[12945]



Am I authorised to make a communication in above sense?  
Although it could obviously not be published, an intimation of this kind might help to secure a speedy acceptance of the treaty.  
This refers to my telegram No. 126 of 7th March

E 2214 7 65]

No. 27

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald—(Received March 12)

aphic.) R. Constantinople, March 11, 1924  
MY telegram No. 41

I met Adnan to-day at a social function. He told me that his Government could not agree to an Irak representative attending conference, reasons were those alleged at Lausanne.

I had no opportunity of further discussion with him  
(Sent to Bagdad, No. 1.)

E 2301/7 65]

No. 28.

Memorandum by Mr. Osborne

SELEVKI PASHA, a member of the Turkish Mission in London, came to see me to-day in connection with the impending arrival in London of a Turkish military air

He referred to the Mosul negotiations, and asked when Sir P. Cox was going out. I said that depended on when his Government declared themselves ready to begin. He said they preferred to await our ratification of the Lausanne Treaty and the consequent re-establishment of friendly peaceful relations, so that Lamet Pasha might be able to come to Constantinople from Angora. I did not gather that he would be a Turkish negotiator, but rather that he would have a talk with Sir P. Cox. It may be that he will himself represent his Government, which would repay us for

Selevki referred to the Turkish Petroleum Company and the oil deposits in Mosul, and said that the question was of great importance to them. I gathered that they were anxious to get control of some at least of the oil-bearing territory. He asked who would accompany Sir P. Cox as oil expert, so I took the opportunity of emphasising very strongly that oil and the Turkish Petroleum Company's concession had nothing whatever to do with the frontier negotiations. I added that we had no idea of sending an oil expert.

D. G. OSBORNE.

Foreign Office, March 13, 1924

E 2111 229 65]

No. 29.

Foreign Office to Colonial Office.

Sir, Foreign Office, March 14, 1924.  
WITH reference to your letter of the 4th inst. regarding the establishment of Turkish posts in the French mandated area, I am directed by Mr. Secretary Ramsay MacDonald to state that he concurs in Mr. Secretary Thomas's view that the establishment of these posts does not provide sufficient grounds for a protest by His Majesty's Government to the Turkish Government.

2. Mr. Ramsay MacDonald does not, however, consider, having regard to all the information which has been received up to the present on the subject of Turkish troop movements in South-Eastern Anatolia, that the Turkish authorities intend a serious threat to the frontiers of Irak, though an attempt may be made to exert pressure on His Majesty's Government by means of bluff. Therefore, despite the fact that some of the information from French sources tends to confirm that concentrations are taking place in the vicinity of the area under dispute, it is not considered that His Majesty's Government have sufficient grounds for calling on the French authorities to implement

the undertaking given in 1921 to put a stop to the transit of Turkish troops over that portion of the Taurus range.

3. Mr. Ramsay MacDonald is prepared to direct His Majesty's Ambassador in Paris to approach the French Government on the subject, enquiring what information they have received regarding Turkish armed penetration of the area immediately south of the Nisibin-Jezret-ibn-Omar road, and reminding them of their promises made in 1921. But he is unable to concur in the proposal in the fourth paragraph of your letter under reply to inform the French Government that, in the event of a concentration of Turkish regular or irregular forces on the Syrian side of the Irak frontier in such a strength as to cause tribal unrest, His Majesty's Government would look to them to take military or air action to eject the Turks or would ask permission to take it. The proposal that the occupation by the Turks would not appear to be a matter which can be settled by conducting hostilities against the latter.

4. Having regard to these considerations, I am to enquire whether Mr. Thomas concurs in the terms of the enclosed draft instructions which Mr. Ramsay MacDonald proposes to address to Lord Crewe in Paris.

5. A copy of this correspondence has been sent to the Air Ministry.

I am, &amp;c.

D. G. OSBORNE

E 2331/7/65]

No. 30

Colonial Office to Foreign Office—(Received March 17)

Confidential.)

Sir, Downing Street, March 15, 1924.  
I AM directed by Mr. Secretary Thomas to refer to his letter of the 11th March addressed to the High Commissioner for Irak, and to Sir Henry Dobbs's reply of the 7th March (copies of which were transmitted to you under cover of this Department's letter of the 10th March) on the subject of the consideration of the Irak frontier subsidiary agreements by the local Constituent Assembly. I am to explain that the former telegram was sent at the suggestion of Sir Percy Cox, who, as Mr. Secretary Ramsay MacDonald is aware, was disposed to think that his position in the forthcoming frontier negotiations with the Turkish Government would be appreciably strengthened if these instruments had been accepted by the Irak Assembly prior to the commencement of the negotiations.

2. From Sir Henry Dobbs's telegram Mr. MacDonald will observe that it is anticipated that the Irak Constituent Assembly will meet on the 20th March and will proceed immediately to consider the Irak Treaty and agreements, but that Sir Henry Dobbs regards it as impossible at present to predict how long the Assembly's deliberations are likely to last.

3. Mr. Thomas gathers from recent telegrams addressed to your Department by the Turkish Government that they intend to open the frontier negotiations on the subject of the Taurus-Irak frontier until the Treaty of Lausanne has been ratified on behalf of the British Empire. In these circumstances it would appear improbable in any case that a date, anterior to the meeting of the Irak Assembly, will have to be fixed for the commencement of the frontier negotiations. It is to be anticipated that, when the Assembly meets, Sir Henry Dobbs will be in a better position than at present to advise as to the probable duration of its deliberations upon the Irak Treaty and agreements.

4. Reference is invited in this connection to the telegram from Sir Henry Dobbs of the 11th March. It is proposed, subject to Mr. MacDonald's concurrence, to ask Sir Henry Dobbs to inform the Turkish Government that their position in the forthcoming frontier negotiations would be greatly strengthened if the Irak Treaty and subsidiary agreements were accepted by the Assembly before the commencement of the negotiations, since this would demonstrate the unity of purpose existing between the two countries, public opinion in the Turkish Government will not consent to the participation of an official Irak representative in the negotiations.

[12045]

p 3



5. It is proposed to instruct Sir Henry Dobbs, when making this communication to the Irak Government, to omit all specific reference to the inhabitants of the Mosul Vilayet and carefully to avoid giving any impression that His Majesty's Government are in a position to guarantee that, if the Irak Treaty and agreements are accepted by the Assembly, the frontier negotiations will necessarily result in the inclusion of the whole of the area under dispute in Irak. He proposes also to issue instructions that these negotiations should invariably be referred to both in official communications and in conversation in Irak as "frontier negotiations" and not as "Mosul negotiations."

I am, &c

J. E. SHUCKBURGH

E 2015 291 65

No. 31

Foreign Office to Colonial Office.

Foreign Office, March 10, 1924

I AM directed by Mr. Secretary Ramsay MacDonald to draw Mr. Secretary Thomas's attention to paragraph 143 of Irak Intelligence Report No. 4, dated 1st February, copy of which was enclosed in your letter (annexed) of 11th February, relative to Turkish apprehensions of the effects in Anatolia of the development of the Kurdish national movement within the old Mosul Vilayet.

2. There appears to be good grounds for the belief, which it is understood is shared by Sir H. Dobbs, that the Turkish desire to include the territory of the former Mosul Vilayet within the boundaries of Turkey is largely due to the anxieties caused by the Kurdish movement in Anatolia. The Turkish Government are accustomed to difficulties of the Kurdish areas, and they no doubt have every reason to be anxious to secure in those difficult areas in the event of the grant of a measure of autonomy to the Kurds on the Irak side of the frontier. They therefore consider it essential that the whole of the Kurdish country should be included within Turkish territory, when they will have a free hand to deal with any troubles that may arise.

3. It is essential, at the present moment, that the British and Irak authorities should avoid any action which would be likely to confirm Turkish fears that the Kurdish agitation is being fostered on the Irak side of the present administrative boundary. It is also a question for consideration whether there exists any means of allaying the well-founded Turkish apprehensions for the future, since, if it were possible to do so, the whole Turkish attitude on the frontier question might be profoundly modified.

4. I am to enquire whether Mr. Secretary Thomas is in a position to offer any suggestion as to how this result might be achieved.

I am, &c

D. G. OSBORNE

Enclosure in No. 31.

Extract from Irak Intelligence Report No. 4, dated February 21, 1924

All reports are in agreement that the reason for the Turkish anxiety on the part of the Kurds is because the Turkish Government is obsessed with the idea that the British and Irak Governments are carrying on a well-sustained propaganda among the Anatolian Kurds in order to persuade them to rise against Turkish rule. It is further believed that arrangements have been reached with Sheikh Mahmud and Sayyid Faha and that these two will be put forward as Kurdish national leaders. It is the fear that the Kurdish national movement will be encouraged and developed in Kurdish areas within the old Mosul Vilayet, and that this will have a fatal repercussion on the Kurds of Anatolia, which is at the back of the Turkish claims with regard to the Mosul frontier, the idea being that no Kurdish areas can safely be left to the Irak.

E 2331/7 65

No. 32

Foreign Office to Colonial Office

Foreign Office, March 20, 1924

Sir,

WITH reference to your letter of the 15th instant on the subject of the forthcoming consideration of the Irak Treaty, &c., by the Constituent Assembly in Bagdad, I am directed by Mr. Secretary Ramsay MacDonald to state that, in all the communications sent to His Majesty's High Commissioner in Bagdad regarding the pressure which it is proposed that Sir H. Dobbs might bring to bear on the Government of Irak to secure the early ratification of the treaty and subsidiary agreements.

2. Mr. Ramsay MacDonald further concurs in the necessity of pointing out to Sir H. Dobbs that, in making any communication on this subject to the Irak Government, all specific reference to the inhabitants of the Mosul Vilayet should be omitted, and that he should refrain from giving the impression that His Majesty's Government are in a position to guarantee the inclusion of the Mosul Vilayet within the frontiers of Irak.

I am, &c

D. G. OSBORNE

E 2574 7 65

No. 33

Colonial Office to Foreign Office.—(Received March 24.)

Downing Street, March 22, 1924

Sir,

I AM directed by Mr. Secretary Thomas to refer to your letter of the 14th March regarding the impending Turco-Irak frontier negotiations, and to state that, in connection with, to be laid before Mr. Secretary Ramsay MacDonald, a copy of a memorandum has been received from the Air Ministry enclosing a memorandum on the strategic aspect of the frontier prepared by the Air Staff, together with a copy of a note on this subject by the General Staff of the War Office.

An additional copy of the enclosures is transmitted herewith for communication to Sir H. Cox should Mr. MacDonald consider this desirable.

I am, &c

J. E. SHUCKBURGH

Enclosure 1 in No. 30

Air Ministry to Colonial Office.

(Secret.)

Sir,

Air Ministry, March 12, 1924

I AM commanded by the Air Council to refer to the impending frontier negotiations respecting the northern boundary of Irak, and am to forward, for the information of the Secretary of State for the Colonies, a memorandum on the strategic aspect of the frontier which has been prepared by the Air Staff, together with three maps.

As the strategic frontier must be considered primarily from the point of view of ground defences, the Council have been in correspondence with the War Office on the subject, and I am to enclose a copy of a memorandum by the General Staff which has been received from that Department.

The sketch map referred to in the General Staff memorandum is a map of the frontier referred to as shown in the three maps accompanying the Air Staff memorandum. The sketch map is enclosed herewith, and is shown on map (C).

I am to add that the Council understand that the War Office are engaged in the preparation of a map of the country in question which will probably be ready by the end of the month.

I am, &c

J. A. WEBSTER



(Secret.)

*Air Staff Memorandum on proposed Strategic Line for a Frontier between Iraq and Turkey*

(Reference maps attached as Appendices (A), (B), and (C)\*)

*General.*

IN considering the question of the most suitable strategic boundary between Iraq and Turkey the Air Staff have assumed that the Mosul Vilayet is to be retained in Iraq and that there is no question of ceding it to Turkey. They have therefore considered a frontier from the point of view of the following requirements:—

- To make a Turkish invasion, either by regulars or irregulars, as difficult as possible.
- To safeguard the interests of the Assyrians, so that they will be of value in protecting Iraq. Experience has shown that the Assyrians make better fighting-men than any of the other available tribes, and the position of their settlements is such that they are well placed to defend the country.
- To retain as much as possible of the difficult mountainous country of Kurdistan as a natural barrier between Turkish territory and the plains of Iraq, so that the advantages thus gained will lessen the disadvantages which Iraq will have to meet if the Turkish Government, being the aggressive party, it is essential that every possible obstacle should be put in her way to make it too difficult for her to wage war.
- To bring the boundary as close to Mosul as possible without adversely affecting the requirements of (a), (b) and (c) above.

*Possible Lines of Advance from Turkey into the Mosul Vilayet*

2. There are five possible lines of advance for the Turks to advance on Mosul. They are—

- Jezret bin Omar, Zakho, Mosul.
- Van, Merwanon Khabur River, Amadia, Mosul.
- Van, Bushkala, Jeddah, Amadia, Mosul.
- Diza, Oramar, Nerve, Amadia, Mosul.
- Van, Bushkala, Diza, Neri, Zoni-e-Bardi Pass, Rowanduz.

(There is a sixth route from Nushin to Mosul, but as this passes through French Syria it is not considered in this paper.)

*Details of Routes in paragraph 2.*

3. Route (a) is passable throughout the year for A.T. cars from Jezret to Zakho; from Zakho to Mosul it is passable for light armoured motor-cars. This is the best route.

Routes (b), (c) and (d) are only fit for pack to Amadia, and then are closed between December and April. From Amadia there are three alternative routes to Mosul. These alternative routes are fit for pack only for 30 miles, when they can take wheeled traffic as follows:—

- Alkosh to Mosul.*—Ford cars.  
*Baldri to Mosul.*—Ford cars half way, then light armoured cars.  
*Akra to Mosul.*—A.T. cars.

There is also a route from Amadia to Zakho (via Sipu Darog), passable for pack mules throughout the year.

Route (e) is considered under two stages:—

- (1) *Van to Diza.*—More or less practicable for light wheeled traffic except for a stretch of 20 miles commencing 13 miles north of Diza. This stretch would only be made fit for wheels with considerable difficulty.

\* Not reproduced.

- (2) *Diza-Neri-Rowanduz.*—Before the Great War a rough but easy mule route existed from Diza to Rowanduz. The Russians improved it considerably in 1916, and it is believed to be passable for light carts, but it may have deteriorated to its pre-war condition. Supplies are scarce, but grazing is plentiful all the year round. The road is open from December to April.

Taking the whole length from Van to Rowanduz, it appears that it is passable for mules only, and is closed from December to April (four and a half to five months). It is, however, an easy route for mules, and from Diza to Rowanduz it might be made passable for light wheeled carts without much difficulty.

*Frontier shown on Appendix (A).*

The frontier shown on map at Appendix (A) coincides with the new frontier suggested by the High Commissioner for Iraq in his despatch dated the 10th October 1923. It is suggested that the Air Staff considered the line should follow the right banks of the Khabur and Hazi Rivers (as in Appendix (A)), whereas the High Commissioner's line follows the left banks. This amendment gives Iraq control of the river crossings, which would be an important advantage. The Air Staff consider that the "blue" frontier map (A) is the best strategic line for Iraq to hold, but they feel that the strategic requirements can still be met by the "red" frontier map (B).

The "blue" frontier map (B), has the following disadvantages:—

- It gives Turkey control of some of the Guli and Sirdi villages, but this is a political disadvantage, as the ground forfeited is of little or no value.
- It gives Turkey control of the Jela and Has country, which forms a formidable corner bastion to the natural barrier which runs from this point to the Persian border. The surrender of this area gives the Turks easier access for the purpose of intrigue and propaganda to the remainder of the Assyrian country already settled in the mountains.
- It entails the loss of part of the natural barrier wall, and it cuts off the Ormar and Hazi from the main line of communication between the two rivers.

*Effect of "Red" Frontier Map (B) on Route (a).*

3. Route (a) is commanded by the Jebel Ichelu Ridge, which runs between Fesh Khabur and Zakho and the hills to the north of Zakho. The proposed "red" frontier brought back any closer to this ridge the Turks would not find it difficult to obtain a direct and easier route to Mosul. It also gives Iraq control of the Khabur and Hazi River crossings, as it is considered advisable to deny these to the potential enemy.

*Effect of Proposed Line on Routes (b), (c) and (d).*

6. Routes (b), (c), (d) all converge at Amadia, which is the strategic point. It has already been stated that "the high ground on which Amadia is situated overlooks the low lying districts of Doluk and Akrah to the south as well as the valley running west to the Taurus mountains." The roads radiating to these places. With Amadia in the hands of the Turkish forces, and with facilities for propaganda which the frequent use of the local tribesmen with Mosul would provide, adequate military protection of the northern frontier would involve insuperable difficulties. In any event, the retention of Amadia as a supply and road centre and so as a potential base of hostile operations, for which the inevitable inter-tribal disturbances would offer a ready pretext, would be a constant source of anxiety to the Iraq Government.

The "red" frontier map (B) not only includes the Amadia Ridge, but takes in all the present inhabited Assyrian country to the north. If the Assyrians are left to the mercy of the Turks, it is more than likely that they would eventually turn against the Iraq Government. The "blue" frontier map (A) is the best strategic line for Iraq to hold.

\* High Commissioner's Iraq despatch dated October 18, 1923.



Enclosure 4 in No. 33

## Notes by the General Staff on the Turco-Irak Frontier

to the forces. In their opinion, the strategic, political and economic effects of a cession of Mosul would render the existence of an independent Arab kingdom in Irak, after the withdrawal of the British garrison, most precarious. The effect upon the French position in Syria would also have to be considered.

2. With regard to Kurdistan, both topographical and ethnographic considerations are of military importance. Taken on the broadest lines, the strategic desiderata are:

- (a.) To retain as much as possible of the difficult, mountainous country of Southern Kurdistan as a natural barrier between Turkish territory and the plains of Iraq
- (b.) To include the Assyrian areas within Iraq, as this people can provide the best material available for service in the Iraq forces, and, in their homes, they form an admirable buffer between Turk and Arab

3. The above points have received full consideration in the recommendations of the High Commissioner, Irak, given in his despatch of the 16th October, 1923, and they are also dealt with in the Air Staff notes on the Irak frontier attached to Air Ministry's letter dated the 5th March, 1924.

4. The General Staff agree generally with Sir H Dobbie's conclusions, and consider that the strategic needs of Iraq could best be served by (1) a line from the Taurus-Irak frontier the maximum line ("now extreme line") to the Persian Gulf, (2) a western alignment so as to make the right bank of the Khabur the line of the frontier, as recommended by the Air Officer Commanding and supported by the Air Staff.

5. Should the more advanced line prove unattainable, the General Staff concur in the somewhat withdrawn line which the Air Staff are prepared to accept as satisfactory in the essential strategic requirements of Iraq. The strategic considerations upon which this alignment is based have been fully explained by the Air Staff and, as the General Staff hold the same views, it appears unnecessary to repeat the arguments. They only wish to reinforce the arguments of the Air Staff as to the military value of places such as Zakho, Amadia and Howanduz, which, though insignificant in themselves, assume in a country such as Kurdistan great importance as potential advanced centres of hostile activity, whether in the nature of operations or propaganda.

The General Staff consider that one modification of the strategic line suggested by Mr. A. J. B. While agreeing with the military desirability of this line along the Iraqi frontier, they feel that our position in this area, which cannot be reinforced by any argument based on the Assyrian districts, are likely to meet with strong opposition from the Turkish delegates. Rather than prejudice the hope of a settlement or risk Turkish counter-claims in other areas, it is considered that we might withdraw the line to the north of Rowanduz. It is suggested that, instead of modification (F) of Sir H. Dobbs' plan, the frontier might continue along the alignment of modification (B) and then along modification (E) up to the Persian frontier. This would make the watershed between the River Baradost (Indbar-i-Baranjar on map) and the River Dubor the boundary north of Rowanduz, and, so far as it is possible to judge from the maps at our disposal, would be less favourable than the other alternatives.

7. The above gives the views of the General Staff as to the frontier which, for strategic reasons, they consider we should endeavour to obtain. Any further withdrawal of this frontier must inevitably impair Iraq's power of defence. It is conceivable, however, that the Government of Iraq might be prepared to consider further concessions to the Turks.

... We ... by concession to secure a satisfied Turkey and free Iraq from a ... tolerable territorial sacrifices might, for the ... because, even with the ...

Enclosure 3 in No. 33

War Office, March 8, 1924

I AM commanded by the Army Council to refer to your letter dated the 5th March, 1924, enclosing a copy of the Air Staff notes on the proposed Turco-Irak frontier.

A General Staff note on the same subject as requested is attached herewith.

I am, &c.

B. B. CUBITT.



... of realisation, as Turkey, so far as we can see, has no legitimate cause  
... Apart from reasons of *amour-propre*, it is difficult to detect in Turkish

... other hand, Iraq's claims in Kurdistan are obviously based on the requirements of  
... which even a Turkish diplomat could scarcely advance on behalf  
... and we must strive to obtain a frontier such as that now suggested, which  
... Iraq the maximum protection by making any hostile advance a serious and  
lengthy operation

9. Thus it is considered that, from the military point of view, no useful purpose  
would be served by an examination now of any reduced frontier lines, as there are no  
... grounds upon which they could be based. Any such examination would be  
dealing with hypothetical conditions of a political nature, and would be academic rather  
than practical

10. A sketch map is attached,\* showing the proposed alignment of the frontier  
with the two possible modifications

General Staff, War Office

17th March 1924

E 2613 229 65

No. 34

Colonial Office to Foreign Office.—(Received March 24)

Sir,

Downing Street, March 24, 1924

I AM directed by Mr Secretary Thomas to acknowledge the receipt of your letter  
of the 18th March regarding the proposal advanced in a recent telegram from the High  
Commissioner for Iraq, that combined manoeuvres should be undertaken as a  
precautionary measure in the Mosul area, and to transmit to you herewith the draft  
a telegram which Mr Thomas proposes, subject to the concurrence of Mr Secretary  
Ramsay MacDonald, to address to Sir Henry Dobbie in reply

2. It will be observed that Mr Thomas has deferred to the  
... and I am to request that he may be informed at an early  
... Mr Ramsay MacDonald concurs in the terms of the proposed reply to Sir Henry Dobbie

3. A similar letter has been addressed to the Air Ministry

I am, &c

J. E. SHUCKBURGH

Enclosure in No. 34

Draft Telegram to the High Commissioner, Iraq

YOUR telegram No. 103 of 11th February

It is undesirable that any unusual movement should be undertaken in the Mosul area  
...  
...  
...  
...  
neither letter nor spirit of article 11 of the 1914 Protocol is contravened

E 2682/7 65]

No. 35

Colonial Office to Foreign Office.—(Received March 25)

Sir,

Downing Street, March 25, 1924

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for the Colonies to transmit to you, for  
the information of Mr Secretary MacDonald, copy of a telegram to Sir H Dobbie  
subject of the forthcoming consideration of the Iraq Treaty, &c., by the Constituent  
Assembly in Bagdad

I am, &c

J. E. MASTERTON SMITH

\* Not reproduced.

*Secretary of State for the Colonies to the High Commissioner of Iraq.*

(Telegraphic) P.

Colonial Office, March 21, 1924.

HIS Majesty's Government agree to your informing the Irak Government that His Majesty's Government's position in the frontier negotiations which are shortly to take place would be considerably strengthened if the Irak Treaty and the agreements subsidiary thereto were accepted by the Irak Assembly before these negotiations actually commence.

The unity of purpose existing between the two countries would thus be demonstrated. It is particularly desirable that public evidence of this should be given, as it is improbable that the Turkish Government will consent to the official participation of Iraq in the negotiations.

When communicating thus to the Iraq Government, you should not specifically refer to the inhabitants of the Mosul Vilayet, and you should carefully avoid conveying the impression that His Majesty's Government are in a position to guarantee that, "the event of the treaty being accepted by the Iraq Assembly, the whole of the area under dispute will be included in Iraq as a result of the frontier negotiations." Both in official communications and in conversation in Iraq, those negotiations should invariably be described as "frontier negotiations," and not as "Mosul negotiations." This refers to your telegram No. 129 of the 11th March.

[ R 3021/7/65 ]

No. 95A

Yusef Kemal Pasha to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received April 4.)

## Excellence

Monsieur l'ingénieur, Londres le 3 avril 1861

Excellence,  
MON Gouvernement, ayant été informé que des personnes se sont  
Députés de la population du [ ] ont été autorisées à adresser à Vostre  
qui vient de réunir à Be [ ] à l'égard de votre Excellence q  
ce fait comme contraire aux stipulations contenues dans l'article 7  
à l'évacuation des territoires turcs occupés par les forces britanniques, françaises et  
italiennes" et déclaration signée à Lausanne le 24 juillet 1922 par [ ] des deux  
Gouvernements" s'engagent respectivement, en attendant la mise [ ] du Traité  
de Paix, à ne rien faire qui puisse modifier le statu quo, quo le [ ] a été de  
l'article 3 (2) dudit traité a pour objet de maintenir jusqu'à la déter [ ] de la  
frontière

Toutefois, malgré l'occupation militaire à laquelle elle se trouve soumise, la Turquie, par ses députés, dans le Parlement de Constantinople, et par ses députés à la Conférence de Lausanne, a manifesté durant et après les dernières élections générales qui eurent lieu en Turquie et continues toujours à manifester un ardent désir de se voir représentée par ses véritables mandataires dans la grande Assemblée nationale de la Turquie et de la République. Le Gouvernement turc a approuvé et continue d'approuver les plus grandes difficultés pour observer strictement, comme il s'y est engagé, les stipulations de l'article 7 susmentionné.

de l'article 7 susmentionné.  
 Dans ces conditions, mon Gouvernement m'a chargé de renouveler auprès de  
 votre Gouvernement la demande de libération de la ville de Srebrenica, la dernière tentative de  
 médiation ayant échoué.  
 Je tiens à vous remercier pour l'attention que vous avez portée à la demande de libération  
 signée à Lausanne, le 17 juillet 1995, et pour l'engagement que vous avez pris de  
 bombardement aérien de Srebrenica effectué le 16 août dernier et qui causa parmi la  
 population civile de la ville trente-sept victimes.  
 Je vous prie d'agréer, Monsieur le Secrétaire d'Etat, l'assurance de ma haute considération.

Je prie, &c  
YOUSSEUF KEMAL.

E 2614 229 651

No. 35.

Mr. MacDonald to Mr. Phelps (Parent)

(No. 1145.)

511.

Foreign Office, April 4, 1924.

During the past two months information has been received indicating a progressive weakening of French administrative control in that area of Syria contained between the 1920 League of Nations Mandate for Syria and the Lebanon and the 1920 French-Turkish Convention line of 1920, the Franco-Turkish boundary of October 1921 and the Euphrates. A complete evacuation of this area could not be most likely to entail a Turkish advance into the wedge of territory between the 1920 League of Nations Mandate for Syria and the Lebanon and the 1920 Franco-Turkish Convention line of 1920, the Franco-Turkish boundary of October 1921 and the Euphrates, and the situation is one that causes

2. Recent information from His Majesty's High Commissioner at Bagdad confirms three fears, for reports have been received of the establishment of Turkish posts south of the Nisibin-Jezirat-ibn-Omar road, on the west side of the Tigris in an area on the Syrian side of the frontier laid down by the Franco-Turkish Treaty of 1921. This information, if confirmed, would appear to indicate, on the one hand, a gradual withdrawal of French authority from this eastern portion of Syria and, on the other hand, aggressive intentions on the part of the Turkish authorities against Iraq, of which other evidence has been received. Such indications of aggressive action are at present insufficient in themselves to warrant a protest to the Turkish Government against an infringement of the *status quo* provided for in article 3 of the Treaty of Lausanne and article 7 of the Evian Protocol. At the same time, the authorities in Bagdad are apprehensive lest the establishment of posts west of the Tigris and the advent of Turkish troops to this area may cause tribal unrest which would react on the eastern side of the boundary.

3. I should therefore be glad if you will inform the French Government that His Majesty's Government have learnt of the armed penetration by Turkish detachments into Syrian territory west of the Tigris and south of the Nasibin-Jezret-ibn-Omar road, which, under article 8 of the Franco-Turkish Agreement signed at Angora on the 24th October, 1921, clearly falls within the area under French mandate. You should explain that some apprehension is felt regarding this movement, which, taken in conjunction with certain reports of Turkish troop movements in an easterly direction towards the area north of Mosul, constitutes a potential if not actual threat to the position of His Majesty's Government on the eve of the negotiations regarding the Treaty of Peace.



Irak frontier. The French Government should be reminded of the following statement in M. de Montale's note to the Marquess Curzon of the 25th November, 1921:—

« Sur ce point, le Gouvernement français tient à donner au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté l'assurance la plus formelle qu'en aucun cas il ne pourrait envisager l'hypothèse d'une facilité quelconque donnée par lui à des desseins hostiles dirigés contre un territoire de mandat britannique.

4. In conclusion, I shall be glad if you will ask the French Government whether they have any information bearing on the general question, adding that, in view of the above undertaking, His Majesty's Government are confident that they will allow no concentration of Turkish troops to occur on the Syrian side of the Irak frontier.

I am, &c

J. RAMSAY MACDONALD.

E 2574/7 65]

No. 37

Foreign Office to Air Ministry

(Secret.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, April 9, 1924.

I AM directed by Mr. Secretary Ramsay MacDonald to transmit to you the accompanying printed copies of a letter with enclosures from the Colonial Office,\* relative to the strategic aspect of the Turco-Irak frontier negotiations.

2. The question, as therein discussed, has been in view of the safety of Irak from Turkish attack, although the assumption is naturally involved therewith in so far as it concerns retention of the territory to which they belong, and where it is hoped to re-establish. This point of view, which is well summarised in paragraph 4 of the notes by the Staff of the War Office appears, however, to contain a fallacy. In that paragraph it is stated that Irak could never, unaided, resist serious Turkish aggression and that any concession beyond the minimum "green" frontier line will not avert the danger of aggression, but will rather afford an inducement and opportunity for it.

3. The Secretary of State is rather inclined to the view that, to satisfy the Turks by some concession to their demands, even beyond what is regarded as the maximum by the Air Ministry and the War Office, the danger of aggression might be averted, at any rate for a time, since the acquisition of territory not inhabited by people of the Turkish race is hardly compatible with the present Turkish policy of nationalism and racial purification.

4. I am further to observe that it would be unwise definitely to count upon obtaining even the minimum "green" frontier either by agreement at Constantinople or by arbitration of the League of Nations.

5. I am to invite the observations of your Department upon the above considerations.

6. Similar letters are being sent to the Colonial Office and War Office.

I am, &c  
D. G. OSBORNE.

E 3415/7 65]

No. 38

War Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 16.)

(Secret.)

Sir,

War Office, April 16, 1924.

I AM commanded by the Army Council to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, dated the 9th April, 1924, on the subject of the Turco-Irak frontier negotiations.

In reply, I am to forward the observations of the General Staff, which are made in the attached memorandum.

Copies of the memorandum are being sent to the Air Ministry and Colonial Office.

I am, &c

B. B. CUBITT

[E 3079 7 65]

No. 36A

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received April 7.)

(No. 284.)

Sir,

Constantinople, April 2, 1924

WITH reference to Mr. Henderson's despatch No. 60 of the 18th January, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a note from the delegate to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs regarding Turco-Irak frontier incidents.

2. I venture to suggest that no good purpose will be served by pursuing this matter further with the Turkish Government. Subject, therefore, to your approval I propose not to make any reply to Adnan Bey's last note.

I have, &c

R. G. LINDSAY

Enclosure in No. 36A

Adnan Bey to Mr. Lindsay

Excellence,

Constantinople, le 31 mars 1924

EN réponse à la note que votre Excellence a bien voulu m'adresser en date du 18 janvier 1924, j'ai l'honneur de l'informar, sur une communication du Département de la direction de Ravandiz, quatre seulement ont passé la frontière et survolé les villages de la commune de Kurdi en violation du territoire turc.

Quant au commandant Ismail Hakkı Bey officier de renseignements de Neumollane, Par conséquent, il ne peut être question d'une lettre adressée par lui aux chefs de Singar.

En portant ce qui précède à la connaissance de votre Excellence, je prie de

ADNAN

*Memorandum on the Turco-Irak Frontier*

The Staff have carefully considered the observations of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, set forth in Foreign Office letter dated the 9th April, 1924.

The question turns upon the attitude of the Turks, not only now but in the future, towards the reacquisition of territory inhabited by people of other than Turkish race.

The attempt to forecast the future trend of Turkish aspirations and ambitions is a task which the General Staff can only approach with great diffidence, and which they feel they can be far more competent than they to deal with.

Nevertheless, certain aspects of the case in which recent Turkish action appears to afford some indication of Turkey's attitude, and upon which the General Staff would venture.

The General Staff have noted that the National Assembly claims to be working for nationalism and racial purification, and that in the National Pact itself the intention to allow self-determination to the Arabs finds expression. When, however, it comes to practical application both Turkish actions and claims appear difficult to reconcile with this policy.

The negotiations over the Turco-Irak frontier, which we are now considering, themselves result directly from Turkish claims which, as Lord Curzon said at Lausanne, are entirely incompatible with the national and racial ideas professed by Turkey.

A reference to this policy being so conspicuously absent in the presentation of the Turkish case in the negotiations, the General Staff can feel no hesitation to say that they would not expect or restrain them in whatever the situation may be as the result of these negotiations.

It was mainly for this reason that the General Staff considered that concessions, in the event of the opportunity, would also offer an inducement to further encroachments.

Their view on this point remains unchanged, and they are strongly of opinion that it would be inadvisable to surrender any territory of tangible strategic advantage to Irak in the hope of securing the very problematical goodwill of Turkey. They agree that for the moment of aggression might possibly be averted, but they assume that our policy is to endeavour to obtain lasting security for Irak. They would point out that the graver danger to Irak is not likely to arise until after our withdrawal at the end of four years, and it is primarily for Irak's safety from then onwards that we wish to make provision.

If further argument were needed, it might perhaps be found in Syria. The foreign activities and apparent future intentions in this predominantly Arab area are in accordance with their reputed policy.

In conclusion, the General Staff would advocate most strongly that every endeavour be made to secure at least the minimum "green" frontier, even though it should be at Constantinople.

Should the subsequent arbitration of the League of Nations fail to give us our full demands, Irak—whose cause it is we are fighting—will actually be no worse off than if such concessions to Turkish claims were made by His Majesty's Government in the first instance. Indirectly, it is perhaps not too much to hope that the position might be somewhat stronger, as the settlement will have been reached by impartial arbitration of the League, with whatever moral weight it can bring to bear upon the Turks behind it.

General Staff, War Office,  
April 14, 1924

E 3461 7 65

No 39

*Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received April 18)*

(No. 75)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Constantinople, April 17, 1924

MY telegram No. 52

Adnan called to-day to say that Turkish Government would be ready to negotiate on Irak frontier when His Majesty's Government had completed ratification. Ismet Pasha proposed beginning of May for opening negotiations.



I recommend that you telegraph to me as soon as ratification is deposited, and at the same time instruct me to inform Turkish Government that Sir P. Cox will arrive on 5th May to begin negotiations.  
Bairam holiday ends 7th May  
(Reputed to Bagdad, No. 18)

E 3538 88 65]

No. 40

Mr. Hodgson to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received April 22)

(No. 385.)

Sir,

Moscow, April 10, 1924

With reference to your despatch No. 275 of the 5th March, I have the honour to report that, according to such information as I have been able to obtain, of Assyrian refugees scattered over the territory of the neighbourhood of 40,000.

2. Of the total number approximately 30,000 were at one time Turkish subjects, from various parts of Mesopotamia, more particularly from the Mosul district, from Bush Tura, Tikharin, Daz Gavar, Lavin and Jalaverik. The rest are of Persian, Armenian, Circassian and Sulman. All are in very poor condition and are a life among them. They wish to return to their homes under Turkish rule.

3. In Moscow there are some 4,000 of these refugees, in Petrograd some 3,000, and a similar number in Rostov. The rest are scattered about at Novosibirsk, Armavir, Vladikavkaz, Krasnodar, Stavropol and Kiev.

I have, &c

R. M. HODGSON

(E 3612 7 65)

No. 41

Air Ministry to Foreign Office.—(Received April 25)

Sir,

April 24, 1924

of Foreign Office

In reply to your letter of the 19th March, 1924, regarding the suggestion in paragraph 4 of the letter, and in reply to the memorandum on the subject which has been forwarded to the Foreign Office.

I am, &c

J. A. WILKINSON

Enclosure in No. 41

Memorandum on the Turco-Irak Frontier

THE Air Staff have carefully considered the observations put forward by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in Foreign Office letter of the 9th April, 1924, and regret that they are unable to agree with the conclusions contained in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the letter, and for the following reasons view with great concern the suggestion in paragraph 4:—

1. In considering the question of the Turco-Irak frontier the Air Staff have always assumed that the requirements dealt with in paragraph (1) of their previous memorandum, dated the 10th March, 1924, were the principles on which the frontier should be based and it is therefore essential that every possible step should be taken to safeguard her frontier. Every concession which is made to Turkey behind the maximum "blue" frontier will make Turkey better able to act the part of aggressor. In view of the fact that the negotiations that are to take place in Constantinople are directly due to Turkish claims for territory which is not inhabited by people of the Turkish

race, it is difficult to understand on what principles the Turkish policy of racial purification and nationalism is based. Previous experience has shown that when Turkey has territory which is not occupied by people of the Turkish race she remedies the "fault" by the simple expedient of expelling the non-Turkish population.

Any departure from these requirements would weaken Irak to such an extent that it is doubtful whether she would even be able to withstand the effects of the pro-Turkish propaganda which is actually disseminated to-day within Irak territory. It is also very much open to question whether the Imperial garrison in Irak would not have to be increased if Turkey were given greater advantages. In this connection it should be remembered that only twelve months ago it was necessary to turn the Turks out of Rowanduz by force before the Imperial garrison could be reduced below a nine-battalion basis because the Turks were using this favourable position to organise an attack against the British and Irak Governments.

- Turkish propaganda has been in existence ever since Great Britain accepted the mandate for Irak. The Turk has been untiring in his efforts to raise trouble in Irak, chiefly amongst the Kurds in the north and north-east of Irak. Even now, when a conference has been arranged in Constantinople to decide the frontier question, this propaganda has not ceased but lately has become more disgusting.

- In view of the above facts the Air Staff do not feel confident that Turkey has any intention of carrying out her professed policy as detailed in paragraph 3 of the Foreign Office letter. A complete cessation of Turkish propaganda in Irak and Kurdistan would be more in keeping with the Turkish policy of nationalism and race purification.

The Air Staff consider that the greatest danger to Irak will come after the withdrawal of the Imperial garrison, and as it appears that the Foreign Office are in no way certain that their suggestion would be lasting in its effect, it would seem quite possible that, if the Foreign Office were to agree to the suggestion, an occasion may arise when Irak will be without a strategic barrier when she most needs it. With no natural barrier in her way Turkey would be in a position to smother Irak with propaganda and the collapse of the Arab Empire, which we have taken such pains to establish, would be a matter of time.

- If the people of Irak believe that the British Government is not able to hold its own against Turkey for the benefit of Irak it is quite within the bounds of possibility that political risings will take place throughout the country and serious loss of life might result, which would greatly add to the difficulty of controlling the country during the next four years.

- The Air Staff are still of the opinion, as expressed in their previous memorandum, dated the 10th March, 1924, that the "green" frontier map (c) is the last modification which they can consider from a strategical point of view and even then this modification should only be carried out when the political considerations are so important that they outweigh the strategical considerations. They trust, therefore, that the Foreign Office will not even press for a withdrawal behind the maximum "blue" frontier on the strength of the arguments put forward in the letter under discussion.

Air Staff, April 23, 1924

[E 3663/7/65]

No. 42

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received April 26)

(No. 83)

(Telegraphic)

Constantinople April 25, 1924.

ADNAN called to-day to state officially that Turkish delegation for Irak frontier negotiations will consist of Fethi Bey, ex-Prime Minister and now President of Assembly, Fezi Deputy for Diarbekir and ex-Minister for Public Works, and Faik another Deputy. This delegation will be ready to begin on 1st May, and Turkish Government wish to know when Sir P. Cox will be here to meet it.

Delegation is as distinguished in character as could have been expected, and unexceptional in other respects.

[12045]

I asked Adnan to-day for a reply about Indian reservation, but he was unable to give me one. Turkish Government have thus waived tacitly any demand for full and formal ratification before beginning of frontier negotiations. I do not think that

to reply about Indian Government reservation. So far as beginning of negotiations is concerned, they have substantially done precisely what I demanded of them (see telegram No. 64). I then told them that, as soon as Parliament had completed action on treaty, I should expect them to name a date for frontier discussions immediately. Parliament having passed treaty 12th April, Turkish Government on 17th April named 1st May for opening of discussions. I should also mention that, in accordance with your instructions (your telegrams Nos. 42 and 52), I have repeatedly urged them to name earliest possible day, and have always given them to understand that His Majesty's Government would be ready to at any moment (see your telegram No. 43).

I therefore earnestly hope that Sir P. Cox will be able to arrive here on or immediately after 1st May. Any delay now by His Majesty's Government will have the worst possible effect here and will excite every Turkish suspicion.

It may also make it difficult for His Majesty's Government to maintain their claim that nine months' period for negotiation began running on 8th December (Repeated to Bagdad No. 16).

E 3555/7/65]

No. 43

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald -- (Received May 2)

(No. 67)

(Telegraphic) R

Constantinople, May 2, 1924

MY telegram No. 83 of 25th April Turkey-Irak frontier negotiations.

I have received official note from Adnan dated 30th April, informing me of arrival of and composition of Turkish mission, and asking when Sir P. Cox will arrive.

E 3552 229 65]

No. 44

The Marquess of Crewe to Mr. MacDonald -- (Received May 3)

(No. 1005.)

HIS Majesty's Ambassador at Paris presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of notes exchanged with the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs respecting the movement of Turkish troops through Syria.

Paris, May 2, 1924.

Enclosure 1 in No. 44

Memorandum communicated to French Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

WITH reference to the note addressed to the President of the Council by His Majesty's Ambassador on the 7th April last, the attention of the Government of the Republic is now drawn to the fact that a memorandum recently communicated by the French Intelligence Service in Syria to the British liaison officer at Beirut on the subject of conditions concerning the movement of Turkish troops on the Syrian section of the Bagdad Railway appears to His Majesty's Government to indicate that by the terms of a recent Franco-Turkish convention the Turkish Government have been released from the obligation to inform the French authorities of the origin and destination of their troops when giving notice of their intention to employ this section of railway for the movement of such troops.

The relevant passages in the memorandum are to the effect that an annex to the Agreement of Angora stipulates that at each time when either of the two countries requires to make use of the right of military transport on stated sections of this railway it will be under the obligation to inform the other country beforehand.

E 3558 7 65]

No. 42a

Mr. MacDonald to Yussuf Kemal Bey

Sir,

Foreign Office, April 2, 1924

IN reply to your letter of the 3rd instant, regarding the representation of Mosul Vilayet in the Irak Constituent Assembly, I have the honour to state that the Mosul Vilayet is at present under the effective administration of the Irak Government, and as admitted that vilayet was so administered at the time of the Treaty of Lausanne, the purely domestic decision of the Irak Government to carry out the administration in accordance with the principles of representative government cannot in any way be regarded as constituting a disturbance of the status quo. As a result of the forthcoming negotiations, the Mosul Vilayet were declared to be Turkish, the election of deputies for that district to the Irak Constituent Assembly would automatically lapse. On the other hand, the representation of Mosul in the Grand National Assembly of Turkey in the present circumstances would constitute a disturbance of the status quo.

I have, &c

J. RAMSAY MACDONALD



convention, which has not yet been ratified, provides that telegraphic warning shall be given seven days beforehand and that the warning shall indicate the number of passengers and of trucks, whether open or shut, without mentioning either the origin or destination of the troops or the material carried.

In the undertaking of the 25th November, 1921, the French Government gave to His Majesty's Government the most formal assurance that in no case would they contemplate the possibility of facilitating any hostilities against territory under British mandate, and on that assurance His Majesty's Government fully rely. There appears, however, to be some disparity between this undertaking and the terms of the new convention quoted above. The terms of this new convention would appear in fact to render it impossible for the French authorities in Syria to exercise any effective control over Turkish troop movements by railway through French mandated territory.

Paris, April 25, 1924

#### Enclosure 2 in No. 44

#### Note communicated by French Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

L'AIT une note en date du 25 avril, l'Ambassade de Sa Majesté a bien voulu attirer l'attention du Gouvernement français sur le récent projet de convention franco-turque, relatif aux transports militaires sur le Chemin de Fer de Bagdad, prévus par l'article 10 de l'Accord d'Angora. Elle signale que, d'après ce projet, les transports importants de troupes et de matériel effectués de la part soit du Gouvernement turc, soit du Haut-

sept jours auprès des Gouvernements intéressés, qui indiquera le nombre des voyageurs et des wagons ouverts ou fermés, mais sans faire mention de l'origine et de la destination des troupes ou du matériel transportés.

Le Gouvernement britannique rappelle que, dans l'accord du 25 novembre 1921, le Gouvernement français lui avait donné l'assurance la plus formelle qu'en aucun cas il ne laisserait imaginer l'hypothèse d'une facilité quelconque donnée par lui à des desseins hostiles dirigés contre un territoire de mandat britannique. Le Gouvernement britannique fait remarquer qu'il semble qu'il y ait désharmonie entre les termes de cet arrangement et ceux de la nouvelle convention, les articles de celle-ci paraissant, en fait, rendre impossible pour les autorités françaises de Syrie l'exercice d'un contrôle effectif sur les mouvements de troupes turques utilisant la section de chemin de fer en pays de mandat français.

Le Ministère des Affaires étrangères a l'honneur de faire connaître à l'Ambassade de Sa Majesté britannique que sa note du 25 avril a retenu toute son attention et croit devoir formuler à cette occasion les observations suivantes.

En ce qui concerne la question du préavis, la lettre-annexe à l'Accord d'Angora avait indiqué la nécessité, en cas de transports militaires, de donner, de part et d'autre, un préavis suffisant. Le Gouvernement français a estimé qu'il était difficile, en équité, d'imposer aux Turcs un préavis télégraphique de plus de sept jours.

Pour la seconde question, relative à l'indication d'origine et de destination des troupes et du matériel transportés, le Gouvernement français croit devoir faire remarquer que s'il n'a pas insisté sur ce point, c'est qu'il s'est rendu compte du caractère illusoire de la garantie donnée par une déclaration turque en pareille matière. Les mouvements et la destination des troupes ottomanes peuvent, d'ailleurs, difficilement échapper aux autorités françaises. Le Gouvernement de la République a, du reste, donné l'instruction au Haut-Commissariat de se documenter d'une manière aussi précise que possible sur les déplacements et la direction des troupes turques transportées et de lui communiquer les renseignements de quelque importance qui parviendraient à sa connaissance. Il a fait, en outre, insérer dans le texte même du projet de convention la formule suivante :

"Il va de soi que la présente convention ne porte pas atteinte aux obligations des Parties contractantes en vertu de la Convention de La Haye de 1907 sur les règles de la neutralité."

Le Ministère des Affaires étrangères est assuré d'avance qu'après ces explications l'Ambassade de Sa Majesté reconnaitra qu'il n'y a pas désharmonie entre les

projet de convention relatif aux transports militaires prévus par l'article 10 de l'Accord d'Angora et l'accord du 25 novembre 1921, mais qu'en négociant la première, le Gouvernement de la République a eu, au contraire, constamment le souci de rester fidèle à l'esprit et à la lettre des engagements pris vis-à-vis du Gouvernement britannique.

Paris, le 30 avril 1924

E 3855 7 65

No 45

Mr Macdonald to Mr Lindsay (Constantinople)

(No 67)

(Telegraphic)

Foreign Office, May 7, 1924

YOUR telegram No. 83 of 25th April

Sir Percy Cox accompanied by Lady Cox, Mr Hall, Mr Jardine and Colonel Lees, is leaving London for Constantinople on 12th May. The party should arrive on Friday 19th. Taha Bey will reach Constantinople from Bagdad direct on date which will be notified later.

You should inform Adnan Bey of date of Sir Percy Cox's arrival.

E 3855 7 65

No 46

Mr Macdonald to Sir P. Cox

Foreign Office, May 6, 1924

WITH reference to the correspondence ending with the letter from this department of the 12th January last on the subject of your appointment as British representative at the frontier negotiations with the Turkish Government arising out of article 3 of the Treaty of Lausanne and article 7 of the Evacuation Protocol attached thereto, I have to inform you that it has been decided in agreement with the Turkish Government, to open the oral negotiations in Constantinople as soon as possible.

2. You should therefore make such arrangements as you deem necessary to leave for Constantinople on the 12th inst. Mr J. N. Hall of the Colonial Office and Lieutenant Colonel E. F. W. Lees, of the War Office, will be attached to your staff to assist you in the negotiations, together with Mr R. F. Jardine (Administrative Inspector in the service of the Iraq Government), who possesses expert knowledge

of Iraq and has appointed Taha Bey as his representative. The Turkish Government have refused to allow him to participate officially in the discussions, but he will be able to assist you with his advice, and you should endeavour to secure his attendance, in an informal capacity, as your adviser at as many of the official meetings as possible, and at such of the informal discussions, which will no doubt take place, as you may consider suitable. He will proceed direct from Iraq and will join your mission in Constantinople. Arrangements have been made for you to receive the assistance of an adequate clerical staff.

Conference, but as the discussions then produced no definite result it was decided that the frontier should be laid down in friendly arrangement to be concluded between Turkey and Great Britain within nine months, and that in the event of no agreement being reached between the two Governments within the time mentioned, the dispute should be referred to the Council of the League of Nations. This decision was embodied in article 3 (2) of the Treaty of Lausanne and article 7 of the Evacuation Protocol. The period of nine months therein prescribed commenced on the 5th October 1923. It is in virtue of the provisions of these articles that you are proceeding to Constantinople for the purpose of resuming the negotiations at the point where they were laid down by Lord Curzon at Lausanne, in order to make an effort to establish, in agreement with the representatives of the Turkish Government, an acceptable frontier between Iraq and Turkey.

4. In deciding what frontier they should endeavour to secure, His Majesty's Government have primarily been influenced by the various ethnic, political, economic and strategical considerations which were outlined in Lord Curzon's speech before

the Political and Military Commission at Lausanne on the 23rd January 1923 (p. 352 of Cmd. 1814), and more fully developed in the several memoranda on the subject submitted by the British delegation (pp. 363-364 of Cmd. 1814), and also in subsequent reports from the competent civil authorities.

5. Another consideration of material importance is the considerable influence upon the policy of His Majesty's Government

to arrange for the settlement of all Assyrian communities other than those of Persian origin, within Iraq territory.

6. On the basis of these considerations His Majesty's Government claim on behalf of Iraq the frontier indicated on the attached map\* (scale 1" to 4 miles), which would admit of the Assyrians being settled within the borders of Iraq, either actually in their ancient habitations or in suitable adjacent districts. It is considered that this frontier is in accordance with the wishes of the Christian minorities of the Christian communities of the region.

7. You should use your utmost endeavours to secure the acceptance by the Turkish representatives of a frontier between Iraq and Turkey substantially identical with that indicated above. If you are successful the decision reached should be embodied in a formal agreement to be signed by yourself and the chief Turkish representative. This agreement should provide for the subsequent appointment of a Boundary Commission composed of one Turkish and one British representative assisted by a suitable staff to delimit the frontier on the spot. It would be advisable to make it clear at the outset of the discussions that this frontier does not represent the maximum claim that could be advanced on behalf of the Christian minorities, but that it would leave on the Turkish side of the frontier a large area of their ancient home land. The line is in the nature of a compromise, and is only put forward by His Majesty's Government in view of their desire to meet the views of the Turkish Government so far as possible and thus to secure a settlement by agreement. Should this prove unobtainable His Majesty's Government reserve to themselves full liberty of action in regard to the frontier to be claimed before the League of Nations.

8. Should it appear that by conceding certain areas of relatively minor importance, or by making economic or other concessions which would not impair the vital interests of Iraq, it might be possible, having due regard to the declared policy and obligations of His Majesty's Government, to secure an agreed frontier, you are authorised to use your discretion to explore the ground by means of private and informal discussions with the Turkish delegation upon the clear and mutual understanding that such discussions are entirely without prejudice. The result of any such informal discussion should be reported at once to His Majesty's Government, and you should not commit yourself to accepting any compromise without obtaining their prior concurrence.

9. If, on the other hand, it becomes evident that there can be no satisfactory outcome from the negotiations and that their continuance would serve no useful purpose, you should report accordingly to His Majesty's Government and as a result of the wish of His Majesty's Government that the negotiations should be definitely broken off while there remains any prospect of a successful issue or without prior reference to London.

I am &c.  
J. RAMSAY MACDONALD

E 4942 88 65

No. 47

High Commissioner for Iraq to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.— Communicated by Colonial Office, Received in Foreign Office, May 9.

(Telegraphic) P

Bagdad, May 6, 1924

PRINCIPLES of policy towards Assyrians detailed in your telegram of 19th January have already been communicated to Prime Minister for Council by letter, of which a copy has been sent to King Feisal. Letter contained in particular an

\* Not reproduced.

[12045]

23



invitation to the Irak Government to undertake to grant lands to the Assyrians on favourable terms and without charge and afford them a generous measure of liberty management of their own local affairs. Letter explained advantages which Irak would gain by such an arrangement. Resolution accepting the proposals contained in the letter was passed by Council of Ministers on 30th April. I am forwarding by air mail copies of letter and resolution. I have satisfied myself that north of Mosul there is sufficient Government land available for all Assyrians likely to require it. On the 4th May, however, inhabitants of Kirkuk were the victims of an atrocious massacre perpetrated by Assyrian levies, which has changed whole situation. I am reporting separately upon this.

Above refers to your telegram of 10th April

[E 4043 4043 65]

No. 48.

High Commissioner for Irak to Secretary of State for the Colonies.—(Communicated to Foreign Office, May 9.)

(Telegraphic) P.

Bagdad, May 7, 1924

REGRET to report deplorable outbreak at Kirkuk on 4th May of two companies of the 2nd infantry battalion Assyrian levies, consisting of the wildest tribal elements. Two companies of the battalion had recently departed for Chemchemal, and the remaining two companies were due to start for the same place on the 5th May. Facts at present ascertained are as follows:—

About 10 a.m. altercation regarding prices between three Assyrian privates and three Moslem shopkeepers ended in assaults by the latter on the former, who ran to their lines and excited their comrades by complaints of insults to the levies. Two levies of the Assyrian levies immediately paraded all the Assyrians without arms, told them the shopkeepers would be severely dealt with and they behaved, pacifying Assyrians dismissed parade. On the way from Assyrians savagely assaulted number of Moslems sitting in tea-shop, and, after slight collision with the civil police, who tried to bar their way into the town, rushed to their quarters, seized rifles and ammunition, and ran amok through Kirkuk for something like three hours firing at and killing all Moslems whom they met and bring down into streets and houses from roofs. Police were powerless, and Kurdish cavalry levies detained in lines by officers for fear of making racial fighting worse. Native Assyrian officers reported to have behaved well and to have tried to beat back their men, but completely lost control. Administrative Inspector, Kirkuk, immediately reported by telegraph, and Air Officer Commanding sent to Kirkuk by Air Colonel Dobbs and two platoons of the Royal Air Force. By 4 p.m. all the British officers at great personal risk Assyrians had been got under control by the British officers and the local Christians from massacre by the enraged Moslem populace. All Assyrians were immediately marched few miles outside town. I went by

Kirkuk, and found the situation much quieter. Ten local Christians killed accidentally in retaliation on 5th May to make preliminary enquiries, after which ringleaders will be tried by special court of inquiry. I am satisfied that the Government must face the possibility that the execution of the ringleaders, which will almost certainly be necessary, may, however completely justified, lead to intense excitement

owing to the intense excitement on both sides. Air Officer Commanding situation much quieter. Ten local Christians killed accidentally in retaliation on 5th May to make preliminary enquiries, after which ringleaders will be tried by special court of inquiry. I am satisfied that the Government must face the possibility that the execution of the ringleaders, which will almost certainly be necessary, may, however completely justified, lead to intense excitement

amongst the other Assyrian levies. Relations between Assyrians and Moslems of Kirkuk had up to the moment of the outbreak been uniformly excellent. I will report further after the preliminary enquiry is complete.

Air Officer Commanding has seen this telegram

[E 4305/7/65]

No. 49

Colonial Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 16.)

Sir,

Downing Street, May 16, 1924.

I AM directed by Mr Secretary Thomas to refer to the Inter-Departmental Conference, held at this Office on the 6th May, to consider the strategical aspects of the Turco-Irak frontier negotiations, and to transmit herewith, for the information of Mr Secretary Ramsay MacDonald, a report of the proceedings of the conference.

2. In view of the terms of Sir H. Dobbs's telegram No. 237 of the 6th May, a copy of which accompanied the letter from this Department of the 8th May, it will not be necessary to send a telegram in the sense recommended in the first of the resolutions recorded at the end of the report.

I am, &c.

J. E. SHUCKBURGH

Enclosure in No. 49

Note of a Conference held at the Colonial Office on May 6 to consider the Strategical Aspects of the Turco-Irak Frontier Negotiations.

Present:

Sir J. E. Shuckburgh, K.C.M.G., C.B.	...	...	Colonial Office.
Major H. W. Young, C.M.G., D.S.O.	...	...	
Mr. J. H. Hall, D.S.O., M.C.	...	...	
Mr. L. Oliphant, C.M.G.	...	...	Foreign Office
Mr. F. Rodd	...	...	
Colonel S. F. Muspratt, C.S.I., C.I.E., D.S.O., A.D.C.	...	...	War Office.
Lieutenant-Colonel E. F. W. Lees, D.S.O.	...	...	
Group-Captain C. S. Burnett, C.B.E., D.S.O.	...	...	Air Ministry.
Squadron-Leader R. Graham, D.S.O., D.S.C., D.F.C.	...	...	
Flight-Lieutenant A. C. Collier	...	...	
Sir P. Z. Cox, G.C.M.G., G.C.I.E., K.C.S.I.	...	...	
Mr. R. F. Jardine	...	...	

SIR J. SHUCKBURGH explained that the object of the conference was to consider the possibility of making still further frontier concessions to the Turks and the "green line" frontier shown upon the maps furnished by the Air Ministry. He pointed out that this question arose from a recent letter from the Foreign Office, in which the view was expressed that the "green line" would not satisfy the Turks, and that, in order to secure an agreed frontier, further concessions might prove to be necessary. He asked Group-Captain Burnett whether the Air Staff thought it would be possible to make any additional concessions and still to retain a strategically defensible frontier for Irak. He added that as it had been decided to base the British case in the frontier discussions upon the settlement of Assyrians within Irak territory and as the Assyrian habitations were situated in the western sector of the frontier, we were obviously precluded from ceding any further territory in that sector.

GROUP-CAPTAIN BURNETT replied that, in the view of the Air Staff, the "green line" frontier represented the maximum concession which could be made to Turkey without leaving Irak with an undefensible frontier.

COLONEL MUSPRATT said that this was also the view of the General Staff

[12045]

24

MAJOR YOUNG said that he understood that it had been decided at the last conference on this subject to claim a frontier substantially in advance of the "blue line."

Mr. HALL pointed out that, in the Secretary of State's telegram of the 19th January to the High Commissioner it was stated that His Majesty's Government intended to press for the "extreme-limit frontier" proposed by Sir Henry Dobbs, which approximately corresponded with the "blue line." In this telegram no mention was made of claiming any more favourable line.

MAJOR YOUNG pointed out that, if it could be shown that the maximum concessions contemplated on the eastern sector of the frontier would more than counter-balance the territory in advance of the present administrative boundary which it was proposed to claim for Assyrian settlement in the western sector, it might then be possible to satisfy the Turks without surrendering any more territory.

The proposed frontier variants were then examined from this point of view, and it was found that, judged by the administrative boundary, if the "green line" of the frontier were adopted, the area to be ceded to Turkey would, in fact, be appreciably greater than that to be ceded by Turkey to Iraq.

The order in which the various frontier concessions should, if necessity arose, be acquiesced in by Sir P. Cox was then discussed, and it was decided that this should generally follow the order proposed by Sir Henry Dobbs in paragraph 5 of his secret despatch of the 18th October, 1923, except that the cession of the Jelu and Baz country should precede the surrender of the Girdi tribe and the Zaur-Berli pass.

GROUP-CAPTAIN BURNETT said that this represented the maximum possible concession.

SIR J. SHUCKBURGH asked whether it would not be possible, in the last resort to surrender the town of Rowanduz, while retaining control of the pass immediately to the south. He pointed out that, as Rowanduz and its occupation by British forces had excited a certain amount of public interest, the Turks might be inclined to attach a "sentimental" value to its retrocession, much in excess of its real advantage to them. Its recovery would "save their face," and might reconcile them to substantial concessions elsewhere. It was worth considering, therefore, whether the cession was one that could safely be made.

GROUP-CAPTAIN BURNETT and COLONEL MUSPRATT both considered that, for strategical reasons, this would be extremely undesirable, and the former pointed out that recent information from various sources regarding Turkish intentions went to show that they were determined to reach an agreement with this country about the Iraq frontier at all costs, and that, if this information were correct, it would be unnecessary to make any further concessions other than those represented by the "green line."

Mr. OLIPHANT said that the Foreign Office were now convinced, by the arguments advanced by the Air Staff and the General Staff, that further territorial concessions to Turkey were unpracticable, and they no longer desired to press the views expressed in their letter of the 9th April.

Mr. JARDINE, in reply to an enquiry, said that he was inclined to think that, so long as the gorges south of Rowanduz were held by Iraq, it would be possible to hand over the town itself to the Turks without impairing the security of Iraq.

GROUP-CAPTAIN BURNETT stated that this matter had been discussed orally with Sir John Salmond, who did not share this view and was very strongly of opinion that the retention of the town of Rowanduz was essential to the safety of Iraq.

SIR J. SHUCKBURGH, in summing up, said that it was obvious that the answer to the question under consideration by the conference was "No," and that the "green line" represented the maximum possible concession to Turkey.

After further discussion it was agreed that—

1. A telegram should be despatched to the High Commissioner for Iraq, asking for a definite assurance that the Iraq Government concurred in, and were prepared to support, the Assyrian policy of His Majesty's Government, and that the proposed frontier should be primarily based upon this policy.

2. That the War Office should endeavour to produce the maps required by Sir P. Cox for the negotiations on or before the 13th May.

3. That, in addition to the amendment notified in Foreign Office letter of the 12th April, the following minor amendments should be made in the draft instructions to Sir P. Cox—

- (a.) In paragraph 1, before "Mr. R. F. Hardina," insert "together with," and delete the words "will proceed from Iraq to join you in Constantinople."
- (b.) Paragraph 1, penultimate sentence, omit the word "also."
- (c.) Paragraph 5, first sentence, omit the words "by the blue line of bars and crosses."

E 4363 7 65]

No. 50.

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald — (Received May 10)

Constantinople, May 12, 1924.  
In reference to your telegram No. 67 of the 7th instant, I have the honour to refer to the note addressed to Adnan Bey on the 8th instant in which I informed him of the arrangements for the meeting of the British delegation in Constantinople together with a list of the British delegation which I gave to him at the same time.

My note of the 30th April on which my telegram No. 87 of the 2nd instant was based.

It will be observed that the latter note refers to the possible opening of pourparlers as from the 1st May. I considered whether, in replying to the note, I should introduce some specific reference to the fact that most of the nine months' period during which the negotiations between Turkey and Great Britain are to take place has already elapsed. I preferred not to do so. In the first place, I saw no reason to suppose that the paragraph in question in Adnan Bey's note was intended to bear on the first part of the nine months' period—the word "pourparlers" rather than "negotiations" was used—and, secondly, there are indications in the press here that our version of the date from which the nine months' period is to run is now generally accepted. At all events, we have already affirmed our view of the matter in writing sufficiently often.

I have &c.

R. G. LINDSAY

Enclosure 1 in No. 50

Mr. Lindsay to Dr. Adnan Bey.

Constantinople, le 8 mai 1924.  
JE n'ai pas manqué de télégraphier à mon Gouvernement le contenu de la note de votre Excellence sur la question, sous la présidence de son Excellence Fethy Bey, Président de la grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie, et dont Faik Bey, Député d'Ordou, et Fezi Bey, Député de la capitale, ont fait partie.  
Je tiens à faire savoir que Sir Percy Cox, délégué de Sa Majesté britannique pour les négociations prévues à l'article 2 du Traité de Lausanne et à l'article 7 du protocole relatif à l'évacuation, arrivera à Constantinople par le Simplon-Express vendredi 16 mai.

Veillez, &c.

R. G. LINDSAY.



\* *continued*

We met it tomorrow, and after disposing of certain misstatements of facts in his last speech I propose to inform him that unless he can discuss my proposition or put before me an alternative which my instructions will allow me to consider, I must ask for further instructions from His Majesty's Government before resuming discussions."

(Sent to Bagdad, No. 23)

[E 4587 7 65]

No. 54.

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received May 26.)

No. 419.)

Sir,

Constantinople, May 21, 1924.

WITH reference to the negotiations now in progress between Sir Percy Cox and the Turkish delegation for a definition of a Turco-Irak frontier, it seems to me hardly possible that an agreement can now be reached, and I anticipate that in the course of comparatively few days the two sets of negotiators will have to recognise the difficulties of the situation and abandon their efforts to find mutually acceptable terms. The nationalism of Turkey is of an extreme character; and its Government is weak, and makes concessions to foreign Governments unless they are concealed from the public. The failure to agree, therefore, if it occurs, will not be surprising. I am more than ever in Lord Curzon's anticipations as expressed at London. I am indeed with regret the impossibility of reaching a direct settlement with Ismet Pasha (Cmd 1814, p. 398), he strongly urged immediate recourse to arbitration (p. 400 et seq.); and it was only at the last meeting of the first part of the Lausanne Conference, when eleventh-hour concessions were being offered to the Turks, that he reluctantly consented to interpose a period for further negotiation on this question of time, and that recourse to arbitration should be had on its termination (pp. 843 and 844).

The breakdown, if and when it takes place, will doubtless cause an outcry of the public and press of this country. The papers will talk about oil and the petroleum and will compare you, perhaps unfavourably to Lord Curzon, even to Mr. Lloyd George. The attitude of the press may be reflected in that of the Government. The latter have never yet been less than recalcitrant and dating—they may now seek or, at any rate, welcome opportunities to behave almost in friendly manner towards us. A period of some slight tension is likely to ensue during which His Majesty's Government will be treated to much abuse of the kind to which they have long since grown accustomed, and some British interests, though I think demonstrations in the direction of the Irak frontier, though I do not expect that the Turkish Government would wish, even if they are able, to move any considerable body of troops so far as I can at present foresee, at the worst, a state of affairs might arise on the Irak front or similar in kind though not in degree to that now prevailing on the Turco-Syrian frontier, where things are constantly happening and the Turkish Government are always able to say that these incidents arise outside their frontier and in connection with matters with which they themselves have no concern.

3. It appears to me that the situation that is likely to arise might be placed, His Majesty's Government were able to deposit at Paris their ratification of the treaty, and on the Government, and would teach the local press that, so far from all being over but the fighting, there would remain a perfectly normal course along which events might quietly pursue their way.

4. There is, however, another and still more cogent reason why ratification by His Majesty's Government should be effected more or less at the moment when the Irak frontier negotiations break down. The treaty provides that after the nine months—i.e., on the 5th July, recourse shall be had to arbitration by the League of Nations. As I read the treaty (article 3 (2) and article 7 of the Protocol of Evacuation) His Majesty's Government will be bound to refer the matter to the League of Nations. It will be

well to prevent an anomalous space of time from intervening between the end of the period for negotiation (viz., the 5th July) and the moment when arbitration becomes a treaty obligation on the Turkish Government.

I have, &c.

R. C. LINDSAY.

[E 4613 7 65]

No. 55

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received May 26)

No. 101)

(Telegraphic)

Constantinople, May 25, 1924

FOLLOWING from Sir P. Cox —

My telegram of 23rd May

Yesterday's proceedings were as follows —

After exposition of certain misleading statements contained in Fethi Bey's last speech I remarked that rest of his observations resolved themselves into another reiteration of his claim to Mosul Vilayet, and on that basis was unable to negotiate.

"In conclusion, I invited him to do one of two things—either to accept my proposition in principle and discuss with me possibility of adjustments of detail or to put before me an alternative solution of a nature which it might be possible for me to consider.

"After half an hour's deliberation with his colleagues, Fethi replied that he was unable to entertain our proposition, that in existing circumstances the solution clearly indicated was a plebiscite, which had been proposed before but

frontier line which he would propose for discussion and would send it to me this morning for consideration. It has since reached me. His proposed line is merely the southern frontier of Mosul Vilayet."

"In above there appears to me no basis for pursuing these negotiations further, but I await your instructions before breaking off."

"I surmise that in persisting in this extreme demand Turks are prompted by the fact that Irak seems likely to develop in their favour or at all events to remain neutral, and that meanwhile it would be a mistake to come to any agreement now or to prejudice their future position by appearing to entertain any less solution than rendition of Mosul Vilayet, for which they thus formally staked their claim. This morning I have received from Sir P. Cox a telegram suggesting that if description of our claim and that of Turks were now authoritatively made known in Bagdad it might help final effect."

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 24.)

[E 4629 7 65]

No. 56

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received May 26)

(No. 102)

(Telegraphic)

Constantinople, May 26, 1924

FOLLOWING from Sir P. Cox —

My telegram of 25th May

If it is decided to break off negotiations it will, in any case, be necessary to hold another meeting with Turkish delegation to wind up affairs of conference.

"I am sure that you might think it convenient were I to take this occasion to propose an agreement as to manner and terms of reference of frontier question to Council of League of Nations in virtue of article 3 (2) of Lausanne.

If my attempt were successful not only would conference break up in more friendly atmosphere, but much delay might be avoided since, in the absence of an agreement Turkish Government may be expected to pursue their usual policy of procrastination and obstruction."





her frontier, and there will be no field for the intrigue which would inevitably result if only the Assyrians were in Irak and the other half in Turkey. Again, if the Irak Government can by generous treatment secure the friendly regard and loyalty of the Assyrians, the danger will be avoided of their applying to the French or the Russians for support, a danger which would be by no means remote if the Assyrians were not assured of the intentions of the Irak State. In the taking of all further steps to the issue for the admission of Irak to the League of Nations, what better proof could she offer of her ability and desire to deal justly and wisely with persons of different race and faith than to point to a friendly and satisfied body of Assyrians settled within her borders?

The immediate necessity is to satisfy the British Government that in contending for the extreme northern frontier, so as to strengthen the Irak State and secure the future of the Assyrians, they can count on the active co-operation of the Irak Government in providing land on which the Assyrians can be settled and a satisfactory arrangement under which they manage their own local affairs.

The Excellency invites the Irak Government to consider the whole question recently from this point of view in order that he may be able, as he hopes, to give the British Government the assurances of Irak's co-operation in this definite policy, so that the British Government may feel fully justified in insisting on the extreme northern frontier in the interests of the Irak State and of the Assyrian people. As the Mosul frontier negotiations will it is believed, open very shortly at Constantinople, you will realise how necessary it is that his Excellency should be in a position to reply without delay to the enquiries made by the British Government on the points dealt with in this letter.

Yours &c

NIGEL D. DAVIDSON

The source 3 is No. 38

*Extract from the Proceedings of the Council of Ministers held at Bagdad on Wednesday, April 30, 1924.*

There was read out his Excellency the High Commissioner's letter dated the 2nd April, 1924 on the subject of the settling of Assyrians in Irak territory, whereupon the Council of Ministers passed a resolution accepting the proposals contained in the said letter.

No. 59

*Mr Lindsay to Mr Macdonald.—(Received May 30)*

(No. 106)

(Telegraphic)

*Constantinople, May 29, 1924*

FOLLOWING from Sir P. Cox—

"Mr Keeling representative of Turkish Petroleum Company has just been here with authority of his principals on his way back from Bagdad. I informed him that his presence here was inexpedient from my point of view and he left this morning. I doubt if his identity has or will transpire. He understood, however, that Sir Arnold Wilson, who was to leave Bagdad a few days after him, was also likely to come here. It will hardly be possible for him to conceal his identity and seeing that papers are continually alleging that oil is our sole motive for refusing to surrender Mosul Vilayet, it is clearly undesirable that these oil representatives should apparently rendezvous here with me. If Anglo-Persian Oil Company are able to communicate with Wilson perhaps you could suggest his diversion to another route or to his being instructed to pass straight through."

(Repeated to Consul, Aleppo, for guidance)



E 4874/7 65]

No. 61A

*Turkish Chargé d'Affaires to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received June 3.)*

Excellence,

Irak, le 3 juin 1924

La note responsive en date du 25 mai 1924 du Ministère des Affaires étrangères de Mossoul à l'Assemblée réunie à Bagdad avait été communiquée de suite au Ministère des Affaires étrangères de la République turque.

D'ordre de mon Gouvernement, j'ai l'honneur de porter à la connaissance de votre Excellence que le fait de faire désigner et de laisser siéger à l'Assemblée constituante de l'Irak des Députés du vilayet de Mossoul est considéré par lui comme une atteinte à son intégrité et que les deux parties s'étaient engagées à respecter.

D'autre part, les Députés de Mossoul, élus par la volonté sincère et unanime de la population de ce vilayet et sans qu'aucune pression d'aucune sorte ait naturellement pu s'exercer, ont été envoyés pour siéger à la grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie, mais par suite des vacances de cette Assemblée n'ont pas encore eu l'occasion de prendre part à ses délibérations.

En vous faisant part de ce qui précède, mon Gouvernement me charge en outre d'attirer l'attention de votre Excellence sur le fait que les notables de Mossoul qui ne sont rendus à l'Assemblée de l'Irak ne peuvent avoir aucun pouvoir pour décider du sort de cette province.

En transmettant à votre Excellence cette communication du Gouvernement de la République turque, je la prie, &c

H. K. M. F.

E 4775 7 65]

No. 60

*Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received May 31)*

(No. 106)

(Telegraphic)

Constantinople, May 30, 1924

ADNAN BEY called to-day by instructions from Ismet to say that, according to information received from Irak Mosul Government (sic)\* was providing arms to Christian natives and that preparations were being made at Geziren (nal and Rowanduz for an offensive towards Van. Ismet instructed him to protest against such measures and to say that if verified they must cause a rupture of present frontier negotiations.

I replied that I knew nothing off hand about armament of Christians, but that on other point policy of His Majesty's Government was to observe loyally *de facto* frontier line now existing and that news which had reached Angora of an intended offensive was untrue.

Adnan said he would reply to Ismet at once in this sense.

I should be glad to receive from you an official reply to communicate to Turkish Government.

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 28)

E 4629 7 65]

No. 61

*Mr. MacDonald to Mr. Lindsay (Constantinople)*

(No. 80)

(Telegraphic)

Foreign Office, May 31, 1924.

(R) YOUR telegrams Nos. 101 and 102 of 25th and 26th May: Turkey-Irak frontier.

Following from Sir P. Cox:—

I have been informed by Fethi Bey that you have reported the situation to His Majesty's Government who regret to find nothing in the Turkish proposals which provides any basis for negotiation. That you have, therefore, received instructions to return to London as soon as the Turkish delegation has acknowledged the receipt of your communication; and that the line submitted by you as a basis of settlement on the present occasion, having been drawn with a view to meet without discussion some of the Turkish claims, His Majesty's Government, when submitting the question to the Council of the League of Nations in accordance with the provisions of article 9 of the Lausanne Treaty, consider themselves free to submit a more complete claim on behalf of the Turkish Government.

I suggest to Fethi Bey a final meeting to discuss the procedure for referring the question to the Council of the League, adding that His Majesty's Government will forthwith prepare their case for submission to that body and will communicate further with the Turkish delegation regarding the points on which they propose to approach the League.

In the meanwhile, Sir H. Dohls has been authorised to make use of the text of your telegram No. 101, and a statement is also being prepared for publication to the press as suggested in the last paragraph of your telegram. The text will be telegraphed to you. (End of R)

(Confidential)

If you think that Turks will really continue negotiations if you threaten to withdraw from the present negotiations, I suggest to be prepared to do so in any event you must emphasise in no merely formal way regret His Majesty's Government feel that such promising opportunity has not yielded results.

[E 4731, 7/65]

No. 62

Mr. Macdonald to Mr. Lindsey (Constantinople)

(No. 82)

Foreign Office, June 3, 1924

(Telegraphic) MY telegram No. 104 of 25th May: Reference of Turkey-Irak frontier dispute to League of Nations

Following for Sir P. Cox —

"You should on no account raise this point with the Turkish delegation but if they raise it you should dismiss the argument as absurd for the following reason:

"1. It is a surprising suggestion that if two countries have agreed by a treaty to submit a certain dispute to an independent authority, the decision of the latter is not binding on the parties unless this is definitely stated in the treaty.

"2. The purpose of article 3 is to lay down the frontier of Turkey, and it provides that the Turkey-Irak frontier is to be laid down by friendly arrangement, in absence of which the dispute shall be brought before the Council of the League. This can only mean that the council is to lay down the frontier if necessary and that the frontier so laid down is to be the frontier of Turkey. Decision of the council fixes that frontier automatically and no question arises as regards its acceptance by either party.

"3. No argument to the contrary can be drawn from article 116, wording of which is not identical with that of article 3. The last four words of article 116 (in French) are a French legal term equivalent to 'sitting as a final court of appeal,' and mean that an appeal from the commission to the council having been made no further appeal will be permissible, either to arbitration or to any other means of settling the dispute.

"If the Turks really propose to raise this point they should be left to raise it before the Council of the League."

[E 4901 7/65]

No. 63

Mr. Lindsey to Mr. Macdonald (Received June 4)

(No. 108)

Constantinople, June 3, 1924

(Telegraphic)

FOLLOWING from Sir P. Cox —

"I sent note to Fethi Bey yesterday (2nd June) on the lines directed in your telegram of 31st May. He returned interim reply the same day to the effect that he had communicated contents of my note to Ankara and that upon receipt of instructions he would address me further.

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 30)

[E 4910 7/65]

No. 64

Mr. Macdonald to Mr. Lindsey (Constantinople)

(No. 83)

Foreign Office, June 4, 1924

(Telegraphic) R.

MY telegram No. 80 of 31st May: Turkey-Irak frontier

Following for Sir P. Cox —

As regards procedure in the event of no agreement being reached before the expiry of the nine months period, His Majesty's Government will submit the matter to the Council of the League under article 3 of the

5.

treaty and the evacuation protocol, adding that His Majesty's Government hope that Turkish Government will join with them in submitting the matter to the council. If they decline to do so you should intimate that this does not in any way limit our right or indeed relieve us of the obligation to have recourse to the Council of the League as agreed at Lausanne.

"As article 3 of the treaty definitely provides for reference to the council, it will not be necessary to invoke any particular article of the covenant.

There will not be a meeting of the council between 8th July and the end of August, which will give time for the preparation of any documents which may be required.

[E 4982/7/65]

No. 65

Mr. Henderson to Mr. Macdonald — (Received June 6)

(No. 110)

Constantinople, June 6, 1924

(Telegraphic)

FOLLOWING from Sir P. Cox —

"My telegram No. 108 of 3rd June.

"On Wednesday Fethi Bey asked for meeting on Thursday. He had no fresh proposal to put forward and expressed inability to consider draft terms of reference to League. Conference was accordingly brought to conclusion and we expect to leave Monday. For details of meeting see my immediate following telegram."

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 32)

[E 4986 7/65]

No. 66

Mr. Henderson to Mr. Macdonald — (Received June 7)

(No. 111)

Constantinople, June 6, 1924

(Telegraphic)

FOLLOWING from Sir P. Cox —

"My immediately preceding telegram.

"At meeting held yesterday, 5th June, after signing *procès verbal* of meeting of 24th May Fethi Bey opened with a speech maintaining Turkish standpoint that Mosul Vilayet did not form part of Irak proper and citing Sykes-Picot Agreement and 'Encyclopædia Britannica' (old edition) in support. He also made point that British frontier claimed was inconsistent with letter of Lausanne Treaty in that fate of Mosul Vilayet alone was under consideration and we had now claimed for Irak, portions of Hakkari country which was never investigated at Lausanne. I replied briefly, referring to particular circumstances in which attribution of Mosul Vilayet to French was contemplated at the time of Sykes-Picot Agreement, adding that further experience of local conditions had clearly demonstrated impracticability of any such arrangement and reminding him, that at any rate, there had been an endeavour to restore vilayet to Turkey. With regard to his remarks regarding Hakkari I reminded Fethi that no precise frontier had ever been indicated by Lord Curzon, that what we were here to discuss was frontier between Irak and Turkey and not Mosul Vilayet. I then emphasised to Fethi my proposed frontier line to which he alluded was of course covered by my invitation to discuss adjustments of detail. I concluded by asking Fethi for a clear statement as to whether he was prepared upon reconsideration to accept my proposals in principle and to discuss rectifications of detail or alternatively to submit entirely new proposition which would not involve appreciable retrocession of territory and which I might therefore feel justified in examining. In reply Fethi again reverted to question of Hakkari and said that so long as I maintained a claim to country north of Mosul Vilayet there could be no terram

[12045]

P. 2



for discussion. As it was obviously his intention by doing so to endeavour to make our claim appear unreasonable and to throw upon us onus for breaking down, I again emphasised that portion of our line touching Hakkari was a section where I was fully prepared to discuss local adjustments if he would accept line in principle. I also pointed out that administrative boundaries of Mosul Vilayet had never been clearly defined and indeed under Valis varied considerably from time to time. I ultimately pinned down Fethi to statement that he could not entertain my proposals even in principle, that he had no proposition to put forward and could only suggest that we accept his proposal (i.e., the cession of whole of Mosul Vilayet) in principle and should discuss adjustments of detail. I replied that such being the case I saw no alternative but to break off negotiations and to return to London. I laid great emphasis on regret felt by His Majesty's Government that, as a result of a direct agreement had failed, the matter would have to be referred to Council of League of Nations. I went on to repeat proposal already made in writing that before separating we should endeavour to concert joint terms of reference to League for recommendation to our Governments and I handed him a draft for consideration.

"Fethi Bey in rejecting my proposal replied that the matter was a reference to League of Nations and must be left to the two Governments to deal with. Here he hinted that since our claim was opposed to letter and spirit of Lausanne Treaty, Turkish Government might in the circumstances not desire to participate in the conference.

"I expressed regret that Fethi Bey could not see his way to fall in with my proposal and communicated to him substance of first paragraph of Foreign Office telegram No. 90 of 4th June, which was handed to me while meeting was in progress. Finally I expressed gratitude on behalf of myself and my delegation for hospitality which had been extended to us and appreciation of spirit of cordiality which had marked our discussions and intercourse between the two delegations. Fethi Bey made suitable reply in very friendly terms and meeting broke up. Fethi Bey and I proposed to meet on Saturday afternoon to sign agreed copies of *procès-verbal* of yesterday's meeting and I contemplate leaving Constantinople 9th June."

(Reputed to Bagdad No. 33)

No. 87

Mr Henderson to Mr Macdonald — (Received June 9)

(No. 112)

(Telegraphic)

Constantinople, June 9, 1924

FOLLOWING from Sir P. Cox —

"My telegram No. 111

"*Procès-verbal* of last meeting was signed by Fethi Bey and myself this morning (9th June)

"Delegation leaves 9.30 P.M. to-night

"(Private)

Telegram 'Times' correspondent sent last night was based on inaccurate report in local press."

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 35)

3

[E 5087/7/65]

No. 68

THIRD IRAK FRONTIER NEGOTIATIONS: PROCEEDINGS OF MEETINGS HELD AT  
CONSTANTINOPLE BETWEEN MAY 19 AND JUNE 5, 1924

(Communicated by Sir P. Cox; Received at Foreign Office, June 11)

Conférence de Constantinople sur la Question de Mossoul

PROCES-VERBAL No. 1.

Séance de Lundi 19 Mai 1924, tenue dans le local de l'ancien Ministère de la Marine à Constantinople

La séance est ouverte à 11 heures 15 du matin.

Sont présents

Pour la Turquie

Fethi Bey, Président de la grande Assemblée nationale, Député de Constantinople

Keyfi Bey, ancien Ministre des Travaux publics et Député de Diarbékir

Faik Bey, Député d'Ordou

Nousret Bey, Conseiller légiste au Ministère des Affaires étrangères

Islah Avni Bey, Lieutenant-Colonel d'Etat-Major

Pour l'Empire britannique

Sir Percy Cox

Mr J. H. Hall, D.S.O., M.C.

Mr C. H. Jardine

Lieutenant-Colonel E. F. W. Loom, D.S.O.

Secrétaires : A. Bédly Bey ; M. Kamul Bey.

Interprètes : Ismet Bey, Mr. W. D. W. Matthews

FETHI BEY lit le discours suivant :

"J'ai l'honneur de saluer respectueusement, au nom de mon Gouvernement, messieurs le délégué et les conseillers du Gouvernement britannique chargés de négocier la délimitation de la frontière entre l'Irak et la Turquie dont la fixation à l'amiable avait été ajournée par le Traité de Lausanne.

"Il est à souhaiter ardemment que nous puissions arriver à un règlement satisfaisant de cette importante question qui, déjà à Lausanne, avait été l'objet d'une longue discussion entre les délégations turque et britannique et dont on avait dû remettre la négociation à une période plus calme. De la solution amicale de cette affaire dépendrait tout l'édifice des relations futures entre la République turque et l'Empire britannique.

"Espérant vivement que les sentiments de droit et de justice prédomineront au cours de la solution de la question posée devant la conférence, je souhaite la bienvenue à la délégation de Sa Majesté le Roi britannique et me fais un plaisir de déclarer ouverte la conférence."

SIR PERCY COX lui répond par la lecture du discours ci-dessous :

« Excellence,

Je dois tout d'abord vous remercier des expressions très cordiales de bienvenue dont nous avons été l'objet, moi et ma délégation. En faisant cela, je profite de l'occasion pour vous assurer que nous apprécions vivement l'accueil amical qui nous a été accordé à notre arrivée et l'esprit généreux d'hospitalité avec lequel le Gouvernement turc a bien voulu se charger de notre logement et de notre bien-être.

« A part l'honorable mission que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté s'est plu à me confier, j'ai ressenti beaucoup de plaisir personnel à l'idée de revoir votre belle ville après un intervalle de quinze ans, et je trouverai, je n'ai pas de doute, l'accueil et d'hospitalité qui existait à cette époque-là.

« Je m'empresse de vous assurer que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté et cette mission sont pénétrés de l'espoir et du désir les plus ardents que nos délibérations amicales nous aient, dans le bref délai qui reste aux négociations directes, à un règlement du problème qui doit nous occuper et qui ainsi que le reconnaît votre Excellence, constitue le seul obstacle au plein rétablissement de ces relations intimes qui ont existé entre nos deux Gouvernements pendant tant d'années avant la catastrophe de 1914.

« Votre Excellence n'ignore pas que au cas où nos efforts collectifs en vue d'un règlement ne seraient pas couronnés de succès dans le délai prévu, l'article 3 du Traité de Lausanne stipule que le litige sera porté devant le Conseil de la Société des Nations et, tandis que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté envisagerait le renvoi du litige à ce tribunal avec une confiance absolue, je ne saurais vous cacher le fait qu'un tel moyen d'action contribuerait à son avis dans un degré beaucoup moindre à produire cette atmosphère de confiance réciproque qui est si nécessaire du point de vue des relations futures des deux pays.

« C'est dans cette croyance et dans le désir de favoriser dans la mesure du possible les espoirs d'un règlement durable du problème qui doit nous occuper, que l'exposé que je vous présenterai cet après-midi a été préparé.

Après ces discours les deux délégations se communiquent réciproquement leurs plénipotentiaires.

Puis on discute la procédure de la conférence.

Il est décidé d'un commun accord que les pourparlers auront lieu en français et en anglais.

Les déclarations seront au besoin traduites réciproquement par les interprètes des deux parties, Lord Bly et Mr W. D. W. Matthews.

Le service du secrétariat sera assuré par les deux parties, Lord Bly et Mr W. D. W. Matthews.

Les procès-verbaux seront communs. Ils seront rédigés en français avec la collaboration des deux parties. Ils seront signés par les présidents des deux parties également.

Des communiqués seront extraits de ces procès-verbaux pour la presse.

Ils seront rédigés par le secrétariat et vus par les présidents des deux parties.

Ils seront transmis à la presse après chaque séance de 7 à 8 heures du soir. Les discours d'ouverture seront communiqués intégralement.

Les réunions auront lieu à 3 heures de l'après-midi. Néanmoins, il est décidé de se réunir aujourd'hui à 4 heures exceptionnellement.

Des experts pourront être admis aux séances sur la proposition de l'une des parties et l'assentiment de l'autre.

La séance est levée à midi.

Le 21 mai 1924

P. Z. COX.  
A. FETHY.

## PROCÈS-VERBAL No. 2.

Séance de Lundi 19 Mai 1924, tenue dans l'après-midi.

La séance est ouverte à 1 heure 20.

Sont présents

Les plénipotentiaires et conseillers et secrétaires qui assistent à la séance de la matinée.

FETHY BEY lit le discours suivant :

« La tâche que nous avons devant nous consiste à délimiter à l'amiable la frontière entre l'Irak et la République turque. La délégation turque est persuadée que toute délimitation arbitraire serait une source de perpétuels conflits entre deux Empires.

« Pour qu'une frontière puisse servir de base à une concorde et aux relations de bon voisinage, il faut qu'elle remplisse deux conditions essentielles :

1. Au point de vue ethnique, la frontière doit partager les populations ayant leurs races et civilisations de façon à ne les laisser sous une domination qui leur serait étrangère.

2. Au point de vue géographique, il est indispensable que la frontière, tout en s'adaptant à la conformation naturelle du territoire, puisse répondre aux nécessités ethniques exposées ci-haut afin d'éviter les difficultés qui s'en suivent.

« La délégation turque avait déjà expliqué à Lausanne quelle importance vitale offre pour la Turquie le Vilayet de Mossoul et avait démontré qu'il constitue une contrée inséparable de notre pays, tant au point de vue ethnique qu géographique. Je trouve inutile de revenir ici sur ce que les experts ont dit.

« La délégation de Sa Majesté britannique à Lausanne avait elle-même convenu que la grande majorité du Vilayet de Mossoul est turque et kurde. Or, les Turcs et les Kurdes sont deux nations sœurs ayant les mêmes destinées politiques. Ils ont fondé une république avec une égalité parfaite, jouissant des mêmes droits et des mêmes devoirs de souveraineté.

« Sous le rapport ethnique, le Vilayet de Mossoul est une partie de l'unité nationale qui constituent ces deux nations sœurs. Il ne présente aucune différence avec les régions se trouvant plus au nord et où les Turcs et les Kurdes vivent en parfaite harmonie dans une communauté entière de sentiments et d'aspirations. Ainsi, la frontière ethnique de la République turque s'étend nécessairement jusqu'au sud de ce vilayet. C'est à partir de là que commencent les conflits de l'Irak, contre arabe ayant une civilisation et une langue différente.

« Je ne veux pas chercher les raisons qui avaient primitivement poussé le Gouvernement britannique à incorporer à l'Irak le Vilayet de Mossoul, malgré les vérités ethniques et géographiques que je viens de signaler et qu'on ne saurait refuser.

« Dans la période ayant suivi la cessation des hostilités, après la guerre générale, les Puissances alliées avaient voulu réduire la Turquie à d'autres situations aussi peu naturelles encore que celle qui lui avait été faite en lui arrachant ce vilayet. Heureusement, devant les sacrifices énormes que le peuple turc, fidèlement et parfaitement secondé par ses frères kurdes, avait endurés durant la longue lutte pour son indépendance, la Grande Bretagne et ses alliés ont inauguré dans le Proche-Orient une politique différente, basée sur la reconnaissance de l'indépendance de la nation turque de vivre indépendamment dans ses limites ethniques. Cette politique de justice a valu la paix et la tranquillité en Orient.

« Je ne crois pas me tromper en affirmant que toute l'opinion britannique a favorablement accueilli les résultats de cette politique d'apaisement. Malheureusement, les bienfaits de cette politique de justice et d'équité se sont fait attendre jusqu'ici, en ce qui concerne une délimitation de frontière entre l'Irak et la Turquie, conformément aux desiderata de la population locale et aux exigences des principes ethniques. Tous les efforts tentés à cet effet par la délégation turque à Lausanne sont restés stériles.

« Il est donc à espérer ardemment de trouver à la question de Mossoul une solution qui puisse servir de base à une entente durable entre la Turquie et l'Empire britannique.



"Les expériences précieuses de votre Excellence en Orient ainsi que ses connaissances profondes et son amour pour la paix fournissent de fortes garanties pour la solution de la question de Mossoul suivant les règles de la justice.

"S'il s'agit de résumer en peu de mots la thèse de la délégation turque à ce sujet, je puis dire que la question de Mossoul est une question vitale pour la Turquie. Détacher à la Turquie ce vilayet habité par une grande majorité turque et kurde, serait porter atteinte à son unité territoriale. Du reste la population de ce vilayet a manifesté de toutes les manières, malgré la présence de l'armée d'occupation, son refus d'accepter le régime de l'Irak. Elle ne se considère liée d'aucune façon au Gouvernement de Bagdad.

"Le peuple turc se sentirait continuellement menacé au sud de son territoire, tant que Mossoul demeure assujéti à une administration étrangère. Pour parer tant à cette menace qu'aux agitations politiques pouvant monter vers le nord par les voies de Mossoul, de Suleymanie et Kirkuk, la République turque serait obligée de consacrer une grande partie de ses ressources aux mesures d'ordre défensives qu'elle utilise pour la prospérité de son pays. Cela ne pourra jamais assurer, sans doute, les relations de bon voisinage nécessaires pour une paix durable. La nation turque ne saurait respirer à l'aise tant qu'elle n'aura dissipé les nuages ténébreux qui couvrent le soleil de la paix à l'horizon de son avenir.

Par contre si la question de Mossoul est équitablement réglée, il ne restera plus aux Turcs et aux Kurdes qu'à travailler à l'enrichissement de leur pays et se livrer à des travaux de civilisation. L'intérêt qu'il y aurait à produire une atmosphère politique de ce genre est si grand, si net, qu'il est difficile pour la délégation turque de croire que le Gouvernement britannique passerait outre cet intérêt, et lui substituerait une politique de mécontentement et de friction.

Il est évident que la question de Mossoul est une question de vie ou de mort pour la Turquie. Elle ne peut pas se permettre de laisser à une administration étrangère le soin de gouverner ce vilayet vital pour son existence.

SIR PERCY COX lui répond par le discours ci-après :

"Votre Excellence a connaissance des stipulations du Traité de Lausanne relatives à la détermination de la frontière entre la Turquie et l'Irak, et des débats longs qui en ont précédé la rédaction. Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté est d'avis, et je suis sûr que votre Excellence est, en principe, d'accord, que parvenir de nouveau le terrain étudié à fond à Lausanne ne serait d'aucune utilité et ne ferait que fournir l'occasion à des controverses et conflits renouvelés. Dans tous les cas, je ne saurais m'engager dans cette voie, ayant des instructions formelles de reprendre le fil des négociations au point où Lord Curzon les a délaissées, lors de l'insuccès de son sérieux effort pour obtenir, d'accord avec les représentants de votre pays, une frontière acceptable.

"Cependant votre Excellence reproduit dans son discours éloquent certains des raisonnements mis en avant et pleinement débattus à Lausanne. A ces raisonnements-là je dois m'abstenir de répondre. Cependant, je ne saurais passer sous silence la déclaration de votre Excellence, d'après laquelle les habitants du Vilayet de Mossoul auraient refusé de reconnaître le régime actuel et seraient opposés à leur incorporation dans l'Irak. Il a été clairement démontré par Lord Curzon à Lausanne que le contraire en est la vérité, et je tiens à faire observer que les habitants de Mossoul ont pris une part active à l'administration centrale du pays, à partir de son accession sous la présidence du Nakib de Bagdad. S'il faut des indications de date plus récente, démontrant que les renseignements de votre Excellence à cet égard sont erronés, elles se trouvent dans le fait que ce vilayet, comme les autres provinces, a contribué sa quote-part de Députés à l'Assemblée nationale établie dernièrement sur la base d'élections libres. Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté adhère très énergiquement aux diverses considérations ethniques, politiques, économiques et stratégiques, esquissées par Lord Curzon dans son discours devant la Commission territoriale et militaire à Lausanne le 23 janvier 1923 et développées dans les divers mémoires y relatifs soumis par la délégation britannique, et ne peut aucunement rabattre sa prétention à une frontière septentrionale de l'Irak, compatible avec ces considérations si probantes.

"D'ailleurs, depuis l'interruption des négociations de Lausanne, un problème, dont l'importance a beaucoup grandi aux yeux du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté,

est l'avenir des Assyriens, autres que ceux d'origine persane, dont le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté se sent dans l'obligation la plus impérieuse d'assurer l'établissement conformément aux prétentions et aspirations raisonnables de leur race. Ils ont fait un vif appel, que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté ne saurait garder avec indifférence, pour qu'ils soient établis dans leurs anciennes habitations sous le protectorat britannique. Nonobstant l'intérêt qu'un règlement pareil de leur avenir présenterait pour la chrétienté en général, le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté ne peut pour différentes raisons envisager un accroissement si grave de ses responsabilités. Sans être à même de donner pleine satisfaction à leurs aspirations, le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté s'est décidé à faire ce qu'il pourra pour obtenir à la suite de ces négociations un tracé qui posséderait les qualités reconnues d'une bonne frontière conventionnelle et rendra en même temps possible l'établissement des Assyriens sous forme d'une seule communauté compacte dans les limites du territoire pour lequel Sa Majesté britannique tient un mandat sous l'autorité de la Société des Nations, sinon, toujours dans les habitations de leurs aïeux, tout au moins dans des régions contiguës et convenables. Cette politique d'établissement des Assyriens jouit de la pleine sympathie et de l'appui du Gouvernement de l'Irak, qui est disposé pour sa part à prêter la coopération nécessaire pour y donner suite.

C'est pour ces raisons que j'ai reçu l'ordre de réclamer la frontière indiquée sur la carte, que je pose maintenant devant vous.

Il ressort clairement des reconnaissances effectives dernièrement qu'une frontière proposée se conforme à des particularités physiques bien définies. Elle suit pour la grande partie en une chaîne de montagnes presque ininterrompue, qui constitue une barrière naturelle entre les deux pays et offre ainsi toute perspective de permanence, ce qui serait l'avantage réciproque des deux Gouvernements de Turquie et d'Irak.

"Votre Excellence a bien voulu faire allusion à mon long séjour en Orient et à ma connaissance des conditions locales de l'Irak. De ma part, je tiens simplement à répondre à votre Excellence que telle expérience et telle connaissance que j'ai pu acquérir ne servent qu'à me convaincre que résoudre les questions de la frontière sur la base recommandée par le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique, c'est le seul moyen d'assurer un avenir de paix et de stabilité.

"Je me sens d'autant plus justifié à inviter votre Gouvernement à s'acquiescer aux désirs de mon Gouvernement de ce côté que, comme je pense que votre Excellence reconnaîtra volontiers, l'administration et le contrôle de cette région peu hospitalière, et des communautés qui l'habitent, ont été par le passé un embarras incessant pour les Gouvernements turcs et une source féconde de frictions avec les Puissances occidentales.

"En émettant cette proposition, je dois faire observer à votre Excellence que la frontière ainsi réclamée ne présente pas la réclamation maximum qu'on pourrait mettre en avant au nom des minorités chrétiennes, vu qu'elle laisse toujours du côté turc de la frontière une grande partie de leur ancien pays d'habitation. La ligne, qui est plutôt du caractère transactionnel, est mise en avant par le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté à la suite de son vif désir de donner satisfaction.

"La mesure du possible aux vues du Gouvernement turc et d'arriver ainsi à un règlement à l'amiable. Si, comme je souhaite vivement, une telle entente se produit, nous aurons la tâche de nous entendre pour la constitution d'une commission de délimitation, chargée de la détermination exacte de la frontière sur les lieux.

"Au cas où nous ne réussirions pas, cependant, à arriver à un règlement sur les lignes de la proposition que je viens de vous soumettre, le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté se réserve toute liberté d'action en ce qui concerne la frontière à réclamer devant la Société des Nations.

"Une comparaison de la déclaration de votre Excellence avec les propositions que je viens d'émettre créerait, je le crains, l'impression que la tâche qui doit nous occuper est insurmontable. Je tiens à vous dire, votre Excellence, que dans nos efforts pour arriver à un règlement nous devons nous garder de nous laisser influencer outre mesure par des considérations purement éphémères, nées dans les conditions et préjugés politiques du moment, et poursuivre sans fléchir le but d'arriver à un règlement du problème devant nous, qui pourra supporter l'épreuve suprême du temps.

"Je prie maintenant votre Excellence de prendre en même considération la proposition définitive que j'ai eu l'honneur de lui soumettre."

FETHY BEY prend la parole et déclare avoir attentivement écouté l'allocution de Sir Percy Cox. Il ajoute qu'il ne peut se dissimuler qu'il existe une différence énorme entre la thèse turque et la thèse britannique. La délégation turque, dit-il, persévère dans sa conviction que ses revendications reposent sur des observations très fondées, et espère que la délégation britannique les prendra en sérieuse considération. Pour prouver cependant combien elle a raison, et pour répondre point par point aux considérations soulevées par M. le délégué britannique, la délégation turque aura soin de remettre la question sur le tapis. Elle demande de se réunir à cet effet le mercredi 21 mai 1924, à 3 heures de l'après-midi.

La séance est levée à 5 heures

P. Z. COX.  
A. FETHY

Le 21 mai 1924

L'UNION-VERBALE No. 3.

Séance de Mercredi 21 Mai 1924, tenue dans le local de l'ancien Ministère de la Marine à Constantinople.

La séance est ouverte à 3 heures de l'après-midi

Sont présents

Pour la Turquie

Fethy Bey, Président de la grande Assemblée nationale, Député de Constantinople.  
Feyzi Bey, ancien Ministre des Travaux publics et Député de Diarbekir  
Fahk Bey, Député d'Ordou  
Noussret Bey, Conseiller-légiste au Ministère des Affaires étrangères  
Ishak Avni Bey, lieutenant-colonel d'Etat Major

Pour l'Empire britannique

Sir Percy Cox  
Mr. J. H. Hall, D.S.O., M.C.  
Mr. C. H. Jardine  
Lieutenant-Colonel E. F. W. Loos, D.S.O.

Secrétaires : A. Bedy Bey, M. Kiamil Bey

Interprètes : Ismet Bey, Mr. W. D. W. Matt

FETHY BEY lit la déclaration suivante

" Excellence,

" En réponse aux déclarations que votre Excellence a bien voulu faire en date du 19 mai 1924, je la prie de bien vouloir me permettre de lui exposer quelques observations

" Je suis pleinement d'accord avec votre Excellence sur le fait que " Dans nos efforts pour arriver à un règlement nous devons nous garder de nous laisser influencer outre mesure par des considérations purement éphémères, les conditions et préjugés politiques du moment, et tâcher d'arriver à un règlement qui pourra supporter l'épreuve suprême du temps

" C'est justement sur la base de ces considérations que la délégation turque a trouvé naturel qu'une portion de territoire habitée par une majorité turque et kurde rentre dans les limites des frontières de la république fondée par les Turcs et les Kurdes.

" Votre Excellence veut bien faire observer qu'ayant reçu des instructions lui prescrivant de reprendre les pourparlers au point où ils avaient été laissés par la dernière conférence, elle a dû se conformer à ces instructions. Il va sans dire que la déclaration de votre Excellence à ce sujet ne saurait affaiblir en aucune façon les arguments afférents à la cause défendue par la Turquie ici et à Lausanne

" Votre Excellence veut bien citer comme une preuve récente de l'attachement de Mossoul à l'Irak l'envoi à Bagdad par la population de ce vilayet du nombre des Députés représentant la part de celle-ci

" Si on devait attribuer une telle force à cet argument, je me permettrai de faire remarquer à votre Excellence que ce même vilayet, y compris le Sandjak de Suleymanie, a également envoyé ses Députés à Angora, auprès de la grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie

" Si le Gouvernement de la République n'a pas cru devoir faire passer aux délibérations de la grande Assemblée ces Députés—élus et envoyés d'ailleurs—malgré l'occupation étrangère, par la population du Vilayet de Mossoul—cela n'est dû uniquement qu'au respect des prescriptions stipulées au dernier paragraphe de l'article 3 du Traité de Lausanne, ainsi qu'au premier paragraphe de l'article 7

En effet, en vertu de ces articles, les deux Gouvernements s'étaient engagés respectivement, en attendant la mise en vigueur du Traité de Paix, à ne rien faire qui puisse modifier le statu quo qui existait lors de la signature du Traité de Lausanne. Le Gouvernement de la République n'avait pas manqué de consulter comme contraire aux stipulations dudit traité le fait d'avoir fait accepter des Députés au sein de l'Assemblée de Bagdad

" Cependant, il n'aurait jamais pu penser que son respect auxdites stipulations serait utilisé par le Gouvernement anglais comme un argument en sa défaveur

" Je voudrais ajouter ceci : alors qu'aucun Député n'a été envoyé du Sandjak de Suleymanie à Bagdad, ledit sandjak a envoyé à Angora le Député le plus qualifié pour le représenter. Le fait, qu'à la suite de l'élection de ce Député, Suleymanie a été visité par une flottille d'avions anglais et endommagé par un grand nombre de bombes, démontre que la population, malgré toutes les pressions, n'a pas voulu affaiblir ses liens d'attachement à la mère-patrie.

" Les considérations ethniques, stratégiques et politiques énoncées à Lausanne par Lord Curzon le 23 janvier 1923 ne constituent à mon avis une preuve en faveur de la demande d'une frontière septentrionale telle qu'elle a été formulée par le Gouvernement britannique.

" Afin d'éviter des controverses superflues, j'indique pour un instant comme incontestable les chiffres fournis par le chef de la délégation britannique à Lausanne. Que signifient ces chiffres ? Ils signifient que d'un total de population se montant à 786,000 habitants les 521,000 sont composés d'éléments turcs et kurdes. D'un autre côté, je crois nécessaire de faire remarquer que les chiffres représentant les éléments turcs et kurdes sont en dessous de la vérité, le plus que ceux relatifs aux autres éléments ont subi une inflation qui ne saurait passer inaperçue

" De la simple lecture de ces chiffres il ressort éloquentement que la ligne de démarcation, loin d'être septentrionale comme la demande la délégation britannique, doit au contraire se rapporter vers le sud suivant le point de vue de la délégation turque

" Votre Excellence, qui a manifesté le désir de reprendre les négociations au point laissé par Lord Curzon à Lausanne, abandonne ce point de vue pour poser un nouveau problème : je veux parler de l'avenir des Assyriens. En effet, pour assurer cet avenir vous demandez l'annexion au protectorat anglais de certains territoires se trouvant aujourd'hui sous le drapeau de la République turque. Si je vous disais que cette demande n'a pas causé mon étonnement je m'éloignerais de la vérité

" La présidence de la délégation britannique à Lausanne soutenait la thèse que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté devrait l'octroi d'une autonomie aux Kurdes. Votre Excellence met en avant les revendications des Assyriens. Cependant votre Excellence me permettrait-elle de lui faire remarquer qu'en invoquant ces revendications, elle n'a point observé que les Assyriens forment une infime minorité dans le Vilayet de Mossoul et qu'en défendant les intérêts de cette minorité, elle n'a pas pris en considération avec tout le sérieux que le cas comporte les aspirations d'une très grande majorité, c'est-à-dire celles des Turcs et des Kurdes

" La délégation turque ne peut croire qu'il soit raisonnable d'arracher à la mère patrie [plusieurs centaines de milliers] de Turcs et Kurdes pour prendre sous le protectorat britannique [quelques dizaines de mille] Assyriens dont une partie a d'ailleurs émigré de la Perse.

" Les Assyriens étant chrétiens, je comprends que le Gouvernement britannique les juge dignes de son appui particulier. Toutefois la délégation turque déclare que tous les hommes, sans distinction de race et de religion, ont le même droit, et qu'à ses yeux, les aspirations nationales des peuples, qu'on



ne saurait écouler, prennent toutes les autres considérations. Ainsi tout en appréciant les intentions humanitaires du Gouvernement britannique lorsqu'il s'agit de protéger les chrétiens, la délégation turque ne peut cependant s'empêcher d'ajouter qu'elle n'arrive pas à concevoir que ce Gouvernement sacrifie à cet effet les intérêts des musulmans. Votre Excellence a eu la bonté de me rappeler que l'administration et le contrôle de cette région peu hospitalière a toujours été une source d'embarras pour le Gouvernement turc. Or, tout en ne me souvenant pas que le régime turc, qui a duré pendant des siècles dans cette contrée, y ait jamais rencontré de sérieuses difficultés, il n'est guère possible non plus de se rappeler qu'un fonctionnaire turc y ait été traité autrement qu'avec égard et respect. Toutefois si les embarras d'ordre administratif devaient motiver l'abandon d'un territoire quelconque, me permettez-vous de vous rappeler également les citadels et les soulèvements auxquels le régime britannique a été ouvertement exposé depuis ces quatre ou cinq dernières années dans l'Irak :

"Je voudrais ajouter aussi que les Nestoriens trouveraient encore dans le territoire turc le repos et l'aisance dont ils y ont joui pendant des siècles, au cas où ils ne répéteraient pas les fautes qu'ils avaient commises au commencement de la guerre générale sous des instigations étrangères.

"Je remercie votre Excellence d'avoir bien voulu déclarer que la frontière indiquée par elle dans la séance précédente a été proposée en vue de donner satisfaction autant que possible aux desiderata du Gouvernement turc, et pour régler ainsi à l'amiable la question posée devant la conférence. Cependant je me vois dans l'obligation de vous déclarer que cette ligne est loin de contenter les revendications du Gouvernement turc. Je suis chargé par mon Gouvernement de réclamer une ligne frontière qui laisserait sur le territoire de la patrie turque les Sandjaks de Mossoul, de Sulaymanie et de Kerkuk.

"Je me vois obligé de répéter de nouveau que le vilayet dont il s'agit est habité par une grande majorité turque et kurde. Et, ainsi que j'ai eu l'occasion de le déclarer précédemment, il n'est possible d'assurer une paix durable qu'à la condition de tracer une frontière qui puisse répondre aux nécessités ethniques. Des lignes de démarcation fixées sous la suggestion de considérations éphémères, ne peuvent, comme je l'ai exposé plus haut, jamais résister à l'épreuve suprême du temps.

"Pourrai-je rappeler à votre Excellence que, sous l'accord Sykes-Picot envisageant le rattachement à la Syrie du Vilayet de Mossoul? Cette condamnation qui avait le consentement du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté ne reposait pas sur des considérations essentielles. De même, je le crains fort, la ligne proposée aujourd'hui par votre Excellence ne semble pas s'inspirer des nécessités d'une situation durable et peut créer un irrédentisme plein de menaces pour la paix future de l'Orient.

"La déclaration de votre Excellence, suivant laquelle le Gouvernement britannique se réserverait toute liberté d'action pour porter le différend devant la Société des Nations dans le cas où nous n'arriverions pas à tomber d'accord sur une ligne de démarcation, a été accueillie comme très naturelle. De u le Gouvernement de la République turque en réserve de son côté pleine liberté d'action pour faire prévaloir auprès de cette haute Assemblée ses revendications légitimes basées sur des arguments ethniques, politiques et économiques.

"C'est dans ces considérations que la délégation turque déclare qu'elle est dans l'impossibilité d'acquiescer à la proposition de votre Excellence concernant la formation d'une commission qui se rendrait sur les lieux afin de tracer la frontière, et qu'elle a l'honneur de prier de nouveau la délégation britannique de prendre en considération une ligne de démarcation répondant aux exigences ethniques et géographiques et sauvegardant les intérêts supérieurs des deux pays.

Après cette déclaration, SIR PERCY COX prend la parole et dit qu'il a parfaitement saisi les revendications turques, qui sont identiques à celles déjà formulées à Lausanne. Il trouve inutile que les deux parties insistent à soutenir leurs thèses réciproques. Néanmoins, il tient à répondre à quelques points dans la déclaration de son Excellence Fethy Bey.

FETHY BEY estime lui aussi qu'il est inutile que les deux parties gardent leurs points de vue. Si la délégation turque insiste, c'est qu'elle est persuadée qu'elle a raison. "Notre thèse est juste," ajoute Fethy Bey; "elle traduit les desiderata de la population locale, qui est du même sang et de la même race que nous."

SIR PERCY COX demande que la séance prochaine soit reportée à samedi 24 mai 1924, pour lui permettre de répondre à la déclaration de son Excellence Fethy Bey. Il exprime ensuite le désir de connaître les noms des Députés élus par la population de Mossoul et envoyés en Turquie.

FETHY BEY lui indique ces noms : Nahi Zade Nuri Bey, Sabri Bey, Emin Effendi, Halil Aga Zade Mehmed Nourri Effendi (Mossoul), Nef'ati Zade Nuri Bey (Kerkuk), Fetih Bey (Sulaymanie).

La réunion prochaine est reportée à samedi 24 mai, à 3 heures de l'après-midi.  
La séance est levée à 3 heures 40.

FETHY  
P Z COX.

Le 24 mai 1924

#### PROCES-VERBAL No. 4

Séance de Samedi 24 Mai 1924, tenue dans le local de l'ancien Ministère de la Marine à Constantinople.

La séance est ouverte à 3 heures 10 de l'après-midi.

Sont présents :

Pour la Turquie

Fethi Bey, Président de la grande Assemblée nationale, Député de Constantinople.

Feyzi Bey, ancien Ministre des Travaux publics et Député de Diarbekir.

Faik Bey, Député d'Ordu.

Nousret Bey, Conseiller-législateur au Ministère des Affaires étrangères.

Isahak Avni Bey, Lieutenant-Colonel d'Etat-Major.

Pour l'Empire britannique

Sir Percy Cox.

Mr J. H. Hall, D.S.O., M.C.

Mr C. H. Jardine.

Lieutenant-Colonel R. F. W. Lee, D.S.O.

Secrétaires : A. Rudi Bey, M. Kamil Bey.

Interprètes : Jamet Bey, Mr. W. D. W. Matthews.

SIR PERCY COX lit le discours suivant :

"Comme j'ai informé votre Excellence à notre dernière réunion, il y avait certains points dans le discours que vous avez alors prononcé que je ne pouvais laisser passer sans y répondre, mais qui paraissent mériter d'être étudiés. J'ai l'intention d'examiner maintenant ces points.

"Le premier point est celui qui a trait à la déclaration faite par la délégation turque à Lausanne, d'après laquelle les Turcs et les Kurdes constitueraient la majorité de la population du Vilayet de Mossoul. Cette assertion, qui est entièrement tendancieuse et trompeuse, a été définitivement rejetée par Lord Curzon dans son discours prononcé devant la Commission territoriale et militaire le 23 janvier 1923, au cours duquel il a fait ressortir que la véritable proportion turque de la population du vilayet ne s'élevait qu'à un douzième du total.

"Ensuite, en parlant de mon allusion à la présence des Députés élus de Mossoul dans l'Assemblée d'Irak, votre Excellence a fait observer que le Vilayet de Mossoul, y compris le Sandjak de Sulaymanie, avait également envoyé des Députés à la grande Assemblée nationale à Angora.

"Votre Excellence ignore peut-être que l'avoir de ces soi-disant Députés à la grande Assemblée nationale n'a pas été le résultat d'aucune élection publique de la part des habitants locaux, et que ces personnes ne peuvent d'aucune manière être considérées comme mandataires des communautés que, à ce qu'on prétend, elles représenteraient. Je desire faire remarquer qu'il est si loin d'en être ainsi que, lorsque la communauté locale a appris que ces individus, qui avaient quitté l'Irak pour diverses raisons que j'expliquerai sous peu, prétendaient être les

" Quelques personnes de Mossoul sont allées, paraît-il à Angora et sont entrées à la grande Assemblée nationale comme représentants de la ville de Mossoul. Il va sans dire qu'un représentant doit être élu, et nous ignorons que les habitants de Mossoul aient élu quelqu'un pour les représenter à l'Assemblée d'Angora. Puisque cette affaire est très importante, et intéresse la vie même du pays, et puisque Mossoul est une partie inséparable de l'Irak, nous demandons à notre Gouvernement de faire une enquête, afin qu'il soit démontré qu'il n'y a personne à Mossoul ayant connaissance de la représentation de la ville à Angora."

“ D'après mes renseignements, l'un d'entre eux, Nuri Effendi Shushko, qui a obtenu une allocation de retraite turque et qui était, dans le temps, fonctionnaire du gouvernement d'Irak, a été dernièrement relevé de ses fonctions pour incompétence. Se trouvant assujéti à une mesure de surveillance policière, il pensa bon de quitter le pays.

"Le numéro trois paraît être Suleiman Essendi, fermier des impôts sur une petite échelle à Moscou, qui, n'ayant pas fait face à ses obligations envers le Gouvernement, s'est enfui du pays pour en éviter les conséquences.

"Je viens maintenant au soi-disant Député de Kerkuk, Nadjim Bey Nadjimade, qui était autrefois Député de ce sandjak au Parlement de Constantinople. Pendant l'administration britannique fondée après l'armistice, il a prêté son concours au Gouvernement dans les affaires locales, et a servi comme membre du Comité des Notables établi en 1921 pour élaborer une loi électorale pour l'Irak. En 1921, il a postulé un emploi gouvernemental, et a reçu l'offre du Ministre d'Etat de Hahli, qu'il a refusé, en alléguant qu'il était candidat au même poste à Kerkuk auquel il pensait avoir des droits acquis. N'ayant pu réaliser ses ambitions de carrière il s'est mis à intriguer contre le Gouvernement central. Au printemps de 1924, sachant que son arrestation allait s'effectuer, il s'est enfui à Suleymanié. Lors de l'annonce des efforts de Fuz Beir pour étayer le Gouvernement Rowanduz, il s'est réfugié en Turquie. Nadjimade est une personnalité importante, dont le chef, Salih Bey Nadjimadeh, siège actuellement au Conseil de Kerkuk et dans l'Assemblée d'Irak.

« Dans ces cas, c'étaient des délégués et non pas des députés élus.

"Votre Excellence a, pourtant, prétendu que l'admission des Députés du Vilayet de Mossoul à l'Assemblée constituante d'Irak constituerait une violation du *statu quo*, prescrit par l'article 3 du Traité de Lausanne et par l'article 7 du Protocole d'Evacuation. Sous ce rapport, j'ai l'honneur de faire ressortir que, jusqu'au Vilayet de Mossoul est actuellement sous l'administration efficace du Gouvernement d'Irak, la décision uniquement domestique du Gouvernement d'Irak de diriger l'administration conformément aux principes de gouvernement représentatif ne saurait d'aucune manière être regardée comme une

Votre Excellence se trompe en disant qu'aucun député n'a été envoyé du  
Soudan à l'Assemblée d'Irak.

Votre Excellence a fait allusion aux mesures sévères prises contre le Cheik Mahmud à Suleymanie. Il ne sera pas nécessaire de rappeler à votre Excellence que le Gouvernement turc se voit parfois également dans l'obligation d'avoir recours à des mesures coercitives contre des chefs kurdes, dont les ambitions personnelles menacent de troubler la tranquillité publique, comme, par exemple, dans le cas de Abdurrahman Aglu, chef de la tribu Sheranckh, qui d'après mes renseignements est détenu en prison depuis quelque temps par votre Gouvernement.

J'ai déjà eu l'occasion de faire allusion à la disposition de votre Excellence  
sur les chiffres des Turcs et des Kurdes, en me référant à la population du  
village de Mossoul et à ses divers éléments ethniques, et de cette façon à donner  
l'impression tout à fait erronée que les Turcs et les Kurdes sont des races unies,  
incapables d'être distinguées, et aux traits et aspirations identiques. Je n'ai pas  
prévu que votre Excellence devrait retourner à une position qui avait été si  
complètement et si publiquement démentie par Lord Curzon à Lausanne. Je fais  
remarquer, pourtant, que votre Excellence a de nouveau choisi cette ligne, en  
traitant les chiffres fournis par la délégation britannique à Lausanne, dans le but

En parlant de l'aveur des Assyriens, votre Excellence a attribué au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté l'intention d'annexer en protectorat britannique certains territoires qui se trouvent actuellement "sous le drapeau de la République turque." Au premier lieu, je voudrais rappeler à votre Excellence qu'en vous soumettant votre exposé, j'ai déclaré d'une façon spécifique que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté ne pouvait envisager l'idée d'un protectorat britannique pour la région assyrienne.

"Votre Excellence a fait allusion à la contradiction apparente entre le désir exprimé par Lord Curzon à Lausanne en faveur de l'établissement de l'autonomie



kurde et mes propositions actuelles se rapportant à l'avenir des Assyriens. Je ne peux pas y voir de contradiction. La réclamation que j'ai l'honneur de faire tend à fournir une solution de la question kurde, conformément aux aspirations librement exprimées des Kurdes d'Irak, aussi bien qu'à assurer l'avenir des Assyriens. La remarque suivante de votre Excellence, d'après laquelle il serait manifestement déraisonnable d'alerer à la Turquie un grand nombre de Kurdes afin de subvenir aux besoins d'un nombre plus restreint d'Assyriens (qui, au surplus, sont numériquement égaux au moins aux Turcs et aux Turcomans du vilayet), demontre qu'en exposant le point de vue britannique, je n'ai pas réussi à m'exprimer avec clarté, et pour éviter toute méprise à cet égard je me répéterai au risque d'être fastidieux. Ce n'est pas et n'a jamais été l'intention du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté de subordonner d'aucune façon les intérêts de la nombreuse population kurde à ceux des minorités chrétiennes du Vilayet de Mossoul. Les éléments kurdes, satisfaits de la mesure d'autonomie locale qui leur a été octroyée, ont déjà à plusieurs reprises donné des preuves incontestables du desir d'être leur destinée à celle de l'Irak, et le cas des Assyriens n'a été cité conjointement avec des considérations probantes d'ordre topographique et stratégique, qu'à l'appui de la réclamation du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté à une ligne de frontière, un peu au delà de celle envisagée primitivement, qui rendra possible leur établissement sous forme d'une seule communauté, ou effectivement dans leurs anciennes habitations ou dans le voisinage, sur le territoire pour lequel Sa Majesté britannique tient un mandat de la Société des Nations.

"Une solution telle que celle que j'ai proposée n'entraînerait, comme le fait entendre votre Excellence, aucun sacrifice d'intérêts musulmans, vu que les éléments musulmans habitant le pays, réclament aux fins de l'établissement des Assyriens, consistent, ou en fractions de tribus nomades accoutumées à passer l'hiver dans les plaines de Mossoul, ou en fractions détachées des tribus, dont l'habitat est dans le Vilayet de Mossoul. Votre Excellence fait observer que tous les hommes sans distinction de race ou de religion jouissent des mêmes droits et privilèges en Turquie, et ajoute que les Nestoriens trouveraient sur le territoire

qu'ils ne renouvellent pas leurs activités de la période de guerre. En réponse, je peux seulement dire que tel n'est pas l'avis des Assyriens et des Nestoriens eux-mêmes, qui gardent le souvenir le plus vif, entièrement contraire à celui de votre Excellence, des traitements qu'ils ont reçus aux mains des Turcs par le passé.

"Au reste, les remarques de votre Excellence se résolvent encore une fois en une répétition de la demande, mise en avant par la délégation turque à Lausanne, au Vilayet de Mossoul.

"Cela, bien plus, comme j'ai déjà rendu clair à votre Excellence, tendrait, de négocier sur cette base

à votre Excellence une proposition spécifique d'une frontière, qui, selon la conviction du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté, est nécessaire pour faire face aux exigences de la situation. A moins que votre Excellence ne soit prêt, ou à accepter cette proposition en principe et à discuter avec moi les ajustements éventuels de détail, ou à me soumettre une proposition alternative que mes instructions me permettent de prendre en considération, je serai obligé de m'en référer à mon Gouvernement en demandant des instructions complémentaires, avant de reprendre nos délibérations."

FETHY BEY remercie Sir Percy Cox pour les observations qu'il a bien voulu développer devant la Commission. Il propose donc que la séance soit suspendue pour une demi-heure.

La séance est suspendue à 3 heures 40.

Elle est reprise à 4 heures 15.

FETHY BEY déclare :

"Permettez-moi, Excellence, de vous répondre. Je me sens obligé de parler d'abord de la partie finale de votre discours. Votre délégation a bien voulu indiquer sur la carte qui nous a été remise la ligne frontière qu'elle nous proposait. Revenant sur ce point, votre Excellence nous demande si nous acceptons en principe la ligne proposée, en ajoutant que, dans l'affirmative, elle serait disposée à discuter les rectifications de détail.

"Je dirai tout de suite que je ne puis pas entamer les négociations sur cette base, nos instructions nous prescrivant de régler la question même de Mossoul, qui avait été longuement débattue à Lausanne sans aboutir à un résultat net et définitif. Le différend en avait été ainsi différé faute d'accord. Il est stipulé

l'article de Lausanne qu'il sera examiné à l'amiable par les Gouvernements britannique.

"Aux sommes charges de revendiquer le Vilayet de Mossoul. Pour concrétiser notre demande, nous allons vous présenter une carte préparée par notre expert militaire, et indiquant les lignes frontières répondant aux vœux de notre Gouvernement. J'espère que vous recevrez ce document jusqu'à demain. Comme votre Excellence a déclaré que ses instructions lui prescrivent de ne pas engager les discussions au point où elles avaient été laissées à Lausanne elle verra, après l'examen de notre carte, si elle peut négocier avec nous dans les limites de nos offres. Je serais bien heureux d'avoir à ce sujet son avis."

"Quant aux autres considérations formulées par votre Excellence, je ne veux point perdre du temps à les discuter point par point. Je ferai seulement remarquer que les uns en méritent d'être relevées, et d'autres rectifiées."

"Je dois vous dire qu'on ne peut procéder aux élections publiques dans un

état de trouble, de peur que les pressions, d'être poursuivis ou emprisonnés. Notre histoire des dernières années offre des exemples de ce genre. Ainsi, Constantinople et ses environs étaient occupés par les puissances alliées, ce qui n'a point empêché cette ville d'envoyer des députés à la Chambre, et j'ai eu l'honneur d'être élu député."

"Il en a été de même à Adana, occupée par les forces françaises, et à Smyrne, envahie par les troupes hellènes. Les élections y ont eu lieu secrètement. Cela ne se pouvait autrement faire, du moment que, dans le cas contraire, les électeurs auraient à souffrir aussi bien que les élus des mesures de représailles. L'unique moyen de connaître la véritable expression de la volonté populaire dans un cas pareil, c'est de recourir au plébiscite, qui, toutefois, doit être rigoureusement impartial. Or, il est indispensable, pour réaliser cette condition essentielle de retirer les troupes d'occupation et d'évacuer le pays. La plébiscite pour Mossoul a été proposée par la délégation turque à Lausanne. Mais il a été rejeté par Lord Curzon. C'est pourtant bien là le seul moyen de savoir réellement si la population de ce vilayet desirait être rattachée à l'Irak ou à la République turque."

"Je voudrais également dire quelques mots relativement au mandat britannique sur l'Irak. Le principe de la répartition des mandats aux territoires sous mandat ayant été arrêté à la Conférence de San-Remo, la Société des Nations a délégué la surveillance de l'Irak à la Grande-Bretagne. Mais la Turquie n'ayant encore fait la paix, les droits de souveraineté sur ce pays appartenaient juridiquement à ce moment à elle. Or, la Ligue des Nations ne pouvait déléguer un territoire à telle ou telle autre puissance, sans l'assentiment de son véritable propriétaire. La Turquie n'étant détachée des Arabes par le Traité de Lausanne, elle se désintéressait du sort de leur patrie qui peut être soumise à un mandat. Mais elle n'a jamais admis un mandat étranger pour une contrée à majorité turque et kurde."

"Votre Excellence a déclaré qu'il n'existe pas de vestige du Gouvernement turc dans le rayon meridional du Vilayet de Hakkari. Je ne permettrai de lui déclarer que cela n'est nullement vrai. Dans la région en question, sont situés les Kazas de Beyt-el Chehab, de Djulemork et de Chindinan, qui sont administrés par des kaimakams turcs désignés par notre Gouvernement central, dont ils reçoivent et exécutent les ordres. Pour en finir, je tiens à exprimer l'espoir que votre Excellence trouvera juste notre proposition, et qu'elle recevra des instructions lui permettant de la prendre en considération pour pouvoir continuer les pourparlers. Je souhaite que nous puissions arriver de cette façon à trouver une solution satisfaisante au problème dont le dénoûment nous incombait."

SIR PERCY COX répond à Fethy Bey en ces termes :

"J'ai écouté avec attention les observations de votre Excellence et j'ai noté que je dois recevoir une carte de votre Excellence demain matin, indiquant la ligne que vous proposez que nous discutons."

[1204]

"Comme la plus grande partie des observations, que vient de faire votre Excellence, soulèvent la question de la reddition ou de la non-reddition du Vilayet de Mossoul, je préférerais recevoir la carte, que votre Excellence a promise de me faire parvenir, avant de reprendre les pourparlers.

La séance est levée à 3 heures 15.

A. FETHY  
P. Z. COX.

Le 5 juin 1924

#### PROCES VERBAL No. 5.

Séance n° 1 du 5 juin 1924, tenue dans le local de l'ancien Ministère de la Marine à Constantinople.

La séance est ouverte à 3 heures 10 de l'après-midi.

Sont présents

Pour la Turquie :

Fethy Bey, Président de la grande Assemblée nationale, Député de Constantinople  
Feyzi Bey, ancien Ministre des Travaux publics et Député de Diarbékir  
Fahri Bey, Député d'Orak  
Noussret Bey, Conseiller-légiste au Ministère des Affaires étrangères  
Ishak Avni Bey, Lieutenant-Colonel d'Etat-Major

Pour l'Empire britannique :

Sir Percy Cox  
Mr J. H. Hall, D.S.O., M.C.  
Mr C. H. Jarlino  
Lieutenant-Colonel E. F. W. Lees, D.S.O.  
Taha Bey

Secrétaires : A. Bedi Bey ; M. Kiamil Bey.

Interprètes : Jevdet Bey ; Mr. W. D. W. Matthews

FETHY BEY lit de discours suivant :

" Excellence,

" Par ma lettre en date du 2 juin 1924, j'ai eu l'honneur d'accuser réception de la lettre de votre Excellence en date du même jour, que j'ai transmise à mon Gouvernement.

" Par ladite lettre votre Excellence me fait savoir que, sans modification du point de vue de mon Gouvernement, elle se verrait obligée d'abandonner les négociations et de retourner à Londres.

" En réponse, j'ai l'honneur de porter à sa haute connaissance ce qui suit :

" Les conférences s'étant réunies conformément à l'article 3 du Traité de Lausanne, dans le but de déterminer à l'amiable la frontière entre la Turquie et l'Irak. Or, la frontière septentrionale de l'Irak consiste d'une façon générale, ainsi qu'il est à la connaissance de tous, dans le tracé que j'ai eu l'honneur de soumettre à la conférence :

" D'ailleurs, pour ne citer qu'une autorité qu'il ne viendrait à la pensée de personne d'accuser de partialité en faveur de la Turquie, l'Encyclopædia Britannica, deuxième édition, 1911-II, p. 740, définit ainsi que suit les limites géographiques de cette région : " Irak is approximately the region between the Median Wall, from Opis, on the Tigris, at the mouth of Shatt-el Adl, in the neighbourhood of Ramadiah, on the Euphrates ; that is, from nearly lat. 33° N. to the Persian Gulf, and from the Syrian desert to the Persian mountains.

" Avant d'être arrivés à un accord relativement à ladite délimitation, le Vilayet de Mossoul, quoique se trouvant aujourd'hui sous l'occupation provisoire de la Grande-Bretagne, fait juridiquement partie de la Turquie. Telle est donc la position de droit en présence de laquelle le Gouvernement britannique ne peut pas se dispenser de proposer la solution de la question.

" Par conséquent, notre attitude se borne à poser la question même dont le Traité de Paix prescrit l'étude de la solution à l'amiable. Par contre, la revendication de la délégation britannique, n'a aucun rapport avec le principe de la délimitation des frontières entre la Turquie et l'Irak, prévue dans le traité.

" La délégation britannique demande, en effet, la cession d'un nouveau territoire appartenant à notre Vilayet de Hakkari et crée ainsi une nouvelle question qu'il ne serait venu à la pensée de personne de soulever.

" Quant au traité

" votre Excellence voulant exclure des négociations les questions nouvelles que le traité n'envisage pas et revenir au but même de notre réunion, il pourrait y avoir naturellement au terrain de conversation.

" Mais si le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique

" de Hakkari, il n'y aura pas de doute qu'il aura manifesté de cette façon

" de voir les négociations en cours venues à un tel point

" et en concernant la liberté pour le Gouvernement de Sa

" présenter une revendication plus complète pour le compte de l'Irak en soumettant le litige au Conseil de la Société des Nations. Je tiens à

" faire observer que, me basant sur ce qui a été en mes mains relativement à la frontière de l'Irak, la liberté d'action du Gouvernement britannique ne pourra se porter en dehors des limites du litige en question. La revendication plus complète pour le compte de l'Irak serait contraire aux stipulations de

" et de soumettre le litige à l'arbitrage de la Société des Nations, la Turquie ne s'est engagée nulle part à se trouver en présence de revendications territoriales illimitées. Par conséquent, elle ne saurait admettre la discussion

" des Nations, de n'importe quelle question qui n'a

" n'est traité. Au contraire, je me permets d'attirer

" sur le point que, conformément à l'article 16, ce n'est qu'après la détermination de la frontière entre l'Irak et la Turquie que la renonciation de la Turquie à ses droits et titres sur l'Irak peut acquiescer un caractère conventionnel, car il ne pourrait naturellement pas être question de renoncer à un territoire et à un tel d'une frontière non délimitée.

" La délégation britannique, en conséquence, ne peut pas, d'après l'esprit et au texte de l'article 3 du traité, ne prend pas en considération la question en litige, qui consiste à déterminer la frontière entre la Turquie et l'Irak. Mais, par contre, en se levant des prétentions à l'égard du Vilayet de Hakkari, elle a créé une nouvelle question qui n'a jamais été envisagée et ne peut donc avoir rapport à aucun point de vue avec la question à soumettre à la Société des Nations.

" Par conséquent, il y a lieu de revenir au but prescrit par le texte du traité et de négocier sur ce point, de cela dépend la solution à l'amiable de la question. Toutefois, si, malgré la précision de l'article 3, la délégation britannique, sur le même point en litige, insiste pour que la question soit posée par-devant la Société des Nations, ceci n'impliquerait d'autre idée que celle de vouloir reporter la question à la dite Société en évitant les négociations directes.

" Devant cette attitude, notre délégation ne considérerait comme dispensée de tout effort ultérieur pour mener sa mission à bonne fin : l'étude de la question incombant aux Gouvernements respectifs.

" Mon Gouvernement préférerait la solution de la question à l'amiable, et conserve encore la conviction que cela est réalisable. Il ne peut cependant comprendre, à son grand regret, les raisons pour lesquelles la délégation britannique propose de soumettre la question à la Société des Nations.

A cette déclaration Fethy Bey ajoute les explications suivantes :

" La Turquie est un Gouvernement républicain fondé par les Turcs et les Kurdes d'un commun accord, et où ils jouissent des mêmes droits. La contrée qu'on comprend par l'expression géographique Irak est notoirement connue. C'est une région dont les limites ont été déterminées et tracées par les géographes, depuis bien longtemps. Nous avons pour tâche de délimiter la frontière entre la Turquie et l'Irak. Cette tâche sera facilitée après avoir défini les régions qui rentrent sous les définitions de Turquie et d'Irak. Je n'ai pas voulu aller aussi loin que l'Encyclopædia Britannica en vous demandant la ligne Opis-Ramadiah



passant par le 34° de latitude. Cela n'aurait pas constitué une ligne de frontière entre les deux pays.

La frontière que nous revendiquons est située beaucoup plus au nord par rapport à cette ligne, car notre but est de déterminer une ligne de frontière qui puisse écarter toutes sortes de complications entre les deux États, assurer pour longtemps des relations amicales entre eux, et être compatible avec les exigences ethniques et la conformation territoriale naturelle. À cette occasion je desire noter une fois de plus que nous ne sommes animés que de sentiments amicaux envers le jeune Gouvernement de l'Irak, pour lequel nous formons les meilleurs vœux.

"Mais si ce jeune Gouvernement se laisse emporter par des vœux impérialistes et veut subjuguer les éléments ethniques appartenant à des pays voisins, je n'ai pas besoin d'exposer les dangers qu'une telle politique pourrait susciter entre les deux parties."

En outre, l'histoire démontre que, dans la région de Mossoul, se sont toujours constitués des États séparés, qui sans être liés à l'Irak ont quand même longtemps vécu en rapports de bon voisinage.

"Il n'est donc pas besoin de recourir à l'histoire."

Le traité conclu entre le Gouvernement britannique et le Gouvernement turc, qui avait accepté la séparation de Mossoul d'avec l'Irak par le projet du Traité de Sévres, que l'on avait voulu imposer à la Turquie et qui a été prouvé de fait inapplicable, le Gouvernement britannique et ses alliés avaient décidé de séparer Mossoul de l'Irak et de l'annexer au Kachistan. (Art. 64.)

"Nous éprouvons des difficultés à comprendre les raisons pour lesquelles votre Excellence insiste à refuser, malgré tous ces précédents, d'entrer en discussion."

Admettant que votre Excellence voudra bien le reconnaître, je me suis basé sur les accords conclus par le Gouvernement britannique, sur les propositions faites par lui, ou sur l'Encyclopædia Britannica, qui est un admirable monument de la science anglaise, pour que les arguments que j'ai invoqués, ne donnent lieu à aucune objection."

"Nous sommes forcés de considérer le refus de votre Excellence d'entrer en discussion, et le silence opposé aux arguments que nous avons exposés, comme un aveu à la justice de nos revendications."

"Pour me résumer, je dois dire que géographiquement le territoire du Vilayet de Mossoul est tout à fait séparé du territoire de l'Irak."

"Au point de vue ethnographique les 50 pour cent de la population du Vilayet de Mossoul sont composés de Turcs et Kurdes. Il n'y a donc absolument aucun rapport entre Mossoul et l'Irak, contrée habitée par les Arabes. Je dois répéter encore une fois que même dans une question où nos droits sont en jeu, d'une façon si incontestable il y aurait toujours possibilité de trouver un terrain de négociations, ainsi que je le fais savoir par écrit à votre Excellence au cas où elle accepterait de discuter."

"J'ai l'honneur de déclarer à votre Excellence que je n'ai aucune objection à la proposition pour lui fournir toute explication complémentaire qu'il voudra."

À la suite de ces déclarations, SIR PERCY COX a exprimé le désir d'une brève suspension ou de seoir afin de pouvoir discuter avec les membres de sa délégation avant de donner sa réponse.

La séance fut suspendue à 11 heures.

La séance fut reprise à 6 heures.

SIR PERCY COX répondit en ces termes aux déclarations précédentes de son Excellence Fethy Bey.

"J'ai écouté avec grande attention les observations de votre Excellence, et je desire commenter les points suivants."

En premier lieu, vous dites avec raison que la frontière que nous nous sommes vue pour discuter c'est la frontière entre la Turquie et l'Irak. Ensuite, passant sous silence tous les événements de la guerre et tout ce qui s'est passé à

vos Excellences s'efforcent de démontrer que l'Irak, auquel ont traité que chose de tout a fait autre que ce que nous avons

examiné l'avis que la frontière septentrionale de l'Irak est approximativement la limite septentrionale du Vilayet de Bagdad, et que le Vilayet de Mossoul ne fait pas partie de l'Irak."

"Je ne peux naturellement pas prendre un seul moment ce raisonnement au sérieux. L'Irak que nous discutons est le territoire, pour lequel, à la suite de la guerre, Sa Majesté britannique a accepté la responsabilité vis-à-vis de la Société des Nations, et le territoire qui a été discuté à Lausanne, sujet aux revendications territoriales accessoires, de la nécessité desquelles le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté a convenu à la lumière des enquêtes faites et de l'expérience acquise dernièrement."

Le deuxième point c'est l'allusion que votre Excellence a de nouveau faite à l'Accord Sykes-Picot. Il est tout à fait vrai que, pendant les premières années de la guerre, la Grande-Bretagne et la France ont envisagé la cession du Vilayet de Mossoul à la France et des Vilayets de Basorah et de Bagdad à la Grande-Bretagne. Il importe, pourtant, de se rappeler que cette proposition a été méditée entre deux puissances étroitement alliées, à un moment où on s'attendait à ce que la troisième puissance alliée, la Russie, fût leur voisine au nord. Des considérations plus profondes des conditions locales ont clairement démontré combien cet arrangement était impraticable, et il a été par conséquent abandonné."

Dans tous les cas, il n'a jamais été question de la reddition du Vilayet de Mossoul à la Turquie."

En dernier lieu, votre Excellence émet l'avis, d'après lequel la frontière que j'ai revendiquée comprenant du territoire appartenant au Hakkari, que ma revendication serait en contradiction avec l'esprit et la lettre du Traité de Lausanne. J'ai déjà rappelé à votre Excellence qu'aucune frontière précise entre l'Irak et l'Irak n'a jamais été indiquée par Lord Curzon à Lausanne. C'est pour délimiter cette frontière que nous nous trouvons actuellement réunis. Je peux dire, cependant, que je regarde cette partie de la ligne que j'ai proposée et laquelle votre Excellence fait allusion ici, comme comprise dans mon invitation à votre Excellence à accepter la ligne en principe et à discuter avec moi des ajustements de détail. Pourtant, votre Excellence ne s'est montrée aucunement disposée à accepter cette invitation, ni à modifier d'aucune manière la prétention formulée par la délégation turque à Lausanne."

"Je dois maintenant prier votre Excellence de me faire savoir définitivement et après nouvel examen elle est prête à accepter en principe la ligne de frontière que j'ai proposée ou bien à me formuler des contre-propositions entièrement nouvelles, ne comportant pas de retrocession appréciable de territoire, et de nature telles que je pourrais me sentir justifié à les étudier. J'attends la réponse définitive de votre Excellence."

FETHY BEY prenant la parole déclare avoir écouté avec la plus grande attention les déclarations de Sir Percy Cox, mais, relève que le délégué britannique n'a pas renoncé à ses prétentions sur le Vilayet de Hakkari, ce qui n'est pas conforme au traité. Il fait de nouveau observer qu'à la Conférence de Lausanne il a toujours été question de Mossoul, mais qu'une cession territoriale du Vilayet de Hakkari n'avait jamais fait l'objet de délibérations.

Quant à l'invitation de formuler une contre-proposition, Fethy Bey fait remarquer que tant que la délégation britannique n'acceptera pas le principe de renoncer à toute revendication sur le Vilayet de Hakkari, et ne reviendra point au point de vue initial devant former le terrain de négociations prévues par le traité, il sera impossible à la délégation turque de formuler de nouvelles propositions, et que dans ce cas il se voit au grand regret obligé de constater que les pourparlers ne pourront aboutir à un résultat satisfaisant."

SIR PERCY COX intervenant alors répond qu'il soutient que la ligne qu'il a soumise à la délégation turque est conforme à la lettre et à l'esprit de l'article 3 du Traité de Lausanne. Il n'est pas fait allusion dans cet article au Vilayet de Mossoul, mais seulement à la frontière entre la Turquie et l'Irak, sa revendication vise une telle frontière.

En ce qui concerne la partie de la ligne concernant Hakkari, cette partie est comprise dans son invitation à discuter les ajustements de détail pourvu que la ligne soit acceptée en principe."

FETHY BEY, poursuivant ses déclarations, fait remarquer de nouveau qu'il ne fut nullement question à Lausanne du Vilayet de Hakkari, mais seulement de celui de Mossoul, ainsi qu'en font foi des procès-verbaux des séances, lesquels peuvent être consultés ici. Les explications fournies par la délégation britannique pour démontrer

point convaincu. Il ajoute qu'en réponse à la proposition britannique de reconnaître en principe la frontière proposée par elle et d'en discuter les détails, il est prêt, au cas où la délégation accepterait en principe la frontière proposée par la Turquie, d'entrer à tout moment en discussion sur les points d'ajustement.

Dans le cas où la délégation britannique continuerait à maintenir son point de vue, il ne semblait pas possible d'arriver à un résultat satisfaisant.

SIR PERCY COX déclare que la ligne de la limite septentrionale de Mossoul n'a jamais été, à sa connaissance, délimitée d'une façon permanente ou définitive. Les conditions des tribus et d'ordre politique ont nécessairement rendu cette ligne de division fluide et variable. Elle a dépendu de l'influence des différents Valis, de l'administration et d'autres considérations passagères. De plus,

les deux provinces du même État est loyalement et honnêtement reconnue entre deux États, et il répète qu'aucune frontière définitive et permanente n'a jamais existé, après laquelle la revendication de ce qui, de l'avis

de Hakkari ne serait pas en conformité de l'entente de Lausanne, ne saurait être maintenue, ne fût-ce que pour cette raison.

Il doit par conséquent inviter encore une fois Fethy Bey à déclarer de nouveau s'il est prêt à accepter en principe la ligne de frontière qu'il a proposée et à discuter les ajustements de détails, ou à formuler une contre-proposition.

FETHY BEY estime qu'il ne peut accepter les remarques de Sir Percy Cox au sujet des situations des limites du Vilayet de Mossoul, car aucune chose n'a jamais existé.

FETHY BEY déclare ne pas pouvoir accepter la proposition de Sir Percy Cox.

SIR PERCY COX alors prend la parole pour répondre.

"Dans ces circonstances, et d'après mes instructions, je suis obligé de déclarer que, pour le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté, c'est un regret personnel pour moi que nos efforts pour arriver à un règlement d'après le droit en conformité de l'article 2 de l'article 3 du Traité de Lausanne aient échoué. Ce n'est pas là une expression de regret purement formelle et continue lorsque des négociations n'aboutissent pas. Le regret qui

me vient est véritable et sincère. Tout en comprenant pleinement les raisons de nos deux Gouvernements, et les grandes difficultés d'avis manifestées à Lausanne, je ne puis que regretter que Sa Majesté ait espéré qu'avec de la bonne volonté des deux parties on pourrions résoudre la question qui nous incombait, et de cette façon écarter le dernier obstacle au plein rétablissement de ces rapports amicaux qui existaient entre nos deux pays avant la guerre. Je me permets de dire que la bonne volonté s'est complètement manifestée, et je ne saurais prendre ombrage de votre Excellence sans exprimer le contentement que je ressens, et que ressent mon Gouvernement dans un degré tout à fait modeste, de ce que nos délibérations aient été animées d'un esprit tellement amical et que les relations entre les deux délégations aient été si uniformément cordiales. Néanmoins, ainsi que le craignant Lord Curzon à Lausanne, en recommandant que cette question fût référée sans retard à l'arbitrage de la Société des Nations, les difficultés se sont montrées insurmontables, les points de vue respectifs de nos deux Gouvernements trop irréconciliables pour rendre possible

un accord, comme des amis qui ne peuvent s'entendre sur une question fondamentale, et qui ne veulent pas que leur amitié s'en ressentisse par des controverses prolongées, nous mettre d'accord pour référer la question à un arbitrage indépendant et entièrement impartial. Dans ce but, et afin que le procès-verbal de notre dernière réunion ne constate pas simplement l'insuccès complet de nos efforts pour arriver à un règlement, je suis autorisé à proposer à votre Excellence qu'une tentative soit faite à cette réunion pour que nous nous mettions d'accord

sur une formule de référence collective à la Société des Nations, dont nous pourrions appuyer l'adoption auprès de nos Gouvernements respectifs. Il est vrai que ce n'est pas la le but principal pour lequel nous avons été nommés, mais je suis d'avis que nous serons pleinement justifiés à faire cette tentative, puisque y réussissant nous éviterions non seulement à nos Gouvernements respectifs une correspondance pouvant se prolonger et comportant des retards

les uns, mais nous ferions en même temps ressortir que, tout en ne pouvant nous entendre sur la question principale, nous partageons l'avis que cette question laissée en suspens devrait être solutionnée aussi rapidement que possible, afin qu'il ne reste rien susceptible d'empêcher le rétablissement de relations amicales entre nos deux pays. La formule de référence dont il s'agit devrait prendre, à ce que je comprends, la forme d'une lettre adressée par les deux Gouvernements en termes identiques au Conseil de la Société des Nations, et j'ose exprimer l'espoir que votre Excellence sera d'avis que le texte que je vous remets maintenant est conçu en termes appropriés et non contestables. J'attends à présent la réponse de votre Excellence à la question de savoir si elle peut en agréer les termes, et si elle est prête à en appuyer l'acceptation auprès du Gouvernement turc."

FETHY BEY dit partager complètement les regrets et les déceptions de Sir Percy Cox, mais fait observer, au risque de se répéter, que les revendications territoriales au sujet de Hakkari, posées sous forme d'ultimatum par Sir Percy Cox, ne pouvaient rompre les pourparlers au cas où la délégation turque ne les accepterait pas en principe, qu'il a en discutant les détails dans la suite, ne pouvant donner d'autres résultats.

SIR PERCY COX fait observer que Fethy Bey se trompe en disant que sa proposition est un ultimatum. Il l'a deux fois invité à formuler une contre-proposition, mais ses instructions lui prescrivaient de prendre en considération. En réponse il n'a fait que permettre à revendiquer le Vilayet de Mossoul entier. Ce n'est pas là une

Il a remis à Fethy Bey des cartes que la délégation s'est donné beaucoup de peine à préparer et qu'il avait invité à accepter en principe, tout en discutant des ajustements de détails, par exemple, dans la partie touchant cette région connue de Hakkari. Mais il n'est pas disposé à prendre en considération une proposition qui, à part ces ajustements de détails, entraînerait la restitution de territoire irakien.

FETHY BEY relève qu'il a déjà formulé une contre-proposition, mais que Sir Percy Cox en déclarant que les instructions dont il était porteur ne l'autorisaient pas à prendre en considération lesdites propositions avait ainsi enlevé tout terrain à négociation; que le délégué britannique insistait sur ses revendications territoriales sur le Vilayet de Hakkari sans faire lui-même de nouvelles propositions et que, tout en évitant de se mettre sur le terrain de négociations visées par le traité qui envisage la solution à l'amiable de la question, il propose de tomber d'accord sur la formule par laquelle les deux Gouvernements en référeront à la Société des Nations.

Fethy Bey estime par conséquent que la question principale n'ayant pas été touchée, les instructions de son Gouvernement ne l'autorisaient pas à discuter les termes de la formule proposée et exprime le profond regret qu'il éprouve à constater que tous les efforts déployés n'ont point abouti.

SIR PERCY COX exprime son regret de trouver que Fethy Bey ne se soit pas autorisé à prendre en considération des propositions en vue de s'entendre sur une formule de référence collective à la Société des Nations. Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique avait nourri l'espoir qu'une formule provisoire de référence aurait été élaborée par la délégation pour être soumise à l'approbation des Gouvernements respectifs. Il est à regretter que Fethy Bey ne soit pas à même de coopérer à la rédaction de cette formule. À défaut de référence collective, le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté s'adressera lui-même à la Société le 6 juillet ou plutôt (Sir Percy Cox a ici consulté des instructions télégraphiques reçues pendant la séance) à l'expiration du délai de neuf mois.

Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté aime à croire que le Gouvernement turc s'associera à lui dans cette démarche. Cependant, son abstention ne lui fera d'aucune façon perdre le droit, ou plutôt ne déchargera pas le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté de l'obligation, d'avoir recours au Conseil de la Société, comme cela fut convenu à Lausanne.



FETHY BEY remercie Sir Percy Cox des informations qu'il veut bien lui donner. Il estime, cependant, que l'élaboration d'une formule provisoire de référence à la Société des Nations n'est pas du ressort de la conférence; cette question concerne maintenant directement les deux Gouvernements.

SIR PERCY COX prenant la parole s'exprime alors en ces termes :

"En ce cas, comme votre Excellence ne peut modifier son attitude, il ne me reste plus qu'à prendre congé de votre Excellence et de ses collègues.

Faisant, je dois encore une fois exprimer en mon nom et au nom des membres de ma délégation les sentiments de vive reconnaissance que nous éprouvons pour la large hospitalité qui nous a été réservée et pour les mesures qui ont été prises d'une façon si amicale afin d'assurer notre aisance et bien-être pendant notre séjour parmi vous. J'emporterai avec moi, comme j'en suis sûr, tous les membres de ma délégation, un souvenir très vil et très heureux de la bienveillance invariable dont nous avons été l'objet pendant notre séjour à Constantinople et de l'esprit de cordialité qui a marqué nos délibérations et les rapports entre nos deux délégations."

FETHY BEY prenant à son tour la parole répliqua :

"Excellence,

"Je me vous oblige d'exprimer mes regrets sincères et profonds de ce que, réunis pour délimiter les frontières entre l'Irak et la Turquie, nos travaux soient demeurés si éloignés du but que nous nous proposons d'atteindre. J'espère que nos Gouvernements respectifs qui auront désormais à s'occuper de la question pourront trouver une solution au problème et je souhaite que leur tâche soit moins ardue que celle dévolue à nos délégations.

"Malgré les regrets que nous cause l'insuccès de notre mission, je suis sûr d'être l'interprète de tous les membres de ma délégation pour prier votre Excellence de recevoir nos remerciements les plus sincères pour l'esprit de cordialité et d'amitié que votre Excellence et sa délégation a bien voulu manifester lors de nos relations, dont nous garderons toujours le meilleur souvenir."

La séance a été levée à 6 heures 40.

P. Z. COX  
A. FETHY

Le 9 juin 1924.

#### Annexe au Procès-verbal

La que l'alinéa 2 de l'article 3 du Traité de Paix avec la Turquie, signé à Lausanne le 24 juillet 1923, stipule que la frontière entre la Turquie et l'Irak sera établie entre la Turquie et la Grande-Bretagne dans un délai de neuf mois, et qu'à défaut d'accord entre les deux Gouvernements dans le délai prévu, le litige sera porté devant le Conseil de la Société des Nations; et vu que les négociations engagées entre la Grande-Bretagne et la Turquie, en conformité des stipulations de cet article et de l'article 7 du Protocole relatif à l'Évacuation, n'ont pas atteint le but visé, aucun accord n'étant intervenu, il reste donc que le litige soit porté devant le Conseil de la Société des Nations en vue d'un règlement; et les Gouvernements britannique et turc demandent que le Conseil soit invité à prendre la question en prompt considération, et, après s'être procuré les renseignements qu'il jugera utiles et en suivant la procédure qui lui paraîtra convenable, à déterminer une frontière entre la Turquie et l'Irak.

P. Z. COX  
A. FETHY

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No. 69

Mr. Henderson to Mr. MacDonald, — (Received June 16.)

(No. 475.)

Sir,

Constantinople, June 11, 1924

BEFORE this despatch reaches you, you will doubtless have received a personal report from Sir Percy Cox amplifying what he sent home from here regarding the

course of the negotiations. It may, however, help His Majesty's Government to shape their further course of action if, without encroaching on the province of Sir Percy Cox, I endeavour to describe the general political setting in which the question of the frontier now presents itself here.

2. While the conference was in progress the local atmosphere was characterised by two remarkable features.

3. In the first place, there was no insistence on the National Pact a document which on various occasions since early in 1921 has been so strenuously invoked by Turkish statesmen and publicists. It is true that on the day following the arrival of the British delegation one newspaper printed prominently the article of the pact, which stipulated that all territory within the armistice boundary and all territory, whether within or without the armistice boundary, which was inhabited by a Turkish or Turkish-Human Moslem majority. Since then, however, the National Pact has been almost entirely forgotten.

4. Secondly, the attitude of the press throughout the conference was extraordinarily temperate. This was the more striking because of the contrast between the moderate tone of most of the papers regarding what is for the Turks a capital issue and their ready excitability over facts or rumours concerning the relations of Turkey with other Powers like Russia, France, Greece and, more recently, Italy. That the Government approved if it did not initiate, this moderation is shown by the fact that even when

Mr. I. T. Halet Pasha, regarding the alleged arming of Christians with a view to an advance towards Van, no attempt was made to make capital in the Turkish press. The incident was not more absurd than the tales of Italian concentration camps.

5. French and Italian official circles were not unnaturally impressed by the difference in the Turkish attitude towards Great Britain and towards France.

6. They professed in private conversations to see in it a deliberate attempt on the part of the Ankara Government, and especially of Ismet Pasha, to maintain, in spite of the quarrel over the Irak frontier, relations of friendship with Great Britain. Other observers detected in the exploitation of Turkish difficulties with France and Italy a deliberate attempt on the part of Ismet Pasha to divert the attention of his own countrymen from the question of Mosul, not out of any regard for Great Britain but for reasons of internal politics.

7. There is probably more truth in both these hypotheses. Many Turks, and Ismet Pasha is probably one of them, feel that Turkey cannot stand alone, that her M. J. is a necessity. They are aware of her foreign relations, and that no friendship would be of greater value to her than that of Great Britain. We have already had proof of this during the recent crisis, though I must confess that it has shown itself in matters so small that there has seldom

Ismet Pasha, personally popular but Head of a Government which is violently criticised, knows that nothing would justify him more in the eyes of the majority of Turks than a real rapprochement with the Power whom they most respect, even though the respect be mingled with fear and, in the case of many, with the remnants of hatred and suspicion.

8. Whatever the explanation of the moderate tone of the press during the conference, it is remarkable that the final rupture has provoked no violent outburst of hostile efforts, as might have been expected. Only one paper, the *Yeni Asya*, has taken the lead in the hostile note. The rest have accepted the attitude of the Government with most unusual philosophy and good humour. The truth is, as I may be permitted a paradox, that Mosul is very remote from Turkey and Great Britain a very living presence.

9. I do not wish to exaggerate in any direction. Ankara, though playing a difficult game at home and abroad, is really anxious to recover the Mosul vilayet. The question for Ismet Pasha is not what he wants, but how to get it without challenging Great Britain too openly. The real question to-day is the question of reference to the League of Nations. The choice lies between acquiescence in the British thesis that nothing now remains but to let that body adjudicate on an otherwise insoluble dispute and an

alternative which has probably not yet made up their minds between the two alternatives. Ismet Pasha had an obvious opportunity of stating his views at a much-advertised meeting of the bureau of the People's party on the 9th June. He did make a statement on foreign

affairs, but all that was allowed to appear regarding the Irak frontier question in the communiqué published after the meeting was: "Enfin le bureau a pris entière connaissance des pourparlers de la Conférence de la Corne d'Or et de la façon dont on y a travaillé."

9 Meanwhile the press uses language which points sometimes in one direction, sometimes in the other. Some writers maintain that Turkey's cause is so just that she can rely on the League, all the more as the question will be a test of that body's impartiality. Others, elaborating the views hinted at by Fethi Bey at the last meeting on the 5th June, accuse His Majesty's Government of having deliberately provoked a rupture of the conference by insisting on impossible demands, in excess even of those advanced at Lausanne, in order to compel a reference to the League. They infer almost openly that His Majesty's Government have taken this course not because they are sure of their case, but because they are sure of their influence in the League of Nations.

10 Apart from this suspicion, there is another reason which inclines at least some Turks to postpone the issue rather than let it go at once to the League. Attention has been directed to the uneasy state of Great Britain's relations with Irak. They feel that, in the present state of those relations, time may well be on their side and that therefore procrastination is probably the best policy. When I saw Adnan Bey on the 7th June, for the first time after Mr Lindsay's departure, he suggested plainly that, as we were going to leave Irak in four years' time both sides could very well afford to let the frontier question stand over for the time being.

11 Nevertheless, I think that the balance of probability is that Turkey, which at present accuses His Majesty's Government of plausible though not necessarily just, of having taken up an unreasonable attitude by refusing to redress the wrongs which were thrust out at Lausanne and by claiming the Hakkari territory for Irak will not lightly surrender this tactical advantage, and will decide to go to the League than expose herself to the accusation of having gone back on article 3 of the Lausanne Treaty. It is not for me to advise His Majesty's Government at this stage, but I feel that tendency in this direction would be stimulated if you did not attempt to force the issue and avoided any appearance of threatening to invoke the arbitration of the League unilaterally until every possible endeavour had been made to induce the Turks to unite with us in submitting the matter jointly to the Council. I anticipate that they will leave it to His Majesty's Government to make the next move, and, as I gather that the Council of the League will not in any case be able to entertain the question before September, I think this move should take the form of a studiously friendly invitation to the Ankara Government through the ordinary diplomatic channel to agree to such joint terms of reference as were proposed by Sir Percy Cox at the last meeting of the conference.

12 The above is my general view of the situation at present, but it may be possible in the course of the next few days to form a clearer idea of what is in the mind of the Turkish Government. This morning's papers announce that Ismet I. is expected to make a statement to-day in reply to the declarations made by Sir Percy Cox to the Constantinian press on the 8th June with the object of correcting the erroneous impression which might have been created by the incomplete and inaccurate account of the last meeting of the conference which was circulated through the press on the 10th June before the agreed minutes had even been signed. If Ismet I. makes a statement marking any new development of importance, I will report it telegraphically. Any pronouncement by him at the present moment will be of considerably greater importance than statements recently made or inspired by Fethi Bey, not only for the obvious reason that Ismet is Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, but for another reason which it is well to bear in mind, namely, that Fethi is a rival and his principal subordinate, Feizi, an enemy of Ismet Pasha's, a fact which has doubtless influenced their general attitude here. Their personal interest is to present the appearance of standing for the utmost claims of Turkey, and to leave the Government to bear the onus of any concession, however small, to British views.

I have, &c.

NEVILLE HENDERSON

[E 5257 7 65]

No 70.

Question asked in House of Commons, June 16

Lieutenant-Commander Kenworthy asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs what is the position of the negotiations with the Government of the Turkish Republic on the question of the boundaries of Irak

Mr. Curzon asked the Prime Minister whether he can make any statement with reference to the broadcast of 14th June last

Answer

The Prime Minister (Mr. J. Ramsden MacDonald): As the Turkish delegation to the conference which has been sitting at Constantinople to settle the boundaries of Irak and Turkey informed the British representative at the last meeting that they were unable to consider, even in principle, the proposals put forward by His Majesty's Government, it became apparent that no useful purpose would be served by continuing a conference without any common ground for discussion. Sir P. Cox was therefore instructed to inform the Turkish delegate that he had received orders to return to London, since no other course remained open to His Majesty's Government than to submit the matter to the League of Nations in accordance with article 3 (2) of the Treaty of Lausanne. Sir P. Cox left Constantinople on the 9th instant, and, as soon as the nine months' period provided for direct negotiation by article 7 of the Evacuation Protocol has elapsed, His Majesty's Government for their part will submit the question of the boundaries of Turkey and Irak to the League of Nations and invite that body to give a decision regarding the boundaries of Turkey and Irak. In the meantime they propose to continue the negotiations.

Lieutenant-Commander Kenworthy: May I ask why we are delaying till the full nine months are over before applying to the League? Would it not be satisfactory from every point of view to get this matter settled at the earliest moment, and why should we not apply to the League straight away?

The Prime Minister: I am advised that we have to wait nine months according to the terms of the agreement but in the meantime I am in communication with the Turkish Government in this matter.

E 4988 7 65

No 71

Mr. MacDonald to Mr. Henderson (Constantinople)

(No 88)

(Telegraphic) R

Foreign Office, June 17, 1924

YOF R telegram No 111 of 6th June Turkey Irak frontier negotiations, penultimate paragraph

As indicated in my telegram No 83, you should now address Turkish Government officially, informing them that, failing an agreement before the expiry of the nine months' period on 5th July, His Majesty's Government will submit matter to Council of the League under article 3 of treaty and evacuation protocol. You should express hope of His Majesty's Government that Turkish Government will concert with them in preparing a joint communication to the League of Nations.

Should Turkish Government decline to collaborate in a joint communication to the League of Nations, this would not in any way limit the right, or indeed, relieve His Majesty's Government of the obligation to have recourse to the Council of the League as agreed at Lausanne.

In the event of Turks taking the line that British claim put forward by Sir P. Cox is opposed to letter and spirit of the Treaty of Lausanne (see your telegram No. 111), and that therefore they are disinclined to participate in any reference of dispute to the League, you should state that His Majesty's Government cannot accept this line.

The discussion of the frontier between Turkey and Irak it contains no suggestion that the discussion should deal solely with the Vilayet of Mosul, nor did the previous negotiations imply any such limitation (see Lord Curzon's statement in Lausanne Blue Book,

[12045]

12



p 380 "The question is not what is to be the ultimate destiny of Mosul but where the line is to be drawn between the Turkish possessions and the mandated Arab State of Iraq—an entirely different question". In view of the perfectly clear terms of article 3, His Majesty's Government cannot admit that either Turkish Government or themselves can evade the obligation to refer the matter to the Council of the League

E 5317 7 65

N 72

Mr MacDonald to Mr Henderson (Constantinople)

(No 90)

(Telegraphic) D.

Foreign Office, June 21, 1924

YOUR telegram No. 116 of 15th June Turkey Iraq negotiations

Your suggestions in first four paragraphs are approved

If Turks raise objections foreseen in paragraph 5, you should report by telegraph, while maintaining in any verbal discussion the line laid down in third paragraph of my telegram No. 88 of 17th June

E 5606 7 65

N

Mr Henderson to Mr MacDonald, —(Received June 30.)

(No. 503.)

Sir,

Constantinople, June 24, 1924

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of the written communication which, in accordance with the instructions in your telegrams Nos. 88 and 90, I handed to Adnan Bey yesterday in regard to a joint reference to the Council of the League of Nations of the dispute respecting the frontier between Turkey and Iraq

2 Adnan Bey made practically no comment whatsoever beyond remarking that "there have to be made in the League. As he himself made no difficulties, I confined my verbal representations in that respect to observing that the possible objections which his Government might raise could on such a simple issue have no valid basis, and, being easily refutable, would only be regarded as unworthy and useless evasions.

3. I had, however, great stress on two points. I said, firstly, that you desired an early reply, since, even if the Turkish Government declined to join in the invitation to the Council of the League, His Majesty's Government's right and obligation in this respect under the Treaty of Lausanne would be in no way diminished by such refusal. Secondly, I insisted very strongly on the desirability in Turkey's own interest of her co-operation. Evasion and evasion, besides being ultimately futile, would produce an unfortunate effect not only in England but in Europe, where the influence and prestige of the League of Nations were steadily increasing. On the other hand, a prompt expression of Turkey's willingness to join with us in the reference to the League could not fail to create a most favourable impression.

4. Adnan Bey concurred in principle, but professed to be entirely ignorant of the views of his Government on the subject. He said that he would at once telegraph to Angora, and send a messenger with a copy of my communication.

The reception of my communication has little value as an indication. Yet I am inclined to believe that the Turkish Government would have little real hesitation in concurring in a joint communication to the League, were it not for their apprehension that, if His Majesty's Government put forward a more extensive demand than those previously advanced, the influence which they suppose Great Britain to possess in the League of Nations may be powerful enough to secure for Iraq the frontier claimed by Sir Percy Cox or some other frontier comprising territory outside its present administrative boundary. I anticipate, therefore, not a refusal to concur in terms of reference, but an endeavour to reduce those terms to a formula under which the area in respect of which that body is to adjudicate would be restricted, as foreseen in the third paragraph of your telegram No. 88, to the Vilayet of Mosul.

I have, &c.

NEVILLE HENDERSON.

78A

No. 71A

Mr Henderson to Mr MacDonald. —(Received June 19)

(No. 116.)

(Telegraphic) D.

Constantinople, June 18, 1924

YOUR telegram No. 88

For reasons given in my despatch No. 475 I should prefer to confine present action to note in the following

"Owing to failure to reach agreement as result of direct negotiations here. His Majesty's Government propose on expiration of nine months' period, i.e. 5th July, to approach League under article 3 of treaty and evacuation protocol, and hope that Turkish Government will take advantage of interval still remaining to concert with them in preparing joint communication to the League."

As regards preamble, wording suggested above seems to me preferable to "failing agreement," &c., as there has been tendency in certain quarters here to maintain that there is room or even necessity for further stage of direct negotiations, and it seems important to leave no loophole for any such suggestion.

I should also prefer to omit from note anything ornatory, but would propose, when handing it to Adnan, to use language in general sense of second paragraph of your telegram.

I note instructions in third paragraph of your telegram, but we must also be prepared for possible objection that evacuation protocol only applies to period for direct negotiations and that provision for reference to League will not become operative until a treaty comes into force. Turks can be left to raise this point, but if they do so I anticipate difficulty in convincing them by argument contained in paragraph 2 of your despatch No. 632.

I shall await reply to this telegram before making communication.

[E 5531 7 65]

No. 72A.

Colonial Office to Foreign Office. —(Received June 27)

Sir,

Downing Street, June 26, 1924

I AM directed by Mr Secretary Thomas to refer to the telegram from the High Commissioner for Iraq, dated the 20th June (a copy of which was transmitted to you under cover of this Department's letter of the 23rd June, numbered as a) enquiring when the question of the Turco-Iraq frontier is likely to come up for consideration by the Council of the League of Nations, and to request that Mr [redacted] may be informed what reply should, in the opinion of Mr Secretary Ramsay Ma [redacted], be returned to the High Commissioner.

2. In this connection I am to say that Mr. Thomas proposes to invite the Iraq Government to place the services of Mr Jardine at the disposal of His Majesty's Government during the preparation and presentation of the British case before the Council, if this can conveniently be arranged.

I am &

J. E. STUCKBURY

Enclosure in No. 7

Mr. Henderson to Adnan Bey.

M. le Delegé,

Constantinople, June 23, 1924

UNDER article 3 (2) of the Treaty of Lausanne it is stipulated that the frontier between Turkey and Iraq shall be laid down in friendly arrangement to be concluded between Turkey and Great Britain within nine months, and that, in the event of agreement being reached between the two Governments within the time mentioned, the dispute shall be referred to the Council of the League of Nations.

Under paragraph 2 of article 7 of Protocol 14 relating to the evacuation, the two Governments agreed that the negotiations provided for under article 3 (2) of the treaty should commence as soon as the evacuation was completed, and that the period should run from the date on which these negotiations commenced.

3. As your Excellency is aware, the direct negotiations thus contemplated have unhappily led to no result, and the period of nine months, after which recourse must be had to the Council of the League, expires on the 5th July.

4. I have accordingly been directed by His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to express his earnest hope that the Turkish Government will be prepared to take advantage of the interval still remaining to consider the question of Government in addressing a joint communication to the Council of the League, inviting it to take cognizance of the dispute in question.

I am, Sir,  
Very truly,  
Yours,  
RAMSAY MACDONALD

E 5212 7 65

No. 74

Mr. MacDonald to Mr. Henderson (Constantinople)

No. 74b.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, June 30, 1924

I HAVE received your despatch No. 473 of the 11th June and have read with great interest your report on the political situation in Turkey during and after the Turkey-Iraq frontier negotiations.

Before receiving this despatch you will doubtless have approached the Turkish Government in accordance with the instructions contained in my telegram No. 48 of the 1st June regarding the question of a joint communication to the League of Nations regarding the Turkey-Iraq frontier dispute. From the views expressed in your despatch under reply and in your telegram No. 116 of the 18th instant, I conclude that your note will have been couched in terms designed to preserve the friendly atmosphere that characterized the conference. I am in entire agreement with you as to the necessity of exploiting to the full the present calm and reasonable attitude of the Turkish Government and press, and I am anxious that no word or act on our part should inspire any ill-will from it.

With regard to the Turkish Government's attitude towards the League of Nations, I am sure that the Turkish Government will be prepared to co-operate to their mutual advantage in submitting the question to the League of Nations, and my conviction that this way lies the best chance of eliminating the main obstacle to the restoration of serene and intimate relations between the two countries.

I have the honor to inform you that the British Government will not alter its position and point out that the British Government have claimed a frontier which, after much careful thought, they consider to be in the best interests of the latter country.

4. In short, I desire that you should as far as possible pursue a policy of firm resistance to any unreasonable demands which the Turks may put forward, together with unfailing fairness and sympathy towards them in their difficulties.

I am, Sir,

Yours,  
J. RAMSAY MACDONALD

E 5711 5711 55]

No. 74a

Turkish Diplomatic Mission to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received June 30.)

D'ORDRE de son Gouvernement, la Mission diplomatique de la République turque a l'honneur de porter à la connaissance du Ministère des Affaires étrangères de Sa Majesté britannique les faits suivants:

Au début du mois de juin, une escadrille britannique composée de six avions est venue de Mossoul à Zaho, puis de Zaho les six appareils réunis ont volé environ une demi-heure suivant la ligne Mardin-Daghi, Gali-Goulan, Tebeulmerk. Ils sont ensuite repartis pour Mossoul.

Le Gouvernement de la République, estimant que le vol ostensible au-dessus du territoire turc de ces six avions réunis en escadrille constitue un acte incompatible avec les relations amicales existant entre les deux pays, a chargé la Mission diplomatique turque se trouvant à Londres de protester contre ce fait et, dans le but d'empêcher qu'à l'avenir un incident regrettable ne se produise de ce chef, de prier le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique de s'opposer à la répétition d'un tel acte.

La Mission diplomatique turque présente, &amp;c.

Mission turque, Londres,  
le 30 juin 1924.



## CHAPTER II. ARABIA

E 25 11 91]

Consul Hullard to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.— (Received January 1, 1924)

(No. 100)

My Lord,

Jeddah, December 16, 1923

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith the Jeddah Pilgrimage Report for 1923.

Of the report have been sent to Delhi, Singapore, Cairo and Khartoum. I would suggest that if the report is printed, copies should be sent to Palestine, Bagdad, Constantinople, Beirut, Aden, Nigeria and Somaliland.

I have &c.

R. W. BULLARD.

Enclosure in N.

Pilgrimage Report, 1923

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### 1. General

The number of pilgrims who arrived at Jeddah by sea was greater by nearly 20,000 in 1923 than in 1922. Of this increase, 11,000 came from Indian and nearly 4,000 from British Malayan ports.

The approximate figures in detail are—

Country of Emigration	Including a few hundred	Total
British Malaya	1,000	1,000
Dutch East Indies	2,000	2,000
Portuguese Gulf	1,000	1,000
East Africa	1,000	1,000
Soudan (including many pilgrims from French African territories)	1,000	1,000
Egypt (including a considerable number of Syrians and Palestinians)	1,000	1,000
Syria and Turkey	1,000	1,000
<b>Total</b>	<b>7,000</b>	<b>7,000</b>

The distribution was—

Flag	Number of Pilgrims
British	1,000
Dutch	2,000
Italian	1,000
French	1,000
Russian (under French flag)	1,000
<b>Total</b>	<b>7,000</b>

In addition, there were some hundreds of pilgrims—mainly Africans—who arrived by dhow. It is not possible to estimate their numbers accurately.

It is estimated that 100,000 pilgrims were present at Arafat on that day. This number includes local as well as foreign pilgrims. The first pilgrim ship arrived at Jeddah on the 27th January, the first pilgrim ship carrying pilgrims home left on the 31st July, the last on the 10th October.

### (2) Quarantine and Landing Dues at Jeddah

The Hashimite authorities delayed until the 14th December, 1923, to inform this agency what the quarantine dues for the coming pilgrim season would be, and then stated that there would be an increase from PT 37½ to PT 90 (quarantine, 40; landing dues, 50), and that the new rates would come into force at once. As it was known that by that time many of the pilgrims who intended to go to Medina before the pilgrimage day must have secured their tickets, and that, consequently, the shipping companies, who are responsible for payment of the quarantine and landing charges, would probably be unable to collect the difference from ticket holders, the Hedjaz Government were asked to postpone the application of the new rates for at least a month, in order to give the shipping companies time to make the necessary arrangements. This request was granted, and the new rates did not come into force until the 15th January.

The Hedjaz Government have informed this agency officially, in answer to an enquiry, that these charges will be the same in 1924 as in 1923, viz. PT 90 at the rate of PT 112 = 17 gold, i.e. 16s. 1d. a head, payable in gold.

### (3) Customs Dues

The 1922 pilgrims report gives a list of articles which pilgrims are allowed to bring into the Hedjaz free of customs duty. As a result of the exemption of pilgrims, as pilgrims, from customs charges. In the few cases where pilgrims complained to this agency of overcharging representations were made to the customs authorities, who put the matter right at once.

### (4) Cost of the Pilgrimage

A report contained a list of the various items of expenditure which pilgrims incur, as a minimum, from the time they reach the port of Jeddah. The totals were—

	Rs.
Taxes	86 4 6
Other expenditure	201 9 0

This list still holds good. (A B) It does not include the cost of food and water in the Hedjaz. Nor does it include the cost of the sea-passage, which covers also the quarantine and landing charges payable on arrival.

A tax of 2 majidiyahs gold (Rs. 5 5 0) has been levied this year for the first time on all persons who took tents to Arafat, but that does not affect pilgrims who wish to spend no more than the essential minimum.

### (5) Loss of Luggage by Pilgrims

To relieve the congestion which inevitably results from the passage of so many pilgrims through a single small seaport within a few days, pilgrims are hurried off to Mecca the day after their arrival at Jeddah. Their effects are cleared from the customs by the pilgrim guides, and often the pilgrims do not see their property from the time it leaves the steamer or the lighter until the moment when the camels

are being loaded. It is then frequently found that something is missing but the rush to get to Mecca is so great that few pilgrims wish to stay to make immediate investigations. The Hedjaz Government publish notices in the Mecca newspaper the "Kibla," instructing pilgrims who have lost luggage to apply to the customs authorities at Jeddah before the 1st Safar. As this date is less than fifty days from

he can possibly put in his complaint in time unless he can find time and opportunity to submit it before leaving Jeddah. Few such claims are, in fact, made, either because the notices in the press do not come to the pilgrims' knowledge, or because the fierce scramble to get to Mecca, and, after the pilgrimage to get away from the Hedjaz, leaves no time for enquiries about lost luggage. Official notice, there are in the customs some 300 packages and the actual number is probably very much larger.

No scheme which did not involve personal enquiry by the authorities was expected to be satisfactory. In spite therefore of the natural reluctance to incur the risk of delay any pilgrim who loses any of his luggage should apply to the authorities at the customs godowns at the earliest opportunity.

#### (6) Public Security

Again there is no complaint to make on the score of law and order in Mecca and Jeddah and on the Jeddah-Mecca and Mecca-Arafat Roads. There was one robbery on the Jeddah-Mecca Road, a party of Jeddah people being robbed of their money and their donkeys, but this was the first case for over two years, and no other has occurred since.

The roads to Medina, however, are no safer than they were last year. The road via Yanbo has been little used, in order to protect the vested interests of the caravan companies. Travelling on the Mecca-Medina Road individual pilgrims are not allowed to proceed from Jeddah to Yanbo by sea or to land at Yanbo from Egypt or the Soudan. The direct roads between Mecca and Medina become so unsafe that the later caravans to Medina all came to Jeddah and went on (by land) from there.

Hardly any caravan escaped without paying a toll of about 1/ or 2/ on each camel (i.e., for every two persons). The Persians, as Shi'as, were, as always, made to pay more. The brigandage consists in the subsidies promised by King Hussein are always in arrears and maintain that the only alternative means of livelihood is robbery. The business of brigandage is very well organised, both in the military positions which ensure that not a pilgrim shall escape, and in the arrangements for checking the numbers of the pilgrims, levying the tolls and issuing receipts. The Hedjaz Government a plan of trying to keep the tribesmen in subjection, by limiting their purchases in towns to very small quantities of food and other necessities, except in cases where a Government licence is granted for larger quantities, seems to be singularly ineffective so far as the Medina Road is concerned.

In the "Kibla" of the 12th July an official notice was published promising to pay to pilgrims the sums taken from them by Bedouins on the way to Medina, provided that they submitted their claims before the pilgrimage with details of the robbery and the names of their guides and camel drivers, through whom the application had to be made. The assistance of the camel drivers at least is of doubtful value. Most of the losses are made by the Persians, and almost certainly share in the loot. Some Persians and Persians secured a refund, but almost never in full, and in many cases it represented a ludicrously small proportion of the loss.

The greatest sufferers were a caravan composed mainly of Indians, who were detained at a place called Khair for twenty-eight days and made to pay 9/ a camel. They formed part of the last caravan of the season—always a dangerous situation, as the Bedouins in order not to scare other pilgrims from going to Medina keep their most outrageous exactions until the end of the season. Everything points to collusion between the guides and the Bedouins. The main body of the caravan arrived at Medina with no greater loss than the toll of 1/ a camel which the whole caravan had had to pay soon after leaving Mecca. They, however, did not go via Khair. The prosperous Indians composing that portion of the caravan which went via Khair were forced by the guides to go that way on the pretence that it was easier and safer, though they much wanted to keep with the main body and even offered to pay extra to be allowed to do so. With the 1/ a camel which they had paid earlier in their journey, the Khair caravan paid to the Bedouins altogether a sum of over 4,000/. As compensation, the Hedjaz Government paid them 700/ at Medina. The Government

allocated 200/ of this sum to the party of the Begum of Kabul, the grandmother of the Ameer of Afghanistan. By this means this party received rather more than they had paid the Bedouins, whereas the rest of the pilgrims in the caravan recovered only about one-sixth of their loss. Every effort has been made to persuade the Hedjaz Government to refund the balance, but without success. Beyond saying that the disorder in the Hedjaz is the fault of His Majesty's Government, and that the pilgrims went by the Khair Road by their own wish and against the advice of the guides, who had been ordered by the Government not to go that way, the Hedjaz Government have not troubled to produce any arguments. They ignored a sworn statement made by all the leading pilgrims before the British agent on oath administered by a member of the Indian Jan'iyat al Ulama, declaring that the guides forced them to go by the Khair Road.

Minor grounds of complaint in connection with the Khair incident were these:—

- (a) Jeddah, which had been waiting at Jeddah for over a fortnight to take them to India, might be sent up with their kit to take them on board at Yanbo. The telegraph office refused to accept the message.
- (b) Some of the pilgrims arranged to hire a dhow for the journey from Yanbo to Jeddah, but they were compelled by the authorities to book passages on the Government steamer "Tawil," for which they paid twice as much for far less comfort.
- (c) Six hundred and thirty pilgrims and thirty guides were compelled to embark on the "Tawil." The boat could perhaps carry one quarter of this number with decency, if not with comfort, but by overcrowding it the Hedjaz Government recovered nearly the whole of the sum paid at Medina as a pension. Most of the pilgrims were so crowded that they could get nothing to eat or drink during the twenty-two hours' journey.
- (d) A document produced by the Hedjaz Government, containing an admission that the pilgrims went by the Khair Road against the advice of the guides, bore several signatures which were obvious forgeries.

The Khair caravan affair reflects the greatest discredit on the Hedjaz authorities, and in particular, on King Hussein who conducted the whole of the arrangements after the pilgrims reached Medina and moved from his own Diwan the most unreasonable of the letters addressed to this agency.

The Wahabists—rumours of impending attacks by Wahabists were current all the summer, but they did not materialise until October, and then not on any route by which pilgrims had travelled, but against points on the Hedjaz Railway nearly 200 miles north of Medina. There was, however, a serious attack by Wahabists on the Yemen caravan (see section 6, paragraph 5).

#### (7) Public Health

The health of the pilgrimage was good. There were no epidemics, thanks not to

following the revolution of the Moslem calendar, now takes place in mid summer. There were a few cases of smallpox—the only infectious disease reported. Dysentery and diarrhoea were the prevailing maladies, and there were a considerable number of cases of sunstroke. About 100 Indian pilgrims attended the agency dispensary daily for treatment of dysentery and diarrhoea, but lack of hospital accommodation was felt keenly. Some Indians who were found lying in the streets sick were taken to the Hashimite hospital, but they received no proper food there, and on every occasion when a batch was discharged, as well enough to be conveyed to the steamer, one or more died on the way to the steamer and others on the voyage.

In the absence of proper Government statistics, it is impossible to say how many of the pilgrims were killed. The best arrangements for their comfort report that only six died out of 220. But among other Indians the proportion must have been very much higher, particularly among the destitutes. Many pilgrims who are almost too old to travel come on the pilgrimage, and of these a large proportion die. Many deaths are caused by exhaustion due to heat and malnutrition.

The Egyptian Government wished to send two small hospitals to the Hedjaz for the pilgrim season but the proposal was rejected by the Hedjaz Government. This led to the Maimal incident, which is reported in section 5, paragraph 3.

To the notes by Dr. Munir-ud-Din in last year's report on sanitary conditions at Mecca, Arafat and Muna there is nothing to add except that a well-meant intention



atives of their respective countries. The pressure usually takes the form of an asseveration that complaint about anything which has occurred during a pilgrimage to the holy land is a sin. This argument is very effective with the majority of Mahomedans. In one case however, the pilgrims indignation was stronger than the persuasion of the guides, complaints about the robbery at Khair were made to the representatives of all classes of Indians concerned.

## (11) Enquiries

When enquiry is made of this agency about a pilgrim the name of the mutawif (guide) to whom he was attached should always be given. The mutawif's name is as follows:

W A S I M B E N A L I

The Hedjaz Government can always plead the omission to supply it as a good excuse for inability to trace the pilgrim.

## (1) For East

As usual, the arrangements of the British and Dutch shipping companies concerned, for bringing pilgrims from the Dutch East Indies and British Malaya, were admirable. Messrs. Nemasse of Hong Kong, entered into competition with the other firms and secured 2,496 pilgrims from Malayan and 2,955 from Javanese ports. Messrs. Nemasse were inferior to the British and Dutch lines in their arrangements for the return voyage.

Indian pilgrims to this agency. Of these, only four are described as having more than Rs. 100 each. The others are described as having an average of Rs. 12 5 8 each. This is quite incredible, but beyond seeing that the Hedjaz Government keep to the terms of the agreement mentioned above there is little to be done. It is only through the development of a higher standard of honesty in the Hedjaz and of a more critical attitude among the pilgrims that any serious improvement can be expected.

The arrangements have been good on the whole. Several ships brought a number of stowaways—one as many as twenty. It might be worth while enquiring whether the control at Kankay and Kamehi, whether on shore or on shipboard, could not be improved in this respect.

ship arrives in India with more pilgrims on board than her certificate warrant, yet it is very difficult to secure such control at Jeddah as will prevent stowaways from boarding. The confusion of the pilgrim season, the lack of a central authority, and the unavailability of the local police, makes for confusion, and the local police are worthless. Suggestions have been made to the shipping agencies which, if acted upon, should minimize the risk, but to obviate it altogether is impossible.

convenience of Bengali pilgrims, who at present have to make a railway journey to

$$x^2 + 2x + 1 = (x+1)^2$$

to take the pilgrims back direct to Calcutta, as the number desiring to go to Jeddah at any one time would not be sufficient to fill a ship. Many Bengalis, the return halves of tickets by Hull or Nemazee boats to Penang, whence regular and inexpensive transport to Calcutta can easily be secured.

It was discovered that the pilgrim ship agents in Jeddah were not observing the provision contained in clause 67 of the Pilgrim Ships Act, that every ticket issued to a (male) pilgrim must bear the purchaser's name. A number of pilgrims professed to have lost their tickets between the time of purchase and the date of sailing but their names not being recorded on the counterfoil in the agent's office, they were unable to establish their claim to a new ticket or a refund. When the attention of the shipping agents was drawn to this point, it was discovered that the regulation had been a dead letter in Jeddah for many years, and that a British consul who

investigated the matter before the war had come to the conclusion that to attempt to enforce it would do pilgrims more harm than good. The reasons for this conclusion are these: The rush to get away from Jeddah after the pilgrimages is so great that it is impossible to control the boats and the passengers. It is impossible to buy his own ticket, or to compel buyers of a number of tickets to give the names of all the people they represent would delay boats seriously. Individual hocking would put a premium on strength and violence—a very real danger which the present system obviates, while named tickets issued *en bloc* to one man would not necessarily

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Every effort has been made by the pilgrim guides, acting, of course, on instructions from higher authority to prevent pilgrims from complaining to the

be distributed correctly, since very few of the pilgrims can read. It is frequently found that the return tickets issued to India are held by persons who disown the names written on them. I have been sufficiently influenced by these arguments to refrain from making complaint to the Government of India. It is possible to do too much to protect pilgrims from the consequences of their own carelessness and stupidity.

The employment of an Armenian clerk, ignorant of Urdu, on the gangway of one of Messrs. Nemazee's ships, led to refusal to allow eight pilgrims, whose luggage and tickets were held by a companion in another lighter to embark on the ship. These men had to be sent back later as destitutes. No such case has occurred before but no such case ought to occur. It is essential that persons employed on such work as controlling the embarkation of Indian pilgrims on the ships should know at least Urdu if no other Indian language.

A petition was received from several pilgrims who travelled by the "Arabestan," that their luggage was rifled while they were in the quarantine station at Kamaran. The pilgrims complained that instead of stowing their superfluous luggage in the hold pilgrims insist on keeping it with them, where it is not only in the way, but is exposed to great risk from thieves.

Pilgrims who travelled by the "Shushitar" complain that they were not allowed to cook and that they could not get water or medical attention except on payment. The doctors denied that any payment for medical treatment had been demanded or that any pilgrim had been refused water. As to the complaint that water had to be paid for the master was of the opinion that this arose out of the annoyance of certain pilgrims who had not provided vessels large enough to take their day's supply of water all at once, but wanted to draw it a pint or two at a time, at all hours of the day. The complaints, together with the comments of the masters of the ships concerned, the "Arabestan" and the "Shushitar," have been sent to the Commissioner of Police, Bombay, for any action he may think it desirable to take.

Complaints by masters of pilgrim ships at the incompatibility of the habits of some of their first and second class Indian passengers with the cabin accommodation provided are frequently received. One gentleman with a wide reputation for sanctity nearly caused a strike of stewards by his persistence in using his cabin as a latrine, while the use of bunk curtains as towels on which to wipe fingers fresh from a mess of curried rice is common.

Pilgrims from India and the Persian Gulf were brought to Jeddah by the (1) British India Co. (2) Messrs. Khandwani (3) Messrs. Khandwani (4) Messrs. Khandwani. For the return, Messrs. Khandwani ran no steamer after August, and the remaining pilgrims were brought home by the (1) British India Co. (2) Messrs. Khandwani (3) Messrs. Khandwani (4) Messrs. Khandwani. Two of them is the Governor of Jeddah while the agent for the third is the Municipality. This resulted in higher rates, many pilgrims who might have been brought home for 45 rupees or less having to pay 85 rupees, but it benefited pilgrims in that being protected against price-cutting, the owners sent enough shipping to take all the pilgrims to India earlier than usual. It must, too, be remembered that the companies carried over a thousand destitutes to India and the Persian Gulf free of charge.

### (3) Egypt, Syria, Palestine, &c

In striking contrast to the Far East lines, and even to the worst boats carrying Indian pilgrims, were the boats bringing pilgrims from the north, which with the honourable exception of the Khedivial Mail Line behaved like slavers rather than pilgrim ships. From the point of view of the pilgrims and of this agency the selection of Messrs. Victor Schemel and Company of Alexandria as contractors for the transport of the Mahmal and the Egyptian pilgrims, in place of the Khedivial Mail Line, was a disaster. The company, who had lost the contract for the Mahmal, threw up the agency almost at once, and from that moment the company was represented here by one disreputable agent after another. Nearly every Schemel boat which came in gave rise to trouble with the local authorities. The company's business appeared to be conducted on the most casual lines, and so far as could be

seen here, the regulations as to visas, &c., for foreign pilgrims desiring to land in Egypt were disregarded. Little more satisfactory were two or three boats manned by Russians, but run under the French flag. The charterer of an Egyptian boat the "Berkshire," so little appreciated the obligations attaching to pilgrim ships that he took on board a large number of pilgrims for Basra, although the supply of water on board was not sufficient for one quarter of the voyage. It is satisfactory to record that the local authorities compelled all these pilgrims to disembark and that the "Berkshire" returned to Egypt without any passengers. The French authorities

Syria seem to be particularly lax in their control of pilgrim shipping. So far as ships registered or licensed in Beirut carry only Syrian pilgrims this laxity is no concern of ours, but they pick up Palestinian and Egyptian pilgrims, and the interests of Egypt and Palestine are therefore affected. It would seem to be necessary that every individual or company desirous of engaging in the pilgrim trade should deposit heavy security with the authorities of any country whose nationals he proposes to carry as pilgrims, the security to be forfeited in whole or in part for failure to comply with the provisions of the International Sanitary Convention.

### (4) Hashemite Steamers

The two small steamers, the "Tawil" and the "Rushdi" on which this agency reported so unfavourably last year, have been much used this season. On two occasions, at least they have been used to the advantage of pilgrims. The "Rushdi" took to Hadramdah five the survivors of the Yemen caravan which was attacked by Wahabites on its way to Mecca, and the "Tawil" took the surplus pilgrims off a dangerously overcrowded French boat and carried them to Suez. On the other hand there is at least one instance to quote where the desire of the Hedjaz Government to make money was allowed to override all other considerations. Some of the Indian pilgrims belonging to the caravan which was robbed at Khaf made arrangements to hire a dhow to bring them from Yanbu to Jeddah but the Hedjaz authorities compelled them to travel crammed up in the greatest discomfort on the "Tawil."

### (5) Measurement of Ships

It is for consideration whether ships which are to be used for the Eastern and Far East pilgrim traffic could not be measured once for all and a plate affixed in each hold showing how many pilgrims it can take in accordance with the regulations in force in India and, or Singapore and, or the Dutch East Indies. A ship may come to Jeddah with pilgrims under a certificate issued in Singapore for the season. It is decided that it would be more profitable to carry pilgrims to India on the return journey the whole of the accommodation has to be measured, in accordance with the Indian regulations. Again, if a ship carrying pilgrims from Singapore has a hold full of cargo when she leaves, that hold will not be measured at Singapore, even though the cargo is to be discharged on the outward voyage and the hold to be used for pilgrims on the return journey. Consequently it sometimes happens that this agency or the Netherlands consulate has to arrange for ships to be measured and the elaborate calculations which the minutely detailed regulations involve to be made. As this comes at the moment of the year when the rush of work is greatest, any system which would make measuring at Jeddah unnecessary would be welcome.

## 3. Quarantine

### (1) At Jeddah

Twenty four hours quarantine was imposed on pilgrims from all except two or three boats. An exception was made on these few occasions because it was too rough for the quarantine doctor to go out to the ships comfortably on the day of arrival. This was unfair to the steamers, which lost a day and had to find another day's water for the pilgrims, and unfair to the pilgrims, who received no refund and moreover had to pay as much to the lightermen for the 3 miles to the shore as for the 10 miles to the islands and back to land. It also shows what a farce quarantine in Jeddah is. Nevertheless, although we may know for certain that the object of the institution of quarantine at Jeddah is to flatter the vanity and fill the pockets of an incompetent and corrupt administration, this agency has not repeated this year the protests made to the Hedjaz authorities in 1921 and 1922. The Indian argument which this agency has not failed to use in the past, is that arrangements at Kamaran make quarantine at Jeddah unnecessary but (1) the Hedjaz is not a signatory of the International Sanitary Convention (2) King Hussein as



Board at Alexandria to impose quarantine is endemic at Tor (article 128 of International Sanitary Convention). The establishment of a quarantine station at Jeddah, which is then tempt for pilgrims from India and Java. The main arguments for keeping silence are, however not these but the futility of making protests which are not to be followed

relations with the Hedjaz Government and perhaps even make the pilgrims exasperating to innocent pilgrims who see their holy land only a few miles away yet still unattainable. But it might be made much worse at Jeddah. The Hed official in charge of quarantine is a Turk of a particularly disoblising and obstructive kind who would think nothing of revenging a complaint by inflicting additional hardships on Indian pilgrims.

### (2) In Egypt

Although there have been cases of plague in Egypt all through the period of the convention of 1912, which requires that in such cases pilgrim ships from the north shall call at Tor. The board's opinion appears to be that the existence of quarantine arrangements at Jeddah makes the application of article 128 unnecessary, but whatever the reason the decision is regrettable. Quarantine at Jeddah is a farce and not an efficient substitute for quarantine at Tor. And unfortunately the omission to send ships to Tor gives the Hedjaz authorities another reason for retaining quarantine at Jeddah.

The difficulties arising out of the Egyptian Government's regulations prohibiting the landing of foreign pilgrims in Egypt, except in narrowly defined circumstances are dealt with in section 5, paragraph 6.

Even when the quarantine station at Tor is closed, and when the pilgrim season is over, it is not possible for ships to call at Tor. At present, it is not possible for ships to call at Tor, and we need to know of such changes at the earliest possible moment. At present, the "Quarantine Bulletin," which may not reach us until two or three weeks after the event.

Dr. Muhammad Salih of the International Quarantine Board, Alexandria, was appointed to go to Mecca and Medina to report on the pilgrimage. Thanks to the skilfully worded letter he brought from the Hedjaz Government, he was allowed to carry out his mission to a limited extent. At Mecca he was not allowed out unless accompanied by a member of the Hedjaz Government, but he was allowed to telegraph to the Quarantine Board from Arafat to say that the pilgrimage was clean and the quarantine arrangements at Jeddah were satisfactory. He did actually see enough of the arrangements on the quarantine island to learn that they were very primitive.

### (3) At Kamaran.

The question as to the circumstances in which pilgrim ships returning south, after a pilgrimage to India, were ordered to call, though this is contrary to the terms of the 1903 International Sanitary Convention. The fear of similar orders for Dutch vessels, which had not before the war visited Kamaran on their return journey, drew representation from the Netherlands Government when Dutch pilgrim traffic was resumed in 1919. In that year (when Jeddah quarantine arrangements were in the charge of Major Marshall) Colonel Wilkinson recommended that the 1903 convention should be respected, and the Foreign Office ruled that pilgrim ships, if properly inspected at Jeddah before leaving for the south, need not call at Kamaran. In 1920, however, the quarantine arrangements at Jeddah, such as are postulated by article 142 of the 1912 convention, vanished. The pilgrim ships returning pilgrims should visit Kamaran. In 1921 Major Marshall recommended that pilgrim ships returning pilgrims should visit Kamaran. In 1921 Major Marshall recommended that pilgrim ships returning pilgrims should visit Kamaran.

prohibitions and to a certain extent, varying regulations (there appears to be no mention of a call

at Kamaran. The Government of India might be avoided if the law on the subject were clearly laid down. It would probably meet the case if, when the pilgrimage is not clean, all ships were required to call at Kamaran on the journey south, and when the pilgrimage is clean, they should be relieved of this obligation. This agency, after consultation with the medical officer and the delegate, if any, of the Quarantine Board, could advise the local shipping agencies whether their first ships required to call at Kamaran, where however, a skeleton staff might well be kept available until the departure of the main mass of pilgrims was complete.

## 4. India and the Pilgrimage

### (1) Staff

The Indian Government sanctioned the employment of an Indian pilgrim work officer, Muhammad Yasin Khan, did not arrive until the 18th July, but he was employed with effect from the 1st July. Owing to the unexpectedly speedy completion of the work of registering destitutes, the former was able to leave Jeddah for India on the 27th October. The clerk, however, was retained for the disposal of deceased pilgrims' effects and the many other duties arising out of the pilgrimage. It is still the general impression it seems, that pilgrim work is confined to about one third of the year but this is a mistake. It is true that the time immediately before and after the pilgrimage is the time of greatest pressure, but this agency is more or less occupied with pilgrim affairs the whole year round. The work has been pointed out but unfortunately the Government of India have not yet been able to approve the proposal.

### (2) Destitute Indian Pilgrims

1922 1,100 destitutes out of 12,849, i.e., 8.6 per cent.  
To the 11th December, 1923 2,765 destitutes out of 24,450, i.e., 11.3 per cent.  
Thus the percentage of destitutes increased considerably, and this, with the doubling of the total number of Indians making the pilgrimage, created a formidable problem. The task of solving the problem was expensive to the Government of India and most trying and exasperating to everyone concerned in Jeddah, and it was entirely owing to unexpectedly favourable circumstances that the solution was found at a cost of less than 40,000 rupees.

A scheme under which no Indian would be allowed to leave India for the pilgrimage unless he was accompanied by a destitute, was suggested long ago but its adoption, it is understood, would require legislation which the Government of India have not yet been able to introduce. Unless, therefore, all the shipping companies which carry Indian pilgrims can agree to issue only return tickets to pilgrims, there will again be nothing next year to prevent an Indian who can beg the price of a single ticket from making the pilgrimage. There is no doubt that the repatriation of destitutes is a direct encouragement to improvidence and dishonesty, and that many hundreds of Indians leave for the Hedjaz with the deliberate intention of returning at someone else's expense. Destitutes arrive by every steamer, and the captain of one of the steamers appeared to be penniless when they left Bombay and had no food on the voyage to Jeddah except what they begged from the other passengers. The moment the pilgrimage was over hundreds of Indians camped in the streets of Jeddah and clamoured for free passages. The Indian pilgrim officer frequently went about the streets with a bag of money and gave it to the destitutes. The destitutes, of repatriation, and there was always some one to declare that they only had to lie where they were long enough and the ever-thoughtful Government of India would pay for their return. The destitutes, however, were not always so grateful. In the case of pilgrims it is surprising that free or assisted passages had to be provided for so few as 2,765. At the beginning of the season the agency estimated that nearly a third of the pilgrims would be unable to pay for their return. Fortunately this pessimistic forecast was falsified, owing chiefly to various causes which are set out in detail below.

In order to compel pilgrims with money for their tickets to pay for their own passage, the agency, as the first few boats, which were easily filled by paying passengers, was going on. This policy would have been continued for so long as each ship could secure the full number of paying passengers, but the agency's hand was forced by the Hedjaz authorities, who are naturally annoyed at having the streets of Jeddah turned into dwellings and latrines by hordes of Indians who, in the opinion of the Hedjaz Government, had disobeyed the injunction of the Prophet by coming on the pilgrimage without making proper provision for it. An order was suddenly issued on the 11th August that every ship embarking pilgrims for the return journey must carry 10 per cent of destitutes free. It was impossible to allow the Hedjaz Government to make regulations for foreign ships, and strong protests by all the representatives of foreign States in Jeddah secured, if not the withdrawal of the order, at least a private assurance that it would not be enforced. The manner in which the Hedjaz Government dealt with the problem was undefensible but something had to be done quickly, and the offer of the shipping companies routing to India and the Persian Gulf to carry free 10 per cent of destitute pilgrims in addition to the number of pilgrims allowed by their certificates was accepted by the Government of India. This measure was useful in that it has got rid of 1,049 destitutes without cost to the Government of India but in that it has got the right of destitutes to a passage at someone else's expense was the beginning of the return season, it will increase the demoralisation of pilgrims who wish to make the pilgrimage without making proper provision for it.

The numbers of destitutes and the cost of repatriation were as follows:—

	Rupees
1,049 carried by the shipping companies free	
1,042 carried by the shipping companies at 45 rupees a head	18,090
1,314 carried by the shipping companies at 25 rupees a head	32,850
Cost of food for the voyage	6,321
Gross cost	
Contributed by pilgrims	
Net cost	57,000
Contributed by Central Haj Committee	2,000
Net cost to Government of India	55,000

No money was expended on the distribution of food at Jeddah. The pilgrim ship agents and their employees very generously took on themselves the task of feeding destitutes for the last ten days, but they found that they had to feed 1,100 a day nearly the whole of the Indians in Jeddah—and they were convinced that without a most elaborate organisation the distribution of free food must lead to abuses.

The most important of the causes which combined to falsify the pessimistic estimates made at the beginning of the season were these:—

- (1) The arrangement by which the shipping companies carried 1,049 pilgrims without charge. This saved the Government of India 25,000 rupees.
- (2) The formation of a shipping ring. This was of advantage to the destitutes and to the Government of India in two ways: (a) the pilgrims were taken away rather earlier than usual as there was no price-cutting to discourage firms from sending ships to Jeddah, thus many pilgrims who would have been destitute if they had had to wait as long as pilgrims usually do in Jeddah were able to pay for their own passages, and (b) the shipping companies secured a good rate (65 rupees) from the paying pilgrims and a lower rate for destitutes than if they had

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means by which the Government of India can be protected to some extent against impudent fraud. It had a good effect in driving those who had money to buy tickets from the shipping companies. In particular, the effect of sending off the women first was beneficial, in that their male relatives had also pretended to be destitute, frequently found that they had no money to book a passage by the next boat, and were taken care of by the shipping companies, after the Government of India had agreed to pay 40 rupees a head for the transport of destitutes, of the much more favourable rate of 25 rupees a head, whereby a saving of 16,700 rupees was effected.

- (5) The refusal of the Government of India to accept responsibility for Afghan and Bokhari destitutes this year. This saved from 7,000 rupees to 10,000 rupees at least.

We cannot count upon getting off so cheaply another year: the circumstances may be less favourable. Moreover, the demoralisation is likely to extend to a larger and larger percentage of the pilgrims. The deplorable effect which the failure to solve this question has in the Hedjaz can hardly be exaggerated. The pilgrims suffer, the destitutes because they die of inanition in large numbers, the others because the destitutes prey on them and overcrowd the ships by which they travel, the Government of India suffer very heavily in purse and in reputation, the Hedjaz Government are exasperated by the presence of large numbers of foreign pilgrims living in insanitary conditions in the streets, this agency is the object of a disgusting nuisance, when for many weeks the surrounding area is converted into a latrine which the local authorities have neither the money nor the will to clean, and the interests of His Majesty's Government are gravely prejudiced in that the existence of the problem poisons their relations with the Hedjaz Government.

It is earnestly hoped, therefore, that it will be found possible to introduce before the next pilgrimage the system by which every pilgrim will be required to provide in return either by leaving an adequate deposit in India or by taking a return ticket. The scheme has been worked out fully and submitted to the Government of India. The system of deposits would appear to be far preferable to the other. Return tickets are more secure than deposits unless pilgrims are compelled to deposit them at this agency on arrival: an arrangement which would necessitate an increase in staff. If not deposited tickets are lost, stolen, confused by illiterate pilgrims and guides, treated as negotiable instruments, &c., while the finding of a return ticket among the effects of a deceased pilgrim only entails an addition to the Hedjaz death duties, which are already high enough. It is for consideration whether the return tickets could not be collected by the ship's officers with the outward tickets, and handed to this agency with the passport and passenger lists. The value of the return ticket system would be greatly increased if such tickets were good for a passage by any boat of whatever size, since the companies succeeded in making a ring this year to defend themselves against the legitimate to ask them to combine to the extent of having interchangeable return tickets.

### (3) Registration and Deposits in Jeddah

The registration system adopted last year by this agency proved to be not only too laborious for the small staff to cope with, but of far less use than was hoped: it was therefore not continued this year. The practice of accepting deposits was, however, continued. There was an increase in the number of depositors, from 264 in 1922 to 385, but these figures represent a relative decrease, since twice as many Indian pilgrims came to the Hedjaz this year. The amount deposited was 80,714 rupees and 78½ gold as against 84,017 rupees and 58½ gold in 1922. The average amount deposited was thus smaller than last year.

### (4) Loans to Pilgrims

Last year, as an experiment, loans were made to certain pilgrims who, although they had expended all the money they had brought with them, did not want free passages provided that small loans could be made to them. A sum of 3,335 rupees was advanced to thirty-four persons, twenty-eight of whom have refunded a total of 2,930 rupees. Of the balance of 400 rupees, it is hoped that only 75 rupees will prove to be unrecoverable. The success of this scheme is due to the assistance given by various local authorities in India. There is one case where the borrower has



endeavoured to evade the obligation. The police authorities first reported that they were unable to find him, and later that he was too poor to repay the sum of 100 rupees lent to him. Meanwhile the man had raised enough money to come on the pilgrimage again, for he was seen in Jeddah, where he declared that he had repaid the loan to the police authorities. He is now being compelled to repay the loan in small instalments.

#### (5.) "Tukrir"

"Tukrir" system, whereby pilgrims from a particular locality become the prey of a particular guide. My enquiries, however, go to show that this system is applied rigidly only to Biharis other pilgrims being allowed some latitude in their choice of guides. Darbhanga, complained that, as a result of the tukrir system, he was separated from his party and had to travel with different guides by a different caravan. According to the Sayyid, all pilgrims from Bihar whatever their wishes may be are allotted to some guide of the family of Jamal al Lail.

#### (6.) Bengali Pilgrims

Probably attracted by the presence of Maulvi Sayyid Shah Abu Bakr of Hooghly. The Maulvi complained vehemently of the hardships to which Bengalis are subjected from the moment of arrival by boats and shipping agents. The proposal that at least one ship could run from Calcutta direct (see section 2, paragraph 2) was made by the Maulvi with a view to remedy for this grievance.

#### (7.) Complaints in the Indian Press.

It used not to be the fashion to make public complaint about hardships suffered on the pilgrimage, but this distidence appears, fortunately, to have been overcome, and articles reporting pilgrims' grievances have appeared in the Sindhi press. Some of these articles have been translated into English. The hardships suffered by pilgrims on the way to Medina is very high the road is not safe, to complaints which are unreasonable and factitious. In this latter class are such complaints as that water at Jeddah is not pure, and that pilgrims are not allowed to go to Medina on foot. Water is expensive at Jeddah (the quite inadequate supply of rain water (it rains only once or twice in the year, and there is no river) has to be supplemented by the slow process of condensation from sea water. The Hedjaz authorities object to the presence of crowds of destitutes in the Hedjaz because they regard it as a symptom of disobedience to the Koranic injunctions. As large numbers of pilgrims live in the streets it is impossible to cope with the sanitary problem. Pilgrims are not allowed to go to Medina on foot, but only require pedestrians to go with a caravan and not to struggle along singly or in small groups. A caravan keeps up the spirit of pedestrians, provides them with food if their supplies are inadequate (as they always are), and protects them from Berbers, who are constantly watching to secure slaves, and have been known to carry off a dark-skinned Indian as sufficiently African-looking to be sold into slavery.

The Government of India are aware that when there is definite ground for complaint this agency does its best to remove it. It is unfortunate that the wide publicity of the press should be given to complaints against the Hedjaz authorities, and even in some cases of the very people who complain.

Some of the complaints appear to be due to ignorance or misunderstanding of the regulations or to failure to make complaint to the proper authorities in the Hedjaz. To this class belong complaints that pilgrims had to pay to get ashore, to leave the country, on provisions brought into the Hedjaz, for Zemzem water &c. Zemzem water is not sold. There are places in Mecca where it can be obtained free. Pilgrims who want to have it brought to them, or drawn from the well, have to pay for these services, as indeed they had to pay before the war. As to the charges for boat hire health certificate on leaving &c., they are all to be found in a tariff issued by

the Hedjaz Government. This tariff includes the charges which may be made in respect of Zemzem water, while details as to the customs dues were included in last year's report. It is not known what steps are taken to bring this information to the notice of pilgrims, but a reference to them, with an enquiry whether the complainants applied, made, would provide an answer to many of the complaints made in the Sindhi press.

### 5. Egypt and the Pilgrimage

#### (1.) Hedjaz Dues, &c.

Before the pilgrimage to discuss the question of the various charges payable. He reported on his return to Jeddah that he had been successful in securing a reduction in the Mahmal camel contract, from the iniquitous figure of 80 a camel which was the charge last year, to 30. Whether this was an effective agreement or not it is impossible to say, as the Mahmal did not go to Mecca this year, but as the Egyptian representative secured no written undertaking it is probable that the reality would have been less agreeable than the expectation. This judgment is justified by the fact that although, according to the Egyptian representative King Hussein promised that Egyptian pilgrims from payment of landing dues on arrival at Jeddah, dues were actually levied at the rates prevailing last year, viz., 90 Turkish piastres (quarantine dues, 40, landing charges, 50). The trouble and confusion which resulted from the pilgrims having to pay 90 Turkish piastres, whereas the company on the authority of the Egyptian Government, had collected only 40 Turkish piastres, should make it clear that no undertaking by the Hedjaz Government is of any value unless recorded in writing.

#### (2.) Shipping

Attention has been drawn (see section 2, paragraph 3) to the unsatisfactory conduct of most of the firms or individuals who engaged in the pilgrim traffic between Jeddah and the north this year. The return of the official Egyptian pilgrims was badly managed, not by Dr. Muhammad Amin, the Egyptian representative who worked indefatigably, but by Messrs. Selim, who appear to have looked after paying passengers in large numbers instead of first attending to their return ticket obligations.

#### (3.) The Mahmal

The desire of the Egyptian Government to send two small hospitals with the Mahmal, which is not yet over. It was very shortly before the time of the pilgrimage that the question was raised by the Egyptian Government, in a telegram addressed to the Hedjaz Government. The latter replied that the question of the Hedjaz wakfs in Egypt, which had been in dispute for a long while, must be settled first, and the efforts of the Egyptian Government to get each question considered on its merits were unavailing. A final appeal was sent to Mecca through the British Residency at Cairo and this agency, but with no more success. The Mahmal actually reached Jeddah, but the negotiations between the Amir al Hajj and the Hedjaz authorities did not succeed, and the Mahmal was taken back to Egypt. The Hedjaz Government's final offer was that the doctors, drugs, medical equipment, &c., might accompany the Mahmal, "starting when the Mahmal starts, and halting when the Mahmal halts." This seems a reasonable offer, but the Mahmal did not start, and the pilgrims stay in the Hedjaz for some months.

#### (4.) "Official" Egyptian Pilgrims Visiting Medina

Egyptian pilgrims who purchase the "official" green return tickets forfeit the return half if they visit Medina, as the sailings of the "official" Egyptian pilgrim ships do not allow time for pilgrims to visit Medina either before or after the Arafat ceremonies. I understand that pilgrims applying for "official" tickets are always warned that they will not have time to go to Medina if they wish to utilise their return tickets, but in fact some 300 or 400 of them always go to Medina, and to lose

the value of the return half is a great hardship to most of them. Moreover, some of them become destitute and have to be repatriated at the expense of the Egyptian Government.

There would seem to be three possible methods of remedying this defect —

- (1) To require the contractor to refund a considerable portion, if not the whole of the value of the return half of the ticket. The objection to this is that the contractor would have to refund a sum which could not be estimated exactly at the beginning of the season.
- (2) To require the contractor to send a boat (preferably to Yanbo) to pick up such of the pilgrims as go to Medina.
- (3) To take effective measures to discourage pilgrims who intend to go to Medina from purchasing "official" return tickets. They would have no difficulty in finding other means of travelling to and from the Hedjaz.

#### (5) Egyptian Destitutes

Sixty Egyptian destitutes (some of them holders of "official" return tickets) have been repatriated at the expense of the Egyptian Government. Messrs. Schenck kindly carried seven others to Suez without charge.

In cases where it is desired to repatriate Egyptians at the expense of the Egyptian Government the consent of the latter has to be obtained. This takes a considerable time, and the pilgrims are obliged to stay in Jeddah. It would save much delay, and much hardship to pilgrims, if this agency could be authorized to repatriate all destitute Egyptian pilgrims who hold "official" return tickets, and to issue them new (new form) Egyptian passports, and to send in the account to the Egyptian Government.

#### (6) Egyptian Restrictions against Returning Pilgrims.

Thousands of pilgrims from Turkey, Syria, Palestine and other countries land in Egypt on their way to the Hedjaz. As there are almost no direct sailings from Egypt to the Hedjaz, the pilgrims are obliged to stay in Egypt, and, if the season is quite full, it may be taken for granted that nearly all these pilgrims will want to land in Egypt on their way home again. The Egyptian Government make no objection to their passage through on their way to the Hedjaz, but they then shut the door, as though there were a hundred other routes home from Jeddah to Syria, &c., and say that no foreign pilgrim is to land in Egypt (on his way home) unless he has a through ticket (to his final port of disembarkation) and a certificate from his consular authority (in Jeddah) that he has the means required for his stay in Egypt. This system would seem to be indefensible. No one denies to the Egyptian Government the right to take steps to defend their territory against

pilgrims to the risk of detention in Jeddah after the pilgrimage, where the heat is intolerable, the prices which pilgrims have to pay, even for water to drink are very heavy, and the congestion is a grave menace to health. This system might be justified if it were inevitable but it could be avoided quite easily. If every pilgrim landing in Egypt on his way to the Hedjaz were compelled, on pain of being returned to the port from which he came, to deposit sufficient money to ensure that he would not be stranded in Egypt for lack of funds on his way home, he could then be given an Egyptian visa good for the return journey.

The adoption of this reform would be most welcome, both to pilgrims and to this agency. There would still be difficulties, however, in cases where pilgrims, e.g., Indians and Malaysians, who had not passed through Egypt on their way to the Hedjaz, wished to go to Egypt afterwards, either to stay there for some time or to pass through on their way to Palestine or elsewhere. The instructions issued to this agency do not prohibit the grant of a visa to stay in Egypt to such a pilgrim, but the regulations quoted above, which appear in the weekly "Quarantine Bulletin," published in Alexandria, would seem to prohibit it, and in any case these regulations are so interpreted by the Khedivial Company, who refuse to give a passage in such cases. This company also refuse to carry to Egypt any non-Egyptian pilgrim who is bound for some place beyond Egypt to which a through ticket cannot be obtained in Jeddah.

In practice, the effect of the regulations is this. "A," a learned Indian, who has been on the pilgrimage, and who has a through ticket from Palestine to Egypt immediately. The Egyptian Government have gained nothing, while the pilgrim has lost the price of the ticket from Egypt to Palestine. "B," a wealthy Indian merchant, who has been on the pilgrimage, and who has a through ticket to Italy on business. The Khedivial Company cannot issue him a through ticket to Italy, and yet will not issue him a ticket to Egypt, even though he has a certificate of means, furnished by this agency. They offer him a ticket to Haifa, though the communications between Egypt and Italy are good, and between Haifa and Italy inconvenient.

There is reason to think that the Egyptian authorities would not have objected to the landing of "B" in Egypt, but, although this agency may be prepared to take the responsibility of granting a visa, the Khedivial Company refuse to run the risk of incurring a heavy fine or severe quarantine measures by issuing a ticket. It would seem to be necessary to alter the regulations so as to allow any non-Egyptian pilgrim who has money for the onward journey to land in Egypt in transit, whether he has a through ticket or not. It would also be of great service if visas to stay in Egypt could be granted to pilgrims—subject to the pilgrimage being "clean," and to the imposition of such quarantine measures as were considered necessary—by the Egyptian Government's representative in the Hedjaz, i.e., at present, the British agency.

#### (7) Egyptian Takyahs at Mecca and Medina

These takyahs were founded by Muhammad Ali for the distribution of bread and alms to the poor, whether pilgrims or residents. The Makhmal dispute is probably the immediate cause of the suspension of this charitable work, but there was already disagreement before the pilgrim season. The Ministry of Wakfs in Egypt voted a considerable sum for the alteration and extension of the takyah at Mecca, in order to make room for a pharmacy, a consulting room, and a free guest-house, and sent an engineer to Mecca to supervise the execution of the work. The Hedjaz Government, however, not only refused to allow the work to begin, but even raised objections to the retention of the takyah in its present position. The reason given is that the takyah, which is in the main street and almost opposite the Mosque, attracts a large crowd of indigent people, who wait about day and night for the distribution of food, and use the vicinity of the mosque in every respect as a private residence, but a mere passion for cleanliness is not sufficient to account for the closure of the takyah, as the object of attack. Anyhow, both takyahs have now been closed, though whether the Hedjaz Government actually ordered them to be closed, or whether they were closed by the Egyptian Government, is not known for certain. The opening of Hashimite Government food distribution centres to replace the Egyptian takyahs has been widely advertised, and it is credible that the Hedjaz Government should spend on this purpose sums approaching those which the Egyptian wakfs provided. On grain alone, the takyah at Mecca used to spend over 7,000l. a year.

#### 8 Other Territories

##### (1) Straits Settlements and Federated Malay States.

An improved system of control has been adopted and will come into force for the approaching season, which, for Malay pilgrims, begins in January 1924. There is a Malay pilgrim agency at Singapore, and it is understood that a rule is to be applied which will remedy the hardship resulting from the inability of the Bait al Mal at Mecca to supply trustworthy certificates of the death of Malay pilgrims. In the absence of a death certificate, the heirs of a deceased pilgrim cannot recover from the shipping company the value of the unused return ticket—a large amount for poor people, such as most Malay pilgrims are. Under the new rule, the value of the return passage will be recoverable from the shipping company if the pilgrim does not appear at this agency to claim his ticket within one year from the date of arrival at Jeddah.



It is also hoped that, with effect from the coming season, all British and British-protected pilgrims embarking from ports in the Straits Settlements or Federated Malay States, will be provided with passports on the Indian or Dutch model and that all other pilgrims embarking at such ports will be required to be in possession of passports issued by their respective consular authorities. In the absence of

that, it has hitherto proved difficult and frequently impossible to decide whether the British or Dutch representative in Jeddah was responsible in a given case

#### (2) *Soudan and West Africa*

It is convenient to take these together, as the West African pilgrims—most of them Nigerians—come via the Soudan

Complaints of serious overcrowding on two or three of the Khedivial steamers carrying pilgrims from the Soudan, which had been received by this agency, were transmitted to the Governor, Red Sea Province, who referred them to the President of the Central Sanitary Board. It is easy to believe that in at least one case, where the complaint was without foundation. It is regrettable that British firms should be the subject of such complaints, especially when the pilgrims concerned are British, as any case of this kind is seized upon by the Hedjaz authorities, who raise a clamour by which they hope to drown the complaints against their incompetence, corruption and indifference to the welfare of pilgrims

The problem is not, however, simple. The only steamers carrying pilgrims between the Soudan and the Hedjaz are those of the Khedivial Mail Line. The steamers are small, and the sailings, although regular, are infrequent. Many pilgrims come across in dhows, but thousands are dependent on the steamers, and there is something in the company's argument that if pilgrims from the Soudan are to be carried in conditions applicable to pilgrim ships making a two or three weeks' journey, many will be left behind and be unable to go on the pilgrimage at all. It is understood that the Soudan Government are dealing with this question. It would appear that, since the Soudan is less than one day's steam from Jeddah, it would be no serious hardship to pilgrims to be rather more crowded than on the boats bringing pilgrims from Egypt, which are obliged to allow 12 square feet of living space for each pilgrim. It is not desirable to discourage the steamship company unduly, as the more pilgrims travel by steamer, instead of by dhows, which can and do land their passengers anywhere along the coast, the easier the sanitary control will be

The problem of the destitute Nigerian has hitherto given much trouble. Nigerians rarely have much money when they arrive in the Hedjaz, and the proportion who, after the pilgrimage, have not enough money even to take them back to the Soudan is large. Such pilgrims then have to stay in the Hedjaz trying to earn enough for their passage, and exposed to the very real danger of conscription for the Hadramite army. The generosity of the native administrations of the Mohammedan Emirates of Nigeria has created a fund out of which assistance may be given to such destitutes. The sum of £1,000 has been allotted for the purpose. A portion of this sum is being placed at the disposal of this agency, as the sum of £500, which to the returning Nigerian is the cost of the passage across the Red Sea, once arrived in the Soudan he can usually find his way home, though it may take him a year or more

All pilgrims leaving the Soudan for the Hedjaz are required to be provided with papers of identification. Many pilgrims from Senegal, Morocco and other French territories come via the Soudan, and to those who have no national passports the Soudan authorities issue a pass, good for the return journey, stating the nationality of the holders. The French consulate in Jeddah refused to recognise as French any persons holding such papers, on the ground that they ought to be provided with French passports. As many of the pilgrims come from places very far from the Soudan to propose that the Soudan authorities should refuse to let them leave for Jeddah is unreasonable, though less unreasonable than the argument of the French consulate that any destitutes among such alleged French subjects should be repatriated by this agency because the only papers they have are British papers. However there is nothing to be done by us. It is French subjects who suffer as the result of this unreasonable attitude

#### (3) *Aden*

Pilgrims embarking at Aden have no papers to show whether they are British subjects (or British-protected persons) or not. Often they have no papers at all, at

most they have a document which states that "A" is permitted to leave Aden. He is an Arab. This is sufficient so long as the pilgrim does not require help at Jeddah, but if he comes to the agency for assistance we require to know whether he is an Adenese or, e.g., a native of the Yemen. It would be useful if an entry showing whether the bearer of the document is entitled to the assistance of the British authorities could be made on every passport or pass

#### (4) *Palestine, Syria, &c*

It would save this agency much work at the busiest time of the year, when pilgrims are returning from Palestine, Syria, Turkey, &c., could be so worded as to cover also the return journey via Egypt. This course is followed occasionally. Another source of—unnecessary trouble is the limitation of the visa to a period too short to allow of the return journey. Some visas were "for two months," and in many cases they had to be extended at this agency because the two months had just elapsed or would have elapsed before the holder of the passport reached Egypt.

Although they probably did not know it, most of the Syrian and Palestinian pilgrims who came to the agency were compelled, by intimidation, to collect from each pilgrim 12 more than he had decided to charge, and to hand it over to the Hedjaz Government. There is no doubt that the disreputable character of the owners and agents engaged in this branch of the pilgrim traffic encouraged this practice

#### (5) *Hadramaut*

Hadramis travel on a Hadramaut passport printed in English. One such passport was recently torn up by the Sheikh of the Hadramis at Jeddah, who ordered the holder to take out a Hedjaz passport. The holder complained to this agency, and was given a British laissez-passer to enable him to leave the country, but, on presenting this at the Hedjaz Passport Office, he was turned away with curses. The matter was arranged with the Acting Governor of Jeddah, the Hadrami's British laissez-passer being duly visé by the Hedjaz authorities. The cause of the trouble has not been discovered. Possibly the Sheikh of the Hadramis wished to curry favour with the King as a good pan Arab. Anyhow, he is dead now

#### (6) *Somaliland*

It is particularly necessary that Somali pilgrims should not be stranded here destitute, as they then become an easy prey to King Hussein's conscription agents. The authorities in Somaliland are unable to sanction any expenditure for this purpose, partly because there are no steamers running direct from Jeddah to Somaliland. In rare cases we beg a free passage to Aden for a destitute Somali, and ask the authorities at Aden to send him on from there at our expense, but neither the generosity of the shipping companies nor the small charitable fund controlled by this agency is large enough to deal with the repatriation of destitute Somalis on the scale which their number require

#### (7) *Nejd*

In June the Hedjaz authorities wrote to say that villagers and town dwellers from Nejd were flocking to the Hedjaz for the pilgrimage. This was a new development on the Hedjaz by Wababis since the preceding pilgrimage. His Majesty's Government had, however, already informed the Hedjaz Government, in February, that they could not again put pressure on Bin Saud to induce him to forbid his people to make the pilgrimage though they privately sent a friendly message to Bin Saud, saying that they hoped the pilgrimage would be successful and that he would take steps to ensure that no untoward incident should occur through any act of the Nejd pilgrims. In the event, however, no official caravan came from Nejd, though no doubt individual Nejdies made the pilgrimage

#### (8) *Yemen*

Most of the Yemeni pilgrims make the journey on foot in a large caravan, which is known as the "Ushah." They bring with them coffee and other produce to sell or

to go for the supplies they need on the way. This year the caravan was attacked by the Wahabites. It is true that 1,000 out of 2,000 were killed, but this is an exaggeration. It is true that about 100 reached the Hedjaz, but many had fled back to their homes. Nevertheless the incident did much to discredit the Wahabites in the Hedjaz. The Yememites, however, seemed to regard it as a normal incident of Arab warfare and, chiefly, as a warning that the "Usbah" should be well armed in future. It is understood that the aggressors are trying to arrive at a settlement of the case on tribal lines.

R. W. BUTLARD

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No 76

General Bullard to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. — (Received January 14, 1921.)

No 1031)

My Lord,

Jeddah, December 31, 1920.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith the Jeddah report for the period 30th November to the 31st December.

Copies of this document and report are being sent to Cairo, Bagdad, Jerusalem, Delhi, Aden and Beirut (for communication to Damascus).

I have &c

R. W. BUTLARD

Enclosure in No 76

Jeddah Report for the period November 30 to December 31, 1920

THE King came to Jeddah on the 17th December and left for Yambo a few hours after his arrival. There was no opportunity to talk business with him, as the only interview granted was to the Consular Body in common. During the King's visit it was clear that dear-old-gentle character.

The King has announced that he will not be in Jeddah for many days, but if following a well known desert precedent, he should extend his journey to forty years, his absence would be borne by his subjects without complaint.

There is little news about the column which started out from Medina against Kheibar. It is believed to be at Al Ula.

The King has taken with him an American named Bonner who had arrived a few days before to fit up the bathroom which has been presented to His Majesty by Mr. Curzon. Mr. Bonner was dressed in full bedgum costume for the journey. It is going to Al Ula with the King he will have been farther south on the Hedjaz Railway than Mr. Curzon is usually allowed to go. Madam Salih is usually considered the most.

The Hedjaz Government wrote asking for letters of recommendation to the British Consul of a young man "whose father has been at the threshold for a long time." In the letter it was made clear that the man was a Dugh, though he was stated in his Hashimite passport to be a Hashimite subject. I informed the Hedjaz Government that this agency never recommends to them any person who is not a British subject or under British protection and of some importance, and suggested that they should adopt a similar procedure. The person now recommended was admittedly not a Hashimite subject, nor, so far as I could gather from the Hedjaz Government, a person of importance. In the circumstances, I said, I did not feel justified in troubling the Indian authorities with a letter of recommendation. In any case, I should not have been prepared to recommend

the "Kola" published at Mecca under the name of the "Kola" is a slanderous attack on the Government of the Hedjaz. It is a pity that the "Kola" it was merely a warning. And the columns of the "Kola" are a warning.

# Pilgrimage.

A few pilgrims for next year have already arrived. They are all from the Far East. The main rush from the Far East will begin in a few weeks. The Hajj season in Karaman is to reopen on the 3rd January.

A most determined effort is being made to attract a large number of pilgrims for the next pilgrimage. It is common for mutawifs (guides) to go to India, or to Persia, to beat up the masses among possible pilgrims, but this year the King has compelled every Indian mutawif who is not himself going to India to send a representative. His main object is believed to be to arouse interest and fanaticism to such a point that any attempt either by the Indian Government or by the religious leaders to stop the pilgrimage would be useless.

A ship which left for India on the 11th December carried such destitute Indians as had accumulated in Jeddah since the main body were repatriated. The additional charge to the Government of India works out at only 300 rupees. There were 133 destitutes. They contributed rupees 669 6s. 0d towards the cost of repatriation, and the balance was subscribed by the Central Hajj Committee.

The Government of Bombay have informed this agency that the Nizam of Hyderabad intends to make the pilgrimage next year, and have asked whether, as he is going to Medina before the Arafat ceremonies, he may land at Yambo instead of at Jeddah, from the special ship which is being chartered for him. The Hedjaz Government have refused the request. In view of His Exalted Highness's high rank, it would not, they say, be suitable that he should go via Yambo. This means (1) that they cannot protect him on the Yambo-Medina route, and (2) that the Government will share the camelmen on the Jeddah-Medina route.

A party of wretchedly poor Takruni (African) pilgrims, 140 in number, scraped up enough money to go to the Sudan by dhaw, but could not afford to pay also the Hedjaz Government charge for the health certificate which every person leaving the country is required to have. The dhaw was to cost 250 medjidhahs; the health certificate, at 2 medjidhahs a head, would have cost each of the pilgrims more than he was paying for his passage. Most of the Takrunis were this year's pilgrims, all had doubtless come to the Hedjaz originally, and all were poor; but the Hedjaz Government refused to remission the health certificate charge, as they do in the case of destitute Indians, on the ground that Takrunis are not like ordinary pilgrims, but come to the Hedjaz to make money and leave richer than when they arrived. This argument is not only fantastically untrue, but is particularly annoying in view of the general attitude of the Hedjaz Government towards Takrunis. They have repeatedly stated that the Takrunis are a nuisance to the country owing to their poverty and vagrancy, and that the Government are compelled to offer them charitable hospitality in the ranks of the Hashimite forces, and that "if your Excellency wishes to have them to send, or any others, to their country, the Arab Government is ready to return them to you with great thanks." Further remonstrances from this agency elicited only the reply that the Takrunis had been treated with equity by the Hedjaz Government as it was not possible to put them on a level with the pilgrims, and the charge—false, of course—that this agency made destitute Turkish refugees pay consular fees.

In the Hedjaz the money-changers for not observing the Government rate of 7 medjidhahs to the £ are one of King Hussein's regular sources of income, but this does not prevent him from disregarding the regulation himself if it suits him. To obtain silver for his journey, he on two occasions had 3,000£ in gold changed into silver in the bazaar, each time compelling the changers to give him 13 medjidhahs for each £, though even the market rate was from 3 to 1 medjidhah below 13. This, however, was not the only time the Hedjaz money-changers have had to bear recently. A number of them have been in prison for "refusing" to give change in "hallalaba," i.e., parts of a piastre, though if anyone is to be imprisoned on this account, it should be the King, whose currency policy has driven out the Turkish small change and whose mint has failed to produce a substitute in adequate quantities.

[12045]





4. In dealing with the general question of possible steps to be taken in the future, it will be necessary to keep in mind the following two main desiderata:—

(1) That His Majesty's Government should dissociate themselves from King Hussein's claims to the throne of the Hedjaz.

(2) That His Majesty's Government should avoid any action which would be liable to misconstruction as secular interference in a cardinal point of religious observance.

5. Guided by the above considerations, you should therefore, on the return of your mission, in stern language, recapitulating the principal matters in dispute regarding the Hedjaz, and requesting him to take steps to settle them without further delay. You should lay stress on the serious nature of the situation.

6. In making this protest, you should, in view of the imminent appointment of a British Consul-General to the Hedjaz, emphasize the growing feeling of dissatisfaction on the part of His Majesty's Government at the continuation of the deplorable maltreatment to which pilgrims are exposed by extortion and robbery and British merchants by the ill-considered economic restrictions imposed by the King.

7. In making this protest, you should, in view of the imminent appointment of a British Consul-General to the Hedjaz, emphasize the growing feeling of dissatisfaction on the part of His Majesty's Government at the continuation of the deplorable maltreatment to which pilgrims are exposed by extortion and robbery and British merchants by the ill-considered economic restrictions imposed by the King.

I am &c

LANCELOT OLIPHANT

E 661 661 91]

No. 78.

Mr. Kerr to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (Received January 21.)

(No. 32. Secret.)

My Lord,

Cairo, January 13, 1924

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 11th inst. in which you sought the protection of His Majesty's Government, on behalf of tribal chiefs inhabiting the Hedjaz, from the Wahabis.

2. I should be grateful if your Lordship would be so good as to inform me what steps you propose to take in the matter.

I have &c

A. K. CLARK KERR,

Acting High Commissioner

Enclosure in No. 78.

Memorandum by Mr. Furness, Oriental Secretary at Cairo.

MAJOR W. J. ROSS, R.E. (D.O.R.E., Ismailia), came to see me this evening. Sheikh Mohammed-el Arabi of Wejh and a letter of introduction from Major Ross said that both he and Major Harrold were satisfied after their visit to the Hedjaz.

Mohammed-el Arabi stated that he had been sent to Egypt as an emissary of all the tribes of the Hedjaz, and that their existence was being more and more closely threatened by the Wahabis, and King Hussein was unable to protect them or to give them the means of protecting themselves. Not only did he fail to protect them, but his Government was cruel and rapacious in the extreme; they could bear it no longer, and were forced to seek help

from outside. With a little encouragement they would either put an end to him or confine his authority to a zone about Mecca. They wished to place themselves under the protection of Great Britain. For their immediate purposes, both of internal revolution and of protection against the Wahabis, they wanted ammunition. They wished Great Britain to give them moral and material encouragement, and to declare protectorate over their territories. In any case, they desired to secure these benefits from some foreign Power. I gathered that Turkey and Egypt were also in their minds, failing England. Mohammed-el-Arabi hinted that King Hussein need not necessarily ever return from his present journey.

I asked him if they had already sought help from any other source, and he said they had not. I asked him if they had made any representations to His Majesty's agent at Jeddah, and he said it was as much as their lives were worth to do so.

I told Mohammed-el-Arabi that His Majesty's representative in Cairo was not concerned with the Hedjaz, and that, so far as I was aware, I did not think that His Majesty's Government would be disposed to interfere in the internal affairs of that country. His representations would, however, be made known in the proper quarter, and if there was anything to communicate to him it would be communicated.

I attach a list of the sheikhs whose emissary he claimed to be; he showed letters which appeared to establish the sufficiency of his relations with Sheikh Ibrahim bin-Suleiman bin-Rafada.

Among other items of information given me by Mohammed-el-Arabi, I may record the following:—

Hussein's present journey is for purposes of general display and for the proclamation of his authority. He has had experience, ever since his days at Constantinople, of the intrigues and rapacity of foreigners. He gave Sheikh Ibrahim bin-Suleiman bin-Rafada two boxes of ammunition, which the Wejhis thought a poor return for the high taxes they have to pay.

About a fortnight ago, the Wahabis cut the Hedjaz railway between Tobuk and Medina Saleh, and had a fight with Emir Ali, who was either killed or seriously wounded. This report was brought to Suex by a sailing vessel from Wejh.

R. FURNESS.

January 11, 1924

P.S.—I should add that Mohammed-el-Arabi expressed anxiety that his *démarche* and the names of those on whose behalf he was acting should remain secret, and that I assured him that his confidence would be respected.

R. F.

#### List of Sheikhs

Sheikh Ibrahim bin-Suleiman bin-Rafada (of Wejh) (Sheikh-el-Barakat),

supported by:—

Sheikh Hamid bin Saleh bin-Rafada.

Sheikh-el Kurai\* (Sheikh Kabilat Waha).

Sheikh Abdullah bin-Mehanna\* (Sheikh-el-Sahamat).

Sheikh Hamad Abu Shama† (Sheikh-el-Mawahib).

Sheikh Ihsan bin-Jumaa (Sheikh el-Arnai).

Sheikh Abu Diraa (Sheikh Kabilat-el-Fawadna‡).

Sheikh Abdulla-el Karaou (Sheikh Kabilat-el-Zabala).

(Sheikh Kabilat-el-Huma).

Sheikh Saad bin Ghonem (Sheikh-el-Jehina).

Sheikh Ahmed Abu Dageiga (Sheikh-el-Hawaitat).

Sheikh Shazli (el-Hawaitat).

\* Now reported dead.

† Has now joined Waha.

‡ Part of the Kabilat has



[E 661, 661/91]

No. 79.

*Mr. MacDonald to Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby (Cairo).*

(No. 78. Secret.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, January 24, 1924.

I HAVE received Mr. Clark Kerr's despatch of the 14th inst. regarding the request of Sheikh Mohammed-el-Arabi to obtain the protection of His Majesty's Government.

2. Your Lordship is authorised to cause a reply to be addressed to the sheik stating that the Government of His Majesty are fully aware of the situation and are anxious to see the tribes of Arabia live in peace and unity. He should, however, be given clearly to understand that he cannot expect to see His Majesty's Government take any action of any other form of encouragement to make war on either the King of the Hedjaz or the Sultan of Nejd, both of whom are friendly to His Majesty's Government.

I am, &amp;c.

J RAMSAY MACDONALD.

[E 886 886/91]

No. 80.

*Consul Bullard to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received January 28.)*

(No. 2.)

My Lord

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge receipt of your Lordship's despatch of the 6th December, No. 142, regarding the property of certain alleged Turkish nationals who were in the Hedjaz at the time of the Arab revolt.

Ahmad Fahm was one of the most important merchants in Mecca. Since the time of the Turkish and the Hedjaz was imminent, he fled to Mecca shortly before the Arab revolt. The King thereupon confiscated all his property. All the merchandise which, dated in 1914, was now, but the four and saw mills were simply abandoned, they have been looted and are now, I understand, in ruins. I have at present no information about the case of Rajab Fahm, but his case is probably similar to that of Ahmad Fahm.

3. It would appear that the confiscation of Ahmad Fahm's property was in accordance with the provisions of the Hedjaz Law. I have no doubt that the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, in his despatch of the 6th December, No. 142, has been fully informed of the facts of the case. Your Lordship considers the case to be one in which the intervention of this agency is not called for by the Hedjaz Law.

4. A copy of this despatch has been sent to the Acting British High Commissioner at Constantinople.

I have, &amp;c.

R. W. BULLARD

[E 886, 886/91]

No. 81.

*Foreign Office to Consul Bullard (Jeddah).*

(No. 22.)

Sir

Foreign Office, February 2, 1924.

IN your despatch No. 2 of the 8th instant you enquired whether the property of the alleged Turkish nationals who were in the Hedjaz at the time of the Arab revolt had been seized by the Hashemite Government.

I am directed by Mr. Secretary Ramsay MacDonald to explain the observations in paragraph 3 of your despatch of the 6th December, No. 142, as follows:

The measures of sequestration and liquidation of the private property of enemy nationals which were taken in this country have been regulated by treaties with the ex-enemy States concerned, and any person who does not receive his property back will, at any rate in theory, obtain compensation in accordance with the treaties from his own Government. These considerations clearly do not apply to the action taken in this case in the Hedjaz. You will therefore understand that there is no real analogy between the action of King Hussein reported in your despatch and the attitude taken up by His Majesty's Government towards the property of ex-enemy nationals in England.

3. In these circumstances I am to request you to endeavour to obtain from the Hashemite Government the information requested in the two notes enclosed in Foreign Office despatch No. 142 of the 6th December, taking care to avoid in any way involving His Majesty's Government, and explaining that the action taken is due to a request made to the Acting British High Commissioner at Constantinople by the Turkish Government.

4. A copy of this despatch has been sent to the Acting British High Commissioner at Constantinople.

I am, &amp;c.

D G OSBORNE

[E 1532 424 91]

No. 82.

*Consul Bullard to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received February 19.)*

(No. 9. Secret.)

Jeddah, January 29, 1924.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith the Jeddah report for the period the 1st to the 29th January.

Copies of this despatch and report are being sent to Cairo, Bagdad, Jerusalem, Delhi, Aden and Beyrout (for communication to Damascus).

I have, &amp;c.

R. W. BULLARD

Enclosure in No. 82

*Jeddah Report, January 1-29, 1924.*

NOTE

THE absence of King Hussein has not brought to his people the sense of relief that might have been expected, for to a system as centralised as that of Louis XIV (and worked with as much indifference to the eventual deluge), King Hussein adds an instrument which Louis XIV never knew—wireless telegraphy. Mecca and Jeddah are full of spies, the wireless works indefatigably, and there is no doubt that the King is kept in touch with his subjects. Communication, however, does not make it possible to get anything done, and, after a few half-hearted efforts, we have postponed until the King's return all questions of importance. Many ludicrous instances are reported of the unwillingness of Hedjaz officials to take any responsibility upon themselves. Perhaps the most absurd was afforded by the Commandant of Jeddah, who refused to restore to its position a survey stone which we had seen being rolled away by Arabs from its place not far from the barracks, but said that if we would put the stone back he would go so far as to put a sentry over it.

*Bin Saud.*

The Wahabi wave is undoubtedly spreading. To the north Khotbar has been in their hands for some time and there have been several attacks on the railway line. In the Taif area hostilities, though on a small scale, are of frequent occurrence. Taif has been surrounded with a ring of forts which King Hussein has garrisoned with a considerable force—said to be 7,000 men—composed of the best of such fighting material as the Hedjaz can produce. The Wahabis are even believed to be in possession of Safainab and Suwairiyah on the Mecca-Medina road. The normal position on the

[12045]

M 4

[illegible]

Five doctors arrived recently to take up employment under the Hashemite Government. Four have been sent to Mecca, the fifth is working in Jeddah. Whether their appointment is intended as an answer to criticism of the health service in the Hedjaz or is simply a step in the Arabisation of the Hedjaz public services, is not known. Probably both considerations weigh with the King. On their arrival one Turkish doctor left and another



going soon. The number and quality of the Hedjaz Government doctors matter little because the Government will not spend the money to provide the necessary drugs and equipment. Patients at the public hospital in Mecca have to procure their own dressings in the bazaar, and the hospital is frequently without the commonest medicines, lotions, &c.

The Egyptian Government have announced that they do not recognise Abdul Malik, the Hedjaz representative in Cairo, as the official representative of the Hashimite Government. This is only making public the attitude which the Egyptian Government have always adopted, but the announcement has led the Suez police to refuse to insist that no person shall embark for the Hedjaz without Abdul Malik's visa. As, however, the Hedjaz authorities have no instructions to allow any person arriving from Egypt to enter the Hedjaz unless he has Abdul Malik's visa there is no practical change, and the Khedivial Steamship Company have been warned that they will do well to refuse to grant a passage to the Hedjaz to any person who has not obtained the Hashimite visa. It is supposed that the Egyptian Government will not interfere with the grant of such visas by Abdul Malik.

The Malay pilgrim officer has arrived and is preparing to deal with pilgrims from British Malaya. The authorities he represents have not found it possible to introduce compulsory registration of pilgrims this year, but a good beginning has been made by the introduction of a satisfactory form of passport and by the decision to advise all British pilgrims to report at the British agency at Jeddah and all Dutch pilgrims

The arrival of the first pilgrim ship of the season has afforded a striking proof of the futility of the Jeddah quarantine arrangements. The ship had on board some 800 pilgrims from the Dutch East Indies. Not a single death occurred during the voyage, and a clean bill of health was granted at Kamaran. In spite of this the Jeddah quarantine authorities followed the usual procedure and sent the unhappy pilgrims to the quarantine island. They allege that there is cholera in the Dutch East Indies. This legend on its merits is untrue, but even if it were well founded (1) there would have been no cholera on board if any of the passengers had been infected, (2) the properly equipped and staffed station at Kamaran had passed the ship as clean, and (3) the Jeddah procedure is no protection, since it means nothing but leaving the pilgrims on an island for one day as an excuse for charging a fee and to show the world who is master in Jeddah.

There has been a sudden boom in the slave trade in Jeddah. Slaves—nearly all Abyssinians—are being imported in such numbers that the price of young women, which is usually 650-700, has fallen to 300-350. The dhows are becoming bolder and are sailing to Jeddah instead of landing the slaves to the south, and the Hedjaz Government are becoming more shameless and are openly levying customs dues in kind on this human cargo—the best of every man for the Government. It is significant that this should be going on at a moment when King Hussein, at Atoman, is bestowing open sympathy upon the downtrodden inhabitants of Syria and Palestine. Such information as we have obtained as to the routes the dhows take is being conveyed to

the British, i.e., at least for as long as King Hussein reigns, it will be impossible to stop the trade. The Government of the Hedjaz, which at present enjoys a wide autonomy, permission to keep a detachment of troops on his territory, but it is probably through Freetown that most of the slaves are exported.

The welcome intimation having been received from the Foreign Office that the monthly press summary may be discontinued, any material of interest which appears in the Mecca newspapers will in future be dealt with only in the body of the report.

#### Temperature, December 1923.

	Temperature at 10 a.m.		
	Maximum.	Minimum.	Average.
Average	82.3	70.1	76.2
Extreme	89	63	76

R. W. BULLARD.

#### APPENDIX

##### Shipping Intelligence.

Steamship	Flag	From—	To—	Arrived	Left	Pilgrims Disembarked	Cargo Discharged
				1923	1924	Packaging	
M. S. S. S.	Suez	Suez	Suez	Dec. 31	Jan. 1	..	..
				1924			
K. S. S. S.	Suez	Suez	Suez	Jan. 5	" 6	..	2,624
M. S. S. S.	Suez	Suez	Suez	" 8	" 9	..	1,444
M. S. S. S.	Suez	Suez	Suez	" 10	" 10	..	..
M. S. S. S.	Suez	Suez	Suez	" 10	" 10	..	386
M. S. S. S.	Suez	Suez	Suez	" 2	" 22	..	..
M. S. S. S.	Suez	Suez	Suez	" 24	" 25	..	..
M. S. S. S.	Suez	Suez	Suez	" 26	" 26	804	..

E 1532 424 91}

No. 83

#### Foreign Office to Consul Bullard (Jeddah).

(Confidential.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, February 26, 1924.

I AM directed by Mr. Secretary Ramsey MacDonald to state that he has read with much concern the report on the serious recrudescence of the slave traffic contained in the enclosure in your despatch No. 9 of the 29th ultimo.

2. I am to request you to address to King Hussein a protest, couched in the strongest possible terms, against the existence of the conditions reported by you. You should inform him that His Majesty's Government regard the existence of slavery as a most heinous and detestable crime, and are astonished to learn that it should be so openly levied in kind upon this human cargo. You should, further, state that this is not the first occasion on which His Majesty's Government have

expressed this scandal (see Major Marshall's despatch No. 60 of the 2nd August, 1922). You should add that His Majesty's Government are considering the necessity of drawing up a declaration of principles, which, if adopted by the Hashimite authorities, explaining that such action would effectively debar that country from admission to membership of the League.

3. Meanwhile, the Secretary of State is requesting the Admiralty to issue orders for increased vigilance in the patrolling of the Red Sea, and is inviting the French and Italian Governments to co-operate in this task as closely as possible.

I am, &c.

D. G. OSBORNE.

E 1829 29 91]

No. 84.

#### Colonial Office to Foreign Office.—(Received February 28.)

(Confidential.)

Sir,

Dorning Street, February 28, 1924.

I AM directed by Mr. Secretary Thomas to invite reference to telegrams Nos. 59 and 60 to Sir H. Samuel regarding the negotiations with the King of the Hedjaz. Copies of these telegrams were communicated to your Department on the 2nd and 3rd February respectively.

With reference to the telegram No. 59, the attention of Mr. Secretary Ramsay MacDonald is directed to the fact that the Hedjaz Government, as represented by Dr. Najj-el Asil, agent of King Hussein in London, to a representative of Reuter's Agency. I am to refer in this connection to the third paragraph of Dr. Najj's letter of the 12th November last (copy enclosed in your letter of the 17th November), in which he specially requested that steps might be taken to prevent the publication of any statement which might be prejudicial to the interests of the Hedjaz. In this request, Mr. Thomas finds it difficult to understand how Dr. Najj can justify his action in making a public announcement on the subject.

I am, Sir, that, in the interview with Renter's representative, the proposals made by him in November last were accepted in principle by the British Government. So far as Mr. Thomas is aware, this statement is quite without foundation. The reply of the late Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to Dr. Naji's latest proposal in regard to article 2, the precise implication of the new draft of article 2, and he was informed that, when the audience had been furnished a copy would be addressed to him "regarding the further negotiations on the basis of the version which you have now prepared." It was added that in the meantime it would be premature "to discuss the exact wording of the proposed article."

Mr. Thomas is aware that the negotiations with the Hedjaz Government from London to Jeddah, and the transfer as a condition of continuing the negotiations. Experience of Dr. Naji's methods is scarcely such as to inspire confidence, and it appears to Mr. Thomas that the prospect of arriving at a satisfactory conclusion through his agency is very doubtful.

I am, Sir,  
J. E. SHUCKBURN

[E 1841/1841/91]

No. 85

The Marquess of Creice to Mr. MacDonald. (Received February 29.)

(No. 467.)

Paris, February 28, 1924.

Paris, February 28, 1924.

Enclosure in No. 85.

The Marquess of Creice to M. Poincaré.

Paris, February 28, 1924.

His Majesty's Government are informed that slaves are now being imported in the Hedjaz. The number of slaves imported has fallen from 700 in 1919 to 100 in 1923. The dhow trade is becoming bolder and are sailing to Jeddah instead of landing at the south.

His Majesty's Government are informed that slaves are now being imported in the Hedjaz. The number of slaves imported has fallen from 700 in 1919 to 100 in 1923. The dhow trade is becoming bolder and are sailing to Jeddah instead of landing at the south.

I have the honour to add that His Majesty's representative at Rome has been instructed to approach the Italian Government in a similar sense.

I am, Sir,  
J. E. SHUCKBURN

E 1882 11 91]

No. 86

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald. (Received March 1)

(No. 38.)

(Telegraphic) R.

Constantinople, March 1, 1924

FOLLOWING telegram appears in all to-day's Turkish papers. It is obviously an official communiqué, although no source is indicated.

Information has been received that certain inhabitants of our country wish to go to the Hedjaz on pilgrimage this year. As Government of Hussein who are in the country, and is, moreover, daily using oppressive and vexatious treatment towards them, and the Government of Hussein is not doing its duty of protecting and safeguarding them is lacking, notice is given that those who wish to go to the Hedjaz should postpone fulfilment of obligation of pilgrimage to a future time, and that the Government of Hussein is not doing its duty of protecting and safeguarding them is lacking.

(Repeated to Jeddah, No. 1)

E 2136 29/91]

No. 87

Colonial Office to Foreign Office. (Received March 10.)

Sir,

Downing Street, March 8, 1924.

I AM directed by Mr. Secretary Thomas to refer to telegram No. 76 of the 28th February from the High Commissioner for Palestine, of which a copy was transmitted to you with this Department's letter of the 1st March, on the subject of the terms expressed by King Hussein to send a mission to England, and to enquire what reply should, in Mr. Secretary Ramsey MacDonald's opinion, be sent to this suggestion.

2. Mr. Thomas sees no reason to depart from the view expressed in his telegram of February, in the terms of which Mr. MacDonald concurred, that the mission should not be resumed elsewhere than at Jeddah. He would strongly deprecate the despatch of the proposed mission.

3. He is not aware upon what ground Sir Herbert Samuel suggests that Mr. Ballard requires any support or aid from King Hussein, and sees no reason for the despatch of a special delegate of His Majesty's Government from England for this purpose.

4. Mr. Thomas adheres to his view that the conclusion, through the High Commissioner for Palestine, of a treaty from which article 2 was omitted would be to the objection outlined in his telegram under reference.

I am, Sir,

J. E. SHUCKBURN

E 2136/29 91]

No. 88

Foreign Office to Colonial Office.

Sir,

Foreign Office, March 17, 1924.

IN reply to your letter of the 8th instant relative to the desire of King Hussein to send a mission to this country in order to further the negotiations for a treaty with Great Britain, I am directed by Mr. Secretary Ramsey MacDonald to state that I share the view of Mr. Secretary Thomas that the presence in London of an Arab mission, headed by the Emir Ali, would not be desirable, more especially at a moment when His Majesty's Government are endeavouring to secure the peace of the Hedjaz to proclaim himself Caliph.

With regard to the second paragraph of your letter, I am to explain that the draft telegram to Sir H. Samuel, in which the Secretary of State concurred, and which formed the enclosure in your letter of the 12th February, did not, as is now suggested, contain the express stipulation that negotiations with King Hussein should not be resumed elsewhere than at Jeddah. On the contrary, the following phrase occurs in











which come to my knowledge, and I am requesting the Soudan Government to make similar arrangements.

11. I am sending copies of this despatch to Rome, Jeddah, Aden and Khartoum.

I have, &c

ALLENBY, F.M.,  
High Commissioner

Enclosure in No. 90

Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby to the Political Resident (Aden)

Sir,

Cairo, March 29, 1924.

With reference to your despatch of the 15th March, regarding the proposed visit to Hodeidah of certain members of the Idnusi family domiciled in Egypt, I have the honour to enclose herein a copy of a despatch which I have to-day addressed to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs on the subject.

While I can fully appreciate the undesirability of these persons entering Asir, I am not in a position to interfere with their movements in any way.

I have, &c

ALLENBY, F.M.  
High Commissioner

E 3136 1841/91}

No. 91

Annual Bullard to Mr MacDonald.-(Received April 8)

(No. 27.)

Sir,

Jeddah, March 19, 1924.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge receipt of your despatch No. 32 of the 15th February regarding the slave traffic. As I was about to address you on this subject, when your despatch was received.

I am in accordance with the instructions in case you should wish to take the matter into consideration.

2. My predecessor reported to you in his despatch No. 60, dated the 2nd August 1923, his failure to induce King Hussein to prohibit the traffic in slaves. The language used by the Hedjaz authorities in this connection is of interest, and I therefore enclose herewith the correspondence which passed between them and this agency on that occasion. (Enclosures 1 to 4.)

3. At a later date the King made a great virtue of emancipating a Soudanese who had been sold into slavery by his own people. I enclose copies of correspondence on this matter also. (Enclosures 5 to 7.) His zeal can be attributed to the fact that the people who sold the petitioner into slavery were alleged to be Soudanese also, and that the King consequently supported his contention that the traffic in slaves is the work of people for whom Great Britain, France and Italy are responsible.

4. King Hussein has recently indicated his attitude towards the League of Nations. Reference to this will be found in two items of the press summary attached to the Jeddah report for October last (despatch No. 90, dated the 31st October, 1923).

It is not unreasonable to suppose from these considerations that a protest in the terms laid down in your despatch No. 32 would receive an answer to this effect.

The institution of slavery and the sale and purchase of slaves (not the sale and purchase of free people into slavery) are sanctioned by the Koran. (His recent assumption of the title of "Commander of the Faithful" would probably lead King Hussein to lay great stress on this point.) As to the importation of Africans to be sold as slaves, that is the fault of the European Powers who control the territories from which the Africans come. When any person originally free appeals to the Hedjaz authorities for his liberation, they are bound to grant it. (This is true in theory. In practice slaves are almost never liberated in this way now. It is probably years before the slave, who usually knows no Arabic on arrival, is in a position to formulate a demand for freedom which would satisfy a Hedjaz official, even if he heard what his rights are, and then he can rarely produce evidence that he was free.) The condition of the Arabs in Syria and Palestine, for which France and

Great Britain are responsible, is far worse than that of slaves in the Hedjaz. And finally, King Hussein has already stated that he does not want to join a League of Nations which expects him to confirm the mandatory system by signing the Treaty of Versailles, and His Majesty's Government's threat to secure his exclusion therefore leaves him cold.

6. The Turkish Constitution abolished slavery. It is possible that this had little practical effect in the Hedjaz, for even in Irak there were slaves until the British occupation, not only among the tribes but also in the houses of rich people in Basra. Nevertheless, the provision afforded a valuable lever which is no longer at our service. But the slave in the Hedjaz was better off not merely under the Ottoman law, but even during the years preceding the promulgation of that law. A black slave who presented himself at a foreign consulate and asked to be liberated could always obtain papers of manumission from the authorities at the instance of the consul, and I believe that in this way thirty or forty slaves a month, on an average, secured their liberty through the British and French consulates at Jeddah in those days. The practice was based, I suppose, on the Ottoman law of the 4th, 16th December, 1889 (Young's "Corpus de Droit ottoman" Vol. II).

7. It is useless to expect King Hussein (or any Arab ruler who may succeed him) to abolish slavery in the Hedjaz, but it would perhaps be worth while trying to re-organise the procedure by which slaves could be manumitted at the instance of the agency. I therefore submit for your consideration the suggestion that if treaty negotiations with King Hussein are resumed we should try to get him to agree, either in the treaty or by a collateral instrument, to declare the importation of human beings for the purpose of slavery to be illegal and to recognise the old manumission procedure. Among other arguments in support of our demand we could urge that, if King Hussein insisted on cutting out the one valuable concession it was proposed he should make, viz., recognition of His Majesty's Government's Palestine policy, he could not expect the rest of the treaty to stand unchanged, and that in any case Parliament could not be expected to ratify a treaty with a monarch who openly supports a less enlightened slavery policy than the Turks did. If this proposal is not approved by His Majesty's Government or is tried and comes to nothing, we could then threaten to expose King Hussein to the League of Nations, though I venture to suggest, from personal knowledge of King Hussein, that it might be more effective if, instead of saying that "such action would effectively debar (the Hedjaz) from admission to membership of the League," we should point out that the exposure would create much hostility and righteous indignation against the Hedjaz not merely in European countries and America, but also among all the great Mohammedan communities of the world.

8. I should be glad to be informed, if I am to protest to King Hussein, whether the protest is really to cover "the existence of slavery in the Hedjaz" or is concentrated on the importation of human beings for the purpose of slavery. I have ample Koranic authority for the maintenance in a state of slavery of people who are already slaves, though none, I believe, for enslavement, or for the sale of slaves to the slaughter of prisoners of war; and, if I am right, I can show that slavery exists in certain parts of Africa for which His Majesty's Government are responsible.

I have, &c

R. W. BULLARD

Enclosure 1 in No. 91

Major Marshall to His Majesty King Hussein (Neoca).

(After respects.)

Jeddah, June 29, 1922

I HAVE been instructed by His Majesty's Government to inform your Majesty that they learn with deep distress of the continuance of slave trading in the Red Sea and of the importation of slaves into the Hedjaz.

His Majesty's Government are anxious to abolish this iniquitous trade and invite your Majesty's co-operation in this matter. If your Majesty will prohibit the importation of slaves into the Hedjaz a severe blow will be struck at this trade.

I should be glad to learn your Majesty's views on this subject.

I am, Sir,

W. E. MARSHALL, Major, R.A.M.C.,  
Agent and Consul.



## Enclosure 2 in No. 91

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Mecca) to Major Marshall

(Translation.)

(After respects.)

July 1, 1922

I HAVE duly received your Excellency's letter of the 29th June.

I hope that your Excellency believes that our desire is the desire of His Majesty's Government, in accordance at any rate with their view that Arab and British interests cannot be unaware that desires and principles like these can be by nothing except matters of religion, like the matter in question now and the Moslems, which can be neither abolished nor opposed. But I beg to state as clearly as possible that the prevention of this traffic lies in the hands of His Majesty's Government, since it proceeds only from the colonies of Great Britain or of her allies. There is no road for this traffic but the sea, the key of which you hold. If nothing were to break us by that road, this traffic would naturally stop. This is the only plan.

I take this opportunity to explain to His Majesty's Government that what I and the Arabs, their friends desire is salvation from the well-known calamities and disasters which have befallen the whole Arab peninsula. I myself and they, too, only stand where we do stand owing to our trust in the honour of the words and promises, general and particular, uttered by His Majesty's Government. Their present efforts and endeavours to save the Arabs from such calamities and disasters, from the anarchy to which they are subjected, and from the incitement of man against man to plunder. The minimum of consideration shows that the result of the present procedure and of the own intentions towards them is less than the least part of that moral and material damage which will be attributed to Great Britain. If Great Britain were to act in accordance with my five decided points, which are to the common advantage, the issue would surpass all their ideas about mandatory powers and so on, and the trouble caused would be one-tenth of that inherent in the present situation.

The proof is that it is far better to liberate from slavery and captivity the dwellers in Northern Arabia than to desire and work for the abolition of slave traffic.

Your letter is interpreted as implying any selfish object. I have openly said so before all else. But Great Britain has shown her sincere friend and asked him to do what they can to do, and since they have stated to him that the object of all this is complete Arab independence and the liberation of the Arabs from every yoke, and I have communicated these statements to the Arabs and have notified them of this high aim, I am constrained to demand that honourable fulfilment which no single Arab for a single moment loses from view.

Therefore I request your Excellency to transmit my appeal to His Majesty's Government, for it is, I believe, the only means by which both interests, recognised as one common interest, can be secured.

And any reply suggesting the contrary will mean for me and for my people that we have attained great honour, if in a different way, for we shall have become a sacrifice to our confidence and our trust in the honour of Great Britain's word.

With longings, &c.

FUAD-EL-KHATIB

## Enclosure 3 in No. 91

Major Marshall to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Mecca).

(After respects.)

Jeddah, July 6, 1922.

I HAVE received your Excellency's letter of the 1st July, 1922, from which I note that your Excellency considers the importation of slaves into the Hejaz to be a matter of religion which you can neither oppose nor stop. As I always understood that traffic to be a matter of religion, I am glad to hear that your Excellency refers me to any religious authority where it is sanctioned.

While His Majesty's Government are doing their best to stop this traffic by sea, they desire His Majesty's co-operation in the abolition of a trade which is condemned by the whole civilised world. So long as the Hejaz is permitted to

continue as the most profitable market in the Red Sea for this iniquitous and heinous traffic, the abolition of the traffic will be a matter of considerable difficulty.

Longings.

W. E. MARSHALL, Major, R.A.M.C.,  
Agent and Consul

## Enclosure 4 in No. 91

Ministry for Foreign Affairs (Mecca) to Major Marshall

(Translation.)

(After respects.)

July 10, 1922

IN reply to your Excellency's letter of the 6th July, 1922, concerning slaves. Firstly, slavery and the buying and selling of slaves are undoubtedly permitted by many verses of the Koran. What is permitted by religion cannot be prevented or prohibited. This is the religious point of view as I stated. But as to the importation of slaves, as it is understood from your statement "the importation of slaves is a religious question," it is not so. We cannot insist upon this.

It is lawful. If you refer to the files in your office, you will have seen sent from us to you for the deportation of Africans who had been selling free people as slaves, and that we have asked you to arrange that they should not come back again.

With respects.

(For Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs),  
SADAKA

## Enclosure 5 in No. 91

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Mecca) to Vice-Consul Graftley-Smith

(Translation.)

(After respects.)

May 20, 1922.

I BEG to send you the attached petition in order that your Excellency will see other. The Hashemite Government have taken immediate steps to emancipate him. This is for your information, so that you may know what is going on. Please return

With respects.

FUAD-EL-KHATIB

## Enclosure 6 in No. 91

Petition.

(Translation.)

To His Majesty the King.

PETITIONER, Adam-bin-Yahya, begs to submit:-

I am a Soudanese of Kafir and I came six years ago with some people of my own country whom I trusted. I was young and ignorant, and when I reached Mecca the man with whom I came sold me though I am free, not a slave. I was sent with some soldiers to the house of the director of police, Mansour-bin Zaher, who purchased me without asking me whether I was a slave or free.

I continued serving the said director of police for the last six years, as I found myself under his orders and away from my relatives and home.

I asked him to relieve me either by selling me or by setting me free, but he sold me to one of the Java sheikhs and then took me back again, telling me that he would sell me to someone who would emancipate me.

I appeal to your Majesty to order that I should be emancipated, as I have witnesses to my freedom. My only witnesses are Mansour-bin Zaher, the director of Police, and a certain Jelril, a native of my own town, are here and are ready to give evidence to this effect.

ADAM BIN-YAHYA  
Soudanese

10.10.1341.

{12045}

84

Enclosure 7 in No. 91

Vice-Consul Graffey-Smith to Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Mecca)

(After respects.)

Jeddah, May 30, 1923.

I HAVE the honour to return to you herewith the petition addressed to His Majesty by the Soudanese, Adam bin-Yahya, who was bought as a slave by the Rais-ul-Sharia, Mansur bin Zaher.

I beg to thank you for bringing this case to my notice, and for the action you have taken in emancipating this unfortunate young man.

Compliments.

L. B. GRAFFEY-SMITH

[E 3356 424/91]

No. 92.

Consul Bullard to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received April 14.)

(No. 29. Secret.)

Sir,

Jeddah, March 29, 1924.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith the Jeddah Report for the period 1st-29th March.

Copies of this despatch and report are being sent to Cairo, Bagdad, Jerusalem, Delhi, Aden and Beirut (for communication to Damascus).

I have, &amp;c.

R. W. BULLARD

Enclosure in No. 92.

Jeddah Report for the Period March 1-29, 1924.

(Secret.)

KING HUSSEIN'S intention to declare himself Caliph was not made known in the Hedjaz until the 5th March. No official information was given to the foreign press, but shortly before noon it became known that a proclamation of some kind was to be made and a salute of 101 guns fired. According to a report of the Turkish Consul, the King had been advised by the British Consul, Sir R. Bullard, that the King had agreed to accept the Caliphate, and the Hedjaz was doubtful whether the King had agreed to do so. It would appear, however, that he should accept the Caliphate. The King's intention to work up a revolution in the Hedjaz, and to secure from the British Consul, Sir R. Bullard, who would be ready to have proposed, e.g., that relative to the Hedjaz and the nightmare reign of Hussein I come to an end.

With the King money tight, he has no room for optimism with empty pockets. The King's intention to work up a revolution in the Hedjaz, and to secure from the British Consul, Sir R. Bullard, who would be ready to have proposed, e.g., that relative to the Hedjaz and the nightmare reign of Hussein I come to an end.

tenth of these telegrams, and in point of fact they probably just filed the messages. By this means many thousands of pounds have been raked into the royal coffers.

By an unfortunate coincidence H.M.S. "Clematis" appeared at Jeddah on the day of the announcement, after notice so short that there was no time to ask that her visit should be postponed. This gave rise to a rumour that the King's declaration had been best to strengthen the rumour by publishing a paragraph reporting the arrival of H.M.S. "Clematis".

that the officer commanding had called on the kaimakam. In the case of the Italian consul they went farther; they described him as having called on the kaimakam to offer congratulations on the King's assumption of the Caliphate, whereas the object of the consul's visit, as was to warn the kaimakam that an Italian warship, the "Magna", a survey ship, was to call at Jeddah in a day or two in the course of the scientific mission which she is carrying out.

King Hussein is whistling hard to keep up his courage. The "Kibla" and the "Fath" are full of abuse of the Turks and praise of His Majesty Hussein I, Commander of the Faithful. Telegrams of recognition from Syria, Palestine and Iraq are printed in full; tucked away in small print are statements that telegrams of recognition will shortly be received from Singapore and the East Indies, and that Maulvi Abdul Bari of Lucknow and the Nationalist leader, Shaikat Ali, have wired recognizing the King as Caliph. There is something doubtful about these alleged telegrams from India or they would be published in full in large type, but it is quite possible that Abdul Bari has recognized the King as Caliph, he has carried out propaganda in India on various occasions on the King's behalf since his visit to the Hedjaz some years ago when he was feted and flattered by the King.

The Wahabis have been quite quiet for the last two months or so, presumably as the result of the truce.

The latest Transjordan report paints a delightful picture of King Hussein auditing the accounts and reforming the administration of that country. Set a thief to audit a thief, and the result is a picture of a man who is a thief.

The King's opposition to the new system of registration for British Malay pilgrims was suddenly withdrawn, and the guides were given orders to send to this agency one of the British Malay pilgrims as have now form passports. I have been unable to find out the reason for the sudden renunciation of the resolve "not to recognize the Malay pilgrims' capacity whatsoever." Anyhow, for a week or two the guides had deposited the counterfoils of their passports and their tickets in the agency.

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Africa have arrived; nineteen Indians have left Bombay for Jeddah via the Soudan or Persia, inaugurating the new system of control by depositing with the police 60 rupees each to cover the cost of the passage home.

Four pilgrims from Cape Town came to the agency to ask advice. All their money was in British Treasury notes, and the pilgrim guides were advising them to turn it all into gold. Finding that they were very doubtful whether their funds would last, gold being at a premium of about 17 per cent. over sterling and that they had not bought return tickets, I advised them to deposit at this agency in Treasury notes at least enough to cover the cost of their journey home—about £11. a head. This they promised to do, but they did not come, and by now they must have left for Mecca. No doubt the guides provided on them not to make a deposit which would have put a large sum out of the reach of the Hedjaz harpies.

In reply to a notice published in the Turkish press warning Turks not to go on the pilgrimage at present because of the risks they would run, the "Kibla" publishes a proclamation signed by the Grand Kadi, but probably composed by the King. H. d. n. x, says this proclamation, is enjoying general order, peace and comfort under Hashimite Majesty, Commander of the Faithful. "The simplest proof of the King's phrase to introduce a thumping lie is that the Turks who have come to the Hedjaz during the last years have been able to perform the pilgrimage in comfort, peace and security. By what auspices the Turks have escaped the plagues which afflict all other pilgrims the proclamation does not state.

Apart from the money raised for the two steamers, the King has had over 100,000 sent to him since he left to supplement the large sums which he took with him. Having Caliphon in expensive. To make up for this expenditure the most

in Mecca have been instructed not to let their pilgrims go shopping until they have arranged for their

gets of

go, he makes a very handsome profit.

and more easy-going pilgrims from the Far East, both British and Dutch, fall easy victims. A camel loaded with pilgrim gear carries less than a half its ordinary load. It

non to see a camel start off with two half bags of rice instead of three full bags or with nothing but a miserable load of firewood on each side. This was inspected and passed by the president of the Pilgrim Committee, a relative villainy of King Hussein's. He, the Government, the camel-men and the guides their pickings out of the fraud. The pilgrims could circumvent

they would cut down their luggage to a minimum. Indians are reasonable, and as a rule bring nothing beyond their personal effects but rice and ghee. The Far Eastern pilgrims, however, bring the most fantastically unnecessary things: firewood, fruit, cocoa nuts with the fibre on, &c. Apart from the expense of getting the stuff to Jeddah and the landing and customs dues, they have to pay on such things, in camel-hire to Mecca alone, many times the price at which they could buy similar food or fuel in Mecca. It is even doubtful whether they are wise in bringing rice. Rice imported into the Hedjaz from India wholesale must be cheaper than single sacks of Indian rice

increases the congestion of luggage at the custom-house and the consequent risk of loss. There is already this year a mountain of "unclaimed" luggage, and most of it will never be recovered by the owners. When the boxes and bales have been rifled by the customs officials they will be sold for the benefit of the Hedjaz Government.

But who shall save the pilgrim from the consequences of his own stupidity?

started off from the Far East on the pilgrimage a year ago. They travelled via Bombay, where they fell in with a certain Haji Muhammad Nur, who represented himself to have been, and really was at one time, a religious teacher in Mecca. This man, after winning their confidence by teaching them prayers, collected all their money on pretext of buying their tickets, and

passages by dhow as far as Mokalla and a rather, finding them there begging, sent them

have promised to arrest him if he returns to the Hedjaz, and say generally that he may get off with the loss of one of his hands. This is probably a correct forecast. The King

he but himself should swindle the pilgrims

There is no doubt that King Hussein will make a determined effort to divert the whole of the Syrian and Palestinian pilgrim traffic away from the Egyptian route. It

pilgrims from Beirut and Haifa last year were properly conducted, and there is much to be said for the complaint that the Egyptian restrictions on returning pilgrims are unnecessarily vexatious. But King Hussein has probably other reasons, of which some are doubtless (1) a desire to enhance his prestige and to increase his revenue; (2) a determination to score off the Quarantine Board by diverting much of the traffic which would otherwise help to pay the expenses of the quarantine station at Tor; (3) a desire

prospect is not good either for the pilgrims or for reputable shipping

which the pilgrims travel; and although in theory bad conditions should

the boats, though no separate account will be kept, he will never know exactly what the upkeep of the boats is costing and what the net profit is.

the explanation that, being an Arab, he is regarded as a military, not a civilian, pilot. He also bears that he will not be allowed to leave until he has completed three years'

TEMPERATURE for February

		Maximum	Minimum	Temperature at 10 A.M.	
				Dry.	Wet.
Average	81.2	66.1	78.3	72.6	
Extreme	90.0	55.0	88.0	80.0	

R. W. BULLARD.

# APPENDIX

				Arrived.		Left.		Passengers	
				1924.		1924.		Disembarked.	
				Mar. 1		Mar. 1		Disembarked.	
	Dutch	Batavia	Port Said	Mar. 1	Mar. 1				
	British	Batavia	Port Said	" 1	" 1				
	British	Suez	Suez	" 4	" 5		50		
	British	Suez	Aden	" 5	" 6		43		
	Italian	Massawa	Suez	" 6	" 7			1,461	
	British	Batavia	Port Said	" 8	" 10		1,518		30 tons
	Dutch	Batavia	Port Said	" 8	" 10		1,030		
	British	Suez	Port Said	" 8	" 12			9,503	
	Italian	Suez	Massawa	" 9	" 10			2,155	
									3,604



The restrictions abolished by the second, third and fourth of these measures were aimed at Bin Saud. The King hoped by starving the Hedjaz tribes to prevent the export of goods to Nejd. A minor object was to make the Hedjaz tribes too dependent on the King's food permits to give trouble. In so far as the restrictions were observed they had the effect of starving the Hedjaz for lack of such essentials as ght, which are usually imported from Nejd and the Yemen, and of ruining the Hedjaz merchants.

The suppression of the blockade has already led to an increase in the demand for food stuffs, piece-goods and other imports. The sudden removal of the embargo on the

Government have now announced that Government Departments will accept no foreign currency except gold and Indian silver rupees. They do not accept medjidiehs except for sums not exceeding 24 piastres (about 3s 4d), they only use them for paying out, at a loss to the payee of 50 per cent. or more. As the Government rate is 7 medjidiehs to the pound gold, you might think that you could settle a bill of half a sovereign for, e.g., a telegram by paying 3½ medjidiehs. But you do not know your

half a sovereign), and he gives you 3½ medjidiehs change, which is worth from a third to a quarter of a sovereign, according to the season of the year. In the acquisition of gold the King triumphs even over the one-eyed Arimaspians of antiquity; they had to get their gold from the griffin.

business gives wide opportunities to King Hussein's journalistic longer need he hide behind the perfectly transparent veil of "A Reader in Mecca," "Our Special Correspondent at X," etc. As Caliph he is for ever issuing

on. Immediately after his return he launched a proclamation explaining once more the Caliphate which the Moslem world had seen fit to thrust upon him, calling on all Moslems to assist him, and inviting subscriptions for the relief of the exiled Turkish Royal Family. This was followed by another announcing the approaching election of an advisory council to the Caliphate. This council is to consist of two sections—one for religious matters, the other for economic affairs, e.g., the development of agriculture and industry. As the King never takes anybody's advice, and as in any case the Hedjaz has (except for a little agriculture) only one industry, viz., the robbery of pilgrims, industry in which all Hedjazis are proficient at a tender age, it is not anticipated that the council will be very busy.

The council is to be composed of notables of "the countries" (members from abroad will receive from the Caliph not only their travelling expenses, but also a maintenance allowance during their stay in Mecca).

Arab

in the "Kibla" to be as follows: Bayyids, 2; representatives of Mecca, 4; Medina, 1; Iraq, 2; Syria, 1; Daghestan, 1; Bokhara, 3; India, 3; Turkey, 1; Afghanistan, 1; Java, 2; Soudan, 3; Mexico, 1. The Dutch consul has learned that no Javanese

have to give way to the great pressure which is being brought to bear on

The King affects to make light of the opposition to his assumption

as a non Moslem sold to the French; the Egyptian opposition is belittled and ridiculed, India is said to be, as to an enormous majority of the Moslems there, in favour of King Hussein; and the Grand Kadi writes to the Indian Caliphate Committee telling them that, instead of worrying about conferences to discuss a question which has

recovery of the treasures stolen from the Prophet's tomb by the Turks and of those parts of the Hedjaz Railway which are not yet under the control of the Committee of Management established at Medina.

If King Hussein were ever to be deposed, he should command a high salary. West as log-roller and gerrymander of elections. His efforts to secure recognition as Caliph are as determined as they are shameless. How the people of Mecca were obliged to hand in an to pay for expensive telegrams of recognition which were never touched has already been related. The next move was recognition by pilgrims. This was easy, the guides simply handed in lists of all their pilgrims as having recognised the King as Caliph, and the lists were printed in the Mecca press. The

any of these bogus lists was broken only by the appearance, among the alleged Javanese signatories, of one "Mustabil." This looks like the sort of Arabic word which an East Indian might adopt as a name.

Sultan of Kashmir  
by the Minister of Chitral. Similar

have long been by the Yema

extracted from

For

At

On

On calling on the

and there some Bahreinis, Yusuf Fakhr (Y) and two others,

was at the telephone, and, from the conversation, it became clear that

"the Caliph" was at the other end of the wire. How were his Bahrein friends? Not too tired with the journey? They really must come to Mecca at once, and in the

Caliph's car. The Bahreinis appeared a little surprised at this enthusiastic greeting, but gladly accepted the proposal that they should go to Mecca by our instead of by

M. cars for the purpose were actually brought to Jeddah by an Indian

M. but the King would not allow them to be used. Their plain expression of

thanks was bellowed along the telephone wire as "They thank His Majesty the

of the Believers." Some of the announcements of recognition bear on

them the proof of their own falseness, e.g., the "Kibla" and more than a page about

the "recognition of His Majesty as Caliph by 5,000,000 Moslem inhabitants of the

Malay Peninsula," through a learned deleg

purpose. A close examination of the account showed that the only credentials produced

by the "delegation" consisted of "a letter from him (or those) who appointed them,"

signed by "the learned teacher who presided over the annual general assembly by which

the delegation was chosen," and saying that, as it was difficult to get teachers for the

500,000 Moslems of the Malay Peninsula—who were depicted as thirsting for

instruction, not only in the tenets of Islam, but also in the Arabic language—five

students were being sent to Mecca to study for three years or more, would the King

keep a benevolent eye on them. The letter did not mention the Caliphate, though it

was dated twelve days after the assumption of the Caliphate by King Hussein.

Inquiry revealed the learned delegation as, in fact, five youths connected with a school

which was established in Mecca by certain Meccan sheikhs, who have come to Mecca to

school. We may expect "recognition from the Aden tribes," or something of the kind,

presently, as the president of the Executive Committee of the Araba Conference,   
 Sayid Muhammad Alawi-al-Sakkaf, has been sent to Lahaj, via Ad

from Suva" resolves itself into a telegram signed by nine persons of whom

Jeddah people domiciled in Suva, one is a Hedjaz merchant, who

weeks ago, and a fourth is a boy who ran away from h

But all these oaths of allegiance pale before the "recogn

"Kibla" a few days ago. For the confutation of the sceptical, the

in full it is a telegram from an unspecified place, signed by some

person unknown, "in the name of the Moslems of Africa."

An observer, who reported to the Arab Bureau in 1917 about King Hussein's

attitude towards the Caliphate, has already been struck by his "transparent honesty"

The acting British consul at Aleppo has reported reiterated accusations in certain

the distribution of large sums by British consular officers. French suspicion is, perhaps,

Syria at that time, since it is in that form that King Hussein would pay his bribes.

Secretary at Mecca, told me that recognition by

g to him, the King asked how long it would take

twenty-four hours from the time certain secret messengers arrived. Sheikh F

however, sent off the messengers and secured the oath of allegiance, to the King's

delight, within the specified time.

Kibla" is informed by its "special correspondent at Kuwait" that the conference has broken down owing to the rejection by the Nejd representatives of all the proposals made by the other delegates.

[illegible]



have made difficulties over the transport of coal for the Hedjaz Railway and refused to repair some tools sent to them. The latter is the sort which the King could always quote afterwards as evidence of his perfect innocence.

It is stated that owing to the high charges levied on pilgrims travelling to Mecca the pilgrims to Jeddah by sea are trekking painfully to Eritrea, whence they take dhow to the Y. there to begin another long trek to Mecca by land.

King Hussein recently summoned the leading "Easterlings", i.e., Nejd, and said that not only were they now free to trade with Nejd, but Nejd might be on the pilgrimage so long as they did not come armed.

Dr. W. Th. de Vogel, of the Netherlands East Indies Civil Health Service, who has been commissioned by the Netherlands Colonial Office to study quarantine arrangements for the return pilgrimage, spent a night here on his way from Tor to Aden. He much wanted to see Kismayu, this agency therefore gave him a letter of recommendation.

The Government of India have approved a suggestion made in the Jeddah Pilgrimage Report for 1923, that when the pilgrimage is declared to be closed, ships carrying pilgrims back to India and the Persian Gulf need not call at Kismayu.

The Netherlands vice-consul, a Javanese, has reported to his chief on the first of the year, which has now returned to Mecca from Medina, and the pilgrims on to Me. The tolls levied were not very heavy: they were levied on the pilgrims, or without violence, of sums varying from small amounts up to 50l. The King announced that he would refund all tolls (though not sums alleged to have been stolen), at the same time he told the guides that any sums paid as compensation would come out of their pockets, so they persuaded the pilgrims to regard their losses as a gift to God. Other "gifts to God" made by one section of the caravan about a tenth of the whole, from whom the Netherlands vice-consul was able to make full enquiries because they came from his district and included some of his relations.

- Item. Many brutal beatings.
- Item. Loss of both hands by one man.
- Item. Loss of both ears by another man.
- Item. One man and four women carried off into slavery.

The Bedouins regard the pilgrims as sent by God for their maintenance, and this, their eyes, justifies the robbery, accompanied, as it often is, by brutality, of the caravans which fall into their hands. In this belief and conduct they differ very little from the dignitaries in Mecca and Medina. Even the practice of carrying off Moslems into slavery, which is forbidden by the Koran, can be watched every year in the towns, where people of importance buy Moslem children or minor girls either from their relatives or the relatives having died on the pilgrimage, from the people into whose hands they have fallen.

H. M. S. "Cornflower" visited Jeddah during this month. An Italian cruiser, the "Lama," also called. The "Kibla" announces that it called to visit the Government of His Majesty the Caliph, and that the Government gave a banquet to the captain, officers and crew. This should not be taken to mean recognition of the King as Caliph, for M. Minnolani, after consulting His Majesty's Government, telegraphed to the Italian consul here to observe the strictest neutrality in the matter. The visit is probably simply one manifestation of the greater activity in the Red Sea which Italy has been showing lately.

After His Majesty's Government had taken endless trouble to find some territory where the remaining Turkish refugees could go, and the Palestine Government had generously agreed to receive them, the refugees stated that they did not wish to go to Palestine, and the Hedjaz Government, hitherto so eager for their departure, allowed them to stay. Annoying as this behaviour is, it at least relieves His Majesty's Government of any responsibility, even in the eyes of the Hedjaz Government.

The King appears to have been badly bitten over the first of his new ships. Bright tales of its excellent condition and perfect suitability for the pilgrim traffic were current until the announcement of its name, the "San Remo," enabled us to learn from "Lloyd's Register" that she was thirty-one years old. The director of customs, who was indirectly concerned in the purchase, is much depressed by this discovery. I understand that the present price of a steamer eight or ten years old is from 4l. to 5l. a ton. At that rate, the "San Remo" should have cost, at most, 7,000l., if she had been twenty years or

more younger, whereas the Hedjaz Government paid 2,000l. for her. Probably half the purchases were a Syrian piece-goods merchant and a Syrian-Greek of no particular training. It is useless to expect orders for reputable British (or other) firms when such people are employed as go-betweens. They buy through doubtful Levantine intermediaries, who will connive at their robbery of the Hedjaz Government. Nevertheless, the "San Remo" has proved such a bad bargain that the authorities here seem to be deliberating more carefully before buying the second new boat. A commission to take over the "San Remo," and possibly to purchase another steamer has been sent to Egypt. To ensure efficiency it has been selected with great care. It is composed of one customs official, one Cuban alleged to be an engineer, and one ex-instructor in gymnastics in the Turkish navy.

Ever since his accession to the throne, King Hussein has occasionally applied the Koranic penalty of cutting off the offender's hand (or hand and foot), but it needed his accession to the Caliphate to make him boast of the fact in the press. The "Kibla" contained a brief notice saying that an (unnamed) person had been found guilty of being a "mufsid" (corrupter), and had suffered the penalty prescribed for the "mufsid," viz., the amputation of a hand and the opposite foot. According to the general belief, the facts of this case are these:—

Ati ordered him to supply some incense, free. The man refused, whereupon Ati ordered an African slave woman to accuse the man of attempted rape. Ati then reported the matter to the King, who fell into one of his blind rages and, without even consulting the kadi, ordered the man to be executed. The kadi, with reluctance the King handed the case over to the kadi with instructions to apply a severe penalty. Not daring to disobey, the kadi condemned the accused to have his hand cut off, but the King was not content with this and ordered that he should lose his opposite foot also.

When the "Fragkatan" incident occurred, the Jeddah authorities despatched a Reuter telegram saying what "the Caliph" had done for the rescued pilgrims. Messrs. Gellatly, Hankoy and Co. were most reluctant to send a message which might be taken as an endorsement of the King's action. It has been unnecessary if the King had not forbidden the agents of the British steamship company to assist their passengers, but, having important commercial interests in Jeddah, they were forced to do so. The kadi, however, has been ordered to make a strong stand. This agency telegraphed a warning to His Majesty's representative in Egypt, as it is to Reuter's agent in Cairo that Messrs. Gellatly, Hankoy and Co. are unable to send off any Reuter message which is likely to be in any way displeasing to the King.

It is very difficult for the truth about the Hedjaz to reach the outside world. Pilgrims are reluctant to speak ill of anything in their holy land, and all other possible sources of criticism are closely watched by the King. He supervises all favourable and hostile propaganda. His two papers cannot refuse his articles, however foolish the matter and lamentable the style. On the other hand, no paper can attack him, for there are no other papers. No "Constant Reader," no "Pater Quatuor Fanalium" can write to the "Kibla" "to respectfully submit," and hostile papers, if they are to be published, must be published in the Hedjaz. The King should be free to use Reuter also for propaganda. It is regrettable enough that Reuter is unable to indulge, as in other countries, in reasonable criticism, and that so many messages from the Hedjaz are sent to the world in the form of knowledge but also add to the gaiety of nations.

### TEMPERATURE FOR MARCH

		Maximum.   Minimum.		Temperature at 10 A.M.	
				1917	1916
4	56.0	50.0	7	54	54
6	56.0	46	7.5	52	78-8

R. W. BILLARD

A. P. Knyazev

Year	1900	1901	1902	1903	1904	1905	1906	1907	1908	1909	1910	1911	1912	1913	1914	1915	1916	1917	1918	1919	1920	1921	1922	1923	1924	1925	1926	1927	1928	1929	1930	1931	1932	1933	1934	1935	1936	1937	1938	1939	1940	1941	1942	1943	1944	1945	1946	1947	1948	1949	1950	1951	1952	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	2026	2027	2028	2029	2030	2031	2032	2033	2034	2035	2036	2037	2038	2039	2040	2041	2042	2043	2044	2045	2046	2047	2048	2049	2050	2051	2052	2053	2054	2055	2056	2057	2058	2059	2060	2061	2062	2063	2064	2065	2066	2067	2068	2069	2070	2071	2072	2073	2074	2075	2076	2077	2078	2079	2080	2081	2082	2083	2084	2085	2086	2087	2088	2089	2090	2091	2092	2093	2094	2095	2096	2097	2098	2099
1900	1901	1902	1903	1904	1905	1906	1907	1908	1909	1910	1911	1912	1913	1914	1915	1916	1917	1918	1919	1920	1921	1922	1923	1924	1925	1926	1927	1928	1929	1930	1931	1932	1933	1934	1935	1936	1937	1938	1939	1940	1941	1942	1943	1944	1945	1946	1947	1948	1949	1950	1951	1952	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	2026	2027	2028	2029	2030	2031	2032	2033	2034	2035	2036	2037	2038	2039	2040	2041	2042	2043	2044	2045	2046	2047	2048	2049	2050	2051	2052	2053	2054	2055	2056	2057	2058	2059	2060	2061	2062	2063	2064	2065	2066	2067	2068	2069	2070	2071	2072	2073	2074	2075	2076	2077	2078	2079	2080	2081	2082	2083	2084	2085	2086	2087	2088	2089	2090	2091	2092	2093	2094	2095	2096	2097	2098	2099	

$$\begin{aligned} \text{d) } \mathcal{L}(f) &= \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} f(x) \delta(x) dx = f(0) \\ \text{e) } \mathcal{L}(f) &= \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} f(x) \delta(x-a) dx = f(a) \end{aligned}$$

[E 5067, 1941 91]

No 95.

*Consul Bullard to Mr MacDonald.*—(Received June 11)

(No. 50.)

Jeddah, May 21, 1924

Jeddah, May 21, 1904.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to refer to my despatch No. 27 of the 19th March relating to the slave trade in Arabia.

Without then I suppose, owing to the fact, that nearly all the British Indians in the Hedjaz buy, keep and sell slaves in exactly the same way as do the subjects of King Hussein

3. This humiliating discovery was made accidentally in the course of an enquiry into the conduct of the British Indian who has for many years been employed as dispenser and dresser in the dispensary attached to this agency and consulate. Copies of the report on the subject which I have addressed to the Government of India are being sent to you as a separate despatch. The suspension of this man for the offences of which he has been guilty has excited the indignation of the British Indian community, who seem to have been unaware that holding and dealing in slaves is a crime in the eyes of the law. They are making circuitous enquiries what to do, pleading ignorance of the law, past immunity and the difficulty of getting servants other than slaves, as excuses. I have referred the matter to the Government of India and to the Government of Madras, and am waiting for their orders. I have also referred the matter to the intermediary of this agency before employing him.

appear to be difficult to deal with the offence except outside Hedjaz territory e.g. on the return of the offender to India. For the present I propose to content myself with visiting all the British subjects in Jeddah one by one and taking from each a sworn declaration as to the servants he has and as to their status, whether slave or free, in the hope that this alone will give a severe check to slavery in British Indian household in the Hedjaz.

[illegible]

3. A copy of this despatch is being sent to the Government of India.

I have, &c.

R. W. BULLARD

P 4524 1841 917

No 96

Mr. H. D. C. ...  
...

My Lord,

Foreign Office, June 11, 1924

I TRANSMIT to your Lordship herewith a copy of the correspondence marked in

The first part of the paper is devoted to the study of the asymptotic behavior of the solutions of the system (1) as  $t \rightarrow \infty$ . It is shown that the solutions of the system (1) are bounded and tend to zero as  $t \rightarrow \infty$ . The second part of the paper is devoted to the study of the asymptotic behavior of the solutions of the system (1) as  $t \rightarrow 0$ . It is shown that the solutions of the system (1) are bounded and tend to zero as  $t \rightarrow 0$ .

8. I request that you will inform the French Government accordingly, and in return, as indicated in paragraph 3 of Foreign Office despatch No. 112 to His Majesty's agent and consul at Jednah, to co-operate with His Majesty's Government by sending appropriate instructions to their consular officer on the spot.

\* Nos. 82, 83, 91 and 97.





The "Kiblah" again reports alleged grievances from Bahrain. The people of a place called Tawara were accused of having killed a British official, but the British, in the person of their representative there, wished by exaggerating the case to make the Muslims appear in the worst light. It is impossible for readers of the "Kiblah" to imagine how many innocent people were thrown into chains and without any trial sent to the Bedouin, or how many have run away who would be prepared to return if only they were assured that they would be brought to trial.

The attack on Irak tribes by Bedouin, believed to be Wahabis, has touched King Hussein on his sorest point. Several references to it have been made in the press. He is not free from anxiety about his own realms. There is a large camp visible near Taraba, and the two Russian pilots have been sent out several times to report on it. I understand that the King wanted them to bomb the encampment and that they refused, on the ground that bombing is expressly excluded by their contract. The Foreign Secretary has written to this agency reporting a small attack in the Taraba direction and measures taken by Ibn Saud's representative at Hail with the object of attacking the Hedjaz Railway. It is, perhaps, fear that supplies may get out to the Wahabis which has induced the King to renounce the blockade of the coast.

It is believed that the Italian consul in Jeddah is endeavouring to secure munitions for King Hussein.

An announcement has just appeared that the third meeting of the Arab League, which was postponed last year, will be held during the pilgrimage.

Mr. M. Yasin Khan has been sent out again by the Government of India as Indian Commissioner. He reports that the attractions of a pilgrimage falling on a Friday, and the fact that the pilgrims are now being lanced by anti-Shereefian forces, have induced many to return to their homes from Basra.

It is reported that the British Consul in Jeddah has been ordered to stop the pilgrims from leaving the city for the Hedjaz.

A report from the Hedjaz states that the King has ordered the pilgrims to be lanced by anti-Shereefian forces.

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Hedjaz severely to convey so large a body of pilgrims to Medina and back by the coast route. The fate of the first caravan, which consisted of some 12,000 persons, was related in the report for April. Although the pilgrims were induced by the guides to accept the refund of the tolls paid to the Bedouin, and to refrain from making claims for a refund, the King has now ordered the pilgrims to be lanced by anti-Shereefian forces.

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in previous reports from this agency, was sent to Akaba and Ma'an. He had been in Akaba perhaps two days when he telegraphed that a wharf had been begun, a quarantine station selected, and a hospital established and equipped with everything necessary; and a few days later he was able to announce that similar blessings (minus the wharf) had been conferred on Ma'an. How well one knows these "hospitals," where the only drug in stock is eye-wash, and the qualifications of the doctors are fully equal to their chief task of falsifying the death statistics.

The purchase of steamers by King Hussein hangs fire. The boasted "San Remo" turned out to be so rotten that the sale fell through, though not, it is believed, without considerable loss to the King. However, I understand that one steamer has at last been secured, and that the King is coming down to Jeddah to see it when it arrives a few days hence. It is certain that the King hopes to send at least one ship-load of Persian and Irak pilgrims back to Basra in his own steamer this year. Basra is selected for this honour because it is the only port outside the Hejaz where the King can hope to escape responsibility for the violations of the Paris Convention which he will doubtless commit. His Majesty's High Commissioner at Bagdad has been warned of this, as a difficult situation might arise. What is to happen if a boatload of Irakis complain, on arrival at Basra, that His Hashimite Majesty has overcrowded them dangerously, failed to provide them with a hospital or doctor, and kept them short of water? Will King Faisal act the part of a Roman son and fine the captain? Of course, the King's steamers may be models of perfection, and may serve to lower the passage rates and to raise the standard of all the other lines. On the other hand, they may be like everything else that King Hussein touches.

Among the pilgrims this year is the famous Omani Dignia. The King is paying her much attention, perhaps because he hopes for recognition as Caliph, which should be the easier to obtain in that Omani Dignia is in his debt, or perhaps because of a common interest in the institution of slavery.

A humiliating discovery has just been made. Most of the British Indians in the Hudson bay, keep and sell slaves as freely as the Hudsons do. Before more are considered, an attempt will be made, by strict enquiry, to disabuse them of the belief that the English laws relating to the slave trade cannot follow them into a foreign country.

which have all been patrolling the slave routes called at Jeddah on the 20th May. The arrival of so many ships at once caused a slight commotion in Jeddah. The local authorities would have been warned beforehand but for the well founded fear that the King was about to make a sudden reappearance. The press as a call to pay respects

where a recruit has been beaten to death by the police for unwillingness to join the Ekehimite army. Many of these men are probably Nigerians by birth, but they rarely have any papers, and it is difficult to disprove the claim that they are fledgians. In one case where it is known that the man came from Nigeria some fifteen years ago, the fledgian authorities are being asked to release him.

To those who have seen Dr. Naji Al Aul in London it will have been evident that on his first arrival there he disposed of considerable funds. Information here shows that at first he used to draw his money, though irregularly, in thousands of pounds. Lately the stream has flowed more slowly. The last payment, some two months ago, was £500. A few days ago Messrs. Gellatly, Hankey and Co., in Jeddah, were informed by their principals in London that they had paid Dr Naji £500—would they please recover this amount from the Hejaz Government. To the request for payment of the 500, the London office of Messrs. Hankey and Co. has replied that Dr Naji's tenancy of what he describes as his "second home" (the Hyde Park Hotel) must be getting precarious. The jaws of Bloomsbury gape for him.

## TEMPERATURE for April

—	Max. mom.	Min. temp.	Temperature at 10 a.m.	
			Dry.	Wet.
Average	91	72.7	87.9	84.1
Extreme	100	54	99	87

R. W. BULLARD,  
Agent and Consul

## APPENDIX

### Shipping Intelligence.

[illegible]

The Italian surveying ship "Incorregibile Magnifico" arrived on May 14 and left on May 15. It was accompanied by two destroyers called at Jeddah on May 20 and left the same day.

## CHAPTER III.—PALESTINE

E 1376 1376 65]

No. 99

Colonial Office to Foreign Office. (Received February 13.)

Sir, Downing Street, February 12 . . .  
I AM directed by Mr Secretary Thomas to refer to your letter of the 21st December, 1923, transmitting a copy of a despatch from His Majesty's representative at the Holy See regarding the rumour that the See of Turin might be . . . the Latin Patriarch at Jerusalem, and to transmit herewith, to be . . . Mr Secretary MacDonald, a copy of a confidential despatch (with cc. . . High Commissioner for Palestine regarding the . . . and the majority of the Latin community of Bethle . . .

2. I am to suggest, for Mr. MacDonald's consideration, the desirability of communicating the information contained therein to Sir Odo Russell

I am, &amp;c.

J. E. SIBCKHURGH

Enclosure 1 in No. 99.

Sir H. Samuel to the Duke of Devonshire.

My Lord Duke,

Jerusalem, January 18, 1924

I HAVE the honour to refer to paragraph 7 of the report by the District Governor of Jerusalem, dated the 2nd January, 1924 which formed appendix (A) to my political report for the month of December 1923.

2. I transmit herewith, for your Grace's information, a further report from the District Governor of Jerusalem on the subject of the dispute between the majority of the Latin community of Bethlehem and the Latin Patriarch

I have, &amp;c.

BERBERT SAMUEL,

High Commissioner

Enclosure 2 in No. 99

Report from the District Governor of Jerusalem.

Chief Secretary,

WITH reference to your note of the 11th January, the dispute between the majority of the Latin population of Bethlehem and the Latin Patriarch arises from a manifestation of that rivalry between the Latin Patriarchate and the Custodia, which has become so exacerbated under the Patriarchate of Mgr Barlasana. As you are aware, the Roman Catholic parish of Bethlehem is under the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the Custodia, while the Roman Catholic parish of Beit Jala is under the jurisdiction

extend the limits of the parish of Beit Jala at the expense of that of Bethlehem. These efforts on his part have been facilitated by the fact that the recent expansion of Bethlehem has been, for the most part, in the direction of Beit Jala and on Beit Jala lands, where many substantial houses have recently been built by Bethlehem . . . have acquired wealth in North or South America. The endeavour of the . . . cause these new quarters of Bethlehem to be included within the parish of . . . has greatly perturbed and excited the people of Bethlehem, not only on account of the local jealousy which exists between them and the people of Beit Jala, but also because . . . forbears in the cemetery of Bethlehem, but in the cemetery of Beit Jala. I understand that, quite recently, the Patriarch has waived this point in view of the angry . . . of the people of Bethlehem.

E 1354 1354 65]

No. 98A

Marchese della Torretta to Mr. Oliphant.—(Received February 12.)

(Translation.)

Dear Mr Oliphant,

Italian Embassy, February 8, 1924

to the Italian Government

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 21st December, 1923, regarding the . . .

reopened, I have transcribed the observations made . . . greater clearness to the precise paragraphs of . . .

1. There is no objection to the omission of the word "draft" before the word "mandate" in articles 2, 4 and 5 of the memorandum.

2. There is no objection to the modification of article 9 in the sense proposed

The first alteration suggested ("would" instead of "will") in paragraph 7 appears to have already been made in the text of the memorandum transmitted to this E . . . and alteration (to substitute for the words "their terms" the words . . . conditions of their grant") is . . . red acceptable.

3. The Foreign Office propose a new wording for the first sentence of paragraph 8 and the suppression of the second sentence. The text of paragraph 8 as thus drawn up would only be an exposition of fact, so evident that its enunciation appears superfluous. Moreover, as the Italian Government cannot in any way doubt that the British administration in Palestine will be inspired with these principles, they consider it preferable to omit article 8 entirely.

matter, consider it of a . . . Foreign Office, and the transmission . . . respecting Irak, which is . . . which is foreshadowed in the letter to which I am replying.

I have, &amp;c.

TORRETTA



I enclose, for your information, in case further details may be required, an extract from a report by Abdalla Effendi Kardus, then district officer, Bethlehem, of the incident which occurred on the occasion of the Latin Patriarch's visit to Bethlehem on 27th May 1923.

I may mention that the question of defining the civil boundaries between the two municipalities is now under consideration in this office. This question is, however, entirely distinct from the ecclesiastical one which has agitated the Latin population.

(For District Governor, Jerusalem  
Jaffa District),  
H. C. J. K.

The Governorate, Jerusalem  
January 17, 1924.

Enclosure 3 in No. 99

*Extract from Report by District Officer, Bethlehem.*

ON the 27th May, 1923, his Beatitude the Latin Patriarch came to Bethlehem for the confirmation of the Latin children, and after the celebrations were over he proceeded to the Casa Nova and had breakfast with the French consul.

Immediately after the ceremony a good number of notables and elders of the Latin community assembled in the yard of the church and decided to ask his Beatitude for an interview to express to him their grievances over his recent decision of attaching the strip of land lying between the Jerusalem-Habron road and Wad Jaryus of Beit Jala to the latter instead of Bethlehem as hitherto, and requested the priest in charge of the Casa Nova to arrange for this interview. The priest bowed his head in acceptance, and requested the crowd to wait in the room adjoining the Patriarch's, and immediately communicated their request to his Beatitude, who, very roughly answered him that he did not want to receive anybody—that his car was ready—and that he meant to leave soon. The priest, dissatisfied with this reply, warned Don George the attendant of the Patriarch, of the evil results of such a refusal; but the latter paid no attention to his words, and mentioned nothing to the Patriarch.

The deputation who was delegated to see the Patriarch was greatly disappointed at what he was getting ready to leave for Jerusalem before giving them an answer of "Yes" or "No." Their disappointment immediately turned into anger, and soon grew into an open excitement in consequence of this treatment, which they considered as a great insult to the whole community of Bethlehem. The Patriarch cold-bloodedly descended the steps of the Casa Nova, passed the deputation without mentioning a word, left the convent and made for his car which was standing by.

Tewfik Jacir then followed the Patriarch to his car and addressed him, saying: "Beatitude, the inhabitants of Bethlehem are all dissatisfied with your insistence on including the quarter which lies west of the Jerusalem-Habron road, opposite Beit Jala, in the parish of the latter, and their dissatisfaction has grown into bitter disgust with your treatment now."

On the conclusion of this short and sharp address, Yussuf Yacubul-Dabish drew himself up in the midst of the crowd and shouted out: "Down with the Patriarch! Down with the autocrat!" These words were repeated after him by a good number of the crowd.

As soon as the details of the incident reached the rest of the Latin community they decided to boycott the person of the Patriarch, and in the afternoon of the same day they held a representative meeting in the house of Jacir, and passed a resolution of sending two telegrams:—

1. To the Patriarch:—Protesting against his insult to the community, and requesting him to detach from Bethlehem the above quarter, urging him to remedy the situation before it grows worse, and warning him of their intention of boycotting his person should he fail to satisfy their wishes.
2. To the Pope:—Informing him of the situation and requesting him for a reply to their petition, which was submitted some weeks ago.

On the very same day of the incident James Yacub, a Latin of Bethlehem, sent a wire to the Patriarch apologising for the incident, which he said was done by persons representing themselves only, and asked his benediction. The Patriarch wired him

back, thanking him for his devotion, and asking the Almighty to bless him and his family.

On the 28th May, 1923, the Patriarch sent two of his men to Jacir's house with the intention of clearing up the misunderstanding. They boldly said that the Patriarch had no knowledge of their request for an interview, and begged for delaying the despatch of the Pope's telegram until after they have had a meeting with the Patriarch. The community consented to the request of the two priests not to discuss the question any further with the Patriarch, but to make him understand that they did represent the Latin community.

On the 29th May, 1923, a meeting of practically all the Catholics of Bethlehem was held in the room of the Bethlehem Club and finally decided to delegate few persons for fixing the interview. The delegation proceeded to Jerusalem immediately after the meeting above referred to, and arranged for an interview on the 3rd at 9 A.M.

On the 30th May some thirty persons from the different quarters and hamulehs of Bethlehem proceeded to Jerusalem and met the Patriarch. The meeting lasted about two hours, during which a very hot discussion took place, and bitter words exchanged. The Patriarch finally said that he was awaiting instructions from Rome. The question had to be decided on by Rome. The delegation explained that the separation of the quarter in dispute would mean the checking of their social, civil and religious life.

Soon after this meeting they cabled to Rome the following:-

"Impatiently awaiting your Holiness's reply to our petition. Beg you to be good enough to inform the community of the result of the discussion with his Beatitude."

In the afternoon of the same day a meeting of all the leading notables was held, and a petition to His Holiness the Pope prepared. It contained a continuation of their previous petition, and also stated that they were ready to accept any decision of the Holy See. They also assured His Holiness that they will on no account come under Beit Jala, especially that there is not a single Latin in the disputed area from Beit Jala.

The Latin community has decided in its last meeting to send a delegation to Rome should the circumstances make such a step expedient.

A. KARDUS, District Officer  
Bethlehem, June 12, 1923. Bethlehem Sub-Office

E 1717 541 65]

No. 100.

Colonial Office to Foreign Office.—(Received February 25.)

Sir,  
I AM directed by Mr. Secretary Thomas to refer to the letter from this Department of the 18th February, 1924, transmitting a copy of a telegram from the High Commissioner for Palestine on the subject of the proposed resumption of the negotiations for an agreement with the Emir Abdullah of Transjordan, and to forward herewith, to be laid before Mr. Secretary Macdonald, a copy of a despatch which has been received from Sir H. Samuel in this connection.

2. Mr. Secretary Thomas is disposed to concur in the view expressed in the telegram referred to above, that further negotiations should be deferred pending the return of King Hussein to the Hedjaz, and I am directed to Mr. Secretary Macdonald to inform him of this view, and to inform him that Mr. Secretary Thomas proposes to refer the matter to Sir H. Samuel on this matter.

I am, &c.  
J. E. SHUCKBURGH.

Enclosure 1 in No. 100.

Sir H. Samuel to Mr. Thomas.

(Telegraphic.) P. Jerusalem, February 16, 1924

(His refers to my secret despatch of the 8th February)  
I am anxious that Sir Gilbert Clayton should as soon as possible start discussions with the Emir Abdullah in your confidential despatch of the 28th January, 1924, with the Transjordan Government. While King Hussein remains in Transjordan however, I am of the opinion that the Emir Abdullah has taken complete charge of Transjordan affairs and that nothing will be done without his concurrence or contrary to his wishes by Emir and his Government. Were we to enter into discussions in which King took a leading part we should acknowledge a position which he does in fact hold in Transjordan at the present moment, while it could lead to no useful result to ignore him. I propose therefore, unless you desire otherwise, to defer such discussions until return of Hussein to the Hedjaz.

Enclosure 2 in No. 100.

Sir H. Samuel to Mr. Thomas.

(Secret.) Jerusalem, February 8, 1924  
Sir,  
I HAVE the honour, in continuation of my secret despatch of the 25th January, 1924, to attach two memoranda by Sir Gilbert Clayton on the subject of Transjordan.  
2. I concur in the appreciation of the situation as set forth therein and am in full agreement with the conclusions arrived at.

I have, &c.  
HERBERT SAMUEL.

Enclosure 3 in No. 100.

Sir G. Clayton to Sir H. Samuel.

Your Excellency, Jerusalem, February 1, 1924  
I HAVE the honour to submit a general appreciation of the position in Transjordan, and a brief sketch of the facts that have led up to the present situation.  
When the Turkish Empire was broken up, Syria and Arab Military Administration was established at Damascus, was not a territory, but a territory, East, a territory, and a territory. This Administration was established at Aleppo. This Administration was established at Aleppo. This Administration was established at Aleppo.

2. This organization continued in a slightly modified form after the withdrawal of all British forces in Syria to Palestine proper, an event which occurred in December 1919, until the districts of Aleppo and Damascus were occupied by French forces in July 1920 and the Emir Faisal withdrew to Europe.

3. Transjordan was thus left virtually without a Government and, in August 1920, a civil administration was organized which took the form of three separate districts namely, the Ajlun, the Balqa and Karak; each district being administered by an elected council, controlled and advised by a British officer who at the same time represented the High Commissioner.

4. This system was maintained until the Emir Abdullah appeared from the Hedjaz at Maan in November 1920, and subsequently at Amman in March 1921, with the avowed intention of attacking the French in Syria. After some negotiations the Emir was persuaded to forgo his hostile intentions against the French in Syria and it was agreed that he should assume for a probationary period of six months the direction of the administration in Transjordan under the British mandate. The Transjordan Government, which enjoyed considerable powers of local autonomy, was then centralized at Amman and consisted of the Emir assisted by a council of advisers appointed by himself, the district councils being abolished.



justified itself, and that, in spite of many failings, the Transjordan Government, which it was established. From the date of its establishment—which coincides with

G F CRAYTON,  
Chief Secretary

[12045]

any with your Excellency, have had an opportunity of listening to further conversations with King Hussein, and have also been able to gain impressions from their sources.

It now appears to me that the visit of King Hussein to Transjordan may cause a considerable change in the situation in regard to those territories. The King has apparently been extremely reticent as to the reasons of his visit even to his own intimate entourage, but indications are not lacking that one of his main motives is to settle relations between the Hedjaz and Transjordan, which have already been begun.

As a result of the discussions at Amman,

that, with this end in view, King Hussein has arranged

Amman with a view to

introducing him unobtrusively

Abdullah whom he could well take with

fill the appointment of commander-in-chief of the Hedjaz army.

King Hussein has made it his business to enquire very closely into the manner in which the administration in Transjordan has been conducted, both administrative and financial, and I am informed that he is not entirely satisfied with the Emir Abdullah's conduct of affairs, more especially on the financial side, where he has undoubtedly been guilty of considerable extravagance.

6. The Emir Ali is, I am told, less sophisticated than any of his brothers, having

university habits who might conduct the administration on economical lines. But

Emir Ali is his eldest son, who would in normal circumstances succeed to the Throne of the Hedjaz at his father's death, and if he were also at that moment the Emir of Transjordan, he would be a natural successor.

4. These impressions may of course be based on false premises, but they coincide with those of British officers in Amman who are in a position to appreciate the trend of events, notably Mr. Philby and Lieutenant-Colonel Proke, and I consider that their accuracy is sufficiently probable to render it advisable that they should be conveyed to His Majesty's Government.

If King Hussein's intentions are in the direction indicated, they will doubtless be carried out gradually and without any definite announcements or sudden changes, and the result will be that His Majesty's Government will be confronted with a fait accompli and Transjordan will be connected to the Hedjaz by a link which it will be difficult to sever.

5. If I am correct in gauging the trend of King Hussein's policy and he really intends to pursue it, it is not easy to see how arguments, other than force, can be found to combat it. If any objection is raised by His Majesty's Government, he will immediately ask whether, in addition to excluding Palestine and Syria from the pledge given to the Arabs in the early days of the war, His Majesty's Government also intend to rob them of Transjordan, which has already been admitted as definitely theirs.

the promises made in the Mudharabah correspondence. It may be urged that he could be informed that in such circumstances His Majesty's Government could no longer consider the grant of any financial assistance to Transjordan, but this is not a strong argument in view of the fact that it has already been proposed by the Colonial Office to

small proportions, the balance being found by the release of Transjordan money which has hitherto been held on deposit for the payment of arrears of the contribution of the Ottoman Public Debt, moreover, it is not unlikely that King Hussein would retort that he is perfectly prepared to do without any grant-in-aid from Great Britain and is willing to make good any deficit in Transjordan revenues out of his own private

which took place on the subject of the Hedjaz Railway are also instructive in the above connection. Your Excellency will remember that King Hussein stated that the railway would very shortly be operating between Medina and Amman and put forward a proposal to the effect that the section between Medina and Amman, which includes both the Hedjaz and Transjordan sections, should be amalgamated and operated under one direction, the inclusion of the Syrian and Palestine sections of the line being left for subsequent arrangement. He stated that he was prepared to admit that the actual management of this section should be entrusted to Colonel Holmes, general manager of the Palestine railways, but he spoke of the establishment in Medina of a Muslim board of control to direct the policy of the line, under whose supervision

would fall the Palestine and Syrian sections as soon as the unification of the whole Hedjaz Railway was complete. King Hussein also guaranteed to make good any deficit which might result on the running of the Medina-Neub section during the next year or two.

8. King Hussein's proposal is similar

Secretary of State's confidential despatch of the 18th October, 1923, with the view of amalgamating the Hedjaz and Transjordan sections, leaving the inclusion of the Syrian and Palestine sections for future consideration, whereas King Hussein suggests that the Hedjaz and Transjordan sections should first be amalgamated under Muslim control and that the other two should be included

Another significant fact is that the administration of Ma'an district up to the line from a point between Anazai and Jurafai-Darfawish station westward to a point between Khawara and Ma'an. If way between Dhana and Shubah, and thence down the Shabab valley to the Arabs in the neighbourhood of Khirbat Ferman, is already in fact controlled by King Hussein, and the administrative officers in that area have been appointed from Mecca. (Vide your secret despatch of the 18th January, 1924 forwarding the report for December 1923 by the chief British representative.)

10. It appears possible that the tendency to become more and more pronounced is to be resisted.

11. If the latter policy is adopted it will be necessary to take immediate action and explain quite clearly to King Hussein the views of His Majesty's Government in the matter, but it must be remembered that such a course may entail a definite break with King Hussein, followed by bitter complaints addressed to the whole Muslim world.

12. On the other hand, if the tendency to which I have referred is merely controlled and not obstructed, it is possible that Hedjaz influence may be at least in a measure favourable to the policy of His Majesty's Government in Palestine. King Hussein has already shown himself disposed to refrain from intervention in Palestinian politics, and, were the Emir Ali to serve a term as Emir in Transjordan, he might be drawn into an attitude of mind towards Palestine which would prove useful should he eventually succeed to the Throne of the Hedjaz. In this connection, however, must be considered the existence of the British mandate over Transjordan, the fact that the Emir Abdullah was mentioned personally in the conditional declaration of the independence of Transjordan made by His Majesty's Government, the safety of the Transjordan desert route to the Red Sea and the advantage of promoting close political and economic connection between

Transjordan can be made effective without the exercise of strong pressure which may even amount to force.

12. On the other hand, if the tendency to which I have referred is merely controlled and not obstructed, it is possible that Hedjaz influence may be at least in a measure favourable to the policy of His Majesty's Government in Palestine. King Hussein has already shown himself disposed to refrain from intervention in Palestinian politics, and, were the Emir Ali to serve a term as Emir in Transjordan, he might be drawn into an attitude of mind towards Palestine which would prove useful should he eventually succeed to the Throne of the Hedjaz. In this connection, however, must be considered the existence of the British mandate over Transjordan, the fact that the Emir Abdullah was mentioned personally in the conditional declaration of the independence of Transjordan made by His Majesty's Government, the safety of the Transjordan desert route to the Red Sea and the advantage of promoting close political and economic connection between

It is quite impossible that all these questions might be suitably settled and adequate safeguards provided under arrangements which would at the same time show clearly that Great Britain is prepared to abide by her declarations to the Arabs in connection with Transjordan. It is difficult to see how political and administrative connection between Transjordan and Palestine can be strengthened at present with due regard to the promises made to the Arabs, but there is every reason to expect that the pressure of economic and commercial influences is bound to work more and more towards that connection as time passes and the need of the hinterland territories for an outlet to the sea becomes increasingly insistent.

G. P. CLAYTON,

Chief Secretary.

Enclosure 6 in No. 100.

Draft Cypher Telegram.

YOUR telegram of the 16th February

Proposed to defer resumption of negotiations till return of Hussein to Hedjaz is approved.

[13015]



[E 1728/71 85]

No. 101

Sir O. Russell to Mr. MacDonald — (Received February 26)

(N 22. Confidential)

British Legation to the Holy See, Rome  
February 19, 1924

I HAVE the honour to report the following items of information respecting Palestine —

Cardinal Bourne left Rome yesterday, and will meet the British pilgrims on the 20th February at Marseilles. At his audience with the Pope His Holiness told that he was receiving so many and such conflicting accounts of the situation that he wished him to report fully on his return journey to Rome. There were three other bishops from England and Scotland accompanying the pilgrimage, and his Eminence should draw up a memorandum in conjunction with them, embodying their various views. Cardinal Gasparri gave his Eminence, I understand, a memorandum of points which were to be looked into.

An Italian pilgrimage to the Holy Land is announced for April. It will be arranged under the patronage of the Italian Government, and will be the president of which is Mgr. di Sangro, Grand Chancellor of the Constantinian Order of St. George.

A central council has been formed for Italy for the preservation of the faith in Palestine, of which Mgr. di Sangro is president. This organisation was approved by Pope Pius XV. and entrusted with the religious work of the Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem, to preserve and extend the Catholic Christian character of the Holy Land. The committee recently sent a message of homage to the Pope, and Cardinal Gasparri replied with an encouraging message.

This council has been given some prominence recently in the press, and newspapers such as the "Illustrated London News" have not been slow to notice the occasion to denounce in their usual hostile tone the "propaganda carried on by Protestant bodies, and especially the American Young Men's Christian Association, in Palestine under Zionist influences," and hinting that it is done with British connivance.

The Council of the Holy Land is expected to be convened by Rome and will intend to lay a formal complaint before the Italian Government about the recent wounding of Latins by the Copts.

No date is yet fixed, even approximately, for Cardinal Giorgi's mission, which formed the subject of this Legation's despatch No. 122 of the 20th September last.

Father Godric Keane is apparently filling a position outside and independent of the Patriarchate, and a Benedictine from Eddington is, I understand, acting as secretary for Mgr. Barlasana.

I am told that the consensus of opinion among pilgrims arriving from Palestine is that the present indefinite position as regards the commission on the Holy Places should be ended. This feeling is strengthened by the fact that no Christian can enter the Church of the Holy Sepulchre at Jerusalem without paying a fee, and having to pay its price. It is also maintained that incidents such as the recent attack by the Copts would be avoided were the commission to meet and to decide as to the legitimate rights and customs.

The "Illustrated London News" publishes a telegram from Jerusalem giving an account of the visit of Cardinal O'Connell, and of his reception by the Patriarch of Jerusalem. It reports that a luncheon in honour of his Eminence was given by the Patriarch at the Hotel de Ville, and that in the afternoon a reception was given by the Government authorities, foreign consuls, and the Patriarch of Jerusalem. The Anglican Bishop and the Mahomedan Synod, I understand, accompanied by Mgr. Barlasana, returned the visit of His Majesty's High Commissioner on the 15th instant.

I have, &c.  
ODO RUSSELL.

E 2161 292 44]

No. 102

Sir O. Russell to Mr. MacDonald — (Received March 10.)

British Legation to the Holy See, Rome,  
March 6, 1924

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your telegram No. 3 of the 1st March, in which you state in order to make withdrawal of liturgical honours as I could, and in acting who is genuinely anxious what timorous of hereby subjected the demonstration. I am sorry that I cannot state with me just now. But delay duration, as the Vatican, supported openly by His Majesty's Government, have every the scenes by the Italian and Spanish Governments, have every once and for all the custom of granting liturgical honours in Palestine representative.

I have the honour to transmit copy of a note which I addressed to Cardinal Gasparri directly after our conversation, with the object of confirming the views of His Majesty's Government and of expediting the final settlement.

ODO RUSSELL

Enclosure in No. 102

Sir O. Russell to Cardinal Gasparri.

British Legation to the Holy See, Rome,  
March 2, 1924

My Lord Cardinal,

I LOSE no time in referring to my Government the contents of the note which your Eminence addressed to me on the 14th instant respecting the grant of liturgical honours to the French representatives in Palestine.

2 Your Eminence alluded to a recent statement made by the French Ambassador to the Holy See to the effect that a gentleman was in England between the British and French Governments, that the French Government had addressed a note on the subject to His Majesty's Government and were awaiting their reply. Your Eminence enquired as to the exact nature of these negotiations and as to the present position.

3 On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform your Eminence that the communication to which M. Doucet refers was presumably the note addressed by M. Doucet to Lord Houghton on 16th March 1922. This note dealt with the entire question of the French claim to the protectorate of Catholics in the East, and no reply has hitherto been sent as His Majesty's Government have been awaiting the final re-establishment of peace. His Majesty's Government cannot, however, for one moment accept the statement of the French Ambassador that the question of liturgical honours in Palestine is still under negotiation between the two Governments.

4 The French protectorate of Catholics in Palestine, of which liturgical honours are but the accessory, lapsed not only on account of the admitted fact that the French Government renounced it at San Remo, but also on account of the entry into force of the British mandate. This being so, His Majesty's Government are at a loss to understand how the French Government can reasonably expect these honours to continue. It can scarcely be denied that the reason which prompted His Majesty's Government for their abandonment was that they had a political significance in addition to their religious character, and to the Eastern mind implied a privileged position.

5 His Majesty's Government are, indeed, aware that the honours were granted by the Holy See as the reward for services rendered by France, but that does not alter the fact that, notwithstanding their religious character, they were granted as accessory to the protectorate and in order to keep up the prestige of the protecting Power in the eyes of the Eastern population.

6. Once the protectorate lapsed, the liturgical honours, or any similar privileges, which the Holy See's Government do not and cannot recede in any way from the right to your Eminence by this Legation, and more recently explained to your Eminence by Cardinal Bourne. They feel that good faith is involved in France to her solemn undertaking, and in making a final settlement which is demanded. They attach, as I had the honour to express on your Eminence in conversation yesterday morning, the highest importance to the early discontinuance of the liturgical honours hitherto paid to the French representative. 7. In the hope, therefore, that your Eminence will shortly empower me to inform my Government that this question has been finally settled, I avail, &c.

ODO RUSSELL.

E 2174 71 657

No. 103

Sir Odo Russell to Mr MacDonald - (Received March 10)

No. 31.)  
Sir

British Legation to the Holy See, Rome,  
March 7, 1924.

I HAVE the honour to report that Cardinal O'Connell arrived in Rome a few days ago on his return from Palestine. His Eminence was deeply impressed with his pilgrimage, and rejoiced that, as one result of it, Catholics in the Holy Land were taking now and real interest in the Holy Land; he had gone there as a pilgrim and for no other purpose and had discussed no political matters of any kind.

As was perhaps inevitable, the occasion of the cardinal's visit to Rome to indulge in their periodical outbursts of criticism of British policy and to decry Zionism. Their indignation has been perhaps the greater in that they have been shown to the cardinal by His Majesty's Government for criticism. They have therefore had to content themselves with asserting that Cardinal O'Connell has submitted to the Pope a harrowing report of injustices perpetrated against Christians and Catholics under the British Government, that the Pope had expressed great concern and that the cardinal was returning to Jerusalem at once.

To these and similar wild statements and speculations his Eminence has replied by issuing an announcement through the Stefani Agency, copy of which I have the honour to enclose herewith.

It has been able to judge from conversations with different persons away with good impressions, on the whole. The only criticism has been repeated by each one in turn, that there could only be obtained through the good offices of a Turkish agent, article 14 of the mandate. His Majesty's Government could tolerate this. I had the honour to predict, in my despatch No. 22 of the 19th ultimo, that criticism was likely to be raised on this point, and it is possible that it may find an echo in the Catholic press in the United States.

Cardinal O'Connell leaves Rome direct for the United States on the 10th March.

I have the honour to be,  
Sir,  
Your obedient servant,  
ODO RUSSELL.

Enclosure in No. 103

Extract from the "Itali" of March 4, 1924.

#### DECLARATIONS DU CARDINAL O'CONNELL SUR SON RÉCENT VOYAGE EN TERRE SAINTE

LE Cardinal O'Connell, Archevêque de Boston, a fait les déclarations suivantes à l'Agence Stefani :

"C'était mon très vif désir de pouvoir visiter, quand mes occupations me le permettraient, la Terre-Sainte. J'ai pu réaliser ce désir en janvier dernier. Le

but de mon voyage a été exclusivement spirituel. J'ai voulu être un simple pèlerin, uniquement soucieux du bien de mon âme. J'ai réussi entièrement dans mon dessein et mon séjour de cinq jours en Palestine peut se résumer ainsi. J'ai visité les lieux principaux, j'ai célébré la messe à Nazareth, à Bethléem et au Calvaire et j'ai prié dans le jardin de Gethsémani. Les autorités ecclésiastiques et civiles ont eu envers moi les plus grandes politesses, entre autres, interprétant mon désir, celle d'éviter tout ce qui aurait pu me détourner du but que je m'étais fixé pour mon pèlerinage. Même les orthodoxes et les protestants ont été à mon égard d'une courtoisie si affectueuse que je suis tenté de les considérer comme un signe de la Providence pour l'union si ardemment souhaitée des chrétiens en une seule communion. Jérusalem signifie ville de la paix. Aucun lieu n'est donc plus propre pour prier, comme je l'ai fait pour la paix du monde, qui n'est pas encore

Le Saint-Père, en me recevant avec son habituelle bienveillance à mon retour de Terre-Sainte a voulu donner le dernier adieu à ce qu'a été mon pèlerinage, car en Palestine je me suis agenouillé aux endroits qu'a foulés Notre Seigneur, et à Rome je me suis prosterné devant celui qui le représente sur la terre.

Le Saint-Père a daigné s'intéresser à mon voyage et m'a demandé de lui raconter tout ce que j'avais vu et fait. Mais ce qui m'a rempli de joie, c'a été de constater la profonde satisfaction du Pape envers les Américains pour les secours donnés en faveur de ceux qui souffrent en Europe et dans le Proche-Orient.

Le cardinal, après avoir exprimé ses sentiments envers l'Italie et Rome, où il a vécu trente ans et à laquelle il tient les plus chers souvenirs de sa vie sacerdotale, a déclaré qu'en arrivant en Italie il avait eu l'impression de se trouver dans une nation transformée. "A Naples," a-t-il dit, "j'ai été frappé de l'ordre, de la discipline et du calme laborieux qu'on remarque à première vue en entrant dans le port, qui, par son ordre et sa discipline, est certainement le meilleur de tous les ports que j'ai touchés pendant mon voyage. J'ai rencontré le même esprit de discipline, de volonté et d'ardeur pendant mon trajet en automobile de Naples à Rome. En Amérique," a conclu le cardinal, "le Gouvernement de M. Mussolini est très estimé et honoré parce qu'on reconnaît en lui l'homme qui a sauvé, non seulement l'Italie et l'Europe, mais encore

E 2378 71 661

No. 104

Sir Odo Russell to Mr MacDonald - (Received March 17.)

(No. 32.)  
Sir,

British Legation to the Holy See, Rome,  
March 10, 1924.

IN continuation of my despatch No. 31 of the 7th instant I have the honour to report that, in the course of conversation two days ago, Cardinal O'Connell again mentioned whilst engaged, a short time previously, in translating a book on the Passion by Cardinal de Lai. His Eminence laughed at the reports which had appeared in some papers, more particularly in the "Piccolo" and the "Giornale d'Italia," trying to make out a connection between his visit to Palestine and the visit which Cardinal Bourne is now making there. His Eminence referred to an article which the "Messaggero" had published that morning, and which I expect he inspired, denying that there was any sort of connection; and pointing out that Cardinal Bourne's journey had been arranged some time ahead.

After making this denial the article adds: "The visits which members of the Sacred College pay to so important a spot for the Catholic religion as Jerusalem and the Holy Land, are due to the highest authorities of the Holy See and to the official or Government officials sent there for purposes of inspection. They are exercises of duty, and are not to be confused with the visits of private individuals, who, as Catholics, have a right to visit the Holy Land. It is also true that they render an important service, as through them not only the Holy See but Catholics in different countries can keep themselves informed as to the conditions in a land dear to Christian sentiment, and thus form currents of opinion which Governments must take into account."



One of the Cardinal's secretaries a few days ago stated that when Lord Allenby occupied Palestine, admission to the Holy Sepulchre was, he had understood, controlled by the British authorities, and that it was only two or three months later that unfortunately, the key was restored to the Turkish guardians.

I have, &c.

ODO RUSSELL

[E 3109 202 44]

No. 105

Sir O. Russell to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received April 7.)

British Legation to the Holy See, Rome,

April 3, 1924

Sir,  
I have the honour to acknowledge your despatch No. 35 of the 15th March respecting the French liturgical honours in Palestine. I have the honour to report that I learn from Cardinal Bourne that Cardinal Dubou, who has just arrived in Rome, is organising a special service for the British pilgrims, and had persuaded him more fully than ever that the liturgical honours had become an impossible anachronism. His Eminence said that he spoke his mind freely to the Ambassador, who had retired somewhat crestfallen, and could advance no other reply than that he knew already the French consul was lacking in tact.

Cardinal Bourne tells me that M. Laclée, the French Ambassador, has called on him and endeavoured to argue in favour of the retention of French privileges. His Eminence said that the appeal fell on deaf ears, as, while he was in Palestine, he had been most unfavourably impressed with the attitude adopted by the French consul, who had thrust himself into the foreground whenever there was a question of holding a special service for the British pilgrims, and had persuaded him more fully than ever that the liturgical honours had become an impossible anachronism. His Eminence said that he spoke his mind freely to the Ambassador, who had retired somewhat crestfallen, and could advance no other reply than that he knew already the French consul was lacking in tact.

Cardinal Bourne is leaving for London to-morrow, and will doubtless communicate the foregoing to the Foreign Office direct.

I have, &c.

ODO RUSSELL

[E 3513 202 44]

No. 106

Sir O. Russell to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received April 22.)

No. 50.)

British Legation to the Holy See, Rome,

April 15, 1924

Sir,  
WHEN I saw the Cardinal Secretary of State on Saturday last I reminded him that, as the moment for the Easter ceremonies was approaching, it was of vital importance that the Palestine ecclesiastical authorities should be in possession of clear and definite instructions as to the complete withdrawal of the liturgical honours hitherto paid the French representative. His Eminence assured me that these had already gone forth in spite of the continued protests of the French Ambassador to the Holy See. The French Government and the President of the Republic, bowing to the inevitable, had now more or less abandoned the contest or, rather, transferred their share in it to the French clergy, who were desperately anxious to retain some portion at least of France's privileged position in Palestine. Cardinal Dubou, Archbishop of Paris, he continued, who had just been in Rome, had, to his surprise, been speedily convinced by his arguments of the futility of insisting further on their claim, and had, on the whole, taken a sensible view of the attitude of His Majesty's Government as representing the mandatory power. His whole demeanour was in fact so complacent that, when he begged for permission to send in a written memorandum from Paris on the best means of furnishing some little compensation for the loss of an ancient and time-honoured privilege, he, Cardinal Gasparri, imagined it would be merely a trifling concession to French amour-propre, and not exceed any acceptable limit from the Vatican point of view. When this memorandum did reach his hands, which it did just before I entered the room, he perceived that he had been entirely mistaken in his prediction.

His Eminence then handed me the document, asking me to read it and to give my opinion on the contents. Having done this, I replied that it struck me as an insult to the intelligence of the Holy See to expect them to return with one hand all that they had just taken away with the other, and that, in my opinion, the demand should be met with a stern refusal. The Cardinal while agreeing as to the preposterous nature of the claim, was disposed to think that the French clergy, who were fully cognisant

to get, and had purposely put forward excessive claims. If they were to have a sop at all, he felt that points 2 and 3 of the memorandum herewith enclosed, relating to purely French ceremonies, might possibly be considered. I replied that I could not of course tell him off hand the view of His Majesty's Government, but that I would lose no time in laying the matter before you, and in begging for an expression of your opinion as to whether points 2 and 3 could safely be conceded.

An affirmative reply, showing as it would a desire to grant everything within reason, might be worth while as constituting another British act of conciliation towards the French and be accounted as such at a moment like the present, when conciliation is in the air. It would, moreover, assist the Vatican in their not very easy task of abolishing this ancient privilege, without some small *quid pro quo*. His Majesty's Government may conceivably be willing to regard the matter from that angle, and I therefore venture to submit the suggestion.

I have, &c.

ODO RUSSELL

Enclosure No. 106

*Propositions relatives aux Honneurs liturgiques à rendre au Représentant de la France en Terre-Sainte*

LA fête de l'Épiphanie et la fête de la Pentecôte seront célébrées, la première à la Basilique de Bethléem, la seconde à la Basilique du Saint-Sépulchre, en présence du représentant officiel de la France et de la colonie française (prêtres, religieux et fidèles).

Suivant l'usage, le représentant de la France sera reçu à l'entrée des basiliques, où on lui présentera l'eau bénite.

Une place spéciale au haut de la nef, du côté de l'évangile, lui sera réservée; au moment de l'offertoire il sera encensé à part et le diacre lui portera le baiser de paix.

Il reste entendu que le représentant de la France aura droit aux mêmes honneurs, à toutes les messes solennelles, dans les églises ou chapelles des établissements français, sur toute l'étendue de la Terre-Sainte.

3. Si un prélat ou un pèlerinage français se rend aux Lieux Saints, il y sera reçu par le représentant de la France, qui, au cours des cérémonies solennelles, jouira des mêmes honneurs liturgiques que ci-dessus.

4. Si le représentant de l'Angleterre aux Lieux Saints n'est pas catholique, il appartiendra au représentant de la France de tenir la première place dans les cérémonies liturgiques.

[E 3514 61 65]

No. 107

Sir O. Russell to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received April 22.)

No. 50.)

British Legation to the Holy See, Rome,

April 16, 1924

Sir,  
WITH reference to my despatch No. 22 of the 14th February, I have the honour to report that Cardinal Giorgi's visit to Palestine, though not yet officially announced, is likely to take place about the 21st May. His Eminence, who is to consecrate the new church on Mount Tabor, will I understand be accompanied by Father Golubovich, of the Franciscan Order, to whom I refer in my despatch No. 122 of the 20th September, 1923, from this Legation.

When that despatch was written it seemed likely that Father Golubovich might indulge in political propaganda if included in Cardinal Giorgi's mission, but I have since been making confidential enquiries, and am now satisfied that this will not be the case. Father Golubovich has been made to realise that no good will come from any propaganda against the British mandate, and that it is rather to the interest of the Franciscan Order to maintain good relations with the authorities.

[12045]

9

I have the

OHIO RUSSELL.

No. 108

United States Embassy, London.

April 10, 1954

in this connection to give the substance of a telegram which the Department at Washington has just received from the consul as follows:—

With reference to the consul's statement that on questions concerning American claims to the Capitulations the British judge is always overruled by two native judges, dated the 29th December, 1921, to the Embassy, from which it was understood that, even after the Palestine convention went into effect, foreign nationals, including citizens of the United States, should have the right to be tried by a court with a majority of British judges, except in trivial cases.

I beg also to refer to the Embassy's note of the 20th October, 1923, and the reply of the Foreign Office, dated the 29th November, 1923, concerning the difficulties of the situation. In essence, the reply suggested that the best method of regularising the present position would seem to be by the immediate conclusion of the convention for the reorganisation of the judicial system. In regard to the suggestion I am authorised to state that my Government expects to enter into negotiations in regard to that question as soon as it is possible. In the meantime, however, the Government's conclusion and ratification of such an agreement, measures will be taken to avoid raising an issue by the insistence of the local Palestine courts to exercise jurisdiction over American citizens. I therefore beg that such steps may be taken as will satisfy the wishes of my Government.

I have, for

FRANK B. KELLOGG

No 109.

*British Legation to the Holy See,  
Rome, April 20, 1924.*

No. 60.]

25

His Eminence told me that the Italian Government had offered to place a man-of-war at his disposal for the voyage, but that he had declined the offer on the

Until his arrival in Palestine, his Eminence will travel in a private capacity, but on the return journey he expects to visit some religious orders—and especially the Franciscans, of whom he is the protector—in Egypt.

The cardinal's mission will consist of six persons in all. I.e. Mgr. Pecorari, who will represent the Cardinal; a secretary, a servant, a Franciscan monk, and a member of the Franciscan Order; a "gentiluomo," a secretary and a servant. Mgr. Pecorari has promised to let me have details as to dates and the itinerary, and has asked whether customs facilities, etc., can be provided. I told him that I anticipated no difficulty on that score and that I felt sure that every possible courtesy would be shown his Eminence.

I have, x

CLL BORMER

No. 110

Mr Kellogg to Mr MacDonald.—(Received May 6.)

United States Embassy

London, 4 April 30. 1824

Sur.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of the communication of His Majesty's Government of the 20th November 1923 proposing the conclusion of the convention with respect to the British mandate in Palestine, which was the subject of communication from the Embassy to the Foreign Office of the 14th July 1922 and of a communication addressed by Lord Curzon to my predecessor under date of the 2nd October 1922. There was also received under date of the 29th November, 1923, a second communication from the Foreign Office which adverted to certain difficulties resulting from the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction by the American Consular Court and suggested that the early conclusion of a convention for the recognition of the British mandate over Palestine would provide the most satisfactory solution of the difficulties in question.

I order instructions I take pleasure in informing you that my Government concurs in the desirability of an early conclusion of the convention with respect to Palestine and has authorised me to submit to you, for your confidential information, a copy of the convention recently signed with the Government of France relating to the mandate for Syria and the Lebanon, and also to communicate to you copies of certain correspondence exchanged with the French Government in connection with this convention.

In view of the fact that the subject matter to be dealt with in the case of the Palestine Convention is similar to that involved in the negotiations in the case of the Syrian mandate, there would appear to be obvious advantages in preparing conventions in the two cases as nearly alike as possible.

My Government, however, has not overlooked the fact that three previous drafts of the Palestine Mandate Convention have already been prepared, namely that submitted with the communication of the British Foreign Office of the 20th June 1922, a second draft communicated to the Foreign Office by this Embassy under date of the 14th July, 1922, and a third draft of the 2nd October 1922, to which reference was made in Lord Curzon's communication of the 29th November, 1923. The convention recently concluded with France with respect to Syria and the Lebanon follows on essential points the proposals which were considered in July 1922, and taking this convention as a basis for negotiation would not involve any material change from the earlier proposals.

With respect to the preamble to the convention, I am instructed to express the Government's concurrence in the formula which has been adopted by the Convention relating to Syria and the Lebanon. My Government's concurrence in incorporating the preamble to the mandate in the preamble to the convention, my Government is prepared to accept this modification.

[12045]

Q



As you will note my Government suggested to the French Government the inclusion in the convention with respect to Syria of a provision extending to Syria and the Lebanon the provisions of the existing extradition and consular treaties and conventions between France and the United States. For reasons which appear in the annexed correspondence, the French Government, while quite willing to extend to the United States the privileges of these treaties, preferred to effect this by an exchange of notes rather than by the addition of an article in the convention itself. It is suggested that in the Palestine Convention express provision be made for the application to Palestine of the extradition treaties in force between the two countries along the lines proposed in the British draft of the 2nd October, 1922. The first paragraph of article 8 of the draft convention contains appropriate provision to this effect.

With regard to the privileges and immunities of consuls in the mandated territory your attention is directed to the assurances in this respect which have been given by the French Government in its correspondence with regard to Syria and the Lebanon. Under the capitulatory regime in Palestine the position of consular officers and the prerogatives of their offices were safeguarded. As it is contemplated that in view of the terms of the mandate capitulatory rights should be suspended, it

is suggested that American consular officers in the mandated territory would enjoy all the immunities and privileges accorded by international law and custom or as may be granted to the consuls of any other Power by treaty or otherwise. In view of the insufficiency of the existing treaty provisions with Great Britain relating to consular rights, a stipulation to this effect, as well as for the application to the mandated territory of the provisions of any treaties in force between the two countries which relate to consular rights, is contained in the proposed article 6.

The text of article 6, which my Government proposes, would read as follows:

The extradition treaties and conventions in force between the United States and Great Britain, and the provisions of any treaties in force between the two countries which relate to extradition or consular rights, shall apply to the mandated territory.

American consular officers shall enjoy in the mandated territory all the rights, privileges and immunities now accorded or hereafter to be accorded by treaty or otherwise to the consular officers of any other country."

You will note that the eight articles of the convention, of which I enclose a draft, are substantially those proposed in the British Foreign Office draft of the 2nd October 1922 with the exception of the article given above and article 5, with regard to the establishment and maintenance of American educational and philanthropic institutions in the mandated territory. It is hoped that the British Government will not raise objection to the provisions of article 6, which have already been accepted by the French Government with regard to Syria and the Lebanon.

My Government's attention has been called to a note of the Secretary General of the League of Nations, dated the 23rd September, 1922, relating to article 25 of the Palestine mandate, which indicated that the Council of the League of Nations had approved a memorandum submitted by the British representative outlining the provisions of the mandate for Palestine which are not to be applicable to the territory known as Transjordan, as therein defined. In this memorandum it is stated that His Majesty's Government accept full responsibility as mandatory for Transjordan and that such provision as may be made for the administration of that territory in accordance with article 25 of the mandate shall be in no way inconsistent with those provisions of the mandate which are not, by the resolution, declared inapplicable.

Upon the conclusion of the convention between the United States and Great Britain with respect to Palestine, it is my Government's understanding that the British Government will not make any change with respect to the conditions of the British administration of the territory known as Transjordan, without the previous assent of my Government. I am instructed to enquire whether the British Government is in accord with this view.

In a communication of the 11th August 1922 the Foreign Office brought to the attention of the Embassy a communication of the British Government to the Italian Government outlining the privileges which the British Government indicated its willingness to extend to Italy in respect of Palestine. You will note in the enclosures

hereto annexed the views which my Government has expressed to the French Government with respect to the somewhat similar assurances given to Italy by France with respect to Syria. It will also be noted that the French Government has undertaken in this correspondence to assure my Government most-favoured-nation treatment with respect to the agreement between France and Italy, and any other agreement relating to Syria and the Lebanon which may be entered into by France with any other Government. In concluding an agreement with respect to Palestine my Government trusts that the British Government will be prepared likewise to give in an exchange of notes the assurance of most-favoured-nation treatment with respect to the agreement reached by Great Britain with Italy or any other agreements relating to Palestine which have been or may in the future be, reached affecting the mandate territory.

I have the honor to be,  
Sincerely,  
FRANK B. KELLOGG

Enclosure 1 in No. 110

*Convention between the United States of America and France regarding the  
Mandate for Syria and the Lebanon*

THE President of the United States of America and the President of the French Republic

Whereas by the Treaty of Peace concluded with the Allied Powers, Turkey renounces all her rights and titles over Syria and the Lebanon, and

Whereas article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, as amended by the Versailles Conference, provides that in the case of certain territories which formerly were under the sovereignty of the late Ottoman Empire, mandates should be issued, and that the terms of the mandate should be explicitly defined in each case by the Council of the League, and

Whereas the principal Allied Powers have agreed to entrust the mandate for Syria and the Lebanon to France, and

Whereas the terms of the said mandate have been defined by the Council of the League of Nations as follows:

ARTICLE 1

The mandatory shall frame, within a period of three years from the coming into force of this mandate, an organic law for Syria and the Lebanon.

This organic law shall be framed in agreement with the native authorities and shall take into account the rights, interests and wishes of all the population of the said territory. The mandatory shall further enact measures to encourage the progressive development of Syria and the Lebanon as independent States. Pending the coming into effect of the organic law, the Government of Syria and the Lebanon shall be conducted in accordance with the spirit of this mandate.

The mandatory shall as far as circumstances permit encourage local autonomy.

ARTICLE 2

The mandatory may maintain its troops in the said territory for its defence. It shall further be empowered, until the entry into force of the organic law and the re-establishment of public security, to organise such local militia as may be necessary for the defence of the territory, and to employ this militia for defence and also for the maintenance of order. These local forces may only be recruited from the inhabitants of the said territory.

The said militia shall thereafter be under the local authorities, subject to the authority and the control which the mandatory shall retain over these forces. It shall not be used for purposes other than those above specified save with the consent of the mandatory.

Nothing shall preclude Syria and the Lebanon from contributing to the cost of the maintenance of the forces of the mandatory stationed in the territory.

The mandatory shall at all times possess the right to make use of the ports, railways and means of communication of Syria and the Lebanon for the passage of its troops, and of all materials, supplies and fuel.

## ARTICLE 3

The mandatory shall be entrusted with the exclusive control of the foreign relations of Syria and the Lebanon and with the right to issue exequaturs to the consuls appointed by foreign Powers. Nationals of Syria and the Lebanon, living outside the limits of the territory, shall be under the diplomatic and consular protection of the mandatory.

## ARTICLE 4

The mandatory shall be responsible for seeing that no part of the territory of Syria and the Lebanon is ceded or leased or in any way placed under the control of a foreign Power.

## ARTICLE 5

The privileges and immunities of foreigners, including the benefits of consular jurisdiction and protection as formerly enjoyed by Capitulation or usage in the Ottoman Empire, shall not be applicable in Syria and the Lebanon. Foreign consular tribunals shall, however, continue to perform their duties until the coming into force of the new legal organisation provided for in article 6.

Unless the Powers whose nationals enjoyed the above mentioned privileges and immunities on the 1st August, 1914, shall have previously renounced the right to their re-establishment or shall have agreed to their non application during a specified period, these privileges and immunities shall at the expiration of the mandate be immediately re-established in their entirety or with such modifications as may have been agreed upon between the Powers concerned.

## ARTICLE 6

The mandatory shall establish in Syria and the Lebanon a judicial system which shall assure to natives as well as to foreigners a complete guarantee of their rights.

Respect for the personal status of the various religious communities shall be fully guaranteed. In particular, the control and administration of Wakfa shall be exercised in complete accordance with religious law and the dispositions of the founders.

## ARTICLE 7

Pending the conclusion of special extradition agreements, the extradition treaties at present in force between foreign Powers and the mandatory shall apply within the territory of Syria and the Lebanon.

## ARTICLE 8

The mandatory shall ensure to all complete freedom of conscience and the free exercise of all forms of worship which are consonant with public order and morality. No discrimination of any kind shall be made between the inhabitants of Syria and the Lebanon on the ground of differences in race, religion or language.

The mandatory shall encourage public instruction, which shall be given through the medium of the native languages in use in the territory of Syria and the Lebanon.

The right of each community to maintain its own schools for the instruction and education of its own members in its own language, while conforming to such educational requirements of a general nature as the administration may impose, shall not be denied or impaired.

## ARTICLE 9

The mandatory shall refrain from all interference in the administration of the affairs of management (consuls de fabrique) or in the management of religious communities and sacred shrines belonging to the various religions, the immunity of which has been expressly guaranteed.

## ARTICLE 10

The supervision exercised by the mandatory over the religious missions in Syria and the Lebanon shall be limited to the maintenance of public order and good government. The activities of these religious missions shall in no way be restricted, nor shall their members be subjected to any restrictive measures on the ground of nationality, provided that their activities are confined to the domain of religion.

The religious missions may also concern themselves with education and relief, subject to the general right of regulation and control by the mandatory or of the local government, in regard to education, public instruction and charitable relief.

## ARTICLE 11

The mandatory shall see that there is no discrimination in Syria or the Lebanon against the nationals, including societies and associations, of any State member of the League of Nations as compared with its own nationals, including societies and associations, or with the nationals of any other foreign State in matters concerning taxation or commerce, the exercise of professions or industries, or navigation, or in the treatment of ships or aircraft. Similarly, there shall be no discrimination in Syria or the Lebanon against goods originating in or destined for any of the said States. There shall be freedom of transit, under equitable conditions, across the said territory.

Subject to the above, the mandatory may impose or cause to be imposed by the local governments, such taxes and customs duties as it may consider necessary. The mandatory or the local governments acting under its authority may, on special grounds of contiguity, any special customs arrangements with an adjoining country.

The mandatory may take or cause to be taken, subject to the provisions of paragraph 1 of this article, such steps as it may think best to ensure the development of the natural resources of the said territory and to safeguard the interests of the local population.

Concessions for the development of these natural resources shall be granted without distinction of nationality between the nationals of all States members of the League of Nations, but on condition that they do not infringe upon the authority of the local government. Concessions in the nature of a general monopoly shall not be granted. This clause shall in no way limit the right of the mandatory to create monopolies of a purely fiscal character in the interest of the territory of Syria and the Lebanon, and with a view to assuring to the territory the fiscal resources which would appear best adapted to the local needs, or in certain cases, with a view to developing the natural resources, either directly by the State or through an organisation under its control, provided that this does not involve either directly or indirectly the creation of a monopoly of the natural resources in favour of the mandatory or its nationals, nor involve any preferential treatment which would be incompatible with the economic, commercial and industrial equality guaranteed above.

## ARTICLE 12

The mandatory shall adhere on behalf of Syria and the Lebanon to any general international agreements already existing, or which may be concluded hereafter with the approval of the League of Nations, in respect of the following: the slave trade, the traffic in drugs, the traffic in arms and ammunition, commercial equality, freedom of transit and navigation, aerial navigation, postal, telegraphic or wireless communications, and measures for the protection of literature, art or industries.

## ARTICLE 13

The mandatory shall secure the adhesion of Syria and the Lebanon, so far as social, religious and other conditions permit, to such measures of common utility as may be adopted by the League of Nations for preventing and combating disease, including diseases of animals and plants.

## ARTICLE 14

The mandatory shall draw up and put into force within twelve months from this date a law of antiquities in conformity with the following provisions. This law shall ensure equality of treatment in the matter of excavations and archaeological research to the nationals of all States members of the League of Nations.—

1. "Antiquity" means any construction or any product of human activity earlier than the year 1700 A.D.
2. This law for the protection of antiquities shall proceed by encouragement rather than by threat.

Any person who, having discovered an antiquity without being furnished with the authorisation referred to in paragraph 3, reports the same to an official of the competent department, shall be rewarded according to the value of the discovery.



- 3 No antiquity may be disposed of except to the competent department, unless this department renounces the acquisition of any such antiquity.  
No antiquity may leave the country without an export licence from the said department.
- 4 Any person who maliciously or negligently destroys or damages an antiquity shall be liable to a penalty to be fixed.
- 5 No clearing of ground or digging with the object of finding antiquities shall be permitted, under penalty of fine except to persons authorised by the competent department.
- 6 Equitable terms shall be fixed for expropriation, temporary or permanent, of lands which might be of historical or archaeological interest.
- 7 Authorisation to excavate shall only be granted to persons who show sufficient guarantees of archaeological experience. The mandatory shall not, in granting these authorisations, act in such a way as to exclude scholars of any nation with at good grounds.
- 8 The proceeds of excavations may be divided between the excavator and the competent department in a proportion fixed by that department. If division seems impossible for scientific reasons, the excavator shall receive a fair indemnity in lieu of a part of the find.

#### ARTICLE 15

Upon the coming into force of the organic law referred to in article 1, an arrangement shall be made between the mandatory and the local governments for reimbursement by the latter of all expenses incurred by the mandatory in organising the administration, developing local resources and carrying out permanent public works, of which the country retains the benefit. Such arrangement shall be communicated to the Council of the League of Nations.

#### ARTICLE 16

French and Arabic shall be the official languages of Syria and the Lebanon.

#### ARTICLE 17

The mandatory shall make to the Council of the League of Nations an annual report to the satisfaction of the council as to the measures taken during the year to carry out the provisions of this mandate. Copies of all laws and regulations promulgated during the year shall be attached to the said report.

#### ARTICLE 18

The consent of the Council of the League of Nations is required for any modification of the terms of this mandate.

#### ARTICLE 19

On the termination of the mandate the Council of the League of Nations shall use its influence to safeguard for the future the fulfilment by the Government of Syria and the Lebanon of the financial obligations, including pensions and allowances regularly assumed by the Administration of Syria or of the Lebanon during the period of the mandate.

#### ARTICLE 20

The mandatory agrees that if any dispute whatever should arise between the mandatory and another member of the League of Nations relating to the interpretation or the application of the provisions of the mandate, such dispute if it cannot be settled by negotiation, shall be submitted to the Permanent Court of International Justice provided for by article 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

Whereas the mandate in the above terms came into force on the 29th September, 1923, and

Whereas the United States of America, by participating in the war against Germany, contributed to her defeat and the defeat of her allies and to the renunciation of the rights and titles of her allies in the territory transferred by them, but has not ratified the Covenant of the League of Nations embodied in the Treaty of Versailles, and

Whereas the Government of the United States and the Government of France desire to reach a definite understanding with respect to the rights of the two Governments and their respective nationals in Syria and the Lebanon

The President of the United States of America and the President of the French Republic have decided to conclude a convention to this effect, and have nominated as their plenipotentiaries

The President of the United States of America

His Excellency Mr. Myron T. Herrick, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the United States of America to France,

And the President of the French Republic

M. Raymond Poincaré, Senator, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs

Who, after communicating to each other their respective full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed as follows:—

#### ARTICLE 1

Subject to the provisions of the present convention the United States shall assist to the administration by the French Republic pursuant to the aforesaid mandate Syria and the Lebanon.

#### ARTICLE 2

The United States and its nationals shall have and enjoy all the rights and benefits secured under the terms of the mandate to members of the League of Nations and their nationals, notwithstanding the fact that the United States is not a member of the League of Nations.

#### ARTICLE 3

Vested American property rights in the mandated territory shall be respected and in no way impaired.

#### ARTICLE 4

A duplicate of the annual report to be made by the mandatory under article 17 of the mandate shall be furnished to the United States.

#### ARTICLE 5

Subject to the provisions of any local laws for the maintenance of public order and public morals, the nationals of the United States will be permitted freely to establish and maintain educational, philanthropic and religious institutions in the mandated territory to receive voluntary applicants and to teach in the English language.

#### ARTICLE 6

Nothing contained in the present convention shall be affected by any modification which may be made in the terms of the mandate as recited above unless such modification shall have been assented to by the United States.

#### ARTICLE 7

The present convention shall be ratified in accordance with the respective constitutional methods of the high contracting parties. The ratifications shall be exchanged at Paris as soon as practicable. The present convention shall take effect on the date of the exchange of ratifications.

In witness whereof, the respective plenipotentiaries have signed this convention and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done in duplicate at Paris, the 4th day of April, in the year 1924.

MYRON T. HERRICK

(Seal)

(Translation)

Mr. Ambassador,

Paris, November 2, 1923

In a letter dated the 24th October last, the *Chargé d'Affaires* of the United States in Paris informed me that the United States Government had received a communication from the French Government relative to the French mandate for Syria and the Lebanon. In fact, an agreement had been reached between the French Government and the Italian Government of which was deferred until such time as a peace treaty should be signed between the Allied Powers and Turkey and the mandate for Syria and the Lebanon should come into force. The signature of peace with Turkey on the 24th July, 1923, and the coming into force of a mandate, the terms of which were approved by the Federal Government, would have enabled the French Government to take the necessary steps to put the mandate into effect.

On the other hand, the Federal Government has expressed the desire to take into account the interests of the United States and the French Government and other Governments regarding the mandate for Syria and the Lebanon.

I have the honour to inform your Excellency that the French Government has limited itself in this respect to giving the Italian Government the assurance that it has requested in regard to the interests with which it is charged. The French Government has stated that it would consider favourably the establishment of a régime of trade, similar to that which the neighbourhood might lead to establish between Syria and Palestine. It has also confirmed, in conformity, moreover, with the principles of the mandate, that the advantages obtained by Italy in the settlement of peace in the Orient did not deprive her of the benefit of the economic equality ensured in Syria to all members of the League of Nations.

Consequently, the following explanations have been furnished to the Italian Government:

"Within the limit of its powers and its obligations as a mandatory Power, the French Government will apply itself to forestall any provision of the legislation of Syria and the Lebanon aiming to impose upon aliens in Syria or the Lebanon a change of nationality, with the exception of any change resulting from marriage."

The object of article 11 of the mandate for Syria is not to exclude the participation of Italian enterprise in the public works and services, and works of public utility nor in the development of the natural resources of the country when the Administration does not proceed with them directly itself. In case of such participation, the French Government would be disposed to consider favourably the conclusion of an agreement with the Royal Government destined to regulate the conditions of Italian labour which would as a consequence be admitted into Syria.

The French Government gives the Italian Government the assurance that the definitive judicial organisation in Syria and the Lebanon will provide that the tribunals to which aliens will be subject will be composed in the majority of French judges, except in the case of law suits of little importance, against whose judgments, however, appeal may be brought before courts which have a majority of French judges.

The French Government gives to the Italian Government the assurance that the object of article 10 of the mandate for Syria and the Lebanon will not be to prevent the opening of new Italian schools nor to limit the right of those people to receive pupils from other communities. The supervision of the mandate will be limited strictly to what is required by public order and a good administration. It adds that there is no intention of authorising any arbitrary intervention in the internal affairs of any faith.

The French Government assures the Royal Government that Italian schools, orphanages, asylums, hospitals and dispensaries will enjoy in Syria and the Lebanon free customs entry, with the exception of those institutions which carry on agricultural or industrial enterprises having a commercial character.

"Goods amounting to a sum which is to be determined, imported for the personal use of the members of such institutions, will be admitted free of customs duty."

"It is understood that the present advantage will only be granted in the measure that, as long as the conditions attached to them are strictly observed in letter and spirit."

The foregoing assurances being in conformity with the provisions of the mandate and their benefit being assured to the United States of America as to all the members of the League of Nations by article 2 of the draft Franco-American Convention, and by article 2 of the mandate, I am pleased to believe, Mr. Ambassador, that the Federal Government will deem it possible to proceed shortly with the negotiations for the conclusion of a convention, the terms of which I am happy to have established with your Excellency.

Kindly accept Mr. Ambassador, the assurances of my very high consideration

POINCARÉ

Enclosure 3 in No. 110

Mr. Herrick to M. Poincaré.

M. le Président du Conseil,

Paris, December 16, 1923

MY Government has been gratified to note from your communication of the 2nd November, the desire of the French Government to proceed promptly to the conclusion of a convention with the United States of America, and considers that the communication which your Excellency was good enough to address to me under date of the 2nd November, and the draft convention enclosed with your communication, furnish a satisfactory basis for such action.

Note has been taken of the statement in your communication of the 2nd November that the benefits of the agreement which your Government has reached with Italy as therein outlined would be assured to the United States of America. I assume that your Government would also be prepared to accord to the United States Government and to American nationals most-favoured nation treatment not only as regards the recent agreement with Italy, but with respect to any other agreements relating to Syria and the Lebanon which might be concluded by the mandatory Power with other Governments.

On this understanding which my Government will be happy to have the French Government accept, I am sending you herewith a draft convention, which, with certain modifications stated below, I propose to submit to my Government.

Previous drafts of the proposed convention with regard to Syria and the Lebanon contain no provision for the extending to the mandate territory of treaties of extradition between the United States and France. Your Excellency will recall that such provision is made in the conventions relating to Togoland and the Cameroons, and my Government considers that it would be desirable to add an article to the convention similar to article 8 of those conventions. Further, it is suggested for the consideration of the French Government that it would be desirable to provide that the Consular Convention between the United States and France should be applicable to Syria and the Lebanon.

In case the French Government is in agreement on the above-mentioned points, the following article, to be numbered article 7 (the present article 7 to be article 8), might be inserted:

"The provisions of all extradition or consular treaties or conventions which may be in force between the United States and France shall apply to the mandated territory."

The French Government will undoubtedly appreciate the importance of safeguarding the position of consular officers, particularly in a territory such as Syria, where capitulatory rights have long been enjoyed, and my Government is confident that France, as the mandatory Power in Syria, will take the necessary measures to effect this. It would be particularly gratifying to my Government if, in addition to extending to Syria and the Lebanon the Consular Convention, the French Government should see its way to indicate its intention to assure the special immunities and privileges of consular officers in this mandate territory.



I am further instructed to inform your Excellency that my Government is prepared to send me full powers for the prompt signature of the convention in the form in which it was communicated with your note of the 2nd November, with the addition of the article suggested above

With assurances, &c  
MYRON T. HERRICK

Enclosure 4 in No. 110

M. Poincaré to Mr. Herrick

Transmission  
Mr. Ambassador,

Paris, April 4, 1924

BY your letter of the 18th December last, your Excellency was good enough to make known the points which your Government would like to have defined in view of the conclusion of the convention relative to the mandate of France in Syria and the Lebanon

The Federal Government would like to receive the assurance that its nationals, well as itself will benefit in these countries by the most favourable treatment resulting not only from the agreements concluded between France and Italy but by all other agreements or conventions which may be concluded between the French Government and other Governments concerning Syria and the Lebanon. The French Government willingly gives this assurance to the Government of the United States of America

In the second place, the Federal Government desires that it should be agreed that the extradition treaties concluded between the United States and France should be applicable to the Syrian and Lebanon territories. I have the honour to point out that the Convention of 1853 between the United States and France provides that "while the conclusion of special extradition conventions, the extradition of criminals shall be governed by the laws and the mandatory shall be applied in the territories of Syria and the Lebanon". On this account the extradition treaties between the United States and France are already applicable, and would only cease to be so if the Federal Government should desire to have substituted therefor a convention applying especially to the mandated countries.

Lastly the Federal Government expresses the desire that the Consular Convention in force between the United States and France may also be applicable in Syria and the Lebanon, and especially those of its provisions which refer to the consular agents. The French Government would very willingly introduce a clause on this subject into the Convention if, on account of the peculiar régime of the mandated countries, the insertion of this clause in a convention might not cause reactions, as regards a still unexercised number of other States, which bearing it is difficult to foresee. Therefore the French Government thinks it preferable to give in the present letter to the Federal Government the assurance that it will see no objection to the establishment, in any part of Syria and the Lebanon where the Federal Government might deem it useful, of consuls, vice-consuls and consular agents of the United States, who will enjoy the treatment accorded by international custom. It also gives the assurance that as far as the privileges and immunities attached to their duties are concerned, the consuls and vice-consuls of the United States will benefit by all the existing provisions of the Franco-American Convention 1853 it being understood that the said consuls and vice-consuls shall be citizens of the United States.

I would be much obliged if your Excellency would be good enough to inform me if these assurances, as well as those contained in my communication of the 2nd November 1923, give satisfaction to the Federal Government and allow it to proceed to the signature of the draft convention drawn up on the 13th July, 1922, with the sole changes in wording proposed by your Excellency, and which have just been made therein

Please accept, Mr. Ambassador, the assurances of my very high consideration

R. POINCARÉ

Enclosure 5 in No. 1

Mr. Herrick to M. Poincaré

Paris April 4

M. le Président du Conseil,

IN previous communications dated the 24th October and the 18th December, 1923, I have had the honour to bring to your Excellency's attention the desire of my Government that the existing provisions of the Extradition Treaty of 1909 and the Consular Convention of 1853 between the United States and France should be reciprocally extended to the United States in Syria and the Lebanon by an appropriate provision to this effect in the proposed convention. With regard to the mandate it is my understanding that, for reasons which have been already explained, it is not the desire of your Government to include such a proposal, but that the French Government is prepared to assure to the United States and to American nationals in the mandated territory the rights and privileges provided under the treaty and convention respectively

I am instructed by my Government to express its appreciation of the assurance of the French Government in this respect, and to state that, on the basis of this understanding and of the assurances which you have embodied in your communication of the 2nd November 1923 and of the 4th April, 1924, it is prepared to proceed to the signature of the convention

In order, however, that there may be no misunderstanding with regard to the position of nationals of Syria and the Lebanon in the United States, my Government desires me to state that the provisions of the Consular Convention of 1853, would not be applicable with respect to such nationals in the absence of a treaty provision specifically providing for such application and that furthermore the Government of the United States could not assure the application to such nationals in the United States of the provisions of the Convention of 1853

At the same time I take pleasure in informing you that upon the conclusion and ratification of the Mandate Convention, my Government will raise no objection to the assumption by the diplomatic and consular officers of France of the protection of the interests of the nationals of Syria and the Lebanon in the United States

I have, &c  
MYRON T. HERRICK

Certified a true copy of the signed original  
Myron T. Herrick

Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary  
of the United States of America to France

Enclosure 6 in No. 110

Draft Convention between the United States of America and Great Britain  
regarding the mandate for Palestine

WHEREAS by the Treaty of Peace concluded with the Allied Powers Turkey renounces all her rights and titles over Palestine

And whereas article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations in the Treaty of Versailles provides that in the case of certain territories which, as a consequence of the late war, ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States which formerly governed them, the League of Nations should determine their future disposition

explicitly defined in each case by the Council of the League

And whereas the Principal Allied Powers have agreed to entrust the mandate for Palestine to His Britannic Majesty,

And whereas the terms of the same mandate have been defined by the Council of the League of Nations as follows:

[Terms of mandate]

And whereas the mandate in the above terms came into force on the 29th September, 1923

and whereas the United States of America, by her participation in the war against Germany, contributed to her defeat and the defeat of her allies and to the

renunciation of the rights and titles of her allies in the territory transferred by them to the Covenant of the League of Nations embodied in the Treaty of Versailles.

And whereas the Government of the United States and the Government of His Britannic Majesty desire to reach a definite understanding with respect to the rights of the two Governments and their respective nationals in Palestine: His Britannic Majesty and the President of the United States of America have decided to conclude a convention to this effect, and have nominated as their plenipotentiaries, who have agreed as follows:—

#### ARTICLE 1

The provisions of the present convention the United States consent to be bound by His Britannic Majesty pursuant to the aforesaid mandate, of Palestine, as defined in the mandate recited above.

#### ARTICLE 2

The United States and its nationals shall have and enjoy all the rights and benefits secured under the terms of the mandate to members of the League of Nations and their nationals, notwithstanding the fact that the United States is not a member of the League of Nations.

#### ARTICLE 3

Vested American property rights in the mandated territory shall be respected and in no way impaired.

#### ARTICLE 4

A duplicate of the annual report to be made by the mandatory under article 24 of the mandate shall be furnished to the United States.

#### ARTICLE 5

Subject to the provisions of the mandate, the nationals of the United States will be permitted freely to establish and maintain educational, philanthropic and religious institutions in the mandated territory, to receive voluntary applications, and to teach in the English language.

#### ARTICLE 6

The extradition treaties and conventions in force between the United States and Great Britain, and the provisions of any treaties in force between the two countries, which relate to extradition or consular rights shall apply to the mandated territory.

American consular officers shall enjoy in the mandated territory all the rights, privileges, and immunities now accorded or hereafter to be accorded by treaty or otherwise to the consular officers of any other country.

#### ARTICLE 7

Nothing contained in the present convention shall be affected by any modification which may be made in the terms of the mandate as recited above, unless such modification shall have been assented to by the United States.

#### ARTICLE 8

The present convention shall be ratified in accordance with the respective constitutional methods of the high contracting parties. The ratifications shall be exchanged in London as soon as practicable. It shall take effect on the date of exchange of ratifications.

E 4108 72 65]

No. 111

Mr. Dormer to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received May 12)

(No. 65.)  
Sir,

British Legation to the Holy See,  
Rome, May 6, 1924

I have the honour to report that the Cardinal Secretary of State this morning referred to the celebrations which would be held next month at Jerusalem in honour of the King's birthday. With the incident of last year fresh in his mind, he wished, he said, to consult me on one or two points, so that necessary instructions could be sent to Mgr. Barlassina.

In the first place, he had to consider what should be done in the event of the celebrations of the day being limited to a religious service in the Anglican church. Mgr. Barlassina himself, of course, could not attend. Would it be agreeable to His Majesty's Government if a Catholic service were held at the same time? In that case, Catholics could attend their church and non-Catholics theirs. He had reason to believe that one of the consuls, at any rate, had stated that he felt a real conscientious difficulty at attending a non-Catholic service. If he appealed to the Patriarch, as a bishop, for advice, the latter was bound to give it, and the advice would have to be that he should act against his own conscience. If anyone other than the consul appeared to the Patriarch, he was going to be told that he must consult his ordinary spiritual director. Stringent instructions were about to be sent to Mgr. Barlassina to abstain from anything in the nature of propaganda against other persons attending an official non-Catholic religious service.

I replied that the question did not seem to me a very complicated one, and could be settled in five minutes' friendly conversation with the competent authorities on the spot. Their own conscience. In the case of a foreign consul, I could, of course, express my views as to how he should act. As regards Mgr. Barlassina, or, for that matter, anybody else—I should have thought that the natural thing to do would be to explain the position as he saw it, and to make it clearly understood that he wished to avoid any discourtesy. It was obvious that where no discourtesy was intended no offence would be taken.

I do not know whether the King's birthday is going to be celebrated only by a religious service in the Anglican Cathedral or whether His Majesty's High Commissioner intends to hold an official reception, which would be attended by one and all without prejudice to the most delicate conscience. (Please see his despatch to the Colonial Office of the 14th December, 1923, enclosed in Foreign Office despatch No. 9 of the 5th January, 1924.)

I venture to report the above conversation, as Cardinal Gasparri showed great anxiety to avoid any discourtesy such as occurred last year.

I have, &c.  
GEOFFREY DORMER

E 4109 61 65]

No. 112.

Mr. Dormer to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received May 12)

(No. 66.)  
Sir,

British Legation to the Holy See,  
Rome, May 6, 1924

WITH reference to my despatch No. 60 of the 30th April, I have the honour to report that Cardinal Giorgi's approaching mission to Palestine is being constantly referred to in the Italian press, though hitherto without bringing in any political considerations. Discussion centres at present round the question of where his Eminence will stay in Jerusalem, and the less reputable papers are seizing the opportunity to discuss the rivalry between the Patriarchate and the Custody.

I believe there has been no question of the Cardinal staying anywhere than at the Patriarchate, but, as the "Messaggero" points out, the matter is of no special interest.

The same paper states that in Catholic circles it is anticipated that the Cardinal will be received in a solemn manner in view of his character of Papal Legate, his high



As a matter of fact, I believe that the Pope is showing no enthusiasm in the building of these new basilicas, and feels that the money which they will cost could have spent more wisely elsewhere. The whole scheme is regarded largely as one of "Jahannûd," and it is doubtful whether the present Pope would have sanctioned it had his hands not been tied by a promise of his predecessor.

You should, while thanking Cardinal Secretary of State for despatch of instructions, explain that His Majesty's Government regret that they cannot accept any of the points proposed in the French memorandums as being compatible with the cessation of special liturgical honours for French representatives in Palestine.

4. On the assumption that Mr MacDonald concurs in the procedure suggested above, which was unanimously recommended by the conference held in this Department on the 23rd May, the question arises what steps should be taken in the event of any cause or matter being decided by the High Commissioner to have been removed from the jurisdiction of the Palestine courts by the proposed Order in Council. Mr. Thomas suggests for Mr. MacDonald's consideration that, as soon as a concrete case arises, which may perhaps be anticipated in the near future as the result of claims by the Russian Soviet Government, the matter should be referred to the Council of the League of Nations and proposals laid before that body for approval.

5. These proposals might follow the line that, pending the formation of the commission referred to in article 14 of the Palestine mandate, matters which have been decided by the High Commissioner, in pursuance of the authority given to him by the mandatory, to fall within the competence of the said commission shall be brought before a special commission composed of the Chief Justice of Palestine and not more than two British judges of the Palestine courts. This commission would not act as a Palestine court, but as a special *ad hoc* commission charged with the duty of enabling the mandatory to carry out the provisions of article 13 of the mandate, subject to subsequent endorsement by the commission referred to in article 14. The only alternative to this procedure would appear to be the formation of the commission that His Majesty's Government adhered to their undertaking to form such a commission on the lines already proposed by Lord Balfour or on such other lines as the Council might determine. In the event of the commission being appointed without delay, it would not be necessary to resort to the expedient of appointing a special *ad hoc* commission as proposed above.

6. Mr. Thomas would suggest that, in the event of this question arising in the Anglo-Soviet discussions, the Soviet delegation should be informed that the memorandum enclosed in your letter under reply, that the property was to be returned to the Soviet Government if its title can be proved satisfactorily in the Palestine courts, subject to such local legislation as may be in force to ensure the safeguarding of charitable trusts. The delegation might also be informed of the promulgation of the proposed Order in Council, and the reasons which had led His Majesty's Government to remove the matters referred to therein from the jurisdiction of the Palestine courts. The question whether the argument outlined above as to the unsuitability of the present Russian Government to succeed the Imperial Russian Government in its capacity as protector of Christian interests should be put to the delegation is one for the consideration of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

7. I am to point out, however, that it would be dangerous to refer the delegation to the Palestine courts until the proposed Order in Council has been promulgated and local legislation for the safeguarding of charitable trusts has received the necessary sanction. If, therefore, the question is raised by the Soviet delegation before such measures have been brought into operation, I am to suggest that a more general answer be given to the effect that, until the Russian Government have received the special position of His Majesty's Government in Palestine, including the powers laid upon them by articles 13 and 14 of the mandate, no discussion can be entered into on the subject of properties which appear to His Majesty's Government to fall under the category of religious buildings and sites.

I am, &c.  
J. E. SHUCKBURGH

Enclosure in No. 115A.

Draft Order in Council.

WHEREAS by the Palestine Order in Council 1922 it is (among other things) provided that the civil courts in Palestine shall exercise jurisdiction in all matters and over all persons in Palestine;

And whereas it is expedient that certain matters shall not be cognisable by the said courts;

And whereas by treaty, capitulation, grant, usage, sufferance and other lawful means His Majesty has power and jurisdiction within Palestine;

That His Majesty, by virtue and in exercise of the powers in this behalf vested in him by the Palestine Order in Council 1922 or otherwise in His Majesty vested, is pleased

by and with the advice of His Privy Council, to order, and it is hereby ordered, as follows:—

1. This Order may be cited as "The Palestine (Holy Places) Order in Council 1924."

2. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the Palestine Order in Council 1922, no ordinance or law in Palestine, no cause or matter in Palestine, no Holy Places or religious buildings or sites in Palestine shall be heard or determined by any court in Palestine.

Provided that nothing herein contained shall affect or limit the exercise by the religious courts of the jurisdiction conferred upon them by, or pursuant to, the said Palestine Order in Council.

3. If any question arises whether any cause or matter comes within the terms of the preceding article hereof, such question shall, pending the constitution of a special commission, be referred to the High Commissioner, who shall decide the question in accordance with the instructions as he may receive from one of His Majesty's Principal Secretaries of State.

The decision of the High Commissioner shall be final and binding on all parties.

4. His Majesty, His heirs and successors in Council, may at any time revoke, alter or amend this order.

And the Right Honourable James Henry Thomas, one of His Majesty's Principal Secretaries of State, is to give the necessary directions hereon accordingly.



[E 4589 202 44]

No. 115

Sir O. Russell to Mr MacDonald.—(Received May 26.)

(No. 72)

British Legation to the Holy See,  
Rome, May 22, 1924

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge receipt of your telegram No. 100 instant with regard to the cessation of special liturgical honours for the French representative in Palestine. As the Cardinal Secretary of State was away from Rome on a few days' holiday when your instructions reached me I waited until his return in order to be able to inform him verbally, in the first instance, that His Majesty's Government were unable to accept any of the points proposed in the French memorandum. His Eminence returned yesterday afternoon and as he dined at the Legation the same evening no time was lost in placing him in possession of your views. Though, as I had the honour to report in my despatch No. 50 of the 17th ultimo, Cardinal Gasparri had thrown out a suggestion that points 2 and 3 of the French memorandum might possibly be conceded, his Eminence on this occasion displayed visible satisfaction over the non-adoption of that suggestion. The complete rejection of the four points was evidently in His Eminence's opinion the wiser course to pursue from the point of view of the mandatory power and of future dealings with the French, who would only regard any concession as a sign of weakness, though he had felt bound to lay stress on the comparatively harmless nature of points 2 and 3 as far as the Church was concerned.

From the French position in Palestine the conversation naturally turned to the prospects of the new French Government at Paris and I took the opportunity to enquire of the Cardinal whether the change was likely to affect French relations with the Holy See. His Eminence replied that as far as his information, which was still very meagre, went, there was no cause to apprehend a less friendly attitude on the part of the new Government, but there were still early days to form any definite opinion. His final words, "the French Government have much greater need of the Holy See than the Holy See will ever have of the French Government," displaying as they do a calm assurance as to the future, seem to me to go far to show that the atmosphere of the Vatican has not been unduly perturbed by recent events in France.

I have, &amp;c.

ODO RUSSELL.

[E 6618/202 44]

No. 116.

Sir O. Russell to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received June 30.)

(No. 90.)

British Legation to the Holy See,  
Rome, June 26, 1924

Sir,

IN my telegram No. 100 of the 22nd May I informed you that His Majesty's Government were unable to accept any of the points proposed in the French memorandum. I have now the pleasure to inform you that His Eminence has evidently revised his opinion, and has forwarded for the admission of points 2 and 3. Whether this is due to French pressure, or has been forced upon the cardinal by a preparation of the congregation concerned, I am unable to say. No doubt the question should have been on this question. It is, in any case, unfortunate that the question should have been reopened, especially as I had, in my despatch No. 50 of the 17th April, those ceremonies desired by the French priesthood are in themselves harmless and not calculated to militate against the prestige of the mandatory Power. If this conjecture is correct, a question of principle merely would appear to be involved, which His Majesty's Government might be disposed to accept. I should be grateful if you could be informed in due course what reply to return to the cardinal.

I have, &amp;c.

ODO RUSSELL.

Enclosure in No. 116.

Cardinal Gasparri to Sir O. Russell.

(Translation.)

Vatican, 10 Dec 1924

THE undersigned Cardinal Secretary of State begs to acknowledge the letter of the 2nd June sent by your Excellency relative to certain proposals presented by the French episcopacy regarding the honours which could be accorded to the French representative in Palestine in place of the liturgical honours which have hitherto been conceded.

The undersigned cardinal has taken note of the reasons for which the British Government cannot accept proposals Nos. 1 and 4, but fails to understand why they accept Nos. 2 and 3.

The second proposal reads: "Il reste entendu que le représentant de la France

— pillea des établissements français sur toute l'étendue de la Terre-Sainte." These honours, according to what was formulated in proposal No. 1, would consist in the fact that the French representative "sera reçu à l'entrée des églises, où on lui présentera l'eau bénite. Une place spéciale au haut de la nef, du côté de l'évangile, lui sera réservée; au moment de l'offertoire il sera encensé à port et le diacre portera le baiser de paix."

It is not easy to see in what way a similar concession could do harm to the rights of the mandatory Power. It is indeed obvious that, in matters of French institutions, the French representative should be shown particular honours. Besides, as your Excellency knows, in many other States the representative of a nation receives special liturgical honours in the churches or institutes belonging to that nation without the legitimate authorities of the country in which the church happens to be being deprived of them. In the Holy Land, for example, the French representative is present at the Mass; in Santa Maria, in Monasterio, with the Spanish Ambassador present.

Similarly, the third proposal does not appear to be incompatible with the prerogatives of the mandatory Power. In fact, when the French representative goes to the Holy Land, he goes as a Frenchman, as he goes to the Lieux-Saints, il y sera reçu par le représentant de la France, qui, au cours des cérémonies solennelles, jouira des mêmes honneurs liturgiques que les évêques.

or bishop, or to a pilgrimage either of great numbers or of important persons: otherwise the French representative would not be present in his official capacity to receive them and to assist at the Mass. Surely in such cases it would be advisable that the French representative should be particularly honoured.

The undersigned cardinal begs your Excellency to communicate these observations to the British Government in order that they may re-examine the question, taking into consideration that the acceptance of the two mentioned proposals, while it would be a happy resolution of a difficulty which threatens to upset the good relations of the friendly countries, would in no way detract from the prerogatives of the mandatory Power in Palestine.

The undersigned cardinal avails himself &c.

P CARD. GASPARRI

## CHAPTER IV.—SYRIA.

E 219 218 89]

No. 117

Consul Vaughan-Russell to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received January 8, 1924)

(No. 112 Secret)

My Lord,

Aleppo, December 14, 1923

I HAVE the honour to refer to Beirut despatch No. 154 of the 28th November and to the Bagdad High Commission intelligence summaries Nos. 21 and 22, dated the 1st and 15th November, and to offer the following observations:—

I have the honour to report that I have made careful efforts to corroborate from reliable sources the various items dealing with tribal quarrels and their bearing on the political situation in the district bounded roughly by Deir-es-Zor, Ras-ul-Jezirah and Jebel Singar, but owing to the great distance separating Aleppo from these areas, difficulties of getting into touch discreetly with trustworthy persons possessing reliable news, and above all, in view of the paramount necessity of preventing the French authorities from obtaining the slightest suspicion that I have been taking any interest in the tangled political situation in Northern Syria, I have been impeded in the task of making anything but incomplete enquiries.

From such information as I have been able to obtain, I have learned that the French authorities have indeed appointed as the new kaimakam in the northern district near Niabin, Kadur Bey. (Cf. Bagdad Intelligence Report No. 21, paragraph 773.)

Kadur (or Kadri) Bey is a native of Mandin and was from 1918 to 1921 the kaimakam of Niabin, but he is supposed to have been dismissed by the British authorities, and is now in the hands of the Kurds, or Ismail Hakkî, who has

influence, but eventually came to Aleppo in February 1924, where he strove to obtain a pardon from Mustafa Kemal and his readmission. Nothing was promised, I gather, and he returned to Niabin in May 1924. It is supposed that he may have been privately told to do this by Mustafa Kemal and instructed to endeavour to obtain employment from the French authorities whilst at the same time serving the Turkish ends. A Durbekirli is at present Turkish kaimakam of Niabin, but I learn that Major Ismail Hakkî is the moving spirit there, and has much influence among the Shammar, Tai, Shitayah and Milk Kurd tribes lying to the south of Niabin in Syrian territory.

In connection with the appointment of Kadur Bey, one can, I venture to think, trace the French policy in North-Eastern Syria. My informant suggests that it may be because Kadur Bey was supposedly in disgrace with the Kemalist authorities, and was living partly in Syria (where he has large commercial interests), that the French conceived the idea of appointing him as the kaimakam of Bagdadur (doubtless the same place as Mandur, mentioned in Bagdad Intelligence Report No. 21, paragraph 773).

As regards his character, I have (from a not disinterested source, it is true) very unfavourable reports. He is represented as quite unscrupulous and lacking in any moral respect for right and justice; at the same time, there is little doubt that he wields considerable personal influence among the Arabs and Kurds in the Niabin area. It may also have been for this particular reason that he was chosen by the French authorities in a vain attempt on their part to restore order among the Arab clans. I learn, however, that it is more probable that the above suggestion that the French desired his appointment is quite incorrect, and that the real facts are as follows:—

After the severe reverse suffered by the French military authorities in the last week of July last near Hasseke (at Kubur-el-Bid), the French, after having converted the Arabs at Tel Hamde (?), bombed several villages. The villages bombed, being made of mud, little damage to life, cattle or property is stated to have been done, they then sought to reason with them.

In spite of the presence of a fairly large muster of French troops and of General Billot himself, the Arabs were very uncompromising in their attitude.

[12045]

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To the French request that they should give up the dead bodies of the annihilated troops, they replied that that was impossible. On the question of restoring the camels and rifles stolen at the same time from the above troops, the French are reported to me to have yielded. It is reported that the words used during the discussion were roughly to the effect that "the camels belonged personally to the men who were killed, therefore we have no claim on them; as regards the rifles, we do not need them; you need not return them."

The Arabs maintained (so I am informed) a defiant attitude, and the French that they considered that the sphere in which they (the French) exercise control and authority should not stretch to the north of Deir-es-Zor.

It was as a result of this meeting in early August last that the administrative changes in the Hamidi Kaza are supposed to have been put into execution. The Arabs were given great latitude in the choice of the representatives who would govern them under the newly proposed scheme. What is significant is that most of the officials selected were formerly in Turkish employment, notably Kadir Bey, the new kaimakan; and also the new hadi and mufti. It is undoubtedly due to Kemalist influence that these persons were selected, but, as far as is known to me, I have no knowledge of the French having been consulted prior to these appointments or of their approving of them.

The measure of semi-autonomous Government demanded by and accepted to the tribes in these areas may be gauged by the fact that the French authorities undertook to withdraw the Syrian Government collectors of the taxes and tithes and to send only a small body of the latter about June or July 1924 (the harvesting season in that area) when the taxes and tithes are normally collected. Further, the tribesmen undertook to collect themselves the money normally due and to remit it in due course to the Government, to whom they are supposed to have promised to make themselves responsible.

Justice in these areas, which has been nominally supervised by the mandatory authorities, will be left in the hands of the tribal chiefs, who will administer the law in accordance with tribal customs and local usage.

In addition to these concessions, important changes were made, involving a great abandonment of control in this area; military posts on the frontier near the railway were withdrawn, e.g., that at Baghaz-dur (Mundur). It is not difficult to imagine the French authorities reoccupy the district. The military effect of any such movement would be to leave Mosul and points in Iraq to the north of it (e.g., at Zakho, &c.) in danger of an outflanking attack.

Theoretically, the French may be able to claim that the territory under reference is under their complete control and administered much as hitherto (except with reference that more latitude is given to the tribes in the method of their government according to the provisions of the mandate).

In practice, I venture to state that I have grave doubts as to the efficiency of future administration in the area, and I am inclined to view the probable results achieved by it with apprehension.

To expect these tribes to "pull together" without a firm hand to guide them is almost impossible.

Security within the area has been left in the hands of Kadir Bey. He is reported to have undertaken the responsibility and in particular to have guaranteed to keep the Deir-es-Zor to Mosul route free from the raids of Arabs. He is stated to be in receipt of 600 Syrian bonds monthly, and the below-mentioned sheikhs will also receive monthly the following sum:-

The head of the Jubur tribe (? Maslat), £ Syr 50, Dham-el-Hadi, £ Syr 10; and Mishal-bn-Fares, £ Syr 15.

At any rate, according to information received by me, £ Syr 950 is earmarked monthly to pay for the maintenance of order in the area referred to. The French are reported to have promised to assist Kadir Bey in his task by providing the equipment, rifles and ammunition of the levies he engages; £ T. 950 gold was the amount originally mentioned, I believe, but it was later reduced by the French to £ Syr. 950.

The above sum does not appear to me sufficient if any efficient maintenance of public security is really being aimed at.

Although in matters of intertribal interests the new Administration may be found to work satisfactorily there are hardly satisfactory safeguards provided for

defending the interests of foreigners. Any satisfaction obtained by foreigners has hitherto only been obtainable through the exercise of pressure by the mandatory authorities on the guilty persons. If, by their virtual withdrawal, respect for the French military authorities is so far reduced as to be negligible in the Jezrah area, it is difficult to see how direct pressure can be brought to bear on guilty Arabs in future if no means of repressive action exist.

The above remarks are perhaps better illustrated by the case of a British subject in Aleppo, Mr. Moses Shalam, who has business dealings with Arabs in the above area. There being no courts in the Sanjak of Deir-es-Zor or in the Jezrah district, he is unable to state how he could obtain goods (wool, &c.) to the value of about £ 1000. He advanced to an Arab, named Abdulla Taan, resident at Mundur. Taan had entered into partnership with Kadir Bey, it is thought, so that the latter could shield him, and at the same time share goods or their money equivalents which, by their advantageous position, they could evade sending to Mr. Shalam in Aleppo.

I brought the case to the notice of the French military authorities, pointing out that as the complaint of Mr. Shalam against Taan was about to be investigated, and reported upon by the kaimakan (Kadir Bey himself) who had entered into partnership with Taan, the investigation was hardly likely to be impartial. I was assured that the French intelligence officer at Hama would supervise the case and see that Kadir Bey rendered an impartial report, and the matter was left thus a fortnight ago. I felt dubious as to the probable results of the French supervision, but was obliged to leave matters thus whilst pledging the French authorities to do their utmost to see that Taan did not defraud Mr. Shalam. A few days later a large part of the wool arrived by camel caravan from Diarbin, it having been despatched before Kadir Bey started to carry out the enquiry. Whereas any damage done in

as will only cause partial loss, it is not difficult to imagine cases where less fortunate results may be obtained. In the event of dishonest Arabs wishing to defraud foreigners resident in Aleppo (over 300 miles distant) and dependent for redress only on the local Arab tribal justice, which cannot be guaranteed to be impartial and unbiased, it can be seen that such fraud might comparatively easily be carried out, unless strong control and close supervision over the Arabs be maintained.

The new form of administration can hardly be said to possess qualities which render it as immune from the necessity of being more closely supervised than the courts which foreigners have recourse to in Aleppo itself. For that reason, I submit that the first opportune moment should be seized to obtain information from the French authorities as to the exact form of new administration introduced and the precise guarantees which the mandatory Government offers to foreigners aside by side with the above form of almost autonomous Government introduced into North-East Syria.

As things in the Jezrah appear to have been left, I venture to state that there can be little doubt that the Turks will have a practically open field in which to carry out every form of propaganda and to prepare the ground for any Jenghis on Mosul they cherish.

Pending instructions from your Lordship, I shall continue to consider this question as secret, and I do not propose sounding the local authorities here on it, but should you desire me to broach the question, I should be grateful if I might receive full instructions as soon as possible.

I have, &c.

J. C. R. VAUGHAN RUSSELL.

Z 221 221 89]

No. 118

Acting Consul Vaughan-Russell to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received January 8, 1924.)

(No. 136. Secret.)

My Lord,

Aleppo, December 12, 1923.

WITH reference to my immediately preceding despatch, describing my visit to Jorabluz and Carehemigh, I have the honour to report such information as I was able to obtain concerning the progress which is being made on the work of repairing Jorabluz bridge.

Earlier reports by me are corroborated, particularly in regard to the rebuilding of the stone pier. Only one required rebuilding, as those on either side of it are very

little damaged. The destroyed stone pier is now very nearly rebuilt, and would require only a few days' work to be completed.

From one of the French officers stationed at Jerabluz I heard that the work on the railway was being pushed forward. This would seem to disagree with the report that the Turks were pressing for the early completion of the work, and I am at a loss to understand what such action on the part of the Turks could mean, if it be indeed true that the reason for the suspension of the work temporarily be due to an objection raised by them. I am endeavouring to find out by discreet enquiry what the latest position is in regard to the work at Jerabluz and on the Bagdad Railway generally, and to know exactly what the Turks want and what the French intend doing. If there be any truth in the statement that the Turks have been pressing the French authorities to push on the work so as to complete the work by March 1924, having which they will do it themselves, I can safely say that very little chance remains of coming to a bridge, temporary or permanent, by the time required, unless the metal-work contracts have already been placed, and the material arrives in Jerabluz within the next three weeks.

I have, as yet, no information as to whether any orders have yet been given. If it were possible to have early intelligence on this point, it would be easier to follow up various conflicting reports and rumours which reach me concerning the future work on the Bagdad Railway.

Any further information will be sent to your Lordship as early as possible, together with any news I can glean concerning the projected Alexandretta-Aleppo Deir-uz-Zor Railway, the possible construction of which was supposed to be considered by the French authorities here (see Foreign Office despatch No. 59 of the 18th October, 1923). As mentioned earlier, I much doubt whether any serious credence should be given to the report.

I venture to forward the above incomplete interim report, while I have the opportunity of sending it by bag, as it frequently happens that several weeks elapse without the means becoming available to despatch correspondence by safe opportunity.

I have, &c.

J. F. R. VAUGHAN RUSSELL.

E 311/218 89.

No. 11

Acting Consul-General Sir

Curzon of Kedleston. (Received 4)

(No. 165. Secret.)

My Lord,

Beirut, December 15, 1923.

I HAVE the honour to invite a reference to the letter of the British Liaison officer at Beirut of the 11th instant to the General Staff, Sir Salom, with copies to the Air Ministry, London, forwarding the French political summary No. 71 for the month of October 1923.

It is interesting to note that, according to French information, the Turks are just as they played on the Syrian frontier during the final stages of the Lausanne negotiations.

Greece-French relations show no signs of improvement, and as long as they continue so unsatisfactory there is little hope of a complete pacification of the territories included in the frontier State of Aleppo.

I would invite particular attention to the passages in the summary (p. 1, last two paragraphs, and the whole of p. 5) expressing the satisfaction of the French at their and comparing their results with those obtained by us in our mandated territories and Egypt, the comparison being all in favour of France.

Much perhaps of the part about the elections is intended for publicity purposes. I have no illusions regarding them. In Damascus the bazars were closed for several days in protest against the Government's conduct of elections, and French troops were posted prominently about the town during the electoral period. French officers and officials themselves, as well as other Europeans and natives in positions to know, have told me that all over the States of the Syrian Federation the people displayed either indifference to or distrust of the elections. Voters were marshalled to the polling

stations by the police and gendarmerie, who had everywhere received orders to ensure that a decent number of persons registered their votes. These votes were registered in ignorance and apathy. The only persons who really troubled about the elections were the Damascus Nationalists, who abstained from voting to mark their disapproval of the whole business. Needless to say, the Deputies elected were those selected by the French.

It is therefore necessary to discount all in the summary which, to the uninformed, might convey the impression that the Syrian peoples, free from all Government pressure, had elected francophile Parliaments and given striking evidence of their satisfaction with the mandatory Power.

Nevertheless, there is no doubt that the French feel some satisfaction in comparing the internal political situation of Syria with that of Iraq, of Transjordan, of Palestine, of Egypt. They consider that our policies in those countries have left us facing unsolved problems of the most organic order and dependent on the whims of uncertain Monarchs whom we have created and of still more uncertain Parliaments which we have not yet been able to bring into being. No such fundamental internal problems confront France in Syria. Under the cover of native figure-heads, she governs directly and she has so arranged the organic machinery of the country that she is rarely faced with any inconveniently striking demonstrations of popular discontent and has no longer to fear any general, effective opposition from within to the execution of her French administrative programme behind a native constitutional

higher state of evolution in Syria, and by its mandatory character, is similar to that which she has been so successfully applying to Morocco. It involves the general administrative control of the country, with the exception of certain tribal districts, the Frenchmen and the avoidance, as far as possible, of any solutions likely to hamper

nature of parliamentary make-believe, and they have no power. The Government are either Frenchmen or French nominees who only keep their posts on French sufferance and by carrying out French instructions. The heads of departments are figure-heads, the real executive power being in the hands of Frenchmen with the necessary advisory capacity at their side or executive above them. Syrian officials have thus none of the responsibilities which train men to use political and administrative power effectively. This rigorous French control in the political sphere is accompanied by considerable social affinity, which is not without its effect in reconciling the native to his political subordination.

of endurance. French rule has refused to believe that it is possible to find countries whose inhabitants obviously do not desire European control, unless the populations are governed by force. Our system would appear to seek a compromise between force and consent, and the workings of this illogical compromise are perhaps at times unsatisfactory and disconcerting.

As regards actual administrative efficiency, it must be admitted that the French system is not unsatisfactory, either for the native or the foreigner. A machine worked by Europeans is bound to be more effective in detail than one left to native manipulation. Englishmen working in these parts and by no means francophile as well as Syrians of the same complexion have told me that the delegation of so much power to the natives in the countries under our aegis leads to more corruption and vexation of foreigners than in Syria, where the power is concentrated in French hands and where the French consider that the prestige of the European must be maintained in the interest of all.

France's real difficulties in Syria are at present external and economic, not administrative, and these difficulties would exist however she governed the country. Turkish hostility in the north and Sheressian hostility in the south, with the vague Wahabi menace in the background—these are the grave political questions for France. Her economic difficulties arise partly from Syria's artificial isolation from its natural markets and partly from her own economic impotence to develop the country and her determination not to let others do what she is incapable of doing. These external and economic disadvantages are the most damaging factors in her position amongst a race of traders whose main preoccupations are peace and commercial prosperity.

I have, &c.

W. A. SMART.



[E 224/218 89]

No 120.

*Acting Consul-General Smart to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received January 8, 1924)*

(No. 107)

My Lord,

Beirut, December 17, 1923

WITH reference to the concluding paragraphs of despatch No. 132 of the 5th instant from the acting British consul at Aleppo, I would deprecate any interference on our part with French internal administrative arrangements in the northern Jezireh, ————— any authorities in Irak consider that these new dispositions really ————— a menace for Mosul.

————— cannot expect France to provide in these tribal regions the same guarantees for foreigners as she can furnish in the areas of settled population. Besides, British interests, other than political, involved in those regions are insignificant. France might just as well enquire what guarantees we could furnish for foreigners in Suleymanieh.

I have, &amp;

W. A. SMART

No 121

*Acting Consul General, Beirut, to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received January 9)*

(No. 1)

(Telegraphic) R

Beirut, January 9, 1924

YOUR telegram No. 1 of 8th January New judicial regime

Secretary-General assured me to-day that date fixed is 1st February, and that this is definite

[E 303 303 89]

No. 122.

*Foreign Office to Consul Vaughan-Russell (Aleppo).*

(No. 4.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, January 11, 1924

WITH reference to your despatch No. 129, Secret, of the 27th November last on the subject of Hashim Pasha, chief of the Anazeh tribe, I am directed by the Secretary of State to reply to you as follows:—

2. In paragraph 1 the words "at present" and in paragraph 3 the words "as it would be bound to have a repercussion in Irak" should be omitted.

3. In regard to the fourth paragraph relating to Hashim Pasha's visit to Irak, you should be guided by the views of His Majesty's High Commissioner at Bagdad, to whom a communication on the subject is being addressed by the Colonial Office.

4. The fifth paragraph of your reply should be amended to read that "the policy of His Majesty's Government in Irak is in accordance with their obligations, as mandatory Power, to the League of Nations and with their treaty relations with the Irak Government."

I am, &amp;c

LANCLOT OLIPHANT

[E 219 218, 89]

No. 123.

*Foreign Office to Acting Consul Vaughan-Russell (Aleppo)*

(No. 5.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, January 11, 1924

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to state that your despatch No. 132 of the 5th ultimo, concerning the French administration of North-Eastern Syria, has been read with great interest.

2. You should keep a careful watch on the situation in the area included between the Franco-Turkish boundary, the Euphrates and the Anglo-French Convention line of 1920, and on the probable political developments, which are of the utmost importance to His Majesty's Government in the discharge of their duties as mandatory for Irak

3. While no useful purpose would now be served by approaching the French authorities in order to ascertain their precise intentions, as suggested on the last page of your despatch under reference, you should none the less continue to make discreet enquiries, and, when occasion arises, to take any action necessary to protect British interests whenever they may become involved, as in the case of Mr Moses Shalun (referred to on the sixth page of your despatch), where your procedure is approved.

1. Copies of this despatch have been sent to Constantinople, Cairo and Damascus.

I am, &amp;c

LANCLOT OLIPHANT

[E 313 73 89]

No 124

*The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Acting Consul General Smart (Beirut)*

(No. 2)

(Telegraphic) R

Foreign Office, January 12, 1924

YOUR telegram No. 1 of 9th January Consular Courts in Syria

Notice inserted in "London Gazette" suspending Ottoman Order in Council as from 1st November is being cancelled by further notice to be published immediately providing for continuance of Consular Courts until 1st February, 1924. Text follows by post.

This will enable outstanding cases to be cleared off by latter date, when French courts will assume jurisdiction.

(Repeated to Aleppo, No. 1, reference despatch No. 140, and Damascus, No. 1 (copies) bag to Cairo and Constantinople.)

[E 638 73 89]

No 125

*Consul General, Aleppo, to Mr MacDonald R. — 11 January 24*

(No. 2)

(Telegraphic) R

Beirut, January 20, 1924

My telegram No. 1 of 9th January

French High Commissioner informs me that new courts can only come into force 3rd March.

Further notice in "London Gazette" required

Aleppo and Damascus informed by despatch

[E 638 73 89]

No 126

*Mr MacDonald to Consul General Smart*

(No. 4)

(Telegraphic) R

Foreign Office, January 28, 1924

YOUR telegram No. 2 of 26th January: Consular Courts in Syria.

Notice is being inserted in "London Gazette" providing for continuance of Consular Courts until 3rd March, 1924. Text by post.

(Repeated to Constantinople No. 17, Aleppo, No. 2 and Damascus, No. 2.)

[E 895 218 89]

No

*Acting Consul Vaughan-Russell to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received January 20, 1924.)*

(No. 145.)

My Lord,

Aleppo, December 27, 1923.

I HAVE the honour to refer to Beirut despatch No. 161 of the 12th instant, and to the questions raised therein concerning the Antioch elections and the views of the Aleppo Representative Council on them and on the question of the autonomy of Alexandria.

[12045]

T

Mr. Smart's despatch is corroborated by information received by me here; in the question of the official language of the Aleppo Representative Assembly stated upon. As Mr. Smart states, the use of Turkish was finally permitted, no doubt, partly as a result of representations made by Soubhi Bey Barakat, the President of the Assembly, whose Arabic is far from good, so much is this the case that the Arabic press here printed his opening speech in the very Arabic words used by him, all educated Arabs reading the speech could not fail to be struck by the incorrectness of the language used, and of its purely Turkish construction. The above action of more to Soubhi Bey Barakat himself personally (and due to the instigation of personal enemies of his) rather than towards the use of the Turkish language, and of any Turcopian leanings this might encourage.

The remarks in paragraph 4 of Beirut despatch No. 161 are, I think, a corroboration of the incidents in the local Assembly reported by me in my despatch to your Lordship No. 128 of the 15th November last.

The election of the four Antioch members has not been allowed to stand, and a fresh election (the result of which remains in great doubt) is expected to take place to-morrow, the 28th instant.

As regards the extract enclosed by Mr. Smart in his above-referred-to despatch, I have the honour to forward two extracts from Aleppo Arab newspapers dealing with the same question, viz. the autonomy of the Sanjak of Alexandretta, which, in effect, amounts to a virtual repudiation of the French mandate and a bid for union with Turkey.

The first extract, from the "Barid-el-Souri," shows the political programme of the party in the Alexandretta Sanjak who demand autonomy. The "Barid-el-Souri," as the introductory remarks show, strongly disapproves of the programme of Alexandretta's complete independence, and the remarks of the "Tarakki-el-Souri" in its issue of the 19th December equally express marked opposition to the programme. As I have reported before, any plan which has as its basis the erection of any artificial barrier between the Alexandretta Sanjak and the State of Aleppo will find disfavour in Aleppo, as the carrying out of such a proposal would particularly hit Aleppo, and to a lesser extent Antioch.

It is for this reason that the Aleppo Arab press has published objections (of which the two enclosed are examples) to the Antioch Deputy's programme, which threatens the very basis of Aleppo's existence.

I do not think there is the slightest doubt but that the programme reported above is the outcome of Turkish inspiration and that in reality complete autonomy is not what the sanjak really wishes. It may be that the Turks think that they can, by acting on the Antioch programme, assist the plan for the eventual return of the Alexandretta Sanjak to Turkey.

A further despatch on the situation in the Sanjak of Alexandretta follows.

I have, &c.

J. F. R. VAUGHAN-RUSSELL.

#### Enclosure 1 in No. 127.

Extract from the "Barid-el-Souri" Newspaper.

BEIRUT, 17 DECEMBER.

Our dear friends, the delegates of Antioch, Souraya Bey-al-Khakkaf Agha, and we beg to ask the mandatory Power to take the necessary measures to win over to her side the prominent people of that district, which was promised special privileges in the Accord of Angora, and to repudiate the words of those who have no importance there, so that we shall not have evil consequences from personal enmities. All this has arisen from a person who has never been sincere to her (the mandatory Power), nor to us, during the whole of his life:—

1. The separation of the Sanjak of Alexandretta from the Governorate of Aleppo and the assurance of its complete independence under the mandate of the French Government, according to the Accord of Angora.

2. The organisation of the administration of the sanjak in such a way that it has no dependence upon the Syrian Federation as provided by the Accord of Angora.

3. The complete abolition of Capitulations as per the Treaty of Lausanne.

4. The fixation of the share of Alexandretta of the Ottoman Public Debt out of the share allotted to Syria in the Conference of Lausanne, and the taking over by the Finance Department of the collection of taxes which were formerly collected by the Ottoman Public Debt, and the payment of the debts from the finance of the sanjak.

5. The abolition of the Agricultural Bank and the founding of a branch in the Finance Department for providing material help to the fellahs (peasants) and the

6. The protection of agriculture, industry and commerce, and the exemption of their machinery from any import duty.

7. The propagation of knowledge and learning by the foundation of night schools.

8. The abolition of the Ottoman Regie des Tabacs (Tobacco Monopoly).

9. The assurance of freedom and equality among the various communities of the population.

10. The appointment of intelligent officials and in proportion of the numerical strength of each community.

11. The reduction of taxes on property and lands and of the tonnetu (income tax).

12. The amelioration of the Tapu and Emlak Departments (Land Registry, and the carrying out of a second property census).

13. The reduction of court fees.

14. The increase of roads and bridges for the prosperity of the country and the facility of transport and commerce.

#### Enclosure 2 in No. 127.

Extract from the "Tarakki-el-Souri," dated December 19, 1920.

IF A MEMBER OF THE BODY IS CUT OFF, ALL THE BODY SUFFERS.

WE have read in the "Barid el-Souri" the political programme issued by Souraya Bey-al-Khakkaf concerning the separation of the Sanjak of Alexandretta from the State of Aleppo and the assurance of its complete independence under the mandate of the French Government, according to the Accord of Angora.

We are compelled, by our sentiments of national duty, to stop and give our opinion, so that the people of Aleppo may take the necessary measures before the harm is increased and before it becomes too late to remedy the evil.

The Sanjak of Alexandretta is the mouth of Aleppo, its economic life and its most active member. If, however, the body is deprived of this member like the soul, the whole body suffers.

For this reason we feel bound by our mutual duty and interest to arrive at an understanding with the author of the programme, and to describe to him the bad effects which would result if his plan were agreed to by the mandatory Power, an eventuality which we never expect to see realised.

The mandate does not provide for the grant of complete independence to the country, nor for its freedom of action in all administrative or social affairs, as in the case of various independent nations. But all the decisions of the Assemblies of

remains always subject to the approval or disapproval of the High Commissioner. The independent Sanjak of Alexandretta, composed of Alexandretta, Antioch and Beylan, is a component part of the Aleppo district, from which it cannot be separated, and all these parts together form the ensemble of the Syrian Confederation. The internal life is founded on their natural unity, and their separation cannot be imagined or by commerce, by industry, by agriculture, by social customs or by education.

The poor revenues of this sanjak and its great dependence upon the export of prevent it from separating itself from its body, Aleppo, to which it is connected by the above-mentioned ties.



Its separation from Aleppo will result in the organisation of a Government which will have the independence only nominally from the fact of its separation from Aleppo. In addition to this, enormous expenses will result from the payment of salaries to the new Administration. We are confident that the signatory of this programme has based it upon his national feelings, but if he examines the results which would be obtained by the adoption of such a plan, he will certainly change his mind. All that we advise him to do is to try to dismiss the foreigners who occupy positions in the Government offices, he will then reject the idea of separation.

No doubt the High Commissioner, to whose notice this matter will come, will take the necessary action to reject this scheme.

E 896 218 89

*Mr. Vaughan-Russell to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received January 29, 1924.)*

(No. 146. Secret.)

My Lord,

*Aleppo, December 28, 1923.*

I HAVE the honour to refer to my immediately preceding despatch regarding the situation in the Alexandretta Sanjak, and to make the following additional remarks concerning the elections there:—

The four Antioch Turkish candidates and the Alexandretta Alaouite member appear to have been nominees of the French assistant delegate at Alexandretta, a certain young Frenchman named Pronaud. The latter, it seems, was left to organise the elections according to his own political ideas, and he was imbued with the idea of nominating a group of members, all of whom would be hostile to Souhbi Bey Barakat, the president. His hostility towards the latter was inspired, no doubt, by content with the Antioch elements inimical to, and jealous of, Souhbi Bey, elements which depicted him as nothing less than a hypocrite who, earlier, had been nothing less than a brigand operating against the French troops, and who now posed as a French and Syrian patriot.

It is a pity that the past conduct of Souhbi Bey Barakat provided good reasons for the French authorities, there can be but little doubt but that he is now persona grata with the French in Syria; it appears that M. Pronaud thought fit to take no heed of this fact, and instead of consulting the higher French authorities at Aleppo or Beirut, and assuring himself that his proposed political programme fitted in with the general scheme of the French authorities for influencing the elections, he gaily proceeded to encourage the anti-Barakat, and incidentally pro-Turkish faction, in Antioch, and in the end their election was effected. Knowing the reasons for their election and of the personal campaign conducted against him, Souhbi Bey Barakat refused to accept the election of the four members, and the incident, as reported in my despatch No. 125 to your Lordship, transpired. In view of the known Turcophilic leanings of these members, considerable surprise was expressed in the sanjak at the action of the French authorities in having acquiesced in the election of these men. The latter have not attended the meetings of the Aleppo Representative Council, and in view of the objections raised as to the method of their election, are very likely to be replaced by others in the new election which takes place to-day. The publication of the political programme of one of the above members shows how far the Turkish propagandists were able to seize the unique opportunity offered to them by the blunder of the French authorities.

The plan of the Turks seems to be to work first of all for the detachment of the Alexandretta Sanjak from the State of Aleppo and from the Syrian Confederation. Once detached and autonomous, the next step, union with Turkey, would not be a difficult proposition. Once this has been effected, the subsequent fate of Aleppo and of its hinterland could not remain long in doubt, as Aleppo would be bound to follow Alexandretta's example.

The declarations emphasising the inseparability of Aleppo and Alexandretta, a well-known fact, should have acted as a warning to the French authorities that they should watch with extreme caution any movement or propaganda advocating separation. So far from having failed to do this, they seem to have gone to the other extreme, as in the case of the Antioch elections, and by the administrative system which now exists in Aleppo and Alexandretta, they are tending more and more to emphasise the independence of Alexandretta from the control and supervision of Aleppo.

For some time, I learn, the jealousies and ambitions of various French officials in North Syria have been the means of further encouraging this. The present situation is that correspondence on all administrative matters goes from Alexandretta direct to Beirut and not to Aleppo. Correspondence on military affairs, being of purely French character, is naturally carried on directly with Aleppo. It was, I hear, as a result of ambitious ideas of self-importance, and conflicts of opinion with General de Lanoyne, that last year M. Cayla was transferred from Alexandretta to Latakia. The whole trouble was due to the refusal of M. Cayla to submit his reports through Aleppo to the High Commissioner at Beirut. To endeavour to restore harmony, General Billotte and Colonel Desclaux were sent from the State of the Alaouite to Aleppo and Alexandretta respectively. They are very close friends, and work together without any rivalries or jealousies to embitter their relations, at the same time, I learn, correspondence is still carried on directly between Alexandretta and Beirut (being sent under flying seal through the delegate of Aleppo, merely out of courtesy and

to avoid any correspondence going straight to Beirut, as Colonel Desclaux, the delegate at Alexandretta, is not on good terms with M. Reclus, who was then acting delegate at Aleppo. I do not feel disposed to carry on the same amicable liaison with Aleppo as I have ventured to suggest the above

State of Aleppo, and how far the detachment is due to the French policy. In view of the strength of the Turkish element in the sanjak, it seems to me to be an error of policy on the part of the French authorities to encourage unduly the autonomy of the sanjak, as were this to be finally granted, the future of Aleppo would certainly not long remain in doubt.

I have, &c.

J. F. H. VAUGHAN-RUSSELL.

E 996 221 89)

No. 129

*Acting Consul Vaughan-Russell to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received January 31)*

(No. 4. Confidential.)

My Lord,

*Aleppo, January 6, 1924.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 136 of the 12th December last, I have the honour to report that I have learned that the new bridge to be constructed at Jerablus by the French Société d'Entreprises, the company which has the control of the ports of Beirut and Tripoli, is now well advanced. I am glad to hear that the bridge will be completed in time to give cause for surprise.

In the course of a conversation I had yesterday with M. Follet, the local director of the Bagdad Railway, I obtained other interesting details. He confirmed that engines were being assembled on the railway to the east of Jerablus bridge, and said that within two months he hoped to have a regular service of trains as far as Tel Abiad. He was having a lot of trouble with the Turks in connection with the work on the railway, and was unable to get the necessary permission from the Turkish Government without giving any assurances or guarantees as to the eventual ownership or control of the railway, or as to the disposal of the railway receipts. As a result of the irritating nature of these demands, the work on the bridge has been delayed.

Deputies at Angora having urged the Turkish Government to make such a stipulation, although the wood was inferior in quality and dearer in price.

He was negotiating with them, he said, and hoped to come to some more reasonable understanding on the general question. The present work going on at the bridge was only a temporary expedient. No serious work on the permanent bridge would be commenced until the Turkish Government had given the necessary assurances. The work on the bridge would not be able to proceed.

It is expected that the bridge will be completed by the end of March 1924. This seems to fall far short of what the Turks are supposed to have promised, and the completion of the Bagdad line by the end of March 1924.

I AM directed by Mr. Secretary Thomas to refer to the letter from this Department of the 9th January regarding the attitude to be adopted by His Majesty's acting consul at Aleppo towards Hachim Pasha of the Amzali Tribe, and to transmit to you herewith, to be laid before Mr. Secretary Ramsay MacDonald, a copy of a despatch which has been received from the High Commissioner for Iraq on this subject.



Musean and the French, asking for Ali as their King. Great state of tension among Arabs, from Dair-az-Zor southwards, is further reported by Nasr. Reports of our frontier officers agree with this latter information. Apparently movement among the southern Arabs is towards incorporation with Irak, and is largely due to existence of customs barrier, by which export southwards of their produce is prevented. Suggestion of customs convention, made by Weygand, was referred to Government of Irak some time ago by me, but I understand that they are not likely to favour it.

(Repeated Jerusalem.)

E 1839 303 89]

Foreign Office to Consul Vaughan-Russell (Aleppo)

(No. 25.)

Sir,

WITH reference to Foreign Office despatch No. 4 of the 11th Jan. 1891, on the subject of the alleged discovery of the remains of the crew of the *Amoyah* (trading ship) on the coast of the Malay Peninsula, I have the honor to inform you that the Government of the Straits Settlements have been requested to send a party to the spot where the remains were discovered, and to report on the results of their investigation.

E 2698 218 80

*Consul Vaughan Russell to Mr. MacDonald,—(Received March 25.)*

*Aleppo* (vité *Alexandretta*).

February 17, 1921

The status of comparative autonomy which has been enjoyed by the Republic of Alexandroff in the past seems to continue to be emphasized more and more. Various reasons for this are adduced by Mr. Vice-Consul Catoni, among which the following is the most interesting:

• No. 132

E 1843 218/89

(Telegraphic.) P

February 26, 1924.

ON the way from Amman, Nuri Pasha had long conversation at Beirut with Weygand. It was stated by latter that Syrians were gravely discontented with rule of French, principally because customs barriers between Syria and Iraq ruins their trade and customs convention. Weygand then made minute enquiries into British advisory system in Iraq. He hinted strongly, finally, that he had under consideration question whether Atur Alt, son of Hussein, could not be installed in much the same position as Faisal, in Iraq in Syria, under French. According to Nuri, this comes as extensive preparation in Aleppo and Hama districts of circular petitions.

To give a clearer perception of the position I venture to

giving the Arabs too abundant cause to complain of favouritism. There is quite a strong support for this plan among all the Turks and a fairly large body of Arabs who see in the gradually coming independence of Alexandretta a brighter economic future for themselves and the town. This policy is, however, opposed by a large percentage of Christians in the Sanjak of Alexandretta, who foresee with apprehension their return

others (chiefly Christians) in Aleppo, who fear that the detachment of Alexandretta from the mandated French territory must ruin them and Aleppo.

I venture to doubt strongly whether the French would sacrifice the interests of the population of Aleppo merely to carry out the terms of an agreement, much less

tion of the events as above described are to be read as an explanation of the present French policy. It is said, however, that one of the conditions on which depends the granting of a full measure of autonomy to Alexandretta will be the removal of the customs barriers which now hamper Aleppo's trade.

In view of his local knowledge and experience I attach great importance to his views.

A second reason for the present policy of encouraging autonomy in the Sanjak of Aleppo is the desire to pursue this policy by a powerful financial syndicate such as the Société française d'Entreprise or the Groupe Loucheur. Once the Government of the sanjak is sufficiently independent as to permit of its carrying on independently of Aleppo and Damascus (under French control if this should ever come about), Mr. Caton thinks that French capitalists would probably think that less interference from the Muslim and fanatical Syrians would be necessary if they wished to undertake

I have ventured to make the above statement of the present French policy, which seems to me to be a gradual extension of Alexandretta from the control of Aleppo.

J. F. R. VAUGHAN-RUSSELL.

E 2086 221 89

Consul Vaughan-Russell to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received March 7.)

(No. 33.)

Sir,

Aleppo, February 20, 1924.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 1 of the 1st January I have the honour to report hereunder further particulars which I have obtained concerning the progress of work on the Bagdad Railway.

M. Folliet, the director of the railway here, told me to-day that he hopes to publish details in a few days concerning a service of trains to be run between Aleppo and Tel-Abiadh to connect with the bi-weekly service of trains already running to Jerablus. A few trains to Tel-Abiadh had already been run, but he hoped to open a regular service on the 1st March, by the 15th or 20th March the service was expected to be extended to Ras-el Ain (about 150 miles beyond Jerablus). Engineers were inspecting the state of the line beyond there to Marj, and M. Folliet hoped to effect the few necessary repairs to the track in time to extend the service to Marj by the middle or end of April 1924.

As far as the line to Nimbin was concerned, he feared that more metal ballast would have to be added to strengthen the track sufficiently to deal with normal traffic, although it was probably capable of dealing with trains if they were not too heavy and were run slowly.

I have, &c.

J. F. R. VAUGHAN-RUSSELL.

(E 3186 218 89)

No. 137

Consul Smart to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received April 9.)

No. 33,

Sir,

Damascus, March 19, 1924.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch No. 30 of the 6th instant, forwarding copy of a telegram No. 99 of the 26th ultimo, from His Majesty's High Commissioner for Iraq to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, and requesting me to furnish a report on the subject.

Nuri Pasha, on his return journey through Damascus, gave me a detailed account of his conversation with the French High Commissioner, but without mentioning General Weygand's hint about Emir Ali.

I confess that this addition comes as a complete surprise to me. All that General Weygand ever said to me about the Sherrefian family in the course of conversations during my tenure at Beirut would have led me to suppose that he would never have dreamt of favouring the candidature of a Sherrefian Prince to the throne of Syria. The attitude of M. Schœffler, delegate of the High Commissioner at Damascus, conveys

he made it quite clear to Mr. Philby and myself that he had no intention of taking notice of King Hussein at Amman. Mr. Sutow informed me that General Weygand had told him that he would not even visit Jerusalem while King Hussein

the borders of Syria. If the French had any idea of enthroning the Emir in Syria, their attitude towards him and his father, when at their very doors, would appear to be inexplicable.

Moreover, the French system in Syria is that of direct, though veiled, government by themselves. The position of the native authorities under the mandatory Power is that of complete subordination and of comparative insignificance. A Sherrefian ruler could hardly accommodate himself to such a system, which would have to be radically modified for the adoption of the experiment in question. I see no sign of any tendency on the part of the French to modify the only method which they have ever

Nuri Pasha must have misunderstood the general attitude of the French as in favour of Emir Ali, said to have been in Damascus, but may be attributed to Oriental exaggeration. In this sense was apparently sent to King Hussein at Amman.

Nuri Pasha according to the account he gave me, told General Weygand that he doubted whether the time was ripe for a customs convention between Iraq and Syria. I asked Nuri Pasha whether a customs convention on the lines of that concluded between Palestine and Syria would be disadvantageous to Iraq. He seemed to think it would, but I was unable to gather his precise reasons for such a belief. He said that as a prominent part of an Arabian whole, there might be some reason for such a view.

It is possible that the Iraq Government do not want to conclude a convention which would confer advantages on a Syria under French control. It is with much diffidence that I venture to express my views on this question, but, as I am asked for a report, I feel compelled to present the problem from the Syrian angle.

The French evidently expect that a meeting is to take place in Bagdad next month to discuss this question. M. Maurech, Director of the Damascus Customs, has been appointed by General Weygand to act as the representative of Syria. He has spoken to me several times about his journey, asked for facilities, &c. He even expressed the hope once that I would represent to my Government the desirability of mutual customs facilities. If now the Iraq Government refrain from responding to General Weygand's overtures, the effect on French opinion will be unfortunate.

From Sir Henry Dobbs's telegram it might be inferred that the Iraq Government's desire to avoid a customs agreement is due also to the belief that the present barriers increase the economic distress of Syria and thus induce the Syrian populations to view with favour incorporation in Iraq. If this be a correct reading between the lines, I venture to doubt the expediency of such an attitude. The French will never believe that the Iraq Government is the responsible party. They will think that we are dictating this policy to embarrass them in Syria. They will again contrast the attitude

(12045)

U 2



of Palestine with that of Irak, much to the disadvantage of the latter. And by Irak and Palestine they will understand the mandatory authorities in those countries. I doubt whether it is in our wider interest to give the French justification for further successes in Syria.

I trust, therefore, that the question will be considered on purely economic grounds and without any political intent against French Syria. At present the movement of Syro-Irakian commerce would be inconsiderable. With the development of the motor routes across the desert, this movement might be intensified. If Maurech, in conversation with me, expressed the hope that eventually motor-lorries would be crossing the desert. In such an eventuality, Syria might act as a transit land for many things which otherwise would be imported into Irak via the Persian Gulf. Possibly, even goods might penetrate into Persia through Syria and Irak. Such a development would, I imagine, do little harm to Irak, but might adversely affect our import and transit trade in Irak. Syria, under the mandate of France, would presumably be a better medium for French than for British transit trade.

This is a very large and possibly remote question, on which I have not sufficient information to express an opinion of much value. I can, therefore only leave it for the consideration of those in possession of more comprehensive knowledge. I venture, however, to urge, in the interest of Anglo-French relations in Syria, that an endeavour be made by Irak to avoid a too obviously unsympathetic attitude towards the overtures made by General Weygand. Moreover, it would seem desirable to avoid the appearance of our doing in Irak what we are inclined to reproach the French with doing in Syria, that is to say, closing the door in our mandated territories to trade other than our own.

I have, &c

W. A. SMART

E 3187 151 91]

No. 138

Consul Smart to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received April 9.)

Sur

Damascus, March 19, 1924.

I HAVE the honour to report that M. Maurech, the French Director of Customs at Damascus, recently summoned Shukh Abdullah, who is acting for Fozan-ee-Sabik, the Damascus representative of the Sultan of Nejd, and asked him for news of the Kuwait Conference. Abdullah said that he had no information on the subject. M. Maurech persisted in his interrogation and enquired whether, in Abdullah's opinion, there was any chance of the British succeeding in bringing about a reconciliation among the chiefs of the Arabian Peninsula. Abdullah again asserted his ignorance. M. Maurech showed an evident desire to hear of the failure of the attempt to reconcile the Arabian chiefs concerned.

M. Maurech then went on to say that he hoped Abdullah had informed Ibn Saud of the friendly way in which the French had treated the Nejdians. He (M. Maurech) thought that the Sultan and his subjects should be very grateful to the French.

Apparently M. Maurech is unquestionably used on such occasions by the French authorities, as his functions bring him into unpolitical relations with the Hedouin chiefs and thus enable him to give a less formal turn to his conversations with them on political subjects.

Recently M. Bejean, the French Adviser of Police here, revealed in conversation with me considerable interest in Nejd. He said that he was inclined to think that Ibn Saud was preparing another coup. In the past every such coup had been preceded by the Wahhabis, in M. Bejean's opinion, constituted the only serious force in the Arabian Peninsula, and the Sherwahis could do nothing against it.

As French interest in things Nejdian makes it all the more necessary that this consulate should be assisted as far as possible in maintaining its hold over the Nejdian agency here, it is urged in my despatch No. 34 of the 22nd February, the endorsement formula now used by this consulate for Nejdian passports will not be weakened. It is essential that Nejdians should not get any impression that we are weakening in our protection of them.

Hitherto, the Nejdian agency here has shown no sign of inclining towards the French and appears to consider itself as attached to this consulate.

I have, &c

W. A. SMART

E 3184 218 89]

No. 139.

Consul-General Satow to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received April 9.)

(No. 39. Very Confidential.)

Sur,

Beirut, March 22, 1924.

ON the receipt of your despatch No. 32 of the 14th March I could not but feel surprised at some of the statements attributed to the French High Commissioner in the telegram No. 90 from His Majesty's High Commissioner for Irak to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, of which a copy was therein enclosed. General Weygand has, on several occasions, expressed to me his views regarding the Hashimite family and their ambitions, and I know that among the reasons which led him to defer his projected visit to Jerusalem was the presence of King Hussein and his fear that his visit at such a time might be construed as having some connection therewith.

I had yesterday to see the general on business. As he is himself frank by nature and appreciates frankness in others, I requested to be allowed to put a few questions. These questions were (1) whether he had received Nouri Pasha in February on the latter's return from Amman, (2) whether he had discussed with the Pasha the question of a customs convention with Irak, and (3) whether in the course of the conversation the question of the appointment of any person as ruler of Syria had been mentioned.

As regards the first question, the general replied in the affirmative. He said that he had received Nouri Pasha with all due politeness and that he had indeed found him an agreeable and intelligent person to talk to.

In reply to my second question, General Weygand said that he had himself raised the point, as he had had no reply from Sir H. Dobbs to a suggestion as to a customs convention made some months ago.

I would here venture to point out that, although it would naturally be to the interest of the Damascus and Aleppo merchants that the customs barriers which have come into existence since the war should be rendered as permeable as possible, a barrier which is doing most harm to Syrian trade is that between Syria and Irak. It is only natural to suppose that commercial dealings would now, if possible, continue on the lines of such dealings before the war. According to the late Mr. E. Weakley's report on British trade in Syria in 1911, although Damascus had a trade with Irak which was interesting, the city served more as a distributing centre for the country to the south. As regards Aleppo, although the city had considerable business with Mosul, it had a much more important business with places in Anatolia which now lie over the Turkish border. Still the conclusion of a customs convention with Irak would undoubtedly be beneficial, especially to the Aleppo merchants, seeing that the convention made with Turkey under the Angora Agreement has proved to be unsatisfactory. General Weygand, therefore, doubtless emphasised to the best of his power the need of a convention with Irak.

In answer to my third question, the general stated that Nouri Pasha himself had mooted the idea that one of the sons of King Hussein, either the Emir Abdullah or the Emir Ali, might be placed on the Throne of Syria, and he signified as pure invention any suggestion that a proposal of this kind had come from General Weygand. He said that he had ventured even to suggest such an arrangement. I have no doubt at all that this is the correct version of the conversation. The general asked me, if any belief existed that such a suggestion had emanated from him, to deny it categorically.

As regards the alleged preparation of petitions to King Hussein asking for the Emir Ali as King, this appears to be confirmed by Mr. Vaughan Russell's secret despatch No. 2 of the 16th February written from Alexandretta. In that despatch Mr. Russell suggests that Turkish influence may be behind the movement, but it is noteworthy that the prime mover is reported to be in correspondence with King Hussein. It is therefore, I imagine, within the bounds of possibility that the instigation comes from the King himself.

I have, &c

H. E. SATOW

*Consul Smart to Mr MacDonald.—(Received April 25.)*

(No. 66.)

Sir,

*Damascus, April 10, 1924*

I HAVE the honour to report that I recently paid a visit to Amman, and was able to represent to the chief British representative and Peake Pasha certain French apprehensions regarding the Syro-Transjordanian frontier.

Owing to the presence of King Hussein in Transjordan, the French delegate at Damascus, M. Schœffler, acting on orders of General Weygand, instructed the French officers at Deraa to discontinue their liaison visits to Amman. The result was necessarily a loss of mutual contact, which coincided with a recrudescence of raiding bands entering Syria from the Ajloun district. The French frontier post at Maka was fired upon. One armed band penetrated into Syrian territory, but was apparently hustled out after some desultory firing, which resulted in nothing more serious than the killing of a couple of horses. Another and more daring band of seventeen unarmed men crossed the frontier and made for Deraa, a few miles south of Damascus. There they armed themselves with rifles from a secret store and proceeded to a hill just north of the town of Damascus. There they managed to stay for a few days, drawing their supplies from the Kurdish quarter of the city, just under the hill. Arrangements were

made, and, thanks to an opportunist stormy night, managed to evade the net being drawn round them. M. Schœffler thinks that this band intended to operate on the approaches to the town, and especially on the Damascus-Beruit road.

Colonel Arnaud, the French commander at Deraa, and Captain Huguenot, the head of the Bureau des Renseignements there, both spoke to me with some earnestness about this raiding danger. I gathered that they felt rather embarrassed by their orders to suspend their liaison visits to Amman. In fact, on my return journey, Colonel Arnaud even asked me to speak to his chief, M. Schœffler, and urge the desirability of allowing the interdiction. M. Schœffler I am glad to say, has just sent instructions to Colonel Arnaud to the effect that the French officers at Deraa are now free to re-establish the liaison with Amman.

Colonel Arnaud mentioned that he had been very grateful to Mr Palmer for his friendly attitude in these frontier questions. I of course assured him that he could count on my imitating my predecessor in this matter.

M. Schœffler, in conversation with me, justified the attitude of the French during King Hussein's sojourn in Transjordan on the ground that they had definite proofs of a political conspiracy to set on foot the King's propensity for fomenting troubles in Syria. The French had been unable to pay any courtesies to the King, because His Majesty had tried to have direct relations with native authorities in Syria.

orders as though they were under his jurisdiction. In fact the King had chosen to ignore the French mandatory authorities, who were compelled to reciprocate this attitude. The French interference in the Caliphate question had likewise been due to the knowledge that this development was being deliberately made a pretext by Syrian elements, few in number and well known, for subversive purposes in Syria. Otherwise the French attached no religious importance to this Sherwan Caliphate agitation.

I stated that I had no wish to criticize their policy, and that I quite understood their recent attitude had inevitably caused some resentment. It seemed therefore all the more important that co-operation between British and French officers on both sides of the frontier. M. Schœffler agreed emphatically, and expressed the hope that, with the departure of the King, the old liaison arrangements would be re-established.

I think that the French were placed in rather a difficult position by King Hussein's visit to Transjordan. There is in the State of Damascus a considerable and active Arab Nationalist party, which made the most of the opportunity to foster irredentist sentiment here. Perhaps the French would have been wiser to pay some superficial courtesy to His Majesty. A purely formal visit of the French consul-general at Jerusalem to the King would have perhaps been a convenient way of taking some notice of the Egyptian situation, and of exploiting this attention to encourage in Syria hopes which the French cannot satisfy. On the other hand, it is impossible not to appreciate the difficulty of the French in the

midst of a hostile population only too ready to look to the King as a possible saviour from alien domination. I think we should take these difficulties into account, and reserve our criticism.

Anyhow, whether or not the French are to be blamed for an attitude which has of course caused resentment among Arabs in Transjordan, I trust that this aspect of the question will not affect Anglo-French co-operation on that frontier. While it may not be the justification for Arab feeling on the matter, the fact that bands of raiders enter Syria by hands operating from our mandated territory constitute a situation of considerable delicacy, especially for British agents in this country. It is exceedingly difficult to refute the argument that a mandatory Power is responsible for the aggressions of its mandated people against neighbouring territory. Mr. Philby and I have discussed the difficulties which the French attitude has created for them, and I trust that our policy will continue to be equally sympathetic, whatever Arab feelings on the subject may be.

I gather that, for the moment, the frontier situation is more satisfactory. M. Schœffler told me that he has strengthened the frontier posts and taken adequate measures to counteract this threatened brigand activity. He added that, though the French could hardly prevent the entry of bands from Transjordan into Syria, the measures recently taken were of a nature to render their exit problematic. This fact, together with the evident resolution of the French authorities to deal sternly with the forces of disorder, was, in M. Schœffler's opinion, discouraging the activities of the hostile elements concerned.

I have, &c.

W. A. SMART

[E 3658 73 89]

No. 141.

*Consul-General Smart to Mr MacDonald.—(Received May 3.)*

(No. 31.)

Sir,

*Beirut, April 15, 1924*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith a copy of Decree No. 2501 of the 15th March, which modifies and completes in various respects Decree No. 2029 of the 7th July, 1923, regarding the new French courts in the Lebanon, of which a copy was transmitted in Mr Smart's despatch No. 125 of the 14th September last.

The articles of the original decree which have been modified are Nos. 1, 3, 6, 8, 10, 11, 12 and 14. The drafting, as not unfrequently happens in the case of decrees issued by the French High Commission, is somewhat faulty, but it is possible to make out where the modifications are meant to fit into the original decree.

The addition to article 10 of Decree No. 2029 is valuable, as it precludes the native courts from discussing, as they have at times done, questions of national status, which they are in no way capable of deciding.

The addition to article 1 of Decree No. 2029, which lays down when and how the demand for a majority of French judges is to be made, is also important.

No decision has yet been taken to define exactly what foreigners are entitled to trial by the new courts, with the result that these courts are at present dealing with cases in which Egyptians are concerned, although the latter were, under the old régime, not entitled to the benefit of the Capitulations.

I have, &c.

W. A. SMART

Enclosure in No. 141

*Arrêté No. 2501 portant Détails d'Application de l'Arrêté No. 2029.*

LE Haut-Commissaire de la République française en Syrie et au Liban,

Vu le décret du Président de la République française en date du 23 novembre 1920;

Vu l'Arrêté No. 2029 du 7 juillet 1923 sur la compétence et la composition de certaines juridictions de l'Etat du Grand-Liban,



Vu la Décision No. 2251 relative au fonctionnement des juridictions constituées en application des Arrêtés Nos. 2028 et 2029

Considérant qu'il importe de régler les détails et d'établir les conditions de l'application de l'Arrêté No. 2029 entré en vigueur le 3 mars 1924.

Sur la proposition du secrétaire général.

Arrête

Article 1<sup>er</sup>. Sont complétées ainsi qu'il suit les dispositions de l'article 1<sup>er</sup> de l'Arrêté No. 2029

1. En matière pénale, sera considérée comme partie en cause, toute personne directement lésée par l'infraction, même dans le cas où elle ne se serait point portée régulièrement partie civile, soit en raison de son décès, soit par suite de toute autre cause.

2. En principe, le siège du Ministère public près une juridiction statuant en matière étrangère est occupé, à l'audience par le magistrat français ou libanais investi des fonctions de Ministère public près cette juridiction, sans préjudice de la faculté réservée au Procureur général français d'y siéger personnellement.

À la Cour d'Appel et à la chambre des mises en accusation, ce sera le Procureur général français qui tiendra l'audience, sauf délégation de sa part à un magistrat libanais.

3. Le Procureur près le tribunal de première instance de Beyrouth ou le magistrat libanais désigné pour en faire fonctions pourra, en matière étrangère, agir et procéder sur tout le territoire du Grand-Liban.

4. La demande d'une majorité de juges français devra être formulée par le demandeur dans la requête introductive d'instance ou dans la citation devant la juridiction répressive et par le défendeur ou toute autre partie intervenante, lors de son premier acte en justice.

Dans le cas de demande de majorité de juges ou conseillers français et vu le nombre restreint des magistrats français actuellement placés dans les cours et tribunaux libanais, le juge d'instruction français pourra siéger dans les

mises en accusation (président du tribunal et juge suppléant pourront siéger à la Chambre criminelle de la Cour d'Appel même dans les affaires dont ils auront eue la charge).

5. Les conditions dans lesquelles les magistrats français assureront l'expédition des affaires qui leur sont dévolues : fixation des audiences et des rôles, organisation intérieure du parquet, du cabinet d'instruction, des greffes, du bureau exécutif, etc., seront réglées par eux suivant les nécessités du service, sous réserve de l'approbation du premier président à la Cour de Cassation et du Directeur de la Justice.

En ce qui concerne les rapports du Procureur général avec les officiers de police judiciaire de tout ordre et la gendarmerie, pour toutes les affaires prévues à cet article, sont de toutes les attributions découlant de la loi.

Les dispositions de l'Arrêté No. 2029 sont applicables aux auxiliaires français de justice.

Art. 3. Est complète comme suit la 8<sup>e</sup> de l'Arrêté No. 2029. La lecture des décisions de justice n'étant définitive qu'après lecture à l'audience, il appartient au président de prescrire toutes dispositions nécessaires pour assurer, dans les cas requis et si l'une des parties le demande, la traduction immédiate du dispositif de ces décisions et la lecture de cette traduction à la même audience.

Art. 4. L'article 10 de l'Arrêté No. 2029 est complète comme suit :

Les juridictions libanaises composées ou non des magistrats français ne peuvent avoir à trancher, par voie de décision contentieuse, le point de savoir si l'une ou l'autre des parties au procès possède ou non la qualité d'étranger, pour l'application de l'article 1<sup>er</sup> de l'Arrêté No. 2029.

D'après la législation en vigueur dans l'Etat du Grand Liban, il s'agit là d'une question préjudiciable dont la solution appartient exclusivement au Bureau des Nationalités du Haut-Commissariat.

Art. 5. L'article 11 de l'Arrêté No. 2029 n'exclut pas la possibilité de faire procéder à des enquêtes officieuses et, quand il échet, de saisir le tribunal, par voie de citation directe, dans tous les cas où cette procédure est autorisée par la législation en vigueur.

Art. 6. L'article 12 de l'Arrêté No. 2029 est complété ainsi qu'il suit

L'huissier français est fonctionnaire du bureau exécutif.

Le président du tribunal de première instance demeure le chef dudit bureau en ce qui concerne l'exécution des décisions de justice rendues comme il est dit à l'article 1<sup>er</sup>.

Art. 7. L'article 14 de l'Arrêté No. 2029 est complète comme suit

Il n'est rien modifié, jusqu'à la décision définitive sur le fond, à la marche des affaires déjà introduites devant des juridictions consulaires ou capitulaires, qu'il s'agisse d'instances en cours devant une juridiction d'un degré déterminé ou de litiges ayant abouti à une décision susceptible d'une voie de recours non exercée.

En matière pénale, toutes les fois que l'accusé sera en fuite, le Ministère public pourra provoquer le dessaisissement de la juridiction consulaire et saisir la juridiction nouvelle, réserve faite, le cas échéant, d'un accord préalable sur ce point avec la partie civile.

Art. 8. Le secrétaire général du Haut-Commissariat et le Gouverneur du Grand-Liban, délégué du Haut-Commissaire sont chargés, chacun en ce qui le concerne, de l'exécution du présent arrêté.

WEYGAND.

Beyrouth, le 15 mars 1924

E 4178/218 89

No. 142

Mr Hough to Mr MacDonald -- (Received May 12.)

Following observations are submitted on enclosure in your despatch No. 27 of the 9th March --

Dissatisfaction with French rule is fairly general in this district, though mostly rather inchoate. Reasons are partly economic, due to commercial depression since Aleppo was severed from its hinterland, partly political. It is impossible to satisfy all parties, and all are in accord in their dislike for what they regard as an alien mandatory Power. Most determined opposition is from Moslem religious chiefs who would like to see Syria incorporated in a Moslem kingdom. There is no pro-Turkish agitation on their part since the Caliphate affair.

The suggested nomination of Amir Ali as King of Syria would be popular. What local Moslems would like is incorporation in Arab State with a local ruler. A French agent has been sent to King Hussein to discuss this. He is mentioned in the enclosure, but not in the report, mentioning Amir Ali.

My information concerning Dair-az-Zor is confirmatory, except that incorporation with Hashemite State rather than Mesopotamia is sought. Local Mussulmans still think largely that King Hussein has English backing, and by confusion of thought they may imagine that incorporation with him would bring them in British sphere of influence. Moslem leaders of Dair-az-Zor are said to be strongly pro-Hashemite.

[E 5527 218 89]

No. 143.

Consul Smart to Mr MacDonald. (Received June 27.)

(No. 96.)

Sir

Damascus, June 16, 1924

IN continuation of correspondence ending with my despatch No. 80 of the 11th March, I have received the following report regarding further flights of Druze

Ali Bey Attache, cousin of Hussein Pasha Attache, proceeded to Transjordan a few days after his departure.

(2045)

One Yussuf-ul-Basit, a Druze of the Lebanon, was known to be acting as a messenger between Amir Abdullah and Mut'ib Pasha Atrache, Sheikh of Irsas and surrounding districts in the Jebel Druze. The French sent gendarmes to arrest Yussuf-ul-Basit, who tried to escape and was shot dead in the attempt. When Mut'ib heard of this incident, he at once fled to Transjordan.

Yussuf-ul-Basit was accused of the murder of Fouad Bey Jamilat, kaimakam of the Shouf in the Lebanon, and of other crimes. I have no information which would confirm his alleged activity as a messenger between Amir Abdullah and Mut'ib, or any connection between his death and Mut'ib's departure.

Apparently the French are endeavouring to break the power of the Atrache family by gradually putting members of the Halabiyyeh family in positions of authority hitherto held by members of the former family. The gradual emigration of the Atrache chiefs is said to be a reflection of the situation created by this French policy.

There appears to be in the Jebel Druze considerable discontent with the régime of Captain Carliellet, who continues to govern the mountain in violation of the Charter of Independence (see my despatch No. 57 of the 19th March). He is accused of interfering in every detail of local administration.

I have no doubt that Captain Carliellet is a man of high ability and energy, but that his control of local administration in the Jebel Druze is excessive. Like his colleagues elsewhere, he no doubt sees to it that all the power is in the hands of his own countrymen and none in those of the natives.

I have, &c.

W. A. SMITH

## CHAPTER V. GENERAL.

[E 434 202 44]

No. 144.

*Sir John Russell to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. — (Received January 14.)*

No. 7.)

My Lord,

I HAVE the pleasure to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 10th inst. in relation to the question of the French Chamber of Deputies having presented to the French Chamber of Deputies a resolution which would have the effect of safely accomplishing the Vatican would be on firmer ground for resolute action in the future. The French Ambassador, he said, while tacitly acknowledging the termination of the old order of things which this would imply, had hinted at the possibility of an appeal on the part of his Government to be allowed to preserve in some measure the predominant position, with regard to the Church, which they had held for so long. This plea, his Eminence assured me, could not be admitted, and he had pointed out to the Ambassador that the Vatican would hardly be disposed to gratify a French demand.

To me he added that, though the French Government might make an appeal to the services they might or might not have rendered to the Church in the past, there were three good reasons why they should not. These were the remembrance of the services rendered by Great Britain and finally, the ratification of the Treaty of Lausanne. Any one of these would, in his opinion, be sufficient to annul the French claim while the combination of the three left the French Government no pretext for further interference.

I have, &c.

JOHN RUSSELL.

[L 373 373 405]

No. 145

*Foreign Office to Colonial Office.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, January 30, 1924.*

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 24th instant, and to state, for the information of the Secretary of State for the Colonies, that he prefers the spelling *Mahomet*, with *Mahometan* or *Mahomedan* as the adjectival form.

2. The Secretary of State is in general agreement with the suggestion contained in the third paragraph of your letter of the 29th October last, that the word *Moslem* (not *Muslim*) should ordinarily be used to describe a Mahometan, and *Islam* as the name of the religion of Moslems.

3. The Secretary of State strongly prefers *Caliph* and *Caliphate* to *Khalifa* and *Khalifat*.

I am, &c.

S. GASELER.

[E 4842 232 65]

No. 146

*Note by the Secretary-General, League of Nations. — (Communicated by League of Nations, June 3.)*

THE secretary-general has the honour to forward, for the consideration of the Council, the following letters and draft instrument communicated by the British Government.

Geneva, May 24, 1924



(1)

*Letter from the British Government to the Secretary-General.*

Sir, Foreign Office, May 21, 1924.  
I am directed by Mr Secretary Ramsey MacDonald to request that you will include the following item in the agenda for the next meeting of the Council of the League of Nations—

"Iraq - communication from British Government, dated the 21st May, 1924."

LANCELOT OLIPHANT

(2)

*Letter from the British Government to the Secretary-General.*

Sir, Foreign Office, May 21, 1924.  
With reference to my letter of to-day's date, requesting that the question of Iraq be included in the agenda for the next meeting of the Council of the League of Nations, I am directed by Mr. Secretary Ramsey MacDonald to transmit to you herewith, for communication to the members of the council, the following documents:—

- (1) The treaty concluded between His Britannic Majesty and His Majesty the King of Iraq on the 10th October, 1923, a copy of which was communicated on the 11th October of that year to the Council of the League of Nations.
- (2) The protocol, accessory to the treaty, signed on the 30th April, 1923, a copy of which was communicated to the Council of the League of Nations on the 11th October of that year.
- (3) Four agreements, subsidiary to the said treaty, which were concluded on the 25th March, 1924.

The British member of the council (the Right Honourable H. A. L. Fisher) reported to the council in November 1923 that the Government of His Majesty the King of Iraq had agreed to accept the terms of the Treaty of Alliance and the Protocol of 1923, and that the Government of His Majesty the King of Iraq had agreed to accept the terms of the Treaty of Alliance and the Protocol of 1923, and that the Government of His Majesty the King of Iraq had agreed to accept the terms of the Treaty of Alliance and the Protocol of 1923.

3. The council will observe that, under the protocol signed at Bagdad on the 30th April, 1923, provision was made for the treaty to terminate upon Iraq becoming a member of the League of Nations, and in any case not later than four years from the date of the ratification of peace with Turkey.

4. The treaty and connected documents represent the terms on which His Majesty's Government are prepared, in pursuance of the policy outlined by Mr Fisher in 1921, to render to Iraq administrative advice and assistance in accordance with the terms of the Treaty of Alliance.

5. The British member of the council (the Right Honourable H. A. L. Fisher) reported to the council in November 1923 that the Government of His Majesty the King of Iraq had agreed to accept the terms of the Treaty of Alliance and the Protocol of 1923, and that the Government of His Majesty the King of Iraq had agreed to accept the terms of the Treaty of Alliance and the Protocol of 1923, and that the Government of His Majesty the King of Iraq had agreed to accept the terms of the Treaty of Alliance and the Protocol of 1923.

6. The treaty, protocol and subsidiary agreements are now under consideration in Bagdad by the Constituent Assembly referred to in article 18 of the treaty, and it is hoped that these documents, in which His Majesty's Government have announced that they can accept no modification, will have been accepted by that Assembly before the next meeting of the Council of the League. The treaty and agreements are the outcome of prolonged discussion and negotiation with the King of Iraq and his Government, and it is hoped that they will give effect to the policy set forth in Mr Fisher's announcement of November 1921.

17

7. On the assumption that the treaty, protocol and subsidiary agreements are accepted by the Iraq Constituent Assembly, it is the intention of His Majesty's Government, after obtaining the assent of the British Parliament, to invite the Council of the League to adopt the draft instrument enclosed herein, together with its annexes, as defining the obligations of His Majesty's Government to the League in respect of Iraq.

8. There is, however, the possibility that the treaty, protocol and subsidiary agreements will not have been accepted by the Constituent Assembly before the next meeting of the council. In that event a new situation will arise, and His Majesty's Government may have no option but to obtain the authority of the council for some alternative arrangement to ensure the carrying out of the provisions of article 22 of the covenant, in so far as Iraq is concerned.

LANCELOT OLIPHANT.

(3)

*The Council of the League of Nations.*

*The Council of the League of Nations.*

Whereas the Principal Allied Powers have agreed that the territory of Iraq, which formerly formed part of the Ottoman Empire, is to be placed under a mandatory charge with the duty of ensuring the well-being and development of the people of the said territory, in accordance with the provisions of article 22 (paragraph 4) of the Covenant of the League of Nations; and

Whereas the Principal Allied Powers have agreed that the mandate for the said territory referred to above should be conferred on His Britannic Majesty, who has accepted it; and

Whereas His Britannic Majesty has undertaken to exercise this mandate on behalf of the League of Nations, in conformity with the following provisions; and

Whereas by the aforementioned article 22 (paragraph 8) it is provided that the degree of authority, control or administration to be exercised by the mandatory not having been previously agreed upon by the members of the League, shall be explicitly defined by the Council of the League of Nations; and

Whereas His Britannic Majesty has recognised an independent Government in Iraq, and has concluded with His Majesty the King of Iraq a treaty, with protocol and annexes, defining the obligations of His Majesty's Government to the League in respect of Iraq, as the Treaty of Alliance;

Agrees that the said mandate shall be implemented by the said Treaty of Alliance and further decides as follows—

ARTICLE 1.

The Treaty of Alliance shall terminate upon Iraq becoming a member of the League of Nations, and in any case not later than four years from the coming into force of the Treaty of Alliance.

ARTICLE 2.

The privileges and immunities of foreigners, including the benefits of consular jurisdiction and protection as formerly enjoyed by capitulation or usage in the Ottoman Empire, shall be accorded to the subjects of the Principal Allied Powers in the Territory of Iraq.

ARTICLE 3.

Pending the conclusion of special extradition agreements, the extradition treaties at present in force between foreign Powers and His Britannic Majesty shall apply within the territory of Iraq.

ARTICLE 4.

His Britannic Majesty shall make to the Council of the League of Nations an annual report to the satisfaction of the council as to the measures taken during the year to carry out the provisions of the Treaty of Alliance. Copies of all laws and regulations promulgated during the year shall be attached to the said report.

(1045)



## ARTICLE 5.

The consent of the Council of the League of Nations is required for any modification of the terms of the Treaty of Alliance.

## ARTICLE 6.

On the termination of the Treaty of Alliance, the Council of the League of Nations shall use its influence to safeguard for the future the fulfilment by the Government of Irak of the financial obligations, including pensions and allowances, regularly assumed by the Government of Irak during the period of the Treaty of Alliance.

## ARTICLE 7.

His Britannic Majesty agrees that if any dispute whatever should arise between His Britannic Majesty and another member of the League of Nations relating to the interpretation or the application of the provisions of the Treaty of Alliance, such dispute, if it cannot be settled by negotiation, shall be submitted to the Permanent Court of International Justice provided for by article 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

The present instrument shall be deposited in original in the archives of the League of Nations, and certified copies shall be forwarded by the secretary-general of the League of Nations to all members of the League.

Done at , on

[E 5164/232/65]

No. 147.

*Consul London to Mr. MacDonald. (Received June 14.)*

(No. 23.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Geneva, June 13, 1924.

FOLLOWING from Lord Parmoor:—

"It seems probable that final sitting of council may take place Tuesday, 17th June.

"Instructions in regard to Irak should arrive before that date."

[E 5164/232/65]

No. 148.

*Mr. MacDonald to Consul London (Geneva).*

(No. 35.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, June 15, 1924.

YOUR telegram No. 23 of 13th June: Irak mandate.

Following for Lord Parmoor:—

"Owing to changed situation in Bagdad no Colonial Office official will be sent to Geneva. Following communication should be made by the British delegate to the council when Irak comes up:—

"My colleagues will have seen the letter addressed by the British Government to the Secretary-General to the League of Nations of the 21st May, and the documents that accompanied it. The object of His Majesty's Government in writing that letter was to make the council acquainted at the earliest possible moment with the latest developments of their policy in Irak. I need not make more than a passing reference to the statement made to the council by my predecessor, Mr. Fisher, in November 1921. He explained the reasons why we considered it desirable to place our relations with Irak on the basis of a treaty of alliance. The treaty was signed in October 1922, but the subsidiary agreements arising out of it were not concluded until the spring of the present year. Until these agreements were signed we were not in a position to place our whole case before the council. We have now taken the first opportunity of doing so.

"The treaty contained a clause, inserted at the express wish to the King of Irak and his Government, under which acceptance by an Irak Constituent

Assembly was made a condition precedent to its ratification. This Assembly has since been elected and has been in session for the past few months at Bagdad. It intimated its acceptance of the treaty on the 10th June, with the proviso that, after ratification, the Irak Government should enter into negotiations with His Majesty's Government, in accordance with the provisions of article 18 of the treaty, with a view to securing certain amendments in the Financial Agreement. It also added a rider in regard to the Turkey-Irak frontier, which has recently been under discussion at Constantinople, and in regard to which His Majesty's Government will in due course address a communication to the League.

"His Majesty's Government now propose, when they have obtained the assent of the British Parliament, to proceed with the ratification of the treaty and other documents. When the ratifications have been completed they will be in a position, as intimated in paragraph 7 of the letter of the 21st May, to invite the council to adopt the draft instrument enclosed in the letter, together with its annexes, as defining the obligations of His Majesty's Government to the League in respect of Irak.

"I do not propose at this stage to ask my colleagues to record any formal resolutions. They will remember that in October 1921 the then President of the Council invited the British Government to continue to carry on the administration of Irak in the spirit of the draft mandate, until such time as the position should have been regularised. The council have been kept fully informed as to the manner in which the British Government have interpreted the President's invitation. The steps which they now propose to take appear to them, and I feel sure will also appear to the council, to be in full accord with the general authority conferred upon them in 1921."

[E 5186/232/65]

No. 149.

*Colonial Office to Foreign Office. (Received June 16.)*

Sir,

*Downing Street, June 14, 1924.*

IN continuation of my letter of the 10th June, 1924, regarding the situation in Irak, I am directed by Mr. Secretary Thomas to invite reference to the further telegrams that have since been received from Sir H. Dobbs on the subject. A copy of the passage in the report of the Committee of the Assembly, to which the High Commissioner refers in his telegram No. 299, is enclosed.

2. The action of the Constituent Assembly in accepting the treaty and accompanying documents has entirely altered the situation since my letter was written, and has necessitated a complete revision of the draft statement which it was then proposed should be made to the Council of the League of Nations.

3. Mr. Secretary Thomas does not consider that the reservations attached by the Assembly to their acceptance need give rise to serious difficulty. The position is that the condition imposed by article 18 of the treaty has now been fulfilled, and that His Majesty's Government are free to proceed to ratification as soon as the assent of the British Parliament has been obtained. Mr. Thomas would propose, if Mr. Ramsay MacDonald concurs, to take an early opportunity after the reassembly of Parliament to raise the question in both Houses with a view to obtaining the requisite assent.

4. In the meantime, he proposes, subject to Mr. MacDonald's concurrence, to address to Sir Henry Dobbs the telegram, of which a draft is enclosed.

5. With regard to the Council of the League of Nations, it would seem sufficient if the British representative were authorised to make a brief statement during the present session on the lines of the revised draft enclosed herewith. The draft, as will be seen, is merely in the nature of a report to the council on what has occurred. It does not invite any formal ruling, or even discussion, at the present stage. I am to suggest that, if Mr. MacDonald concurs, revised instructions in the sense of the draft statement should be communicated to Lord Parmoor without delay. Mr. Thomas would be glad to know whether, if it is decided to confine the statement to the council within the limits now proposed, Mr. MacDonald still thinks it necessary that a representative of this Department should proceed to Geneva during the present session.

6. It is for Mr. MacDonald's consideration whether the opportunity should be taken to inform the council of the breakdown of the negotiations at



Constantinople for the settlement of the Turco-Irak frontier. It will be seen that the draft statement contains a reference to the "rider" recorded by the Irak Assembly regarding the rights of Irak in the Mosul Vilayet. As the British and Turkish Governments have failed to reach a settlement, the boundary question will presumably, under article 3 of the Treaty of Lusanne, have to be referred in due course to the Council of the League of Nations, and it will consequently fall to that body and not to His Majesty's Government to determine what are the rights of Irak in the area in question. There might be advantage in bringing this point to the notice of the council without delay.

7. The favour of a very early reply is requested.

I am, &c.  
HUBERT YOUNG.

Enclosure 1 in No. 149.

*Extract (p. 85) of Report of Committee of Assembly.*

2. Request that the balance of Works of Public Utility in the hands of the British Government, which are mentioned in Articles 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10, shall be handed over to the Government of Irak without payment.

THE British Government has already intimated with regard to the works set forth in article 5, the valuation of which is known as the "Waller" valuation, that they will be willing to consider the revision of the estimate liberally, after the ratification of the agreement, and this can be done by mutual agreement under article 18 of the treaty. The reason why the British Government felt themselves unable to revise the estimate at once was that the Committee of the Cabinet which had been examining the Waller valuation had already had it before them for something like a year before they made their suggestions for revision. It was expected at the time that the Constitutional Assembly would sit in a very few weeks and neither the High Commissioner nor the British Government had time to examine the arguments of the committee thoroughly. The High Commissioner is engaged in setting forth the difficulties of the whole of the financial situation to the British Government, and he has little doubt that the British Government will, when they are able to grasp the difficulty of the situation as a whole, be prepared to act in a really liberal spirit in this and other financial matters.

Enclosure 2 in No. 149.

*High Commissioner for Irak to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Bagdad, June 11, 1924.*

AT midnight session, 10th June, Assembly accepted the treaty, protocol and agreements as they stand, with instructions to Irak Government to ratify and negotiate for amendments after ratification, but added rider stating that the treaty should be null and void if Britain does not protect the rights of Irak in Mosul Vilayet in their entirety. This last condition may be embarrassing unless we can construe the rights of Irak in Mosul to be those to be decided by the League of Nations after enquiry. Do His Majesty's Government consider that we can adopt this interpretation and take the resolution of the Assembly as accepting ratification? (Repeated to Constantinople, No. 204.)

Enclosure 3 in No. 149.

*High Commissioner for Irak to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Bagdad, June 11, 1924.*

FOLLOWING is the text of the Assembly's resolution:—

"This Assembly considers that many of the artifices [articles] of the treaty and agreements are so severe that Irak would be unable to discharge the

responsibilities of the alliance desired by the people of Irak. But it relies upon and trusts the honour of the British Government and the nobility of the British nation and is confident that they will not consent to burden Irak nor to prejudice the aspirations of its people. It is only this confidence and trust on the part of Irak which has induced the Assembly to accept the statement received from his Excellency the High Commissioner on behalf of the British Government to the effect that the British Government, after ratification of the treaty, will amend, with all possible speed, the Financial Agreement in the spirit of generosity and sympathy for which the British people are famous. In view of this, the Assembly recommends that His Majesty the King shall ratify the treaty, protocol and agreements, provided that immediately after such ratification, His Majesty shall enter into negotiations with the British Government for securing the amendments suggested by the Committee of this Assembly. This treaty and its subsidiary agreements shall become null and void if the British Government fails to safeguard the rights of Irak in Mosul Vilayet in their entirety."

Comment follows.

Enclosure 4 in No. 149.

*High Commissioner for Irak to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.*

*Bagdad, June 11, 1924.*

(Telegraphic.)

MY telegram of 11th June.

First portion of resolution down to recommendation to ratify is mainly window dressing. Only statement given by me regarding the Financial Agreement is that shown on p. 85 of the committee's report forwarded with my Secret A, 29th May, 1924, together with a passage omitted in copying to the effect that Great Britain sold to the highest bidder all war material left in other countries, such as France, and might justifiably have done so in Irak. I stated repeatedly that no specific amendment of any kind could be promised even in article relating to the Waller valuation.

With regard to instruction to Irak Government to negotiate for amendment after ratification, I informed Feisal and Prime Minister and President of Assembly and members of committee several times when the question of the amendment after ratification was mooted that there was no prospect of any amendment being accepted by the British Government after ratification except possibly in the Financial Agreement and perhaps one or two minor matters of wording in other agreement. They are therefore under no delusions on these points, and instruction was, I understand, put in mainly to save *amour-propre* of the committee. I have already commented on final sentence regarding Mosul.

Enclosure 5 in No. 149.

*Draft Telegram to High Commissioner for Irak.*

YOUR telegrams Nos. 204, 207 and 209.

His Majesty's Government do not consider that Assembly's rider as to Irak rights in Mosul Vilayet need give rise to serious difficulty. Question of determining those rights has now passed out of their hands and into those of League of Nations. It is certain that by the time decision is reached, Assembly will have ceased to exist. His Majesty's Government would therefore treat rider as mere expression of opinion on part of Assembly, which need not interfere with ratification and cannot affect validity of treaty when ratified.

2. You may accordingly inform Feisal that His Majesty's Government regard condition imposed by article 18 of treaty, viz., prior acceptance by Constituent Assembly as now fulfilled, and that they are prepared to proceed to ratification as soon as they have obtained assent of British Parliament. This assent they hope to obtain as soon as possible after Parliament has reassembled.

3. You should also make it plain to Feisal that our readiness to consider revision of agreements is confined to limits indicated in your telegram No. 209.



4. Meanwhile it is proposed merely to inform Council of League of Nations of what has taken place, and to intimate to them that we propose to ratify after obtaining assent of Parliament, and that when ratifications have been exchanged we shall be in a position, as indicated in paragraph 11 of letter of 21st May, to invite council to adopt draft instrument and annexes as defining our obligations to League in respect of Irak. Council will not be asked to record any formal resolution at present session.

5. You should ascertain and report whether Feisal is prepared to ratify as soon as His Majesty's Government are ready to do the same.

Enclosure 6 in No. 149.

*Revised Draft of Statement to be made by British Representatives on Council of League of Nations.*

MY colleagues will have seen the letter addressed by the British Government to the Secretary-General to the League of Nations of the 21st May, and the documents that accompanied it. The object of His Majesty's Government in writing that letter was to make the council acquainted at the earliest possible moment with the latest developments of their policy in Irak. I need not make more than a passing reference to the statement made to the council by my predecessor, Mr. Fisher, in November 1921. He explained the reasons why we considered it desirable to place our relations with Irak on the basis of a Treaty of Alliance. The treaty was signed in October 1922, but the subsidiary agreements arising out of it were not concluded until the spring of the present year. Until these agreements were signed we were not in a position to place our whole case before the council. We have now taken the first opportunity of doing so.

The treaty contained a clause, inserted at the express wish of the King of Irak and his Government, under which acceptance by an Irak Constituent Assembly was made a condition precedent to its ratification. This Assembly has since been elected and has been in session for the past few months at Bagdad. It intimated its acceptance of the treaty on the 10th June, with the proviso that, after ratification, the Irak Government should enter into negotiations with His Majesty's Government, in accordance with the provisions of article 18 of the treaty, with a view to securing certain amendments in the Financial Agreement. It also placed on record its view that, in the event of His Majesty's Government failing to safeguard the rights of Irak in the Mosul Vilayet in their entirety, the treaty should become null and void.

His Majesty's Government now propose, when they have obtained the assent of the British Parliament, to proceed with the ratification of the Treaty and other documents. When the ratifications have been exchanged, they will be in a position, as intimated in paragraph 7 of the letter of the 21st May, to invite the council to adopt the draft instrument enclosed in the letter, together with its annexes, as defining the obligations of His Majesty's Government to the League in respect of Irak.

I do not propose at this stage to ask my colleagues to record any formal resolution. They will remember that in October 1921 the then President of the Council invited the British Government to continue to carry on the administration of Irak in the spirit of the draft mandate, until such time as the position should have been regularised. The council have been kept fully informed as to the manner in which the British Government have interpreted the President's invitation. The steps which they now propose to take appear to them, and I feel sure will also appear to the council, to be in full accord with the general authority conferred upon them in 1921.

[E 5195/232/65]

No. 150.

*Foreign Office to Colonial Office.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, June 16, 1924.*

WITH reference to your letter of the 14th instant in regard to the situation in Irak, I am directed by Mr. Secretary Ramsay MacDonald to state that he concurs in the view expressed in the third paragraph and in the terms of the draft telegram which Mr. Secretary Thomas proposes to address to His Majesty's High

Commissioner at Bagdad subject to the substitution in paragraph 4 for the words "when ratifications have been exchanged," of the words "when the ratifications are complete." The Secretary of State hopes that this emendation may enable the treaty and subsidiary agreements, &c., to be submitted for the approval of the Council of the League after they have been ratified in London and Bagdad, but before the instruments of ratification have been exchanged in accordance with the procedure originally devised as least likely to give offence to the members of the League on the grounds that His Majesty's Government were presenting them with a *fait accompli*. The necessary modification has also been made in the statement prepared for Lord Parmoor, the draft of which was transmitted in your letter under reply.

2. With regard to the fifth paragraph of your letter, Mr. MacDonald concurs in the terms of this statement, which with certain modifications was telegraphed to Geneva on the 14th instant. A copy of the telegram as actually sent is enclosed herein together with a copy of Lord Parmoor's telegram of the 13th June.

3. Mr. Secretary Thomas will see from that document that Mr. MacDonald concurs in his view that it is not necessary in the present circumstances to send an officer from the Colonial Office to Geneva, and that he has informed Lord Parmoor accordingly.

4. The passage in regard to the Turkey-Irak frontier in the draft statement was modified in order not to lay undue emphasis on the provision made by the Constituent Assembly in Bagdad in recommending that King Feisal do ratify the treaty, &c. Mr. MacDonald does not consider that anything further can well be said on the subject of the frontier until the views of the Turkish Government on the question of reference of the dispute to the League of Nations have been ascertained.

I am, &c.

D. G. OSBORNE.

[E 5504/232/65]

No. 151.

*Extract from Minutes of the Sixth Meeting, Twenty-Ninth Session of the Council of the League of Nations, June 17, 1924.—(Received June 28.)*

*Irak.*

THE PRESIDENT asked Lord Parmoor to make a statement.

LORD PARMOOR spoke as follows:—

"My colleagues will have seen the letter addressed by the British Government to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations, of the 21st May, and the documents that accompanied it. The object of the British Government in writing that letter was to make the council acquainted at the earliest possible moment with the latest developments of its policy in Irak.

"I need not make more than a passing reference to the statement made to the council by my predecessor, Mr. Fisher, in November 1921. He explained the reasons why we considered it desirable to place our relations with Irak on the basis of a treaty of alliance. The treaty was signed in October 1922, but subsidiary agreements arising out of it were not concluded until the spring of the present year. Until these agreements were signed we were not in a position to place our whole case before the council. We have now taken the first opportunity of doing so.

"The treaty contained a clause inserted at the express wish of the King of Irak and his Government, under which acceptance by the Irak Constituent Assembly was made a condition precedent to its ratification. This Assembly has since been elected and has been in session for the past few months in Bagdad. It intimated its acceptance of the treaty of the 10th June with the proviso that after ratification the Irak Government should enter into negotiations with the British Government in accordance with the provisions of article 18 of the treaty, with a view to securing certain amendments to the financial agreement.

"It also added a rider in regard to the Turkish-Irak frontier which has recently been under discussion at Constantinople, and in regard to which the British Government will in due course address a communication to the League.

"The British Government now proposes when it has obtained the assent of the British Parliament to proceed to the ratification of the treaty and the other



documents. When the ratifications have been completed they will be in a position, as intimated in paragraph 7 of the letter of the 21st May, to invite the council to adopt the draft instrument enclosed in the letter together with its annexes as defining the obligations of the British Government to the League in respect of Iraq.

"I do not propose at this stage to ask my colleagues to record any formal resolution. They will remember that in October 1921 the acting president of the council invited the British Government to continue to carry on the administration of Iraq in the spirit of the draft mandate until such time as the position should have been regularised. The council have been kept fully informed as to the manner in which the British Government has interpreted the president's invitation. The steps which it now proposes to take appear to it, and I feel sure will also appear to the council, to be in full accord with the general authority conferred on it in 1921."

M. BRANTING then read the following report:—

"The British Government has communicated to the council the following papers (Annex) relating to Iraq:—

- "(a.) Draft instrument.
- "(b.) Treaty with King Feisal, signed the 10th October, 1922.
- "(c.) Protocol of the 30th April, 1923, and the agreements subsidiary to the treaty with King Feisal.

"The British Government proposes to request the council to give its approval to this draft instrument with the accompanying documents, intended to define the obligations of His Majesty's Government under article 22 of the covenant, provided that the assent of the British Parliament is obtained to the treaty, protocol and subsidiary agreements.

"As the members of the council have not been informed that this condition has been fulfilled, I think they will agree that the matter should be postponed to the next session, before which time the council may expect to receive a definite proposal from the British Government. This will, moreover, enable the council to study more fully the documents on this subject, some of which have only recently been communicated to it.

"I therefore venture to propose that the council should take note of the British representative's statement and should postpone to its next session further consideration of the question."

M. LEON BOURGEOIS said he was completely in agreement with the British Government and with the rapporteur. The postponement of this question to the next session of the council would enable the various Governments to consult one another and to bring the special text of the mandate for Iraq in conformity with the text of the other mandates. It was clearly necessary that a common legal basis for the texts of the various mandates should be agreed upon and established.

THE PRESIDENT said there was complete agreement on this subject.

(The report was adopted.)